Experimental moral philosophy emerged as a methodology in the last decade of the twentieth centur... more Experimental moral philosophy emerged as a methodology in the last decade of the twentieth century, as a branch of the larger experimental philosophy (X-Phi) approach. Experimental moral philosophy is the empirical study of moral intuitions, judgments, and behaviors. Like other forms of experimental philosophy, it involves gathering data using experimental methods and using these data to substantiate, undermine, or revise philosophical theories. In this case, the theories in question concern the nature of moral reasoning and judgment; the extent and sources of moral obligations; the nature of a good person and a good life; even the scope and nature of moral theory itself. This entry begins with a brief look at the historical uses of empirical data in moral theory and goes on to ask what, if anything, is distinctive about experimental moral philosophy—how should we distinguish it from related work in empirical moral psychology? After discussing some strategies for answering this ques...
In discussions of standards of proof, a familiar perspective often emerges. According to what we ... more In discussions of standards of proof, a familiar perspective often emerges. According to what we call specificationism, standards of proof are legal rules that specify the quantum of evidence required to determine that a litigant's claim has been proven. In so doing, they allocate the risk of error among litigants (and potential litigants), minimizing the risk of certain types of error. Specificationism is meant as a description of the way the rules actually function. We argue, however, that its claims are either mistaken or at a minimum deeply misleading, especially when it comes to standard of proof rules (SPRs) that contain indeterminate formulas, as is typical. As against specificationism, we argue that SPRs are best understood as rules that confer competence to decide whether a given standard has been metaccording to whatever vague or inchoate interpretation (if any) of the rule in question triers of fact implicitly or explicitly employ. We call this the competence-norm approach.
L'A. examine les arguments pragmatiques en faveur de la generalite des principes moraux, afin... more L'A. examine les arguments pragmatiques en faveur de la generalite des principes moraux, afin de montrer pourquoi les partisans de l'irrealisme moral n'etablissent pas leur methodologie du raisonnement moral sur des fondements uniquement pragmatiques
Demands of generality pervade contemporary moral philosophy. For example, both Samuel Scheffler a... more Demands of generality pervade contemporary moral philosophy. For example, both Samuel Scheffler and Shelly Kagan demand a general justification for certain agent-centered features of morality. I argue, however, that these demands are often unjustified. My aim is to level the playing field between our more specific and our more general moral convictions, allowing neither to win by default. I begin by distinguishing generality from universality and consistency, and go on to identify several common motivations for generality in ethics. For each such motivation, I articulate and evaluate the demands to which it gives rise. First, I consider and reject arguments that the origins of our more specific moral convictions taint them beyond credibility and that insufficiently general moral beliefs may be biased in favor of those holding them. Second, I consider more prominent arguments for generality, connected with a concern about justification. I show that some foundationalists are committed to the view that moral justifications must terminate in very general principles, and that some coherentists are committed to a simplicity demand which is, in effect, a demand for generality as well. I argue that these approaches share a common motivation in the view that insufficiently general moral propositions are true, if at all, only for further reasons--a claim I vigorously dispute. Third, I consider various pragmatic justifications for generality. I argue that the pragmatic value of highly general principles is overrated, and that what pragmatic value they do have must often be weighed against our substantive moral concerns. I conclude that generality in ethics, although important, is not as important as it has seemed to be.Ph.D.PhilosophyUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/105401/1/9124048.pdfDescription of 9124048.pdf : Restricted to UM users only
Experimental moral philosophy emerged as a methodology in the last decade of the twentieth centur... more Experimental moral philosophy emerged as a methodology in the last decade of the twentieth century, as a branch of the larger experimental philosophy (X-Phi) approach. Experimental moral philosophy is the empirical study of moral intuitions, judgments, and behaviors. Like other forms of experimental philosophy, it involves gathering data using experimental methods and using these data to substantiate, undermine, or revise philosophical theories. In this case, the theories in question concern the nature of moral reasoning and judgment; the extent and sources of moral obligations; the nature of a good person and a good life; even the scope and nature of moral theory itself. This entry begins with a brief look at the historical uses of empirical data in moral theory and goes on to ask what, if anything, is distinctive about experimental moral philosophy—how should we distinguish it from related work in empirical moral psychology? After discussing some strategies for answering this question, the entry examines two of the main projects within experimental moral philosophy, and then discusses some of the most prominent areas of reseatch within the field. As we will see, in some cases experimental moral philosophy has opened up new avenues of investigation, while in other cases it has influenced longstanding debates within moral theory.
