Since its beginning in Brazil in 1989, participatory budgeting (PB) has spread worldwide to sever... more Since its beginning in Brazil in 1989, participatory budgeting (PB) has spread worldwide to several thousand local governmental units (LGUs) in all continents, celebrated for its success in combining citizen involvement and state accountability in delivering public services. While PB has been adopted in most places by individual LGUs on their own initiative, in India the state of Kerala implemented PB throughout all its governmental units from rural villages and urban wards up through district in one "big bang" move in 1996. Over the succeeding two decades and more, PB has become securely institutionalized, surviving numerous changes of ruling party at state level. Outside of Kerala, however, few LGUs of any sort have implemented PB and it has not flourished in any of the adopters. Using the World Bank's principal-agent model of state accountability for public service delivery, this paper will explore Kerala's experience at PB and more briefly look at its lack of success elsewhere in India.
The Janata period in Bihar has been plagued with instability and violence in the state's politica... more The Janata period in Bihar has been plagued with instability and violence in the state's political life, its universities and its bureauicracy. In the minds of many observers, the disruption and its immediate cause, the Karpoori Thakur ministry's reservation policy, are indicative of a sea-change in the structure of Bihar's political economy: the 'Forwards' or 'twice-born' caste groups that had been dominant in Bihar since independence and before are being replaced by the 'Backward' castes as the dominant stratum in the state. This essay examines the evidence of such a shift in the structure of dominance in Bihar and its implication for the political economy of the state. THE current scene in Bihar is a depressing one. College students are burning buses, sacking government offices, seizing locomotives and even derailing trains; other groups of students do combat with the disrupters. The bureaucracy is paralysed. Stories of Harijan atrocities get into the press more frequently than usual, and give the impression that many more such outrages are going unreported. Political life is beset with intense byzantine intrigpes and manoeuvres to oust (or to save) the Janata ministry, completely distracting the ministry's already severely limited political will for dealing with the problems of a state that is at the bottom of almost every index of social and economic development in India. There have been reports of "more than 2,000 political murders" in recent months.' DEFINING THE BACKWARDS At the eye of the storm has been the one object that Karpoori Thakur in his chief ministership showed himself determined to pursuehis reservation policy. Thakur's successor as chief minister, Ram Sunder Das, has also promised (if more than somewhat half-heartedly) to implement the policy, so it continues to remain at the centre of the stage in the politics of Bihar.2 Promised in 1977 and finally promulgated in the autumn of 1978, the reservation policy asserted that in addition to the quotas on government employment already reserved for Harijans and Adivasis (24 per cent if taken together), henceforth 26 per cent of new government positions would be reserved for the 'Backward Classes'. More precisely, those Backwards known as being 'Annexure I' would be allotted 12 per cent of the posts, those known as being 'Annexure II' would be allocated 8 per cent, 3 per cent would go to women of any group, and 3 per cent to those who were 'economically backward'. The history of the annexures is a tangled one, and the question of how many people they include is even more confusing. The story goes at least as far back as to 1951, when the Bihar government composed two lists of Backward Classes Comprising Hindu and Muslim caste groups that were not Harijans or Adivasis, but were nonetheless determined to be economically and socially backward and in need of special governmental assistance, particularly in the way of educational help. The two lists came to be known as 'Annexure I' and 'Annexure II', which could be thought of as 'more backward' and 'less backward' (but still in need of help) groups. Annexure I (the 'more backward') included some 78 Hindu and Muslim castes, some well-known (e g, Dhanuk, Hajjam, Kahar and Mallah), others considerably less so (eg, Gulguha, Jadupatia). The second ('less backward') Annexure included 30 castes altogether; many of them were communities that in terms of social and economic backwardness were difficult to distinguish from those in Annexure I, such as Barhis, Kandus and Kumhars (as well as some Muslim castes like Momins and Rayeens), but the list consisted primarily of the more advanced communities in the Vaishya and Shudra varnas, that is the Banias, Koiris, Kurmis and Yadavs.3 These groups, while not as powerful (certainly in 1951, anyway) in social, political or economic matters as the first four 'twice-born' tbaste groups in the state (the Brajmas, Bhumihars, Rajputs and Kayasthas), were still far ahead of the remaining communities. The Banias, of course, were traditionally traders and small businessmen, while the other three were largely peasant proprietor castes, smallholders in the 5-15 acre range and primarily ryots in the zamindari land tenure