Papers by Hovav Cohen
עבודה תחילתית על אי ציות אזרחי אצל חנה ארנדט רק כי אני רוצה להכנס לאתר כדי לקרוא מאמרים
Thesis Chapters by Hovav Cohen
University of Haifa , 2021
As one of the outstanding philosophical figures of the 20th century, Hannah Arendt has often been... more As one of the outstanding philosophical figures of the 20th century, Hannah Arendt has often been thought to exemplify original ways of thought. Among the many concepts Arendt revived through her unique political and theoretical contributions was the idea of conscience, and
discussions of this philosophical concept form the backdrop of much of her work. In 1970, Arendt underwent a key shift in her treatment of the concept of conscience, as reflected in her essay that year, “Reflections on Civil Disobedience,”in which she discusses the form and role of conscience in politics. At the same time, Arendt also developed a concept tangential to that of conscience — the idea of thinking — which she refined in the light of her lectures on Kant.
Throughout 1970, Arendt recast her concept of conscience from both a political and a philosophical perspective. This raises two important questions. How did the shift in Arendt’s concept of conscience come about in 1970? And what was the change that Arendt sought to make in her concept of conscience? While this philosophical shift in Arendt’s concept of conscience in 1970 has been noted in
research on Arendt, there remains controversy over its scope and significance. To try to clarify the significance of conscience in Arendt’s thought, this thesis outlines two conceptual and political models, through which the concept of conscience may be characterized. The unifying idea between these models is the relationship between the principle of transcendent law and the principle of Socratic dialogue. It must be noted that, in general, the very development of the concept of conscience has not been studied thoroughly or comprehensively. Consequently, Arendt’s conceptual shift regarding conscience has been detached from itsintellectual context. This thesis employs an intellectual history methodology which involves examining the central ideas underpinning Arendt’s sources, and developing units of meaning in relation to the concept of conscience. The sources referred to include Arendt’s journalistic writings, her appearances, personal and biographical details, writings of her contemporaries, and research about Arendt’s
concepts.
Chapters 1 and 2: Motifs of Conscience Pre-1970 and the Dialectic of the Concept of Conscience in 1970 To explore the essence of the Arendt’s change and its meaning, this thesis begins by reviewing Arendt’s early, pre-1970 writings for evidence of her thinking about conscience. An
examination of these sources uncovers two motifs about conscience: the “voice of conscience” and the “conscious pariahs.” The first motif is philosophical (the internal voice that provokes thought and gives rise to moral distinctions) and the second is political (conscientious historical figures and, in contrast, figures lacking the ability to think, thoughtfulness). After refining these motifs, the thesis selects and examines sources about Arendt from that critical year of 1970. While the 1970 sources reflect some philosophical resemblance to her earlier “voice of conscience” motif, Arendt certainly changed her stance regarding conscientious objection. In the earlier first conference on this subject, Arendt argued that civil disobedience stemmed from decisions made by individuals according to their conscience. However, in 1970, Arendt changed her view, and made a distinction between civil disobedience and conscientious objection, thus situating conscience as a conscientious opinion. This deep philosophical shift is reflected in Arendt’s assertions in her 1970 essay that conscience is “unpolitical,” and that it is actually an intellectual or thought movement in character.
Chapter 3: Conflict with American Thinkers
To better understand the depth of the change in Arendt’s concept of conscience, this thesis seeks to explore her transformation within the context of her intellectual dialog with American thinkers, particularly debates around conscientious objection and civil disobedience. These
form part of a profound transformation that Arendt sought to advance within New York intellectual discourse—an alternative liberal approach. At the time, there was a deepening rift between orthodox and radical liberal approaches and between thinkers from the New Left and Neoconservative trends. Arendt was not only influenced by but was able to confront and
respond to proponents from these different camps at various conferences. Arendt promoted ideas about the spirit of the law and consensus in an effort to create a dynamic politics that would permit the establishment of a new foundation. She opposed the liberal position that
promoted a discourse of civil rights and freedom, while challenging the conservative viewpoint that revered the law and government institutions. Furthermore, Arendt insisted on a separation between the private and public, and the moral and political. She emphasized the role of
conscientious individuals acting in the private sphere and sought to allow space for conscientious opinion within the pluralism of views in politics. Through this call to action, Arendt sought to establish the foundation of the political sphere — the possibility of thinking. Her ideas on political foundation and her position advancing the possibility of thinking were at
odds with the opposing camps on the key issues of the day. Arendt's views were in the minority, and her theoretical political effort to separate conscience from politics and conscientious objection from civil disobedience, were not fully accepted, even among her friends and
associates.
