Previous studies of U.S. political polarization have examined state-level convergence and diverge... more Previous studies of U.S. political polarization have examined state-level convergence and divergence. Increasingly, scholars have turned from state-level analyses to regional analyses and advanced claims as to whether regions are becoming more similar or dissimilar. Yet, formal testing has remained largely absent. Using panel unit root tests, we determine whether regional political convergence is occurring between 1970 and 2004. Our results suggest the importance of distinguishing between ideological convergence and partisan convergence. We find the four regions and eight subregions are stochastically converging to a national norm in regard to ide-ology but not with regard to partisanship. Convergence for partisanship is, however, occurring within three of the regions, but not within the Midwest.
Convergence tests are performed on state-level turnout rates for U.S. presidential elections from... more Convergence tests are performed on state-level turnout rates for U.S. presidential elections from 1896 to 2004. The degree of dispersion in turnout has steadily declined since 1940, suggestive of general overall convergence taking place. Individually, it is found that 29 of the 48 continental states are stationary in their relative trend levels, and 42 states either do not significantly differ from the national average or are significantly trending toward the national average. In total, 25 of the 48 states pass tests for both stochastic and β-convergence, suggesting that national convergence is being achieved by roughly half the states.
This chapter reviews the strange history of social choice, elements of which have been understood... more This chapter reviews the strange history of social choice, elements of which have been understood for perhaps two thousand years. Isolated thinkers in the 13th, 15th, 18th and 19th centuries made substantial contributions to the field but almost always in ignorance of the work of their predecessors. Social choice was not established as a cumulative field of study until the middle of the 20th century. The chapter concludes with some reflections on this strange state of affairs. 2.2 Unanimous Consent and Constitutional Economics (Randall G. Holcombe) Constitutional economics makes heavy use of the normative benchmark of unanimous consent. The idea appears explicitly in the analysis of optimal constitutional rules in Buchanan and Tullock's The Calculus of Consent, and it continues through Buchanan's work that develops constitutional economics as a distinct area of inquiry within public choice. This chapter reviews some of the work that links unanimous consent closely with constitutional economics, and continues with a critical analysis of the implications and applicability of the benchmark of unanimous consent to real-world political decision making. 2.3 Rational Choice and the Calculus of Voting (André Blais) According to the rational choice model of voting, a person should vote only if the expected benefits outweigh the costs. But in a large electorate, the expected benefits are bound to be extremely small since the probability of one's vote being decisive is close to nil, so the rational decision appears to be abstention. Yet even in large elections most people do vote. This chapter reviews both the theoretical amendments that have been proposed to 'solve' this 'paradox of voting' and the empirical evidence that has been brought to bear on this question. The conclusion reached is that the paradox of voting is still very much alive and the decision to vote or not is driven primarily by alternative considerations such as social norms and pressures. 2.4 Computational Social Choice (Robi Ragan) This chapter provides an introduction to computational models of social choice. It discusses two major classes of computational models and provides examples of each. The first pertains to computational simulation of traditional analytical models to explore their robustness against changes in model parameters and functional forms. The second pertains to agent-based techniques for modeling social choice phenomena as complex adaptive systems in a way that is less restrictive than traditional analytical modeling and allows the researcher to build models with greater verisimilitude. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the tradeoffs and limitations in using simulation and agent-based models.
The u.s. Constitution was first developed at the 1787 Convention, where each state’s vote was det... more The u.s. Constitution was first developed at the 1787 Convention, where each state’s vote was determined by the majority preference of its delegates. Two of the delegates from New York, John Lansing and Robert Yates, both strident anti-Federalists, left the Convention early due to disagreement with the proceedings. Their departure cost New York its vote for the rest of the Convention, and has been considered by some scholars to be an important event. We investigate how often New York’s vote was critical to proposals passing or failing, both when present and counter-factually when absent. We find New York’s vote could have been critical on only 28 of 578 (roughly 5%) votes. Most of the 28 votes were on nominal issues. However, paradoxically, it appears that a more favorable outcome for Lansing and Yates might have occurred had New York also missed the very first vote of the Convention and the last vote on apportionment prior to “The Great Compromise”.
This paper explores the relationship between special-interest groups and volatility of GDP growth... more This paper explores the relationship between special-interest groups and volatility of GDP growth. In an unbalanced panel of 108 countries, we find a significant negative relationship between the number of interest groups in a country and the volatility of GDP growth.