... general foundations holds that insufficiently general moral beliefs are not epistemically fou... more ... general foundations holds that insufficiently general moral beliefs are not epistemically foundational, the ... to systematize and bring order to our various views about value, and that ... The distinction between epistemic reasons and metaphysical explanations is often blurred in moral ...
have argued that moral facts cannot explain our moral beliefs, claiming that such facts could not... more have argued that moral facts cannot explain our moral beliefs, claiming that such facts could not play a causal role in the formation of those beliefs. This paper shows these arguments to be misguided, for they would require that we abandon any number of intuitively plausible explanations in non-moral contexts as well. But abandoning the causal strand in the argument over moral explanations does not spell immediate victory for the moral realist, since it must still be shown that moral facts do figure in our best global explanatory theory.
Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 2003
... the superiority of Vermont Grade A Fancy maple syrup to Log Cabin Lite, or that it is foolish... more ... the superiority of Vermont Grade A Fancy maple syrup to Log Cabin Lite, or that it is foolish to think that chop suey is anywhere ... objections to moral realism have indeed been raised, and these might as easily be directed at gastronomic realism.6Footnote 6 Robinson discusses a ...
The 1996 volume of the Tanner Lectures on Human Values contains seven lectures given during 1994 ... more The 1996 volume of the Tanner Lectures on Human Values contains seven lectures given during 1994 and 1995 at some of the most distinguished universities in the world. Of these, four would be of special interest to philosophers. Let me briefly mention the others first. The collection begins with a short speech by Oscar Arias, former president of Costa Rica. The main theme is that poverty is an enemy common to all the world, more significant than mere conflicts among nations. Arias calls for the signing of an international pact committing the nations of the world to meaningful steps toward reducing poverty. His talk is not a philosophical argument, but rather a stirring call to arms against a shared moral enemy. On a different note, Roger Penrose stretches the definition of “values” with his offering, “Space-Time and Cosmology.” The lecture reproduced here appears to be the first in a series of three, “The Large, the Small, and the Human Mind.” And large it is, in ambition at least. In the space of forty-three liberally illustrated pages, we learn about the relationship between time scales (ranging from one chronon to the age of the universe) and distance scales (from the Planck length to the radius of the visible universe); Schrödinger’s equation and the quantum level; Newtonian theory; special and general relativity (including light cones and Lorentz and Möbius transformations); the tidal effect; the perihelion of Mercury; the Big Bang; the Big Crunch; open and closed universes; Lobachevskian and Minkowskian geometries; the inflationary theory; the cosmological principle; the Second Law of Thermodynamics; phase space; black holes; Weyl, Ricci, and Reimann curvatures; M. C. Escher; the Creator; and the “Platonic world” in which mathematical truths dwell. Sadly, the two remaining lectures were not included in this volume. Finally, Shakespearean actress and director Janet Suzman’s “Who Needs Parables?” offers a fascinating recollection of her successful production of Othello in South Africa shortly before the demise of apartheid. Suzman skillfully blends appealing storytelling and poignant literary criticism, making her lecture one of the most engaging in the volume. In “Euthanasia and Health Care” polymath Richard Posner applies his wellknown economic analysis to questions regarding aging and health care, arguing for example that permitting physician-assisted suicide might “reduce the number of suicides and postpone the ones that occur” (p. 21), since people might choose to wait, knowing that help will be available later if needed. Posner packages this simple (if questionable) point in a good deal of economic apparatus, some of which seems unnecessary. But there is much here that would interest anyone concerned about the issue. Posner also recommends that we view “each individual” not as one person,
It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and... more It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality, has a certain objective-seeming character to it, and that this supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories (according to which morality is a realm of facts or truths) and against anti-objectivist theories like Mackie's error theory (according to which it is not). In this paper, I argue that our experience of morality does not support objectivist moral theories in this way. I begin by arguing that our moral experience does not have the uniformly objective-seeming character it is typically claimed to have. I go on to argue that even if moral experience were to presuppose or display morality as a realm of fact, we would still need a reason for taking that to support theories according to which it is such a realm. I consider what I take to be the four most promising ways of attempting to supply such a reason: (A) inference to the best explanation, (B) epistemic conservatism, (C) the Principle of Credulity, and (D) the method of wide reflective equilibrium. In each case, I argue, the strategy in question does not support a presumption in favor of objectivist moral theories.