Chapter 4: Self Thinking
To understand fully the philosophical transformation of Arendt’s concept of conscience, this thesis examines the biographical and philosophical changes that occurred in her thought immediately prior to 1970. During those years, Arendt began to contemplate the notion that thinking was a necessary philosophical complement to “The Human Condition.” Her
philosophical refocusing was rooted in changes that took place in her life. The year 1970 was a turbulent one in Arendt’s life, when she lost those closest to her. Moreover, the lack of public understanding of her thought regarding moral failure, together with her re-reading of Heidegger’s writings, led her to rethink the concepts of the voice of conscience and the possibility of thought. In 1970, Arendt sought to advance and refresh the notion of individual private thought. To reframe this concept, Arendt chose to reinterpret Kant’s work and privilege the aesthetic critique of judgement of taste over the categorical imperative. She rethought the notion of spectator and attempted to re-understand the idea of common sense as a
communication sense of the world as well as an understanding of reality, where the position of the other is integrated as a condition for private esthetic judgement. In developing this approach, Arendt challenged the moral habit that sometimes appears as the voice of conscience rooted in moral law, as with Kant’s categorical imperative. She redefined the sphere of thinking itself as independent and intersubjective. Via intersubjective sensitivity, observers are able to view actors and exercise taste by using enlarged Mentality, extended thinking as an ability, rather than as an obedient duty. Such esthetic critical thinking opens up the possibility of examining others’ points of view as instances in the dialog with oneself of thinking individuals. In 1970, Arendt sought to foster a change in her concept of conscience. The political process and the philosophical process of transformation are often understood in isolation, as two discrete phenomena. However, a full understanding of the transformation that Arendt sought is only possible when the connection is made between these two processes. These processes should be understood as complementary parts of a change that Arendt made in her concept of conscience—as two positions that constitute a single philosophical movement. The political movement in her 1970 essay Civil Disobedience constructs an alternative liberal position that is based on a dynamic understanding of the political sphere and founded on a pluralism of conscientious ideas, in which there is room for private moral thinking. In Arendt’s lectures on Kant, we find a complementary philosophical movement that calls to replace the voice of conscience with the possibility of thinking—with a particular emphasis on Arendt’s concept of
thinking, i.e., an expanded “thinking between me and myself.” The central argument of this thesis is that, in 1970, an overall shift in Arendt’s concept of conscience took place. During this year, Arendt adopted an alternative liberal approach and sought to advance two philosophical changes within the intellectual discourse. Arendt called for a new political foundation, while seeking to establish the possibility for thinking itself. This later change indicates a deeper shift that Arendt made in her concept of conscience, which arose from a personal transition from the political to the philosophical. Thus, as a result of a significant loss in her life, Arendt developed a philosophical movement that called for a critique of the voice of conscience and to advance thinking itself. From her critique of philosophical and political thought, Arendt sought to create an esthetic realm of “thinking between me and myself” where moral thinking is continuously reestablished and where there is room for the other in the inner discourse of man.
Drafts by Hovav Cohen
אוניברסיטת חיפה, 2017
זוהי עבודת סמינריון על פולמוס אייכמן. במאמר זה ישנה סקירה של הפולמוס סביב משפט אייכמן וכן ביאור ר... more זוהי עבודת סמינריון על פולמוס אייכמן. במאמר זה ישנה סקירה של הפולמוס סביב משפט אייכמן וכן ביאור רעיונותיה של ארנדט במאמר אחריות אישית תחת דיקטטורה.
מאמר שעושה סדר ברעיונותיה של ארנדט בעל האלימות
זוהי עבודה בקורס בית מדרשי 'עזרת נשים. בעבודה חקרתי את התאולוגיה הפמינסטית שמציאות הוגות של המאה ... more זוהי עבודה בקורס בית מדרשי 'עזרת נשים. בעבודה חקרתי את התאולוגיה הפמינסטית שמציאות הוגות של המאה ה20 ונסיתי לאפיין את תאולוגיה זו.
