Papers by Filip Reyntjens
Journal of Modern African Studies, Aug 3, 2006
The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 1998
Nous venons de voir qu'il fut decide lors du colloque d'Ostende, du 5 au 12 janvier 1961,... more Nous venons de voir qu'il fut decide lors du colloque d'Ostende, du 5 au 12 janvier 1961, de reporter les elections legislatives prevues pour janvier 1961. Cette decision, conforme a la resolution 1579 (XV) de l'Assemblee generale de l'ONU, etait contraire aux voeux de la residence et des partis politiques hutu, lesquels voulaient achever la revolution en legalisant ses acquis. La Commission de l'ONU pour le Ruanda-Urundi devait visiter le Rwanda fin janvier 1961 et il importait donc de prendre l'organisation internationale de vitesse. L'ordonnance legislative No 02/16 du 15 janvier 1961 [1] conferait l'autonomie interne au Rwanda; les pouvoirs et attributions en furent accordes au Conseil du Rwanda et au gouvernement provisoire, composes essentiellement de Hutu, par l'ordonnance legislative No 02/27 du 25 janvier 1961 [2]. La concession de l'autonomie interne a ces autorites etait incontestablement contraire aux recommandations de l'ONU, ...
The colonization process is seen as rapid, externally imposed modernization. The introduction of ... more The colonization process is seen as rapid, externally imposed modernization. The introduction of bureaucracy into Africa was bound to lead to open conflicts with traditional society. Between the world wars, Belgian authorities sought to implement indirect home rule in Rwanda, which would respect & develop local institutions. The colonial organization was "rationalized" & the Tutsi aristocracy, an ethnic minority, was given control over the whole country, including previously autonomous regions. The traditional chiefs now had to conform to new bureaucratic standards & taxation policies. The disaffected tribes took their revenge during the revolution of the late 1950s, when the Tutsis were forcefully removed from power. Following independence, the government structure was redefined along traditional African lines. 1 Table, 26 References. Modified HA.
Afrika Focus, 1986
This paper provides a short survey and assessment of the political evolution of Rwanda since the ... more This paper provides a short survey and assessment of the political evolution of Rwanda since the inception of the Second Republic in 1973. After a period of de facto rule the country returned to constitutional government in 1978. A single party, the Revolutionary National Movement for the Development, had already been created by the military in 1975. The paper examines the constitution, the organisation of elections, political conflict and the respect for human rights and the rule of law. While the regime has achieved considerable successes, the paper argues that its level of institutionalisation remains limited and that its stability and achievements are essentially due to the personality of President Habyarimana. KEYWORDS : civilianisation, constitutional law, political change, Rwanda
Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue canadienne des études africaines, 2010
... A second form of novel power entering Rwanda consisted of a set of conceptual tools, for the ... more ... A second form of novel power entering Rwanda consisted of a set of conceptual tools, for the ideological power of the new order combined the administrative structures of the emergent colonial state with the teachings of the Church. ...
Journal of Democracy, 2016
Two weeks before Rwanda's 18 December 2015 referendum on a constitutional amendment that would al... more Two weeks before Rwanda's 18 December 2015 referendum on a constitutional amendment that would allow Rwandan president Paul Kagame to run for additional terms, EU High Representative Federica Mogherini declared: "In countries that have consistently respected term limits and allowed for change, societies have become more resilient and institutions more credible. There are many examples of that on the [African] continent." 1 This is an attractive assumption, and it is intuitively convincing. But is it true? Are there many examples in Africa? This subject has become increasingly topical, as a growing number of countries in Africa have scrapped term limits in recent years. In 2015 alone, the Republic of Congo and Rwanda introduced constitutional amendments to allow term-limited incumbents to run again, and South Sudan (where there are no term limits) extended President Salva Kiir's term by three years. In July 2015, Burundian president Pierre Nkurunziza was elected for an unconstitutional third term based on an inventive interpretation of the constitution by the country's constitutional court. In February 2016, Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni was reelected (the country's two-term limit was lifted in 2005), giving him a fifth term in office in addition to the ten years he had been in power before he was elected. Meanwhile, in early March, Angolan president José Eduardo dos Santos, in power since 1979, announced his intention to step down in 2018, presumably after his reelection in 2017. (He had made a similar promise in 2001.) On 8 April 2016, Djibouti's Ismail Omar Guelleh was reelected for a fourth term, despite having sworn in 2011 that his third would be his last. Yet there are exceptions to this trend. On 31 March 2016, just a week
