Most studies have identified in one form or another the normally lengthy time element involved wi... more Most studies have identified in one form or another the normally lengthy time element involved with counterinsurgency. To adapt Thomas Hobbes, insurgencies and the campaigns against them tend to be 'nasty, brutish, and long.' This chapter certainly will not argue against this basic reality. There might, however, be variations on this basic theme. One such variant that has been used with at least some apparent success has been relatively short-term interventions by well-trained military forces (thus far, typically European) designed to stabilize the internal security situation, either together with or followed by more traditional peacekeeping forces that are able to at least retain base levels of security. With this basic security, internal development arguably then can follow. In somewhat traditional military terms, the intervention force is intended to break the initiative of the insurgents or other groups threatening stability, with other forces then able to mop up. Ideally, of course, such interventions would occur under the direct auspices of the United Nations or formal regional organizations. This can make turnover of responsibilities from the 'hard' forces to more traditional-type peacekeeping forces and civilian agencies much easier, together with providing greater legitimacy. However, due to national caveats or broader national strategic interests, unilateral (to a greater or lesser degree) interventions may be the tool nations choose to use. These combined operations-under the category of "hybrid operations" (not to be confused with hybrid warfare)may become more widely accepted as a common strategy.
Controversy has swirled around the ending of Desert Storm, with some authors suggesting that the ... more Controversy has swirled around the ending of Desert Storm, with some authors suggesting that the premature ending of the war resulted in a strategic failure. Suggestions for a more satisfactory ending have ranged from destruction of the Republican Guard to the physical occupation of Iraq. This article examines the tactical and strategic elements of the decision for war termination. While the exact timing of the cease‐fire may well have been far from perfect, a major expansion or continuation of the war would probably have created an even worse situation in the region, with considerably more instability resulting. Given the emphasis on multilateral operations by U.S. policymakers, such incomplete victories will probably be a continuing pattern, as the United States must assess its operations in terms of not only military issues but also the political desires of its partners.
... Calls in September 1997 by both the FIS and the AIS for a ceasefire were ignored by the GIA.5... more ... Calls in September 1997 by both the FIS and the AIS for a ceasefire were ignored by the GIA.55 Whatever political influence the ... However, the theological, philosophical, and cultural gap between Iran's Shia and the Algerian and Egyptian Sunni is so wide that the two groups are ...
... and British against the Japanese and fought under the assumption of post-war power sharing. .... more ... and British against the Japanese and fought under the assumption of post-war power sharing. ... the conflict started between the government and the Karen, see Ba Saw Khin, Fifty Years ... ThanHtike Oo, 'Military Offensive Must Stop for Genuine Political Solution: NU', Mizzima (New ...
Journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare, May 31, 2022
United States (U.S.) civilian and military intelligence services increasingly have engaged with l... more United States (U.S.) civilian and military intelligence services increasingly have engaged with local intelligence services, either in an advisory role or direct coordination or liaison. In many cases, the intelligence officers have tended to try to remake the local intelligence services in the image of U.S. intelligence structures and procedures, with these efforts rather futile in most cases. One factor that has led to considerable frustration and potential failure has been a lack of understanding of the culture of local intelligence systems. Understanding both the subtleties of an area's social norms and mores, and the bureaucratic and historical cultures of other intelligence services remain critical factors in longterm success. Using case studies of environments in which established intelligence services have worked with emergent intelligence agencies, this paper examines the requirements for incorporating both larger cultural approaches and detailed knowledge of other intelligence bureaucracies.
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Apr 1, 2002
The use of intelligence as a support tool in conducting international peace operations has receiv... more The use of intelligence as a support tool in conducting international peace operations has received considerably more attention among practitioners in recent years. In contrast to the banning of the term``intelligence''by the United Nations in earlier peacekeeping missions, ...