זוהי עבודה אקדמית על ספרה של ארנדט על המהפכה
זוהי עבודה על 5 קברים חשובים. העבודה מראה את גלגול קדושתם של קברים אלו.
זהי עבודת סמנריון מקיפה שמטרה להראות את ההשפעות המוסלמיות והאחרות על הרמב"ם בכתיבתו את משנה תורה.... more זהי עבודת סמנריון מקיפה שמטרה להראות את ההשפעות המוסלמיות והאחרות על הרמב"ם בכתיבתו את משנה תורה. הטענה כי הרמב"ם ראה את עצמו כמחדש ואף יותר מכך.
סמינר שכתבתי על יחסה של ארנדט למלחמה הקרה בדגש על התגובה שלה למסמכי הפנטגון.
בעקבות קורס על הוגים לאחר מלחמת העולם השנייה כתבתי את המסה הזו. המסה
, משלבת את הגותם של חנה ארנ... more בעקבות קורס על הוגים לאחר מלחמת העולם השנייה כתבתי את המסה הזו. המסה
, משלבת את הגותם של חנה ארנדט, ישעיהו ברלין, זאן פול סארטר, פרנץ פנון ואמה סזר
המסה עוקבת באופן פילוסופי אחר השינוי מהגדרת הבעיה היהודית והפיכתה לשאלה יהודית,
hovav cohen, 2015
סמינר בחוג לחינוך על משבר החינוך של ארנדט
זהו עבודת סמינר על ביקורתה של ארדנט על שירו של ברטולד ברכט
מסה קצרה שחיברתי על מושג הזהות גם היא זכתה בפרס
hovav cohen, 2014
זוהי מסה שפרסמתי ב2014 עליה קיבלתי פרס ראשון בתחרות חיבורים מטעם אוניברסיטת חיפה
Uploads
Papers by Hovav Cohen
Thesis Chapters by Hovav Cohen
discussions of this philosophical concept form the backdrop of much of her work. In 1970, Arendt underwent a key shift in her treatment of the concept of conscience, as reflected in her essay that year, “Reflections on Civil Disobedience,”in which she discusses the form and role of conscience in politics. At the same time, Arendt also developed a concept tangential to that of conscience — the idea of thinking — which she refined in the light of her lectures on Kant.
Throughout 1970, Arendt recast her concept of conscience from both a political and a philosophical perspective. This raises two important questions. How did the shift in Arendt’s concept of conscience come about in 1970? And what was the change that Arendt sought to make in her concept of conscience? While this philosophical shift in Arendt’s concept of conscience in 1970 has been noted in
research on Arendt, there remains controversy over its scope and significance. To try to clarify the significance of conscience in Arendt’s thought, this thesis outlines two conceptual and political models, through which the concept of conscience may be characterized. The unifying idea between these models is the relationship between the principle of transcendent law and the principle of Socratic dialogue. It must be noted that, in general, the very development of the concept of conscience has not been studied thoroughly or comprehensively. Consequently, Arendt’s conceptual shift regarding conscience has been detached from itsintellectual context. This thesis employs an intellectual history methodology which involves examining the central ideas underpinning Arendt’s sources, and developing units of meaning in relation to the concept of conscience. The sources referred to include Arendt’s journalistic writings, her appearances, personal and biographical details, writings of her contemporaries, and research about Arendt’s
concepts.
Chapters 1 and 2: Motifs of Conscience Pre-1970 and the Dialectic of the Concept of Conscience in 1970 To explore the essence of the Arendt’s change and its meaning, this thesis begins by reviewing Arendt’s early, pre-1970 writings for evidence of her thinking about conscience. An
examination of these sources uncovers two motifs about conscience: the “voice of conscience” and the “conscious pariahs.” The first motif is philosophical (the internal voice that provokes thought and gives rise to moral distinctions) and the second is political (conscientious historical figures and, in contrast, figures lacking the ability to think, thoughtfulness). After refining these motifs, the thesis selects and examines sources about Arendt from that critical year of 1970. While the 1970 sources reflect some philosophical resemblance to her earlier “voice of conscience” motif, Arendt certainly changed her stance regarding conscientious objection. In the earlier first conference on this subject, Arendt argued that civil disobedience stemmed from decisions made by individuals according to their conscience. However, in 1970, Arendt changed her view, and made a distinction between civil disobedience and conscientious objection, thus situating conscience as a conscientious opinion. This deep philosophical shift is reflected in Arendt’s assertions in her 1970 essay that conscience is “unpolitical,” and that it is actually an intellectual or thought movement in character.