Experimental moral philosophy emerged as a methodology in the last decade of the twentieth centur... more Experimental moral philosophy emerged as a methodology in the last decade of the twentieth century, as a branch of the larger experimental philosophy (X-Phi) approach. Experimental moral philosophy is the empirical study of moral intuitions, judgments, and behaviors. Like other forms of experimental philosophy, it involves gathering data using experimental methods and using these data to substantiate, undermine, or revise philosophical theories. In this case, the theories in question concern the nature of moral reasoning and judgment; the extent and sources of moral obligations; the nature of a good person and a good life; even the scope and nature of moral theory itself. This entry begins with a brief look at the historical uses of empirical data in moral theory and goes on to ask what, if anything, is distinctive about experimental moral philosophy—how should we distinguish it from related work in empirical moral psychology? After discussing some strategies for answering this ques...
In discussions of standards of proof, a familiar perspective often emerges. According to what we ... more In discussions of standards of proof, a familiar perspective often emerges. According to what we call specificationism, standards of proof are legal rules that specify the quantum of evidence required to determine that a litigant's claim has been proven. In so doing, they allocate the risk of error among litigants (and potential litigants), minimizing the risk of certain types of error. Specificationism is meant as a description of the way the rules actually function. We argue, however, that its claims are either mistaken or at a minimum deeply misleading, especially when it comes to standard of proof rules (SPRs) that contain indeterminate formulas, as is typical. As against specificationism, we argue that SPRs are best understood as rules that confer competence to decide whether a given standard has been metaccording to whatever vague or inchoate interpretation (if any) of the rule in question triers of fact implicitly or explicitly employ. We call this the competence-norm approach.
L'A. examine les arguments pragmatiques en faveur de la generalite des principes moraux, afin... more L'A. examine les arguments pragmatiques en faveur de la generalite des principes moraux, afin de montrer pourquoi les partisans de l'irrealisme moral n'etablissent pas leur methodologie du raisonnement moral sur des fondements uniquement pragmatiques
Demands of generality pervade contemporary moral philosophy. For example, both Samuel Scheffler a... more Demands of generality pervade contemporary moral philosophy. For example, both Samuel Scheffler and Shelly Kagan demand a general justification for certain agent-centered features of morality. I argue, however, that these demands are often unjustified. My aim is to level the playing field between our more specific and our more general moral convictions, allowing neither to win by default. I begin by distinguishing generality from universality and consistency, and go on to identify several common motivations for generality in ethics. For each such motivation, I articulate and evaluate the demands to which it gives rise. First, I consider and reject arguments that the origins of our more specific moral convictions taint them beyond credibility and that insufficiently general moral beliefs may be biased in favor of those holding them. Second, I consider more prominent arguments for generality, connected with a concern about justification. I show that some foundationalists are committed to the view that moral justifications must terminate in very general principles, and that some coherentists are committed to a simplicity demand which is, in effect, a demand for generality as well. I argue that these approaches share a common motivation in the view that insufficiently general moral propositions are true, if at all, only for further reasons--a claim I vigorously dispute. Third, I consider various pragmatic justifications for generality. I argue that the pragmatic value of highly general principles is overrated, and that what pragmatic value they do have must often be weighed against our substantive moral concerns. I conclude that generality in ethics, although important, is not as important as it has seemed to be.Ph.D.PhilosophyUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/105401/1/9124048.pdfDescription of 9124048.pdf : Restricted to UM users only
Experimental moral philosophy emerged as a methodology in the last decade of the twentieth centur... more Experimental moral philosophy emerged as a methodology in the last decade of the twentieth century, as a branch of the larger experimental philosophy (X-Phi) approach. Experimental moral philosophy is the empirical study of moral intuitions, judgments, and behaviors. Like other forms of experimental philosophy, it involves gathering data using experimental methods and using these data to substantiate, undermine, or revise philosophical theories. In this case, the theories in question concern the nature of moral reasoning and judgment; the extent and sources of moral obligations; the nature of a good person and a good life; even the scope and nature of moral theory itself. This entry begins with a brief look at the historical uses of empirical data in moral theory and goes on to ask what, if anything, is distinctive about experimental moral philosophy—how should we distinguish it from related work in empirical moral psychology? After discussing some strategies for answering this question, the entry examines two of the main projects within experimental moral philosophy, and then discusses some of the most prominent areas of reseatch within the field. As we will see, in some cases experimental moral philosophy has opened up new avenues of investigation, while in other cases it has influenced longstanding debates within moral theory.
