Is agathon a pros hen equivocal? EN does not unambiguously endorse this idea, and it is difficult... more Is agathon a pros hen equivocal? EN does not unambiguously endorse this idea, and it is difficult to defend. EE remains silent on the question
Students of Aristotle's philosophical methodology, whether in ethics or elsewhere, have much to b... more Students of Aristotle's philosophical methodology, whether in ethics or elsewhere, have much to be grateful for when they consider recent studies of the topic. Owen's pio neering efforts in his now classic "Tithenai ta phainomena"1 to upgrade the status of dialectic to serious partnership with syllogistic in science and metaphysics has been modified and elegantly extended in Nussbaum's "Saving Aristotle's Ap pearances" in the Owen festschrift.2 While both of these scholars have drawn heavily on material from both the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics (hereafter abbreviated NE and EE respectively), their.primary focus has been on scientific reasoning in general and not specifically on the practical disciplines of ethics or politics. Two recent studies by Irwin and Barnes, however, have concentrated on what they both call Aristotle's methods of ethics, drawing on a rich critical tradition of close study of the Aristotelian works stretching back to the early 19th Century.3 Their use of the plural might suggest a possible differentiation of Aristotle's thoughts on the subject by reference to various works or to different stages in his development but one quickly discovers that this is not the case. This is because both Irwin and Barnes follow the general pattern of scholarship in this area in not distinguishing, for instance, between NE and EE dis cussions of the topic and in drawing indifferently upon both works in formulating an overall picture of Aristotle's approach to ethical method. They do not raise the question I wish to address here, then, in spite of the searching and valuable
Students of Aristotle's philosophical methodology, whether in ethics or elsewhere, have much to b... more Students of Aristotle's philosophical methodology, whether in ethics or elsewhere, have much to be grateful for when they consider recent studies of the topic. Owen's pio neering efforts in his now classic "Tithenai ta phainomena"1 to upgrade the status of dialectic to serious partnership with syllogistic in science and metaphysics has been modified and elegantly extended in Nussbaum's "Saving Aristotle's Ap pearances" in the Owen festschrift.2 While both of these scholars have drawn heavily on material from both the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics (hereafter abbreviated NE and EE respectively), their.primary focus has been on scientific reasoning in general and not specifically on the practical disciplines of ethics or politics. Two recent studies by Irwin and Barnes, however, have concentrated on what they both call Aristotle's methods of ethics, drawing on a rich critical tradition of close study of the Aristotelian works stretching back to the early 19th Century.3 Their use of the plural might suggest a possible differentiation of Aristotle's thoughts on the subject by reference to various works or to different stages in his development but one quickly discovers that this is not the case. This is because both Irwin and Barnes follow the general pattern of scholarship in this area in not distinguishing, for instance, between NE and EE dis cussions of the topic and in drawing indifferently upon both works in formulating an overall picture of Aristotle's approach to ethical method. They do not raise the question I wish to address here, then, in spite of the searching and valuable
This decade should prove crucial in determining whether a close examination of the lesserknown ve... more This decade should prove crucial in determining whether a close examination of the lesserknown version of Aristotle’s ethics will prove as fruitful as hoped to those convinced by Kenny’s case for awarding the so-called ‘common books’ (Eth. Nic. 6–7 = Eth. Eud. 4–6) to their original environs. With three recently published English translations of all eight Books, it will be easier than ever to study the whole. This volume stems from a 2006 conference but it is not the usual sort of slightly repackaged, disconnected proceedings. The authors had plenty of time to revise their presentations and at least one commentator at the original event now offers a monograph-length study of a key chapter in the book on friendship which is a tour de force. The papers are arranged in the order of topics as they come up in the Eth. Eud., with D. Charles’ discussion of the ‘voluntary’ in Book 2 coming first, then three on Book 7 by C. Rowe, M.M. McCabe and J. Whiting, ending with F. Buddensiek’s treatment of good fortune in 8.2. As B. Inwood and L. point out in their quite helpful introductory overview, the topics treated are by and large confined to distinctively Eudemian contributions. The