Chapter 3: Conflict with American Thinkers
To better understand the depth of the change in Arendt’s concept of conscience, this thesis seeks to explore her transformation within the context of her intellectual dialog with American thinkers, particularly debates around conscientious objection and civil disobedience. These
form part of a profound transformation that Arendt sought to advance within New York intellectual discourse—an alternative liberal approach. At the time, there was a deepening rift between orthodox and radical liberal approaches and between thinkers from the New Left and Neoconservative trends. Arendt was not only influenced by but was able to confront and
respond to proponents from these different camps at various conferences. Arendt promoted ideas about the spirit of the law and consensus in an effort to create a dynamic politics that would permit the establishment of a new foundation. She opposed the liberal position that
promoted a discourse of civil rights and freedom, while challenging the conservative viewpoint that revered the law and government institutions. Furthermore, Arendt insisted on a separation between the private and public, and the moral and political. She emphasized the role of
conscientious individuals acting in the private sphere and sought to allow space for conscientious opinion within the pluralism of views in politics. Through this call to action, Arendt sought to establish the foundation of the political sphere — the possibility of thinking. Her ideas on political foundation and her position advancing the possibility of thinking were at
odds with the opposing camps on the key issues of the day. Arendt's views were in the minority, and her theoretical political effort to separate conscience from politics and conscientious objection from civil disobedience, were not fully accepted, even among her friends and
associates.
Chapter 4: Self Thinking
To understand fully the philosophical transformation of Arendt’s concept of conscience, this thesis examines the biographical and philosophical changes that occurred in her thought immediately prior to 1970. During those years, Arendt began to contemplate the notion that thinking was a necessary philosophical complement to “The Human Condition.” Her
philosophical refocusing was rooted in changes that took place in her life. The year 1970 was a turbulent one in Arendt’s life, when she lost those closest to her. Moreover, the lack of public understanding of her thought regarding moral failure, together with her re-reading of Heidegger’s writings, led her to rethink the concepts of the voice of conscience and the possibility of thought. In 1970, Arendt sought to advance and refresh the notion of individual private thought. To reframe this concept, Arendt chose to reinterpret Kant’s work and privilege the aesthetic critique of judgement of taste over the categorical imperative. She rethought the notion of spectator and attempted to re-understand the idea of common sense as a
communication sense of the world as well as an understanding of reality, where the position of the other is integrated as a condition for private esthetic judgement. In developing this approach, Arendt challenged the moral habit that sometimes appears as the voice of conscience rooted in moral law, as with Kant’s categorical imperative. She redefined the sphere of thinking itself as independent and intersubjective. Via intersubjective sensitivity, observers are able to view actors and exercise taste by using enlarged Mentality, extended thinking as an ability, rather than as an obedient duty. Such esthetic critical thinking opens up the possibility of examining others’ points of view as instances in the dialog with oneself of thinking individuals. In 1970, Arendt sought to foster a change in her concept of conscience. The political process and the philosophical process of transformation are often understood in isolation, as two discrete phenomena. However, a full understanding of the transformation that Arendt sought is only possible when the connection is made between these two processes. These processes should be understood as complementary parts of a change that Arendt made in her concept of conscience—as two positions that constitute a single philosophical movement. The political movement in her 1970 essay Civil Disobedience constructs an alternative liberal position that is based on a dynamic understanding of the political sphere and founded on a pluralism of conscientious ideas, in which there is room for private moral thinking. In Arendt’s lectures on Kant, we find a complementary philosophical movement that calls to replace the voice of conscience with the possibility of thinking—with a particular emphasis on Arendt’s concept of
thinking, i.e., an expanded “thinking between me and myself.” The central argument of this thesis is that, in 1970, an overall shift in Arendt’s concept of conscience took place. During this year, Arendt adopted an alternative liberal approach and sought to advance two philosophical changes within the intellectual discourse. Arendt called for a new political foundation, while seeking to establish the possibility for thinking itself. This later change indicates a deeper shift that Arendt made in her concept of conscience, which arose from a personal transition from the political to the philosophical. Thus, as a result of a significant loss in her life, Arendt developed a philosophical movement that called for a critique of the voice of conscience and to advance thinking itself. From her critique of philosophical and political thought, Arendt sought to create an esthetic realm of “thinking between me and myself” where moral thinking is continuously reestablished and where there is room for the other in the inner discourse of man.