system-then prevailing in Bihar. Just how many people might be included within these groups was not at all clear, for the Census has not gathered data on caste since 1941 and has not published these data since the 1931 Census. As with so many things in India, though, there are exceptions. In addition to the data on Scheduled Castes and Tribes that have been gathered in all the reoent censuses, the Census of 1951 also took down some infonMation on membership in certain of the backward castes. The Backward Classes Commission (BCC), set up at the Central level and chaired by Kaka Kalelkar, made use of these data in composing its own lists of backward classes for the various states in its report published in 1955. For Bihar some 127 castes (again both Hindu and Muslim) are listec,, with a tbtal population of 15.3 million or 38.1 per cent of the state's total population in 1951.4 The 1955 enumeration was not a complete one, however, for such important castes as Koiri, Mallah and Tatwa were included in the listing as Backward, but had not been counted in the 1951 Census. Overall, figures were available for only 54 of the 127 castes denominated as Backward in the BCC report, and so its 15.3 million total was considerably short of the total number that fell within the Backward category as determined in either the 1951 Government of Bihar list or the 1955 BCC report.
Harry W. Blair is now overwhelming that subsidized agricultural The evidence credit programs have... more Harry W. Blair is now overwhelming that subsidized agricultural The evidence credit programs have not been effective in getting credit to the small over the past two decades. Indeed, farmer or in promoting equity the effects of these programs often have been ...
... This experiment, it will be contended, was promising (at least until the i97i civil strife) l... more ... This experiment, it will be contended, was promising (at least until the i97i civil strife) largely because it ... of the "Protestant Ethic" that served as the main-spring of the Industrial Revolution in the West. ... 1Max Weber, The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism. ...
... Both programmes in the Philippines emphasized marginal elements such as the urban poor, low .... more ... Both programmes in the Philippines emphasized marginal elements such as the urban poor, low ... In Indonesia, USAID's Civil Society Support Program (CSSP) began as a national programme ... reduced support for some of the earlier national-level activities, particularly in media. ...
During this period, four successive regimes in Bangladesh have felt reluctantly compelled to set ... more During this period, four successive regimes in Bangladesh have felt reluctantly compelled to set up structures for local participation in government. Each found it had to reach out beyond the support of urban and rural elites and the military if it was to move beyond mere stability to real development of the country. Despite many problems. most notably local elite takeover at local level and military coup at national level, there is considerable evidence. particularly from neighboring India. to suggest that local participatory institutions can be successful over the longer term in promoting development for the middle and the poorer rural classes.
A state's accountability to its citizens for public service delivery constitutes a central compon... more A state's accountability to its citizens for public service delivery constitutes a central component of the democratic polity. But how to assure this accountability? The answer lies in the linkage between citizens and some combination of elected political leaders and those they direct to provide the services. In India over recent decades, a host of mechanisms has emerged to provide that linkage, some of them quite potent. Building on the World Bank's 2003 principal-agent model of long and short routes to state accountability, this article argues for a distinct third civil society route. It then explores the paths these three routes can take and their potential effectiveness in providing citizens a number of institutional mechanisms to hold political leaders and public service providers accountable, improve service delivery, empower poor people and ultimately enhance well-being.
Often reduced to statistics, the misery of the 312 million who live below the poverty line in Ind... more Often reduced to statistics, the misery of the 312 million who live below the poverty line in India, is often overlooked. These stories show how they manage, what sustains them and efforts made to help. The book pays attention to districts, and the issues it raises are universal in their relevance.
Part I of this article traced the experience of India's Bihar state as it shifted in the last dec... more Part I of this article traced the experience of India's Bihar state as it shifted in the last decade of the twentieth century from a region dominated by landowning upper castes and plagued by entrenched poverty to one led by newly emergent middle castes. In a two-step process, these groups first attained a significant dignity and self-respect and then it became possible in the 2000s to turn to economic growth and improvement in living standards. Part II makes a case that Nepal, long suffering under conditions similar to those hobbling Bihar until recently, might follow a similar two-stage path of dignity and then development.