result is a challenging set of fresh interpretations of (relatively) unfamiliar arguments studied for their own merits, neither as mature departures from, nor jejune anticipations of, the much more familiar work. Chronological questions as such, then, dominant for a century, have given way to solid, original attempts to take the Eth. Eud. on its own merits, with special attention to the book on philia. While awaiting longer studies of the overall argument of the Eth. Eud., this collection will surely, and rightly, stir scholarly investigation. For those coming anew to this text, I would suggest reading the papers in a somewhat altered order. After the informative introduction, begin with Rowe’s short piece on the difference between loving things as opposed to people; he argues we should not interpret A.’s claim that we should love our friends for themselves in the exclusively altruistic, Kantian way (as ends in themselves) proposed by Vlastos but in a wider, more inclusive, manner that allows virtue-friends to enjoy each other on the grounds of pleasure and utility as well as their shared aretê. Rowe aims to give this text a ‘hearing’ of its own, with ‘serious discussion’, even while remaining attached to the Eth. Nic. (p. 29). Unlike those who approach the Eth. Eud. as early, and inferior, Rowe finds ‘no evidence here, at least’. i. e. in discussing the three main types of philia, that the Eth. Nic. ‘shows Aristotle moving on from, maturing in respect to’ the Eth. Eud. (p. 30). He reminds us that all three ‘forms of friendship’ are justly termed friendships, a point I believe would have only been strengthened by due attention to one striking difference between the two treatises, the fact that 7.2 THE CLASSICAL REVIEW 66
Hareans frequently in-ivoke a distinction between the primary and secondary meaning of evaluative... more Hareans frequently in-ivoke a distinction between the primary and secondary meaning of evaluative terms that plays a fundamental role in the general theory of prescriptivism. With its use one can readily distinguish, for instance, between specific and general evaluative termsthe former are said to be primarily descriptive in meaning and only secondarily prescriptive (e.g. 'industrious') while the reverse is true of the latter (e.g. 'good'). Even more importantly, such a distinction allows for a univocalist account of the meaning of 'good' as a modifier since its primary prescriptive meaning may be said to hold constant from case to case while its secondary descriptive meaning varies according to the criteria and standards of goodness commonly observed in light of the host noun's meaning. Finally, the fact that children who lack a sophisticated grasp of the criteria and standards of goodness nevertheless quickly master the use of 'good' may be explained by the genetic hypothesis that its primary prescriptive meaning is learned first.' A distinction so fundamental and useful deserves more clarification than Hlare and his followers commonly provide. Even when it has been translated into the idiom of speech-act theory, and we speak of the primary and secondary illocutionaryforce of utterances conltaining literal occurrences of evaluative terms, the familiar citationl of intuitively clear examples is n1o substitute for a suitable criterion for making the distinctioni. Thus, while words like 'generous' or 'selfish' (i.e., many specific evaluative terms) do seem primarily appropriate for performing speech acts of describing and secondarily suitable for commending or condemning, borderline cases will be frequent and intuitions variable in most cases. Furthermore, the claim that utterances containing literal occurrences of 'good' have primary prescriptive or commendatory force has met with effective descriptivist rebuttal in recent years.2 Harean theory has floundered for want of a suitable criterion for distinguishing the primary from the secondary force of utterances with evaluative expressions. To remedy this defect, J. 0. Urmson has proposed a distinction between what he calls the central and peripheral illocutionary forces of an utterance.3 His criterion can be formulated as follows:
This article appeared in a journal published by Elsevier. The attached copy is furnished to the a... more This article appeared in a journal published by Elsevier. The attached copy is furnished to the author for internal non-commercial research and education use, including for instruction at the authors institution and sharing with colleagues. Other uses, including reproduction and distribution, or selling or licensing copies, or posting to personal, institutional or third party websites are prohibited. In most cases authors are permitted to post their version of the article (e.g. in Word or Tex form) to their personal website or institutional repository. Authors requiring further information regarding Elsevier's archiving and manuscript policies are encouraged to visit: http://www.elsevier.com/copyright