In view of the ongoing debate about the degree and direction of political polarization in the U.S... more In view of the ongoing debate about the degree and direction of political polarization in the U.S., we assess whether the 50 states are converging or diverging in their behavior in state and federal elections. We find that states are diverging in their behavior in federal elections but converging in their behavior in state elections. Previous scholars have shown the need to distinguish between the degree of polarization of elites and ordinary citizens. Our findings demonstrate the further need to distinguish between trends in partisan polarization at the federal and state level.
This article distinguishes between two types of vote buying mechanisms. If vote choices can be mo... more This article distinguishes between two types of vote buying mechanisms. If vote choices can be monitored, vote buyers will not discriminate amongst prospective voters, regardless of how they are expected to vote. If voting is secret, a vote buyer will pay opposition voters not to vote which forces the opposition to pay its own voters to ensure they do vote. This implies the secret ballot may be less effective in curbing bribery than originally thought. No man has ever placed his money corruptly without satisfying himself that the vote was cast according to the agreement, or in a phrase which became only too common during the last campaign, without proof that 'the goods were delivered'; and when there is to be no proof but the word of the bribe-taker (who may have received thrice the sum to vote for the briber's opponent), it is idle to place any trust in such a use of money. In other words, take away all interest in committing an offense, and the offense will soon disappear. (Wigmore, 1889, p.31
Interest groups are known to exert a sclerotic impact on mean growth, à la Olson (1982). It is un... more Interest groups are known to exert a sclerotic impact on mean growth, à la Olson (1982). It is unknown, however, what impact (if any) groups exert on the volatility of growth-an important hindrance to development. In this article, we first consider what impact we should expect Olson groups to have on the volatility of growth. We then estimate the relation between groups and growth volatility in a crosscountry panel, using system generalized method of moments. The findings indicate that groups are associated with growth stability. In addition, the findings suggest that interest groups may be a source of the stability observed in democracies.
According to World Bank policy, countries remain eligible to borrow from the IBRD until they are ... more According to World Bank policy, countries remain eligible to borrow from the IBRD until they are able to sustain long-term development without further recourse to Bank financing. Graduation from IBRD is not an automatic consequence of reaching a particular income level, but rather is supposed to be based on a determination of whether the country has reached a level of institutional development and capital-market access that enables it to sustain its own development process without recourse to Bank funding. This paper takes a positive approach to IBRD graduation policy, investigating what income and non-income factors appear to have influenced graduation status in recent decades, based on panel data for 1982 through 2009. Explanatory variables include the per-capita income of the country, as well as measures of institutional development and market access that are cited as criteria by the graduation policy, and other plausible explanatory variables that capture the levels of economic development and vulnerability of the country. We find that the observed correlates of Bank graduation status are generally consistent with the stated policy. Countries that are wealthier, more creditworthy,
Buchanan and Tullock argue that larger supermajority rules reduce tyranny of the majority but sho... more Buchanan and Tullock argue that larger supermajority rules reduce tyranny of the majority but should have no effect on the passage of mutually advantageous policies. The authors test this argument by separately analyzing the effect of supermajority requirements on taxes that are targeted toward narrow groups (more redistributive) and taxes targeted toward a broader base (less redistributive), in a panel of fifty states from 1970 to 2008. Regression analysis reveals an inverse relationship between narrow taxes and the size of the majority rule requirement and no relationship between broad taxes and the size of the majority requirement—consistent with the claim of Buchanan and Tullock. The authors also find that Democratic controlled governments have significantly higher tax rates on narrow taxes than Republican controlled governments. The reverse is found for broad taxes, but the result is not as strong.
In presenting evidence in favor of rational partisan cycles, where electoral victories by leftist... more In presenting evidence in favor of rational partisan cycles, where electoral victories by leftist parties are expected to create temporary expansions and electoral victories by rightist parties are expected to create temporary recessions, Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini (1999) rely upon autoregressive time series intervention regressions. These regressions, however, are not consistent with their model. In this paper, a model is derived which is consistent with the intervention approach in its reduced-form. The differences between the models are highlighted and new empirical estimates are presented on a panel of seven OECD nations, which generally does not support the rational partisan cycle implications.
This paper explores empirically the relation between special-interest groups and economic growth.... more This paper explores empirically the relation between special-interest groups and economic growth. Our analysis exploits new data on the number of groups observed across countries and time, in order to mitigate the identification problems associated with earlier studies. Also in contrast to earlier work, we examine the impact of groups on two sources of growth-capital accumulation and technological change-in addition to the impact of groups on output growth. The findings are consistent with Olson's (The rise and decline of nations: the political economy of economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities. New Haven, Yale, 1982) claim that societies with greater numbers of interest groups grow slower, accumulate less capital, and experience reduced productivity growth relative to others.