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Dec 1, 2005
The ongoing United States campaign against terrorist groups has emphasized the heavy use of speci... more The ongoing United States campaign against terrorist groups has emphasized the heavy use of special operations forces. Defense Department (DoD) officials have made it clear that their preferred strategy is based on the Afghanistan model, in which a small number of troops, backed by an extensive support structure, destroy terrorist targets and their infrastructure. A constant emphasis is placed on the requirement for accurate intelligence in support of these operations. The internal intelligence capabilities of the Special Operations Forces (SOF) units, and the interface of SOF with the larger intelligence structure, are a critical aspect of success in the overall campaign. Clearly, DoD planners are counting on a synergy between SOF and intelligence systems in which the national intelligence community is closely linked with SOF for its operations, and SOF provides critical intelligence for larger strategic operations. Such a strategy could have significant benefits for the U.S. as its military forces are stretched in multiple areas of operations. Given its criticality, examining how well such a strategic concept has thus far worked in practice is worthwhile. Most attention will be paid here to Afghanistan since that seems to be the template for future planning. Some issues involving SOF operations in Iraq are also discussed, insofar as they illustrate further refinements or possible future weaknesses. Special operations may best be defined as those activities which regular U.S. military forces are incapable of doing particularly well, or which they are not particularly willing to do. In most cases, such operations aim at
The GSPC—more recently titled Al Qaeda in the Maghreb—has maintained a small but significant leve... more The GSPC—more recently titled Al Qaeda in the Maghreb—has maintained a small but significant level of terrorist unrest in the countries of the Sahel for a number of years. Although GSPC activities have been rather small-scale, they have added to the host of other security failures plaguing the region. The United State has begun devoting more attention to the regional security gaps and has started to implement an overall strategy in response. The more broadly-based approaches to dealing with security, economic, and political problems show promise, but only if the United States and regional countries maintain their focus on the long term.
Mali has been faced with a series of uprisings by its Tuareg over a number of years. Although eac... more Mali has been faced with a series of uprisings by its Tuareg over a number of years. Although each of these rebellions was ended by a cease-fire, the Malian government never succeeded in instituting longer term peace agreements. The 2012 Tuareg rebellion has presented even more significant security threats. The environment in northern Mali now is marked by multiple armed groups, with multiple competing agendas. This complex situation, with Tuareg rebels, Islamists with varying goals, and local militias, with a pattern of varying levels of cooperation and conflict, will at best be very difficult to resolve in the long term. Combined with an almost complete security vacuum in northern Mali on the part of the government, this situation could be intractable even with external intervention. At the same time, the focus on counterterrorism in northern Mali may not be conducive to a long-term resolution of what in reality is a much more complicated security environment.
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Apr 3, 2019
Among the lessons relearned over the last dozen years has been the significance of external suppo... more Among the lessons relearned over the last dozen years has been the significance of external support for many, even most, insurgencies. In analyzing the situation, such assistance is typically described as "inside to outside." In other words, the focus tends to be on the insurgent groups themselves and on how outside organizations or countries help them. Much less attention has been paid to the dynamics of the governments that provide such support and their reasons for so doing. Given the continued and perhaps increasing incidence of externally supported internal conflicts for power-certainly including such ongoing situations as those in Syria and Ukraine-an enhanced focus on the role of outside powers is necessary, either to counter such support or to increase the odds against their being successful as enablers. These "second-hand" operations are not always well distinguished in the literature on conflict. Most studies and data sets use different typologies. For example, in citing Hungarian scholar Istvan Kende, Klaus Jurgen Gantzel asserted that there are essentially three types of war:
With the collapse of Yugoslavia, the issue of borders between the newly emerging states became of... more With the collapse of Yugoslavia, the issue of borders between the newly emerging states became of major international diplomatic interest. Secessionist and irredentist movements were rampant throughout the region. The international community has either acceded to or actively supported the existence of new de jure or de facto “state” borders within the former Yugoslavia after its dissolution. Beyond these formalized borders, less formal boundaries if not borders have emerged in the region.