... general foundations holds that insufficiently general moral beliefs are not epistemically fou... more ... general foundations holds that insufficiently general moral beliefs are not epistemically foundational, the ... to systematize and bring order to our various views about value, and that ... The distinction between epistemic reasons and metaphysical explanations is often blurred in moral ...
have argued that moral facts cannot explain our moral beliefs, claiming that such facts could not... more have argued that moral facts cannot explain our moral beliefs, claiming that such facts could not play a causal role in the formation of those beliefs. This paper shows these arguments to be misguided, for they would require that we abandon any number of intuitively plausible explanations in non-moral contexts as well. But abandoning the causal strand in the argument over moral explanations does not spell immediate victory for the moral realist, since it must still be shown that moral facts do figure in our best global explanatory theory.
Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 2003
... the superiority of Vermont Grade A Fancy maple syrup to Log Cabin Lite, or that it is foolish... more ... the superiority of Vermont Grade A Fancy maple syrup to Log Cabin Lite, or that it is foolish to think that chop suey is anywhere ... objections to moral realism have indeed been raised, and these might as easily be directed at gastronomic realism.6Footnote 6 Robinson discusses a ...
The 1996 volume of the Tanner Lectures on Human Values contains seven lectures given during 1994 ... more The 1996 volume of the Tanner Lectures on Human Values contains seven lectures given during 1994 and 1995 at some of the most distinguished universities in the world. Of these, four would be of special interest to philosophers. Let me briefly mention the others first. The collection begins with a short speech by Oscar Arias, former president of Costa Rica. The main theme is that poverty is an enemy common to all the world, more significant than mere conflicts among nations. Arias calls for the signing of an international pact committing the nations of the world to meaningful steps toward reducing poverty. His talk is not a philosophical argument, but rather a stirring call to arms against a shared moral enemy. On a different note, Roger Penrose stretches the definition of “values” with his offering, “Space-Time and Cosmology.” The lecture reproduced here appears to be the first in a series of three, “The Large, the Small, and the Human Mind.” And large it is, in ambition at least. In the space of forty-three liberally illustrated pages, we learn about the relationship between time scales (ranging from one chronon to the age of the universe) and distance scales (from the Planck length to the radius of the visible universe); Schrödinger’s equation and the quantum level; Newtonian theory; special and general relativity (including light cones and Lorentz and Möbius transformations); the tidal effect; the perihelion of Mercury; the Big Bang; the Big Crunch; open and closed universes; Lobachevskian and Minkowskian geometries; the inflationary theory; the cosmological principle; the Second Law of Thermodynamics; phase space; black holes; Weyl, Ricci, and Reimann curvatures; M. C. Escher; the Creator; and the “Platonic world” in which mathematical truths dwell. Sadly, the two remaining lectures were not included in this volume. Finally, Shakespearean actress and director Janet Suzman’s “Who Needs Parables?” offers a fascinating recollection of her successful production of Othello in South Africa shortly before the demise of apartheid. Suzman skillfully blends appealing storytelling and poignant literary criticism, making her lecture one of the most engaging in the volume. In “Euthanasia and Health Care” polymath Richard Posner applies his wellknown economic analysis to questions regarding aging and health care, arguing for example that permitting physician-assisted suicide might “reduce the number of suicides and postpone the ones that occur” (p. 21), since people might choose to wait, knowing that help will be available later if needed. Posner packages this simple (if questionable) point in a good deal of economic apparatus, some of which seems unnecessary. But there is much here that would interest anyone concerned about the issue. Posner also recommends that we view “each individual” not as one person,
It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and... more It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality, has a certain objective-seeming character to it, and that this supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories (according to which morality is a realm of facts or truths) and against anti-objectivist theories like Mackie's error theory (according to which it is not). In this paper, I argue that our experience of morality does not support objectivist moral theories in this way. I begin by arguing that our moral experience does not have the uniformly objective-seeming character it is typically claimed to have. I go on to argue that even if moral experience were to presuppose or display morality as a realm of fact, we would still need a reason for taking that to support theories according to which it is such a realm. I consider what I take to be the four most promising ways of attempting to supply such a reason: (A) inference to the best explanation, (B) epistemic conservatism, (C) the Principle of Credulity, and (D) the method of wide reflective equilibrium. In each case, I argue, the strategy in question does not support a presumption in favor of objectivist moral theories.
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