Since its beginning in Brazil in 1989, participatory budgeting (PB) has spread worldwide to sever... more Since its beginning in Brazil in 1989, participatory budgeting (PB) has spread worldwide to several thousand local governmental units (LGUs) in all continents, celebrated for its success in combining citizen involvement and state accountability in delivering public services. While PB has been adopted in most places by individual LGUs on their own initiative, in India the state of Kerala implemented PB throughout all its governmental units from rural villages and urban wards up through district in one "big bang" move in 1996. Over the succeeding two decades and more, PB has become securely institutionalized, surviving numerous changes of ruling party at state level. Outside of Kerala, however, few LGUs of any sort have implemented PB and it has not flourished in any of the adopters. Using the World Bank's principal-agent model of state accountability for public service delivery, this paper will explore Kerala's experience at PB and more briefly look at its lack of success elsewhere in India.
The Janata period in Bihar has been plagued with instability and violence in the state's politica... more The Janata period in Bihar has been plagued with instability and violence in the state's political life, its universities and its bureauicracy. In the minds of many observers, the disruption and its immediate cause, the Karpoori Thakur ministry's reservation policy, are indicative of a sea-change in the structure of Bihar's political economy: the 'Forwards' or 'twice-born' caste groups that had been dominant in Bihar since independence and before are being replaced by the 'Backward' castes as the dominant stratum in the state. This essay examines the evidence of such a shift in the structure of dominance in Bihar and its implication for the political economy of the state. THE current scene in Bihar is a depressing one. College students are burning buses, sacking government offices, seizing locomotives and even derailing trains; other groups of students do combat with the disrupters. The bureaucracy is paralysed. Stories of Harijan atrocities get into the press more frequently than usual, and give the impression that many more such outrages are going unreported. Political life is beset with intense byzantine intrigpes and manoeuvres to oust (or to save) the Janata ministry, completely distracting the ministry's already severely limited political will for dealing with the problems of a state that is at the bottom of almost every index of social and economic development in India. There have been reports of "more than 2,000 political murders" in recent months.' DEFINING THE BACKWARDS At the eye of the storm has been the one object that Karpoori Thakur in his chief ministership showed himself determined to pursuehis reservation policy. Thakur's successor as chief minister, Ram Sunder Das, has also promised (if more than somewhat half-heartedly) to implement the policy, so it continues to remain at the centre of the stage in the politics of Bihar.2 Promised in 1977 and finally promulgated in the autumn of 1978, the reservation policy asserted that in addition to the quotas on government employment already reserved for Harijans and Adivasis (24 per cent if taken together), henceforth 26 per cent of new government positions would be reserved for the 'Backward Classes'. More precisely, those Backwards known as being 'Annexure I' would be allotted 12 per cent of the posts, those known as being 'Annexure II' would be allocated 8 per cent, 3 per cent would go to women of any group, and 3 per cent to those who were 'economically backward'. The history of the annexures is a tangled one, and the question of how many people they include is even more confusing. The story goes at least as far back as to 1951, when the Bihar government composed two lists of Backward Classes Comprising Hindu and Muslim caste groups that were not Harijans or Adivasis, but were nonetheless determined to be economically and socially backward and in need of special governmental assistance, particularly in the way of educational help. The two lists came to be known as 'Annexure I' and 'Annexure II', which could be thought of as 'more backward' and 'less backward' (but still in need of help) groups. Annexure I (the 'more backward') included some 78 Hindu and Muslim castes, some well-known (e g, Dhanuk, Hajjam, Kahar and Mallah), others considerably less so (eg, Gulguha, Jadupatia). The second ('less backward') Annexure included 30 castes altogether; many of them were communities that in terms of social and economic backwardness were difficult to distinguish from those in Annexure I, such as Barhis, Kandus and Kumhars (as well as some Muslim castes like Momins and Rayeens), but the list consisted primarily of the more advanced communities in the Vaishya and Shudra varnas, that is the Banias, Koiris, Kurmis and Yadavs.3 These groups, while not as powerful (certainly in 1951, anyway) in social, political or economic matters as the first four 'twice-born' tbaste groups in the state (the Brajmas, Bhumihars, Rajputs and Kayasthas), were still far ahead of the remaining communities. The Banias, of course, were traditionally traders and small businessmen, while the other three were largely peasant proprietor castes, smallholders in the 5-15 acre range and primarily ryots in the zamindari land tenure system-then prevailing in