This paper provides the first empirical study of delegate voting behavior on issues of slavery at... more This paper provides the first empirical study of delegate voting behavior on issues of slavery at the U.S. Constitutional Convention. We analyze two categories of votes: those related to apportionment and those related to the regulation of the slave trade. Although it is widely believed that delegates voted consistent with the interests of their states on issues of slavery, we find that for votes on apportionment, the effect of state interests was enhanced by both the delegate's personal interest and his religious background. For votes regulating the slave trade, state interests had a significant effect but only within specific regions.
The importance of primary elections is considered within the context of U.S. Senate elections whe... more The importance of primary elections is considered within the context of U.S. Senate elections where senators serve overlapping terms and voters are assumed to balance their two senators against each other. Voters behave strategically in the primaries but convergence to the median position is not achieved except as a knife-edge result. More generally, constraints in the party space prevent the party of the sitting senator from obtaining the median's preference allowing the opposition party to nominate a candidate further away from the median while still capturing the median voter. Empirical evidence supports the notion that senate divergence is a function of the state primary system.
Secrecy in the voting process eliminated an important motivation for voting. No longer able to ve... more Secrecy in the voting process eliminated an important motivation for voting. No longer able to verify the voters' choices, political parties stopped offering payments in return for votes. Within the rational voter framework, it will be shown that these payments were a prime impetus for people to vote. Without a vote market to cover their voting costs, many voters were rational to stay away from the polls. This hypothesis is supported through a series of empirical tests culminating in a multivariate legislative regression. When other electoral laws are controlled for, the .secret ballot accounts for 7 percentage points lower Gubernatorial turnout. * Electoral data of the total number of votes cast in each election is provided by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), Ann Arbor, Ml. Analysis of the data and the conclusions drawn in this paper reflect the views of the author and do not repre.sent the views of ICPSR. I would like to thank Timothy S. Sullivan and M. Malanoski for detailed criticisms of earlier drafts of this paper.
Empirical studies designed to testOlson's (1982) theory of institutional sclerosis aretypica... more Empirical studies designed to testOlson's (1982) theory of institutional sclerosis aretypically forced to rely upon proxies to measure theability of special interest groups to engage inredistributive activities, which in turn areexpected to hinder economic growth. This note showsthat reliance on proxies biases the estimates towardzero. Here, instrumental variable routines areutilized which increase the estimated impact ofspecial interests on the economy.
Previous studies of U.S. political polarization have examined state-level convergence and diverge... more Previous studies of U.S. political polarization have examined state-level convergence and divergence. Increasingly, scholars have turned from state-level analyses to regional analyses and advanced claims as to whether regions are becoming more similar or dissimilar. Yet, formal testing has remained largely absent. Using panel unit root tests, we determine whether regional political convergence is occurring between 1970 and 2004. Our results suggest the importance of distinguishing between ideological convergence and partisan convergence. We find the four regions and eight subregions are stochastically converging to a national norm in regard to ide-ology but not with regard to partisanship. Convergence for partisanship is, however, occurring within three of the regions, but not within the Midwest.
Convergence tests are performed on state-level turnout rates for U.S. presidential elections from... more Convergence tests are performed on state-level turnout rates for U.S. presidential elections from 1896 to 2004. The degree of dispersion in turnout has steadily declined since 1940, suggestive of general overall convergence taking place. Individually, it is found that 29 of the 48 continental states are stationary in their relative trend levels, and 42 states either do not significantly differ from the national average or are significantly trending toward the national average. In total, 25 of the 48 states pass tests for both stochastic and β-convergence, suggesting that national convergence is being achieved by roughly half the states.
This chapter reviews the strange history of social choice, elements of which have been understood... more This chapter reviews the strange history of social choice, elements of which have been understood for perhaps two thousand years. Isolated thinkers in the 13th, 15th, 18th and 19th centuries made substantial contributions to the field but almost always in ignorance of the work of their predecessors. Social choice was not established as a cumulative field of study until the middle of the 20th century. The chapter concludes with some reflections on this strange state of affairs. 2.2 Unanimous Consent and Constitutional Economics (Randall G. Holcombe) Constitutional economics makes heavy use of the normative benchmark of unanimous consent. The idea appears explicitly in the analysis of optimal constitutional rules in Buchanan and Tullock's The Calculus of Consent, and it continues through Buchanan's work that develops constitutional economics as a distinct area of inquiry within public choice. This chapter reviews some of the work that links unanimous consent closely with constitutional economics, and continues with a critical analysis of the implications and applicability of the benchmark of unanimous consent to real-world political decision making. 2.3 Rational Choice and the Calculus of Voting (André Blais) According to the rational choice model of voting, a person should vote only if the expected benefits outweigh the costs. But in a large electorate, the expected benefits are bound to be extremely small since the probability of one's vote being decisive is close to nil, so the rational decision appears to be abstention. Yet even in large elections most people do vote. This chapter reviews both the theoretical amendments that have been proposed to 'solve' this 'paradox of voting' and the empirical evidence that has been brought to bear on this question. The conclusion reached is that the paradox of voting is still very much alive and the decision to vote or not is driven primarily by alternative considerations such as social norms and pressures. 2.4 Computational Social Choice (Robi Ragan) This chapter provides an introduction to computational models of social choice. It discusses two major classes of computational models and provides examples of each. The first pertains to computational simulation of traditional analytical models to explore their robustness against changes in model parameters and functional forms. The second pertains to agent-based techniques for modeling social choice phenomena as complex adaptive systems in a way that is less restrictive than traditional analytical modeling and allows the researcher to build models with greater verisimilitude. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the tradeoffs and limitations in using simulation and agent-based models.