Is agathon a pros hen equivocal? EN does not unambiguously endorse this idea, and it is difficult... more Is agathon a pros hen equivocal? EN does not unambiguously endorse this idea, and it is difficult to defend. EE remains silent on the question
Students of Aristotle's philosophical methodology, whether in ethics or elsewhere, have much to b... more Students of Aristotle's philosophical methodology, whether in ethics or elsewhere, have much to be grateful for when they consider recent studies of the topic. Owen's pio neering efforts in his now classic "Tithenai ta phainomena"1 to upgrade the status of dialectic to serious partnership with syllogistic in science and metaphysics has been modified and elegantly extended in Nussbaum's "Saving Aristotle's Ap pearances" in the Owen festschrift.2 While both of these scholars have drawn heavily on material from both the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics (hereafter abbreviated NE and EE respectively), their.primary focus has been on scientific reasoning in general and not specifically on the practical disciplines of ethics or politics. Two recent studies by Irwin and Barnes, however, have concentrated on what they both call Aristotle's methods of ethics, drawing on a rich critical tradition of close study of the Aristotelian works stretching back to the early 19th Century.3 Their use of the plural might suggest a possible differentiation of Aristotle's thoughts on the subject by reference to various works or to different stages in his development but one quickly discovers that this is not the case. This is because both Irwin and Barnes follow the general pattern of scholarship in this area in not distinguishing, for instance, between NE and EE dis cussions of the topic and in drawing indifferently upon both works in formulating an overall picture of Aristotle's approach to ethical method. They do not raise the question I wish to address here, then, in spite of the searching and valuable
Students of Aristotle's philosophical methodology, whether in ethics or elsewhere, have much to b... more Students of Aristotle's philosophical methodology, whether in ethics or elsewhere, have much to be grateful for when they consider recent studies of the topic. Owen's pio neering efforts in his now classic "Tithenai ta phainomena"1 to upgrade the status of dialectic to serious partnership with syllogistic in science and metaphysics has been modified and elegantly extended in Nussbaum's "Saving Aristotle's Ap pearances" in the Owen festschrift.2 While both of these scholars have drawn heavily on material from both the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics (hereafter abbreviated NE and EE respectively), their.primary focus has been on scientific reasoning in general and not specifically on the practical disciplines of ethics or politics. Two recent studies by Irwin and Barnes, however, have concentrated on what they both call Aristotle's methods of ethics, drawing on a rich critical tradition of close study of the Aristotelian works stretching back to the early 19th Century.3 Their use of the plural might suggest a possible differentiation of Aristotle's thoughts on the subject by reference to various works or to different stages in his development but one quickly discovers that this is not the case. This is because both Irwin and Barnes follow the general pattern of scholarship in this area in not distinguishing, for instance, between NE and EE dis cussions of the topic and in drawing indifferently upon both works in formulating an overall picture of Aristotle's approach to ethical method. They do not raise the question I wish to address here, then, in spite of the searching and valuable
This decade should prove crucial in determining whether a close examination of the lesserknown ve... more This decade should prove crucial in determining whether a close examination of the lesserknown version of Aristotle’s ethics will prove as fruitful as hoped to those convinced by Kenny’s case for awarding the so-called ‘common books’ (Eth. Nic. 6–7 = Eth. Eud. 4–6) to their original environs. With three recently published English translations of all eight Books, it will be easier than ever to study the whole. This volume stems from a 2006 conference but it is not the usual sort of slightly repackaged, disconnected proceedings. The authors had plenty of time to revise their presentations and at least one commentator at the original event now offers a monograph-length study of a key chapter in the book on friendship which is a tour de force. The papers are arranged in the order of topics as they come up in the Eth. Eud., with D. Charles’ discussion of the ‘voluntary’ in Book 2 coming first, then three on Book 7 by C. Rowe, M.M. McCabe and J. Whiting, ending with F. Buddensiek’s treatment of good fortune in 8.2. As B. Inwood and L. point out in their quite helpful introductory overview, the topics treated are by and large confined to distinctively Eudemian contributions. The result is