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Apr 6, 2016
Considerable attention has been paid in recent years to improved intelligence sharing among Weste... more Considerable attention has been paid in recent years to improved intelligence sharing among Western countries in an effort to face common threats. Most studies have focused on efforts by the United States with other states or among such coalitions as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Considerably less attention has been devoted to intelligence sharing efforts in other parts of the world. Africa in particular represents a good area for examining regional approaches to intelligence sharing. The need for sharply improved intelligence cooperation both within Africa and by African countries with larger intelligence-sharing systems has become increasingly noted by many key figures from the region. For example, following the mass abductions by Boko Haram in Nigeria, Erastus Mwencha, deputy chairman of the African Union, stated that ‘‘there is need for a stronger collaboration in intelligence gathering and sharing to help stem the tide of growing terrorist activities.’’ Likewise, Francisco
... 7. Duncan McCargo, Southern Thai Politics: A Preliminary Overview, POLIS Working Paper Number... more ... 7. Duncan McCargo, Southern Thai Politics: A Preliminary Overview, POLIS Working Paper Number 3 (Leeds, UK: University of ... Joseph Chinyong Liow, 'The Security Situation in Southern Thailand: Toward an Understanding of Domestic and International Dimensions', Studies ...
Page 1. The New Constabularies: Planning US Military Stabilization Missions LAWRENCE E. CLINE Mod... more Page 1. The New Constabularies: Planning US Military Stabilization Missions LAWRENCE E. CLINE Modern peace enforcement missions are much more akin to historical constabulary missions than they are to traditional peace operations. ...
... elite among the Muslims. The second strand, formed in opposition to both the Philippine gover... more ... elite among the Muslims. The second strand, formed in opposition to both the Philippine government and (to a lesser extent) the traditional elite, was much more rooted in the modern intelligentsia. Nevertheless, even the second ...
Most studies have identified in one form or another the normally lengthy time element involved wi... more Most studies have identified in one form or another the normally lengthy time element involved with counterinsurgency. To adapt Thomas Hobbes, insurgencies and the campaigns against them tend to be 'nasty, brutish, and long.' This chapter certainly will not argue against this basic reality. There might, however, be variations on this basic theme. One such variant that has been used with at least some apparent success has been relatively short-term interventions by well-trained military forces (thus far, typically European) designed to stabilize the internal security situation, either together with or followed by more traditional peacekeeping forces that are able to at least retain base levels of security. With this basic security, internal development arguably then can follow. In somewhat traditional military terms, the intervention force is intended to break the initiative of the insurgents or other groups threatening stability, with other forces then able to mop up. Ideally, of course, such interventions would occur under the direct auspices of the United Nations or formal regional organizations. This can make turnover of responsibilities from the 'hard' forces to more traditional-type peacekeeping forces and civilian agencies much easier, together with providing greater legitimacy. However, due to national caveats or broader national strategic interests, unilateral (to a greater or lesser degree) interventions may be the tool nations choose to use. These combined operations-under the category of "hybrid operations" (not to be confused with hybrid warfare)may become more widely accepted as a common strategy.
Controversy has swirled around the ending of Desert Storm, with some authors suggesting that the ... more Controversy has swirled around the ending of Desert Storm, with some authors suggesting that the premature ending of the war resulted in a strategic failure. Suggestions for a more satisfactory ending have ranged from destruction of the Republican Guard to the physical occupation of Iraq. This article examines the tactical and strategic elements of the decision for war termination. While the exact timing of the cease‐fire may well have been far from perfect, a major expansion or continuation of the war would probably have created an even worse situation in the region, with considerably more instability resulting. Given the emphasis on multilateral operations by U.S. policymakers, such incomplete victories will probably be a continuing pattern, as the United States must assess its operations in terms of not only military issues but also the political desires of its partners.
