Papers by Davit Merkviladze
Banber arevelagitut'yan instituti, Aug 21, 2023
In the spring of 1775, in order to punish the Kaitag Utsmi Amir-Hamza, a military
expedition of ... more In the spring of 1775, in order to punish the Kaitag Utsmi Amir-Hamza, a military
expedition of Russian troops under the command of General Medem was sent to Dagestan,
after which, at the invitation of Fatali Khan of Derbent, these troops entered the city of
Derbent. King Erekle II of Kartli-Kakheti soon responded to this campaign and tried to interest
the Russian authorities in a long stay of Russian troops in the city of Derbent, and
also suggested that they continue the campaign of troops in the South Caucasus.
In a letter to General Medem dated May 6, 1775, Erekle II suggested that he move to
the South Caucasus with his army. Promising General Medem all-encompassing support on
behalf of all the Christians of Transcaucasia, King Erekle emphasized the ease and further
unhindered march of Russian troops. On May 29, King Erekle sent a letter to the head of
foreign policy of the Russian Empire, Nikita Panin, in which, reproaching the imperial
court for neglecting the interests of the Georgian Kingdom and all Transcaucasian Christians
in the last Russian-Turkish war (1768-1774), he asked to order General Medem to
continue the campaign in the South Caucasus. According to the King, in this case, given the
situation, all the inhabitants of the Transcaucasian khanates, both Christians and Muslims,
would declare obedience to Russia. In the words of King Erekle, such an action by the Russian
army would be a great consolation for all Christians living between Derbent and his
kingdom.
As a result of the analysis of the content of the above-mentioned letters, it can be concluded
that the “minimum plan” of Erekle II regarding the campaign of Medem to the
North-Eastern Caspian was to maximize the stay of Medem's troops in Derbent, and the
"maximum plan" was the advancement of these troops to Shirvan and their approach to the
borders of the Kartli-Kakheti Kingdom.
Naturally, in this case the King of Kartli-Kakheti was guided by the interests of his
kingdom. Probably, on the one hand, Erekle II wanted to use Medem's troops, if they entered
Shirvan, to spread and strengthen his power over some of the khanates of the South
Caucasus. And if Petersburg had not agreed to advance the army in Transcaucasia and
would have left them in Derbent, this circumstance would have made it easier for King
Erekle to fight against the predatory raids of the Dagestanis, and might have made it possible
to try to annex the East Kakhetian region - Char-Belakani, appropriated by the Dagestanis,
to his kingdom.
The aforementioned initiative of Erekle II was unsuccessful: Medem was ordered to
refrain from answering the King's letter. Soon Medem was recalled from Derbent, and then
part of the Russian troops stationed there left this strategic point. Such decisions of the Russian
Imperial Court largely determined the subsequent foreign policy steps of the Georgian
King, in particular his political rapprochement with the Ottoman Empire.
Recruitment of Avarian troops by Shaki Khan Hussein in 1771 and Erekle (Heraclius) II, 2023
Davit Merkviladze
Recruitment of Avarian troops by Shaki Khan Hussein in 1771 and Erekle (Heracli... more Davit Merkviladze
Recruitment of Avarian troops by Shaki Khan Hussein in 1771 and Erekle (Heraclius) II
The war having started between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in 1768 as well as the inclusion of Erekle II, the king of Kartli-Kakheti in this war, that was conditioned by the decision of St. Petersburg having its "subversive" purposes in the South Caucasus and the north-eastern parts of the Ottoman Empire, had more or less significant impact on the political relationships between the rulers of the East Caucasus. The situation was aggravated by the Porta’s appeals to the Caucasian Muslim governors motivating them to defend their faith and join the fight against the "impious" northern enemy. Such appeals from the Sultan himself or the eastern pashas, on the orders of the Sultan, were supported by abundant money given away to the addressees. The political relations between the Caucasian rulers were also rapidly changing as well. The old allies sometimes became enemies towards each other, and sometimes the other way around.
On November 14, 1771, the captain of the Russian Terek army Khasbulat Shamurzin, who was in Russian military service, having returned from Dagestan reported to the commandant of Kizlar, Colonel F. Parker on the basis of the intelligence obtained by him: “even before my arrival in Avaria, the brother of this khan and his greater son with their people gathered, at the request of the Shaki khan Husein, went to him for help against the Georgian king Erekle, where even now the Lezgins and Tavlinians gather from all places in the mountains. And they say that the Shaki Khan promised the Avar [Khan] upon their arrival to send them 3 thousand rubles of money, and to give [them], and everyone in the future, a sufficient salary, and they will all spend the winter there, and fight the battle in spring.” From the same report we learn that due to the mentioned, Erekle II turned back from the successful war campaign toward Akhaltsikhe and while recording the report he was already standing with his army "on the borders against Hussein Khan”. The mercenaries who went from Dagestan to help Shaki Khan were going to winter there, so no significant attacks were expected on this side (i.e. on the borders of Russia – D.M.), added the captain of the Terek army.