The u.s. Constitution was first developed at the 1787 Convention, where each state’s vote was det... more The u.s. Constitution was first developed at the 1787 Convention, where each state’s vote was determined by the majority preference of its delegates. Two of the delegates from New York, John Lansing and Robert Yates, both strident anti-Federalists, left the Convention early due to disagreement with the proceedings. Their departure cost New York its vote for the rest of the Convention, and has been considered by some scholars to be an important event. We investigate how often New York’s vote was critical to proposals passing or failing, both when present and counter-factually when absent. We find New York’s vote could have been critical on only 28 of 578 (roughly 5%) votes. Most of the 28 votes were on nominal issues. However, paradoxically, it appears that a more favorable outcome for Lansing and Yates might have occurred had New York also missed the very first vote of the Convention and the last vote on apportionment prior to “The Great Compromise”.
This paper explores the relationship between special-interest groups and volatility of GDP growth... more This paper explores the relationship between special-interest groups and volatility of GDP growth. In an unbalanced panel of 108 countries, we find a significant negative relationship between the number of interest groups in a country and the volatility of GDP growth.
In view of the ongoing debate about the degree and direction of political polarization in the U.S... more In view of the ongoing debate about the degree and direction of political polarization in the U.S., we assess whether the 50 states are converging or diverging in their behavior in state and federal elections. We find that states are diverging in their behavior in federal elections but converging in their behavior in state elections. Previous scholars have shown the need to distinguish between the degree of polarization of elites and ordinary citizens. Our findings demonstrate the further need to distinguish between trends in partisan polarization at the federal and state level.
This article distinguishes between two types of vote buying mechanisms. If vote choices can be mo... more This article distinguishes between two types of vote buying mechanisms. If vote choices can be monitored, vote buyers will not discriminate amongst prospective voters, regardless of how they are expected to vote. If voting is secret, a vote buyer will pay opposition voters not to vote which forces the opposition to pay its own voters to ensure they do vote. This implies the secret ballot may be less effective in curbing bribery than originally thought. No man has ever placed his money corruptly without satisfying himself that the vote was cast according to the agreement, or in a phrase which became only too common during the last campaign, without proof that 'the goods were delivered'; and when there is to be no proof but the word of the bribe-taker (who may have received thrice the sum to vote for the briber's opponent), it is idle to place any trust in such a use of money. In other words, take away all interest in committing an offense, and the offense will soon disappear. (Wigmore, 1889, p.31
Interest groups are known to exert a sclerotic impact on mean growth, à la Olson (1982). It is un... more Interest groups are known to exert a sclerotic impact on mean growth, à la Olson (1982). It is unknown, however, what impact (if any) groups exert on the volatility of growth-an important hindrance to development. In this article, we first consider what impact we should expect Olson groups to have on the volatility of growth. We then estimate the relation between groups and growth volatility in a crosscountry panel, using system generalized method of moments. The findings indicate that groups are associated with growth stability. In addition, the findings suggest that interest groups may be a source of the stability observed in democracies.