... Calls in September 1997 by both the FIS and the AIS for a ceasefire were ignored by the GIA.5... more ... Calls in September 1997 by both the FIS and the AIS for a ceasefire were ignored by the GIA.55 Whatever political influence the ... However, the theological, philosophical, and cultural gap between Iran's Shia and the Algerian and Egyptian Sunni is so wide that the two groups are ...
... and British against the Japanese and fought under the assumption of post-war power sharing. .... more ... and British against the Japanese and fought under the assumption of post-war power sharing. ... the conflict started between the government and the Karen, see Ba Saw Khin, Fifty Years ... ThanHtike Oo, 'Military Offensive Must Stop for Genuine Political Solution: NU', Mizzima (New ...
Journal of intelligence, conflict and warfare, May 31, 2022
United States (U.S.) civilian and military intelligence services increasingly have engaged with l... more United States (U.S.) civilian and military intelligence services increasingly have engaged with local intelligence services, either in an advisory role or direct coordination or liaison. In many cases, the intelligence officers have tended to try to remake the local intelligence services in the image of U.S. intelligence structures and procedures, with these efforts rather futile in most cases. One factor that has led to considerable frustration and potential failure has been a lack of understanding of the culture of local intelligence systems. Understanding both the subtleties of an area's social norms and mores, and the bureaucratic and historical cultures of other intelligence services remain critical factors in longterm success. Using case studies of environments in which established intelligence services have worked with emergent intelligence agencies, this paper examines the requirements for incorporating both larger cultural approaches and detailed knowledge of other intelligence bureaucracies.
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Apr 1, 2002
The use of intelligence as a support tool in conducting international peace operations has receiv... more The use of intelligence as a support tool in conducting international peace operations has received considerably more attention among practitioners in recent years. In contrast to the banning of the term``intelligence''by the United Nations in earlier peacekeeping missions, ...
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Dec 1, 2005
The ongoing United States campaign against terrorist groups has emphasized the heavy use of speci... more The ongoing United States campaign against terrorist groups has emphasized the heavy use of special operations forces. Defense Department (DoD) officials have made it clear that their preferred strategy is based on the Afghanistan model, in which a small number of troops, backed by an extensive support structure, destroy terrorist targets and their infrastructure. A constant emphasis is placed on the requirement for accurate intelligence in support of these operations. The internal intelligence capabilities of the Special Operations Forces (SOF) units, and the interface of SOF with the larger intelligence structure, are a critical aspect of success in the overall campaign. Clearly, DoD planners are counting on a synergy between SOF and intelligence systems in which the national intelligence community is closely linked with SOF for its operations, and SOF provides critical intelligence for larger strategic operations. Such a strategy could have significant benefits for the U.S. as its military forces are stretched in multiple areas of operations. Given its criticality, examining how well such a strategic concept has thus far worked in practice is worthwhile. Most attention will be paid here to Afghanistan since that seems to be the template for future planning. Some issues involving SOF operations in Iraq are also discussed, insofar as they illustrate further refinements or possible future weaknesses. Special operations may best be defined as those activities which regular U.S. military forces are incapable of doing particularly well, or which they are not particularly willing to do. In most cases, such operations aim at
The GSPC—more recently titled Al Qaeda in the Maghreb—has maintained a small but significant leve... more The GSPC—more recently titled Al Qaeda in the Maghreb—has maintained a small but significant level of terrorist unrest in the countries of the Sahel for a number of years. Although GSPC activities have been rather small-scale, they have added to the host of other security failures plaguing the region. The United State has begun devoting more attention to the regional security gaps and has started to implement an overall strategy in response. The more broadly-based approaches to dealing with security, economic, and political problems show promise, but only if the United States and regional countries maintain their focus on the long term.