Drafts by Hovav Cohen
, משלבת את הגותם של חנה ארנדט, ישעיהו ברלין, זאן פול סארטר, פרנץ פנון ואמה סזר
המסה עוקבת באופן פילוסופי אחר השינוי מהגדרת הבעיה היהודית והפיכתה לשאלה יהודית,
discussions of this philosophical concept form the backdrop of much of her work. In 1970, Arendt underwent a key shift in her treatment of the concept of conscience, as reflected in her essay that year, “Reflections on Civil Disobedience,”in which she discusses the form and role of conscience in politics. At the same time, Arendt also developed a concept tangential to that of conscience — the idea of thinking — which she refined in the light of her lectures on Kant.
Throughout 1970, Arendt recast her concept of conscience from both a political and a philosophical perspective. This raises two important questions. How did the shift in Arendt’s concept of conscience come about in 1970? And what was the change that Arendt sought to make in her concept of conscience? While this philosophical shift in Arendt’s concept of conscience in 1970 has been noted in
research on Arendt, there remains controversy over its scope and significance. To try to clarify the significance of conscience in Arendt’s thought, this thesis outlines two conceptual and political models, through which the concept of conscience may be characterized. The unifying idea between these models is the relationship between the principle of transcendent law and the principle of Socratic dialogue. It must be noted that, in general, the very development of the concept of conscience has not been studied thoroughly or comprehensively. Consequently, Arendt’s conceptual shift regarding conscience has been detached from itsintellectual context. This thesis employs an intellectual history methodology which involves examining the central ideas underpinning Arendt’s sources, and developing units of meaning in relation to the concept of conscience. The sources referred to include Arendt’s journalistic writings, her appearances, personal and biographical details, writings of her contemporaries, and research about Arendt’s
concepts.
Chapters 1 and 2: Motifs of Conscience Pre-1970 and the Dialectic of the Concept of Conscience in 1970 To explore the essence of the Arendt’s change and its meaning, this thesis begins by reviewing Arendt’s early, pre-1970 writings for evidence of her thinking about conscience. An
examination of these sources uncovers two motifs about conscience: the “voice of conscience” and the “conscious pariahs.” The first motif is philosophical (the internal voice that provokes thought and gives rise to moral distinctions) and the second is political (conscientious historical figures and, in contrast, figures lacking the ability to think, thoughtfulness). After refining these motifs, the thesis selects and examines sources about Arendt from that critical year of 1970. While the 1970 sources reflect some philosophical resemblance to her earlier “voice of conscience” motif, Arendt certainly changed her stance regarding conscientious objection. In the earlier first conference on this subject, Arendt argued that civil disobedience stemmed from decisions made by individuals according to their conscience. However, in 1970, Arendt changed her view, and made a distinction between civil disobedience and conscientious objection, thus situating conscience as a conscientious opinion. This deep philosophical shift is reflected in Arendt’s assertions in her 1970 essay that conscience is “unpolitical,” and that it is actually an intellectual or thought movement in character.
