Papers by Mark McLeod-Harrison
Typically theologians take the image of God rather metaphorically and reduce the metaphor to a se... more Typically theologians take the image of God rather metaphorically and reduce the metaphor to a set of properties in virtue of which we are humans. This emphasis on the common features shared among humans supports the doctrine of shared sin and the provision of salvation by another human, Jesus. By analyzing three separate notions of image and applying them to the image of God, this paper argues that humans as God’s image can be taken more literally then it typically is. The result is that the uniqueness of each human is a significant aspect of the human person, grounding our value. Doing so, however, does not entail that we lose the common features of humans supporting theological accounts of shared sin and salvation. Suppose two painters go to northern California, set up their easels and paint images of Mt. Shasta. While there is a very good chance the two paintings will appear similar, sharing certain properties, they need not. Suppose one painter is a realist and his painting “lo...
Faith and Philosophy, 2020
Religion and the Meaning of Life: An Existential Approach, by Clifford Williams. Cambridge Univer... more Religion and the Meaning of Life: An Existential Approach, by Clifford Williams. Cambridge University Press, 2020. Pp vi + 189. $27.99 (paperback).
artist do when she paints? She creates, when she does it well, a rigllt rendering of the abstract... more artist do when she paints? She creates, when she does it well, a rigllt rendering of the abstract world. This is not to say that her painting represen~ some extra-painting reality, but its rightness might consist of rightness of or rightness of expression. A painter cannot just do anything on canvas. P · have limits created by the canvas, the oils or water colors, and so forth. But t are also limits of design; some "get at" what the artist wants, others do not. There are many worlds, not just one. The worlds are worlds in which th are multiple layers of "rightness of rendering," worlds that are juxtaposed, lapping, and created by fiction. The person I've been calling the Common S Realist falls short of telling the whole story because she thinks the story can told simply in terms of Truth. In particular, the Common Sense Realist rejects notion of more than one world understood as alternative descriptions true internally, that is, by reference to the various th...
needs to help students (and others) make connections between the vari ous parts of their lives. P... more needs to help students (and others) make connections between the vari ous parts of their lives. Perhaps at a more basic level, it needs to infect people with a desire for integrated, whole lives. We worry that many individuals are apparently untroubled by intellectual and moral contra dictions in their lives. In such cases apologetics needs to awaken readers' imaginations so that they might begin to dream of something better.
Why do you realists think there is a singular, real world? REALIST: By "real" we mean that there ... more Why do you realists think there is a singular, real world? REALIST: By "real" we mean that there exists a world and that it is what completely independent of how I (or we) think about it, cognize about it, b about it, know about it, and so forth. The relationship between the worl our cognitive dealings with it, although not worked out in some final sen basically one of the world's existing in some mind-independent manner and causing or influencing our thinking, believing, cognizing, and so forth about IRREALIST: You've told me what you believe, but not why. The assum • you make in what you just said are typically taken to be common sense, what argument is there for them? REALIST: I don't need an argument to defend common sense since the other•• sition, antirealism, is so counterintuitive and itself without any decent argum IRREALIST: Counterintuitive it is. I agree. But it's not without argument. C sider this one, for example. Take any two apparently contradictory metaph cal claims. Suppose, for the moment, each claim is equally well epistem• justified (warranted, known, etc.). Add to those claims the additional pr that contradictions are impossible. What metaphysical conclusion should reach? The most straightforward result is that there is more than one world that truth is world-relative. For example: (r) Contradictions are impossible. (2) Metaphysical freedom exists. (3) Metaphysical freedom does not exist. (4) Therefore, there are at least two worlds, one in which metaphysical free• dom exists, one in which it does not. (5) Therefore, truth is world-relative. REALIST: Before I give you what I take to be the obvious solution to the pr !em, let me ask what you mean by "world." How can there be two or worlds? For example, is the action I'm now performing both free and not f
Ars Disputandi
Many traditional Christians hold that since God created the world, the world is noetically real, ... more Many traditional Christians hold that since God created the world, the world is noetically real, that is, not dependent, generally, on human noetic contributions for its ontological status. This essay argues that traditional Christianity only requires noetic realism about God. William Alston and Plantinga are taken as examples of two traditional Christian philosophers who hold to noetic realism and their arguments touching on the connection between the Christianity and realism are considered.
Philosophia Christi, 2006
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Papers by Mark McLeod-Harrison