Mali has been faced with a series of uprisings by its Tuareg over a number of years. Although eac... more Mali has been faced with a series of uprisings by its Tuareg over a number of years. Although each of these rebellions was ended by a cease-fire, the Malian government never succeeded in instituting longer term peace agreements. The 2012 Tuareg rebellion has presented even more significant security threats. The environment in northern Mali now is marked by multiple armed groups, with multiple competing agendas. This complex situation, with Tuareg rebels, Islamists with varying goals, and local militias, with a pattern of varying levels of cooperation and conflict, will at best be very difficult to resolve in the long term. Combined with an almost complete security vacuum in northern Mali on the part of the government, this situation could be intractable even with external intervention. At the same time, the focus on counterterrorism in northern Mali may not be conducive to a long-term resolution of what in reality is a much more complicated security environment.
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Apr 3, 2019
Among the lessons relearned over the last dozen years has been the significance of external suppo... more Among the lessons relearned over the last dozen years has been the significance of external support for many, even most, insurgencies. In analyzing the situation, such assistance is typically described as "inside to outside." In other words, the focus tends to be on the insurgent groups themselves and on how outside organizations or countries help them. Much less attention has been paid to the dynamics of the governments that provide such support and their reasons for so doing. Given the continued and perhaps increasing incidence of externally supported internal conflicts for power-certainly including such ongoing situations as those in Syria and Ukraine-an enhanced focus on the role of outside powers is necessary, either to counter such support or to increase the odds against their being successful as enablers. These "second-hand" operations are not always well distinguished in the literature on conflict. Most studies and data sets use different typologies. For example, in citing Hungarian scholar Istvan Kende, Klaus Jurgen Gantzel asserted that there are essentially three types of war:
With the collapse of Yugoslavia, the issue of borders between the newly emerging states became of... more With the collapse of Yugoslavia, the issue of borders between the newly emerging states became of major international diplomatic interest. Secessionist and irredentist movements were rampant throughout the region. The international community has either acceded to or actively supported the existence of new de jure or de facto “state” borders within the former Yugoslavia after its dissolution. Beyond these formalized borders, less formal boundaries if not borders have emerged in the region.
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Apr 6, 2016
Considerable attention has been paid in recent years to improved intelligence sharing among Weste... more Considerable attention has been paid in recent years to improved intelligence sharing among Western countries in an effort to face common threats. Most studies have focused on efforts by the United States with other states or among such coalitions as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Considerably less attention has been devoted to intelligence sharing efforts in other parts of the world. Africa in particular represents a good area for examining regional approaches to intelligence sharing. The need for sharply improved intelligence cooperation both within Africa and by African countries with larger intelligence-sharing systems has become increasingly noted by many key figures from the region. For example, following the mass abductions by Boko Haram in Nigeria, Erastus Mwencha, deputy chairman of the African Union, stated that ‘‘there is need for a stronger collaboration in intelligence gathering and sharing to help stem the tide of growing terrorist activities.’’ Likewise, Francisco
... 7. Duncan McCargo, Southern Thai Politics: A Preliminary Overview, POLIS Working Paper Number... more ... 7. Duncan McCargo, Southern Thai Politics: A Preliminary Overview, POLIS Working Paper Number 3 (Leeds, UK: University of ... Joseph Chinyong Liow, 'The Security Situation in Southern Thailand: Toward an Understanding of Domestic and International Dimensions', Studies ...
Page 1. The New Constabularies: Planning US Military Stabilization Missions LAWRENCE E. CLINE Mod... more Page 1. The New Constabularies: Planning US Military Stabilization Missions LAWRENCE E. CLINE Modern peace enforcement missions are much more akin to historical constabulary missions than they are to traditional peace operations. ...
... elite among the Muslims. The second strand, formed in opposition to both the Philippine gover... more ... elite among the Muslims. The second strand, formed in opposition to both the Philippine government and (to a lesser extent) the traditional elite, was much more rooted in the modern intelligentsia. Nevertheless, even the second ...
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Papers by Lawrence Cline