Papers by Nicolas Daniel Riquelme
Social Science Research Network, 2022
Social Science Research Network, 2022
Authorea (Authorea), May 22, 2020
Background: COVID-19 is a new pandemic disease with severe respiratory outcome. However, there is... more Background: COVID-19 is a new pandemic disease with severe respiratory outcome. However, there is little evidence of this condition during pregnancy based on small case series reports. Objective: to perform a systematic review and meta-analysis of proportions of case series focused on maternal and perinatal outcomes of COVID-19 during pregnancy. Search strategy: LILACS and Medline were searched from inception until April 24th, 2020. Selection criteria: all case series or case control studies involving SARS-CoV2 infection during pregnancy and neonatal period were identified. Excluded were duplicated data, case reports of individual patients or without clinical data. Data collection and analysis: a total of 14 studies were included. When possible, pooled proportions with 95% confidence interval through a random effect model were estimated. Heterogeneity was estimated with the use of I2 statistics and Tau2 test. Main results: Most common symptoms were fever (58%; I2= 69%) and cough (33%; I2= 65%). A pathognomonic CT-Scan was observed in 92% of patients (I2= 0%). Lymphopenia and increased D-dimer were observed in 50% (I2= 82%), and 80% (I2= 0%) of patients at admission, respectively. There were no maternal deaths, with 2 cases of neonatal death, both with negative SARS-CoV2 PCR. Vertical transmission was observed in 5 neonates. Conclusions: This systematic review and meta-analysis confirms that COVID-19 during pregnancy is associated with good maternal and perinatal outcome. Evidence of vertical transmission should be confirmed with larger cohorts. Funding: none.
Do international organizations (IOs) help states to solve coordination problems over policy choic... more Do international organizations (IOs) help states to solve coordination problems over policy choices? We analyze a formal model of coordinated adaptation in which states use costly signals to transmit information about their preferences. We show that states only delegate to IOs if states are sufficiently aligned and face little uncertainty about each other's preferences. Although states gain from delegation by achieving more policy coordination, they also incur more costs because of inefficient signaling. States misrepresent their preferences to ensure policies are coordinated on their own preferred outcome, and delegation to IOs makes states want to misrepresent their preferences more strongly. This effect can be so strong that the gains from international coordination are insufficient to warrant delegation to IOs. We discuss the robustness of our results to different types of IOs and provide implications for the design of institutions.
This paper studies games where a group of privately informed principals design mechanisms to a co... more This paper studies games where a group of privately informed principals design mechanisms to a common agent. The agent has private information (exogenous) and, after observing principals’ mechanisms, may have information (endogenous) about feasible allocations and private information from each principal. Thus, each principal may be interested in designing a mechanism to screen all this information, for which a potentially complicated message space to convey this information might be needed. In this paper, we provide sufficient conditions on the agent’s payoff such that any equilibrium in this setup has an output-equivalent equilibrium using only mechanisms with simple message spaces (direct mechanisms). Depending on the conditions, we propose two different notions of direct mechanisms and discuss their applicability with some examples.
Background: COVID-19 is a new pandemic disease with severe respiratory outcome. However, there is... more Background: COVID-19 is a new pandemic disease with severe respiratory outcome. However, there is little evidence of this condition during pregnancy based on small case series reports. Objective: to perform a systematic review and meta-analysis of proportions of case series focused on maternal and perinatal outcomes of COVID-19 during pregnancy. Search strategy: LILACS and Medline were searched from inception until April 24th, 2020. Selection criteria: all case series or case control studies involving SARS-CoV2 infection during pregnancy and neonatal period were identified. Excluded were duplicated data, case reports of individual patients or without clinical data. Data collection and analysis: a total of 14 studies were included. When possible, pooled proportions with 95% confidence interval through a random effect model were estimated. Heterogeneity was estimated with the use of I2 statistics and Tau2 test. Main results: Most common symptoms were fever (58%; I2= 69%) and cough (33%; I2= 65%). A pathognomonic CT-Scan was observed in 92% of patients (I2= 0%). Lymphopenia and increased D-dimer were observed in 50% (I2= 82%), and 80% (I2= 0%) of patients at admission, respectively. There were no maternal deaths, with 2 cases of neonatal death, both with negative SARS-CoV2 PCR. Vertical transmission was observed in 5 neonates. Conclusions: This systematic review and meta-analysis confirms that COVID-19 during pregnancy is associated with good maternal and perinatal outcome. Evidence of vertical transmission should be confirmed with larger cohorts. Funding: none.
Do international organizations (IOs) help states to solve coordination problems over policy choic... more Do international organizations (IOs) help states to solve coordination problems over policy choices? We analyze a formal model of coordinated adaptation in which states use costly signals to transmit information about their preferences. We show that states only delegate to IOs if states are sufficiently aligned and face little uncertainty about each other's preferences. Although states gain from delegation by achieving more policy coordination, they also incur more costs because of inefficient signaling. States misrepresent their preferences to ensure policies are coordinated on their own preferred outcome, and delegation to IOs makes states want to misrepresent their preferences more strongly. This effect can be so strong that the gains from international coordination are insufficient to warrant delegation to IOs. We discuss the robustness of our results to different types of IOs and provide implications for the design of institutions.
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Papers by Nicolas Daniel Riquelme