Chapter 3: Conflict with American Thinkers
To better understand the depth of the change in Arendt’s concept of conscience, this thesis seeks to explore her transformation within the context of her intellectual dialog with American thinkers, particularly debates around conscientious objection and civil disobedience. These
form part of a profound transformation that Arendt sought to advance within New York intellectual discourse—an alternative liberal approach. At the time, there was a deepening rift between orthodox and radical liberal approaches and between thinkers from the New Left and Neoconservative trends. Arendt was not only influenced by but was able to confront and
respond to proponents from these different camps at various conferences. Arendt promoted ideas about the spirit of the law and consensus in an effort to create a dynamic politics that would permit the establishment of a new foundation. She opposed the liberal position that
promoted a discourse of civil rights and freedom, while challenging the conservative viewpoint that revered the law and government institutions. Furthermore, Arendt insisted on a separation between the private and public, and the moral and political. She emphasized the role of
conscientious individuals acting in the private sphere and sought to allow space for conscientious opinion within the pluralism of views in politics. Through this call to action, Arendt sought to establish the foundation of the political sphere — the possibility of thinking. Her ideas on political foundation and her position advancing the possibility of thinking were at
odds with the opposing camps on the key issues of the day. Arendt's views were in the minority, and her theoretical political effort to separate conscience from politics and conscientious objection from civil disobedience, were not fully accepted, even among her friends and
associates.
Chapter 4: Self Thinking
To understand fully the philosophical transformation of Arendt’s concept of conscience, this thesis examines the biographical and philosophical changes that occurred in her thought immediately prior to 1970. During those years, Arendt began to contemplate the notion that thinking was a necessary philosophical complement to “The Human Condition.” Her
philosophical refocusing was rooted in changes that took place in her life. The year 1970 was a turbulent one in Arendt’s life, when she lost those closest to her. Moreover, the lack of public understanding of her thought regarding moral failure, together with her re-reading of Heidegger’s writings, led her to rethink the concepts of the voice of conscience and the possibility of thought. In 1970, Arendt sought to advance and refresh the notion of individual private thought. To reframe this concept, Arendt chose to reinterpret Kant’s work and privilege the aesthetic critique of judgement of taste over the categorical imperative. She rethought the notion of spectator and attempted to re-understand the idea of common sense as a
communication sense of the world as well as an understanding of reality, where the position of the other is integrated as a condition for private esthetic judgement. In developing this approach, Arendt challenged the moral habit that sometimes appears as the voice of conscience rooted in moral law, as with Kant’s categorical imperative. She redefined the sphere of thinking itself as independent and intersubjective. Via intersubjective sensitivity, observers are able to view actors and exercise taste by using enlarged Mentality, extended thinking as an ability, rather than as an obedient duty. Such esthetic critical thinking opens up the possibility of examining others’ points of view as instances in the dialog with oneself of thinking individuals. In 1970, Arendt sought to foster a change in her concept of conscience. The political process and the philosophical process of transformation are often understood in isolation, as two discrete phenomena. However, a full understanding of the transformation that Arendt sought is only possible when the connection is made between these two processes. These processes should be understood as complementary parts of a change that Arendt made in her concept of conscience—as two positions that constitute a single philosophical movement. The political movement in her 1970 essay Civil Disobedience constructs an alternative liberal position that is based on a dynamic understanding of the political sphere and founded on a pluralism of conscientious ideas, in which there is room for private moral thinking. In Arendt’s lectures on Kant, we find a complementary philosophical movement that calls to replace the voice of conscience with the possibility of thinking—with a particular emphasis on Arendt’s concept of
thinking, i.e., an expanded “thinking between me and myself.” The central argument of this thesis is that, in 1970, an overall shift in Arendt’s concept of conscience took place. During this year, Arendt adopted an alternative liberal approach and sought to advance two philosophical changes within the intellectual discourse. Arendt called for a new political foundation, while seeking to establish the possibility for thinking itself. This later change indicates a deeper shift that Arendt made in her concept of conscience, which arose from a personal transition from the political to the philosophical. Thus, as a result of a significant loss in her life, Arendt developed a philosophical movement that called for a critique of the voice of conscience and to advance thinking itself. From her critique of philosophical and political thought, Arendt sought to create an esthetic realm of “thinking between me and myself” where moral thinking is continuously reestablished and where there is room for the other in the inner discourse of man.
, משלבת את הגותם של חנה ארנדט, ישעיהו ברלין, זאן פול סארטר, פרנץ פנון ואמה סזר
המסה עוקבת באופן פילוסופי אחר השינוי מהגדרת הבעיה היהודית והפיכתה לשאלה יהודית,