Preface INTRODUCTION 1. Should We Justify War? Roger Berkowitz Bard College JUST WAR IN THE HISTO... more Preface INTRODUCTION 1. Should We Justify War? Roger Berkowitz Bard College JUST WAR IN THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS 2. Justice and Justifications: War Theory among the Ancient Greeks Carolyn Dewald Bard College 3. Religion, Ritual and War in the Late Roman Republic Robert M. Berchman Dowling College 4. The Wars of Yahweh: Biblical Views of Just War Baruch A. Levine New York University 5. Just War in Classical Judaism Jacob Neusner Bard College 6. Christianity in War Bruce Chilton Bard College 7. Jihad in Classical Islamic Legal and Moral Thought Mairaj Syed Bard College 8. Just War in Buddhism Kristn Scheible Bard College 9. Reflections on War and Dharma in Classical Hindiuism Richard Davis Bard College JUST WAR: CASES IN CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT 10. Fighting the Good Fight R. E. Tully United States Military Academy, West Point 11. Jus ad Bellum and the Islamic Reformation Mark David Welton United States Military Academy, West Point 12. Fighting Wars Justly: The Legal and Moral Concerns an...
Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, 1993
With the exception of Stace's view, all of these opinions have appeared since the publication of ... more With the exception of Stace's view, all of these opinions have appeared since the publication of My Philosophical Development in 1959, renewing the poignancy of Russell's complaint there that his philosophical theory has been "almost universally misunderstood"
Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, 1988
WINCHESTER: I'm hoping this will be a very informal session. Our panelists will, of course, feel ... more WINCHESTER: I'm hoping this will be a very informal session. Our panelists will, of course, feel free to say anything that they feel like, that they want to get off their chests, and then the audience will take it upon themselves to make comments. AYER: I think I'd like the audience to interrupt if they feel like it-if we say anything outrageous or platitudinous, or both. I'll start off by saying a few words. I noticed that early on we had a very well-known, typical Russell quotation, namely, that, where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities. But an interesting one that passed unquoted occurs in The Problems of Philosophy, namely that every proposition we can understand must be composed of constituents with which we are acquainted. It seems to me-and this is something I would like my companions to discuss-that this ties Russell very closely to phenomenalism, because he argued as early as The Problems of Philosophy that the only particulars we are acquainted with in addition to our Selves are sense-data; and he excludes Selves by the time he gets to The Analysis of Mind. Otherwise, he allows us to be acquainted with universals. Now if you interpret the theory of definite descriptions in the way that Quine does (and I agree with Quine), Russell should be interpreted as permitting-not only permitting but encouraging-the elimination of singular terms. This means that all the stuffing, as it were, in your statements gets into the predicates, and there's nothing left to be a value of the existentially quantified variable except something that requires no connotation, namely the object of a demonstrative. If that is so, and if the object of demonstratives for Russell can be only sense-data-something he maintained throughout his career right up to Inquiry into Meaning (J.nd Truth-it means that you are only referring to sense-data and to what properties they can have. This leaves you no other alternative but phenomenalism. * In passing two series of proofs of the discussion, the panelisls and "olher voices" nol infrequently revised the wording ascribed to them. The result offered here. while nol a verbatim transcript of the discussion that took place on 24 June 1984, is what each speaker wishes printed. Editorial thanks for assistance with the transcription are extended to
... Logic with Symlog: Learning symbolic logic by computer. Post a Comment. CONTRIBUTORS: Author:... more ... Logic with Symlog: Learning symbolic logic by computer. Post a Comment. CONTRIBUTORS: Author: Portoraro, Frederic D. ... PAGES (INTRO/BODY): xiv, 561 p. SUBJECT(S): Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Study and teaching; Symlog. DISCIPLINE: No discipline assigned. ...