a challenging set of fresh interpretations of (relatively) unfamiliar arguments studied for their own merits, neither as mature departures from, nor jejune anticipations of, the much more familiar work. Chronological questions as such, then, dominant for a century, have given way to solid, original attempts to take the Eth. Eud. on its own merits, with special attention to the book on philia. While awaiting longer studies of the overall argument of the Eth. Eud., this collection will surely, and rightly, stir scholarly investigation. For those coming anew to this text, I would suggest reading the papers in a somewhat altered order. After the informative introduction, begin with Rowe’s short piece on the difference between loving things as opposed to people; he argues we should not interpret A.’s claim that we should love our friends for themselves in the exclusively altruistic, Kantian way (as ends in themselves) proposed by Vlastos but in a wider, more inclusive, manner that allows virtue-friends to enjoy each other on the grounds of pleasure and utility as well as their shared aretê. Rowe aims to give this text a ‘hearing’ of its own, with ‘serious discussion’, even while remaining attached to the Eth. Nic. (p. 29). Unlike those who approach the Eth. Eud. as early, and inferior, Rowe finds ‘no evidence here, at least’. i. e. in discussing the three main types of philia, that the Eth. Nic. ‘shows Aristotle moving on from, maturing in respect to’ the Eth. Eud. (p. 30). He reminds us that all three ‘forms of friendship’ are justly termed friendships, a point I believe would have only been strengthened by due attention to one striking difference between the two treatises, the fact that 7.2 THE CLASSICAL REVIEW 66
Hareans frequently in-ivoke a distinction between the primary and secondary meaning of evaluative... more Hareans frequently in-ivoke a distinction between the primary and secondary meaning of evaluative terms that plays a fundamental role in the general theory of prescriptivism. With its use one can readily distinguish, for instance, between specific and general evaluative termsthe former are said to be primarily descriptive in meaning and only secondarily prescriptive (e.g. 'industrious') while the reverse is true of the latter (e.g. 'good'). Even more importantly, such a distinction allows for a univocalist account of the meaning of 'good' as a modifier since its primary prescriptive meaning may be said to hold constant from case to case while its secondary descriptive meaning varies according to the criteria and standards of goodness commonly observed in light of the host noun's meaning. Finally, the fact that children who lack a sophisticated grasp of the criteria and standards of goodness nevertheless quickly master the use of 'good' may be explained by the genetic hypothesis that its primary prescriptive meaning is learned first.' A distinction so fundamental and useful deserves more clarification than Hlare and his followers commonly provide. Even when it has been translated into the idiom of speech-act theory, and we speak of the primary and secondary illocutionaryforce of utterances conltaining literal occurrences of evaluative terms, the familiar citationl of intuitively clear examples is n1o substitute for a suitable criterion for making the distinctioni. Thus, while words like 'generous' or 'selfish' (i.e., many specific evaluative terms) do seem primarily appropriate for performing speech acts of describing and secondarily suitable for commending or condemning, borderline cases will be frequent and intuitions variable in most cases. Furthermore, the claim that utterances containing literal occurrences of 'good' have primary prescriptive or commendatory force has met with effective descriptivist rebuttal in recent years.2 Harean theory has floundered for want of a suitable criterion for distinguishing the primary from the secondary force of utterances with evaluative expressions. To remedy this defect, J. 0. Urmson has proposed a distinction between what he calls the central and peripheral illocutionary forces of an utterance.3 His criterion can be formulated as follows:
This article appeared in a journal published by Elsevier. The attached copy is furnished to the a... more This article appeared in a journal published by Elsevier. The attached copy is furnished to the author for internal non-commercial research and education use, including for instruction at the authors institution and sharing with colleagues. Other uses, including reproduction and distribution, or selling or licensing copies, or posting to personal, institutional or third party websites are prohibited. In most cases authors are permitted to post their version of the article (e.g. in Word or Tex form) to their personal website or institutional repository. Authors requiring further information regarding Elsevier's archiving and manuscript policies are encouraged to visit: http://www.elsevier.com/copyright
Uploads
Papers by Lawrence Jost