According to World Bank policy, countries remain eligible to borrow from the IBRD until they are ... more According to World Bank policy, countries remain eligible to borrow from the IBRD until they are able to sustain long-term development without further recourse to Bank financing. Graduation from IBRD is not an automatic consequence of reaching a particular income level, but rather is supposed to be based on a determination of whether the country has reached a level of institutional development and capital-market access that enables it to sustain its own development process without recourse to Bank funding. This paper takes a positive approach to IBRD graduation policy, investigating what income and non-income factors appear to have influenced graduation status in recent decades, based on panel data for 1982 through 2009. Explanatory variables include the per-capita income of the country, as well as measures of institutional development and market access that are cited as criteria by the graduation policy, and other plausible explanatory variables that capture the levels of economic development and vulnerability of the country. We find that the observed correlates of Bank graduation status are generally consistent with the stated policy. Countries that are wealthier, more creditworthy,
Buchanan and Tullock argue that larger supermajority rules reduce tyranny of the majority but sho... more Buchanan and Tullock argue that larger supermajority rules reduce tyranny of the majority but should have no effect on the passage of mutually advantageous policies. The authors test this argument by separately analyzing the effect of supermajority requirements on taxes that are targeted toward narrow groups (more redistributive) and taxes targeted toward a broader base (less redistributive), in a panel of fifty states from 1970 to 2008. Regression analysis reveals an inverse relationship between narrow taxes and the size of the majority rule requirement and no relationship between broad taxes and the size of the majority requirement—consistent with the claim of Buchanan and Tullock. The authors also find that Democratic controlled governments have significantly higher tax rates on narrow taxes than Republican controlled governments. The reverse is found for broad taxes, but the result is not as strong.
In presenting evidence in favor of rational partisan cycles, where electoral victories by leftist... more In presenting evidence in favor of rational partisan cycles, where electoral victories by leftist parties are expected to create temporary expansions and electoral victories by rightist parties are expected to create temporary recessions, Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini (1999) rely upon autoregressive time series intervention regressions. These regressions, however, are not consistent with their model. In this paper, a model is derived which is consistent with the intervention approach in its reduced-form. The differences between the models are highlighted and new empirical estimates are presented on a panel of seven OECD nations, which generally does not support the rational partisan cycle implications.
This paper explores empirically the relation between special-interest groups and economic growth.... more This paper explores empirically the relation between special-interest groups and economic growth. Our analysis exploits new data on the number of groups observed across countries and time, in order to mitigate the identification problems associated with earlier studies. Also in contrast to earlier work, we examine the impact of groups on two sources of growth-capital accumulation and technological change-in addition to the impact of groups on output growth. The findings are consistent with Olson's (The rise and decline of nations: the political economy of economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities. New Haven, Yale, 1982) claim that societies with greater numbers of interest groups grow slower, accumulate less capital, and experience reduced productivity growth relative to others.
This paper provides the first empirical study of delegate voting behavior on issues of slavery at... more This paper provides the first empirical study of delegate voting behavior on issues of slavery at the U.S. Constitutional Convention. We analyze two categories of votes: those related to apportionment and those related to the regulation of the slave trade. Although it is widely believed that delegates voted consistent with the interests of their states on issues of slavery, we find that for votes on apportionment, the effect of state interests was enhanced by both the delegate's personal interest and his religious background. For votes regulating the slave trade, state interests had a significant effect but only within specific regions.
The importance of primary elections is considered within the context of U.S. Senate elections whe... more The importance of primary elections is considered within the context of U.S. Senate elections where senators serve overlapping terms and voters are assumed to balance their two senators against each other. Voters behave strategically in the primaries but convergence to the median position is not achieved except as a knife-edge result. More generally, constraints in the party space prevent the party of the sitting senator from obtaining the median's preference allowing the opposition party to nominate a candidate further away from the median while still capturing the median voter. Empirical evidence supports the notion that senate divergence is a function of the state primary system.
Secrecy in the voting process eliminated an important motivation for voting. No longer able to ve... more Secrecy in the voting process eliminated an important motivation for voting. No longer able to verify the voters' choices, political parties stopped offering payments in return for votes. Within the rational voter framework, it will be shown that these payments were a prime impetus for people to vote. Without a vote market to cover their voting costs, many voters were rational to stay away from the polls. This hypothesis is supported through a series of empirical tests culminating in a multivariate legislative regression. When other electoral laws are controlled for, the .secret ballot accounts for 7 percentage points lower Gubernatorial turnout. * Electoral data of the total number of votes cast in each election is provided by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), Ann Arbor, Ml. Analysis of the data and the conclusions drawn in this paper reflect the views of the author and do not repre.sent the views of ICPSR. I would like to thank Timothy S. Sullivan and M. Malanoski for detailed criticisms of earlier drafts of this paper.
Empirical studies designed to testOlson's (1982) theory of institutional sclerosis aretypica... more Empirical studies designed to testOlson's (1982) theory of institutional sclerosis aretypically forced to rely upon proxies to measure theability of special interest groups to engage inredistributive activities, which in turn areexpected to hinder economic growth. This note showsthat reliance on proxies biases the estimates towardzero. Here, instrumental variable routines areutilized which increase the estimated impact ofspecial interests on the economy.
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Papers by Jac Heckelman