Africa Today, 2008
o o k R ev ew s 41 arica to d ay 5(3) beyond independence, as the new state at first failed to ma... more o o k R ev ew s 41 arica to d ay 5(3) beyond independence, as the new state at first failed to make changes to land ownership (dominated by whites) and then invoked “black and white” racial distinctions to define its regime, twenty years after independence, proclaiming the necessity for a new liberation struggle (chimurenga) to resolve the land question and overthrow spatial divisions. Primorac argues that the current state is, as much as Rhodesia, trapped in a world that cannot imagine changes in these absolute distinctions, in which yet another chimurenga is constantly needed, and yet never comes in a fully liberatory way. Primorac reads the novels of these six black anglophone writers against this Rhodesian chronotope, showing how each author inherits a particular “space-time” and history and shows characters struggling to achieve greater freedom of movement, enhanced sense of agency, and a less-determined, more chosen identity. Examples include Marita’s movement to the city in Bones, Tambudzai’s movement from rural home to mission to white urban school in Nervous Conditions, and guerillas’ efforts that create a space-time of war that directly challenges the old chronotope (Harvest of Thorns, Echoing Silences). Primorac also argues that none of these novelists successfully imagines a character entirely freed of the old constraints, who moves into a new space-time of greater freedom for everyone. All these writers choose not to show independence as a break in time; the impediments and the violence that characterize the Rhodesian world continue beyond independence, and the winning of the war is shown with ambivalence, captured in oxymoronic titles like Harvest of Thorns and Echoing Silences and thematically in Vera’s The Stone Virgins. Primorac’s theoretical base enables compelling readings of individual novels; I single out in particular the detailed readings of Bones, Nehanda, and The Stone Virgins. Along the way, Primorac cogently summarizes other critical readings of these texts, and she does an excellent job of analyzing two major collections of criticism on Dangarembga and Vera. This book is essential for any student of Zimbabwean literature—a powerful contribution to well-theorized critical works about African and postcolonial literature. Patricia Alden St. Lawrence University
African Affairs the Journal of the Royal African Society, 2001
Film, 1985
L'ordonnance legislative No 02/16 du 15 janvier 1961 [1], reconduite et legerement modifiee p... more L'ordonnance legislative No 02/16 du 15 janvier 1961 [1], reconduite et legerement modifiee par celle No 02/ 234 du 15 juillet 1961 [2] institua une assemblee legislative qui, contrairement a celle prevue par le decret interimaire, etait composee uniquement de membres elus directement. Le gouvernement, te type parlementaire, assumerait, par le contreseing, la responsabilite politique du "chef du pays", terme qui laissait ouvertes toutes les options ulterieures. Le gouvernement devait obtenir la confiance de l'assemblee et pouvait etre renverse par elle. Les dispositions du decret interimaire concernant l'Assemblee legislative n'avaient jamais ete appliquees, vu que c'est par l'ordonnance legislative ad hoc No 221/275 du 18 octobre 1960 que le resident general avait institue un Conseil provisoire. Nous avons vu plus haut que le report des elections legislatives prevues par le decret interimaire fut la cause principale du "coup" de Gitarama . Apres la victoire du Parmehutu aux elections communales de juin-juillet 1960 et la consolidation de sa position grâce au congres de Gitarama , l'autorite de tutelle pouvait envisager l'organisation des elections legislatives tant attendues. L'expose des motifs de l'ordonnance legislative du 15 janvier 1961 ne s'en cache pas: il y est question de "la victoire d'un parti populaire, le Parmehutu, qui a remporte plus de 70 % des sieges aux sieges communaux" et de "l'impatience des chefs de ce parti, conscients de leur force et de l'immense soutien populaire, d'une part, et d'autre part la necessite d'entamer sans tarder une emancipation politique progressive..." [3]
The report of the Mutsinzi commission attempts to show that President Habyarimana’s airplane was ... more The report of the Mutsinzi commission attempts to show that President Habyarimana’s airplane was not downed by the RPF, as the French investigating judge Bruguière tried to demonstrate, but by Hutu radicals who were close to the main victim of the attack. The report raises a number of serious questions. The committee claims to be independent, but all the commissioners are members of the RPF, which means that it is both judge and party. This is made abundantly clear throughout the report, which treats as solid evidence testimonies showing the complicity of Hutu extremists, but shows total disregard for the evidence pointing in the other direction. While the committee claims to have interviewed hundreds of witnesses, the validity of their testimonies raises serious doubts. Of those identified, dozens are members of the former government army FAR, all of them interviewed under extreme pressure, in full awareness of what they were expected to say, and of the price to be paid if they did...
Uploads
Papers by Filip Reyntjens