Bihar. Just how many people might be included within these groups was not at all clear, for the Census has not gathered data on caste since 1941 and has not published these data since the 1931 Census. As with so many things in India, though, there are exceptions. In addition to the data on Scheduled Castes and Tribes that have been gathered in all the reoent censuses, the Census of 1951 also took down some infonMation on membership in certain of the backward castes. The Backward Classes Commission (BCC), set up at the Central level and chaired by Kaka Kalelkar, made use of these data in composing its own lists of backward classes for the various states in its report published in 1955. For Bihar some 127 castes (again both Hindu and Muslim) are listec,, with a tbtal population of 15.3 million or 38.1 per cent of the state's total population in 1951.4 The 1955 enumeration was not a complete one, however, for such important castes as Koiri, Mallah and Tatwa were included in the listing as Backward, but had not been counted in the 1951 Census. Overall, figures were available for only 54 of the 127 castes denominated as Backward in the BCC report, and so its 15.3 million total was considerably short of the total number that fell within the Backward category as determined in either the 1951 Government of Bihar list or the 1955 BCC report.
Harry W. Blair is now overwhelming that subsidized agricultural The evidence credit programs have... more Harry W. Blair is now overwhelming that subsidized agricultural The evidence credit programs have not been effective in getting credit to the small over the past two decades. Indeed, farmer or in promoting equity the effects of these programs often have been ...
... This experiment, it will be contended, was promising (at least until the i97i civil strife) l... more ... This experiment, it will be contended, was promising (at least until the i97i civil strife) largely because it ... of the "Protestant Ethic" that served as the main-spring of the Industrial Revolution in the West. ... 1Max Weber, The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism. ...
... Both programmes in the Philippines emphasized marginal elements such as the urban poor, low .... more ... Both programmes in the Philippines emphasized marginal elements such as the urban poor, low ... In Indonesia, USAID's Civil Society Support Program (CSSP) began as a national programme ... reduced support for some of the earlier national-level activities, particularly in media. ...
During this period, four successive regimes in Bangladesh have felt reluctantly compelled to set ... more During this period, four successive regimes in Bangladesh have felt reluctantly compelled to set up structures for local participation in government. Each found it had to reach out beyond the support of urban and rural elites and the military if it was to move beyond mere stability to real development of the country. Despite many problems. most notably local elite takeover at local level and military coup at national level, there is considerable evidence. particularly from neighboring India. to suggest that local participatory institutions can be successful over the longer term in promoting development for the middle and the poorer rural classes.
A state's accountability to its citizens for public service delivery constitutes a central compon... more A state's accountability to its citizens for public service delivery constitutes a central component of the democratic polity. But how to assure this accountability? The answer lies in the linkage between citizens and some combination of elected political leaders and those they direct to provide the services. In India over recent decades, a host of mechanisms has emerged to provide that linkage, some of them quite potent. Building on the World Bank's 2003 principal-agent model of long and short routes to state accountability, this article argues for a distinct third civil society route. It then explores the paths these three routes can take and their potential effectiveness in providing citizens a number of institutional mechanisms to hold political leaders and public service providers accountable, improve service delivery, empower poor people and ultimately enhance well-being.
Often reduced to statistics, the misery of the 312 million who live below the poverty line in Ind... more Often reduced to statistics, the misery of the 312 million who live below the poverty line in India, is often overlooked. These stories show how they manage, what sustains them and efforts made to help. The book pays attention to districts, and the issues it raises are universal in their relevance.
Part I of this article traced the experience of India's Bihar state as it shifted in the last dec... more Part I of this article traced the experience of India's Bihar state as it shifted in the last decade of the twentieth century from a region dominated by landowning upper castes and plagued by entrenched poverty to one led by newly emergent middle castes. In a two-step process, these groups first attained a significant dignity and self-respect and then it became possible in the 2000s to turn to economic growth and improvement in living standards. Part II makes a case that Nepal, long suffering under conditions similar to those hobbling Bihar until recently, might follow a similar two-stage path of dignity and then development.
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