<jats:p>While Wittgenstein's Tractatus keeps issues of metaphysics and ontology at arm&... more <jats:p>While Wittgenstein's Tractatus keeps issues of metaphysics and ontology at arm's length, the world it presents seems altogether monistic in character. In Wittgenstein's account, it is a world of objects and facts, a world which lacks selves, values, cognitive relations (such as belief), and God. I argue that the Tractarian world is nevertheless dualistic. I defend the view that the Tractatus points away from monism towards dualism and that Wittgenstein's concepts of thought, sense, and understanding are an essential part of its structure. The language Wittgenstein uses was necessitated by his project of giving a sharp account of the nature of description. It is thus ironic that Wittgenstein defends dualism in the Tractatus and does so in the only form in which he thought it could be defended. Along the way, I try to show that his treatment of thought, sense, and understanding is both a continuation and correction of treatments which Frege and Russell had previously given to these concepts.</jats:p>
Preface INTRODUCTION 1. Should We Justify War? Roger Berkowitz Bard College JUST WAR IN THE HISTO... more Preface INTRODUCTION 1. Should We Justify War? Roger Berkowitz Bard College JUST WAR IN THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS 2. Justice and Justifications: War Theory among the Ancient Greeks Carolyn Dewald Bard College 3. Religion, Ritual and War in the Late Roman Republic Robert M. Berchman Dowling College 4. The Wars of Yahweh: Biblical Views of Just War Baruch A. Levine New York University 5. Just War in Classical Judaism Jacob Neusner Bard College 6. Christianity in War Bruce Chilton Bard College 7. Jihad in Classical Islamic Legal and Moral Thought Mairaj Syed Bard College 8. Just War in Buddhism Kristn Scheible Bard College 9. Reflections on War and Dharma in Classical Hindiuism Richard Davis Bard College JUST WAR: CASES IN CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT 10. Fighting the Good Fight R. E. Tully United States Military Academy, West Point 11. Jus ad Bellum and the Islamic Reformation Mark David Welton United States Military Academy, West Point 12. Fighting Wars Justly: The Legal and Moral Concerns an...
Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, 1993
With the exception of Stace's view, all of these opinions have appeared since the publication of ... more With the exception of Stace's view, all of these opinions have appeared since the publication of My Philosophical Development in 1959, renewing the poignancy of Russell's complaint there that his philosophical theory has been "almost universally misunderstood"
Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, 1988
WINCHESTER: I'm hoping this will be a very informal session. Our panelists will, of course, feel ... more WINCHESTER: I'm hoping this will be a very informal session. Our panelists will, of course, feel free to say anything that they feel like, that they want to get off their chests, and then the audience will take it upon themselves to make comments. AYER: I think I'd like the audience to interrupt if they feel like it-if we say anything outrageous or platitudinous, or both. I'll start off by saying a few words. I noticed that early on we had a very well-known, typical Russell quotation, namely, that, where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities. But an interesting one that passed unquoted occurs in The Problems of Philosophy, namely that every proposition we can understand must be composed of constituents with which we are acquainted. It seems to me-and this is something I would like my companions to discuss-that this ties Russell very closely to phenomenalism, because he argued as early as The Problems of Philosophy that the only particulars we are acquainted with in addition to our Selves are sense-data; and he excludes Selves by the time he gets to The Analysis of Mind. Otherwise, he allows us to be acquainted with universals. Now if you interpret the theory of definite descriptions in the way that Quine does (and I agree with Quine), Russell should be interpreted as permitting-not only permitting but encouraging-the elimination of singular terms. This means that all the stuffing, as it were, in your statements gets into the predicates, and there's nothing left to be a value of the existentially quantified variable except something that requires no connotation, namely the object of a demonstrative. If that is so, and if the object of demonstratives for Russell can be only sense-data-something he maintained throughout his career right up to Inquiry into Meaning (J.nd Truth-it means that you are only referring to sense-data and to what properties they can have. This leaves you no other alternative but phenomenalism. * In passing two series of proofs of the discussion, the panelisls and "olher voices" nol infrequently revised the wording ascribed to them. The result offered here. while nol a verbatim transcript of the discussion that took place on 24 June 1984, is what each speaker wishes printed. Editorial thanks for assistance with the transcription are extended to
... Logic with Symlog: Learning symbolic logic by computer. Post a Comment. CONTRIBUTORS: Author:... more ... Logic with Symlog: Learning symbolic logic by computer. Post a Comment. CONTRIBUTORS: Author: Portoraro, Frederic D. ... PAGES (INTRO/BODY): xiv, 561 p. SUBJECT(S): Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Study and teaching; Symlog. DISCIPLINE: No discipline assigned. ...
<jats:p>While Wittgenstein's Tractatus keeps issues of metaphysics and ontology at arm&... more <jats:p>While Wittgenstein's Tractatus keeps issues of metaphysics and ontology at arm's length, the world it presents seems altogether monistic in character. In Wittgenstein's account, it is a world of objects and facts, a world which lacks selves, values, cognitive relations (such as belief), and God. I argue that the Tractarian world is nevertheless dualistic. I defend the view that the Tractatus points away from monism towards dualism and that Wittgenstein's concepts of thought, sense, and understanding are an essential part of its structure. The language Wittgenstein uses was necessitated by his project of giving a sharp account of the nature of description. It is thus ironic that Wittgenstein defends dualism in the Tractatus and does so in the only form in which he thought it could be defended. Along the way, I try to show that his treatment of thought, sense, and understanding is both a continuation and correction of treatments which Frege and Russell had previously given to these concepts.</jats:p>
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