It is worth noting that soon events unfolded quite differently from the plan described in the report: Hussein Khan sent his own and mercenary army not to the west, to the borders of the Kartli-Kakheti Kingdom, but in the opposite direction to Shamakhi, in order to drive away Fath-Ali Khan (Fatali Khan) of Quba and Derbent, who had captured these lands. And for this reason, the Dagestan mercenaries did not have to winter in Shaki at all, and together with their allies they fought the battle against the army of Fatali Khan in December 1771 or in January of the following year.
It is also worth noting that Erekle II had previously supported Hussein Khan in his confrontation with Khan of Quba. In 1768 having completely conquered Shamakhi, the extremely strengthened Fatali Khan made an attempt to subdue Hussein Khan, who participated in the conspiracy of Shamakhian noblemen intending to be liberated from Fatali Khan’s dominance. At this time King Erekle not only rejected Quba Khan’s appeal to jointly act against the Shaki Khanate, but he sided with Hussein Khan and forced Fatali-Khan to reconcile with the latter. Erekle II’ support to Hussein Khan as well as his military assistance later provided to Karabakh khan Ibrahim were conditioned by the King's decision to prevent Fatali Khan's excessive reinforcements in the region. Later, in the spring of 1770, Hussein Khan (along with Ibrahim Khan) offered the Georgian King to form alliance and applied for his assistance with the expulsion of Fatali Khan from Shirvan (Shamakhi) and the restoration of local power of Aghasi Khan having been deposed. Erekle II was driven by the same desire, but since he was already involved in the war against the Ottomans at that time, he refrained from directly participating in the afore-mentioned plan, although he declared his support and encouraged the Khans of Shaki and Karabakh.
As regards Nursal-Beg of Khunzakh, i.e. Khan (//Nutsal) Mehmed (//Muhammad) IV of Avaria, after his unsuccessful large military campaigns in Georgia, Erekle II had already settled relations with him years before and even found a kind of ally in him. In exchange for the service provided to the King of Kartli-Kakheti the ruler of Khunzakh was appointed the salary by the King: "he wanted to make peace with us, we have reconciled and we give a kind of salary to him” – Erekle II reported to the Russian government.
Taking into account the above-mentioned circumstances (the allied relations of King Erekle II with Shaki Khan Hussein and Nursal-Beg, the ruler of Khunzakh as well as the joint campaign of the latter against Fatali-Khan), at a glance it seems as if the report of the captain of Terek army to the commandant of Kizlar did not correspond at all to the political situation of that time. However, at the same time it is also worth noting that waging the war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire and dragging the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti in this war brought about the salient changes in intra-Caucasian political relations.
Already in October 1769, the first reports appeared, that Ottoman emissaries arrived in Dagestan as well as to Quba Khan in order to engage Dagestan commanders and Fatali-Khan in the ongoing war against Russia. It soon became clear that Sultan Mustafa III received Haji Gerai (Aji Garay), the son of Gazikumukh’s ruler, in his palace, bestowed the title of Pasha upon him and gave him a large sum of money to raise the army of Dagestan people, with whose help he hoped to defend the desolate north-eastern borders of the Ottoman Empire. The similar invitation was also sent to the ruler of Khunzakh, who sent a messenger to Erekle II for advice on how to act in such a situation. The king restrained him from the participation in the event.
Haji Gerai along with the other Dagestan leaders died in the famous battle of Aspindza on April 20, 1770. Having taken offence at this fact and in order to take revenge Khan of Gazikumukh - Muhammad (1743-1789) urgently embarked on the attempts to form a large military coalition with the participation of Dagestan’s and other Caucasian Khans against the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti. Then Nutsal of Khunzakh (Avaria) informed King Erekle of this news and added that he had already responded to the proposal, "that the brotherly and faithful friendship had been established with us and Erekle Khan and we will never break it." However, after the appearance and activation of the Russian army in the South Caucasus, the peculiar hesitations and signs of double game could be observed in Nursal-Beg’s actions. He sent his son to the sword-wielding Gazikumukh Khan to avenge the Georgians and justified his conduct before Erekle II by saying that he had learned about Muhammad Gazikumukh Khan's goal to launch the military campaign against Georgia and involving Avaria in this event from his son only after having sent him there and therefore, he responded to Muhammad Khan with a firm refusal. In the tense political situation created in the Caucasus due to the Russian-Ottoman war, Nursal-Beg also made attempt to raise the price for his "loyalty" towards Erekle II and thereby gain new benefits. “When the Sultan demanded to come to Akhaltsikhe with my army through his ambassadors, I sent my envoy to you, who having returned told me the following: “the King declared that if Nutsal wants, he will give him the estate”, that's why I gave up my intention to go to Akhaltsikhe,” – Nursal-Beg wrote to the King of Kartli-Kakheti. Thus, Nursal-Beg, using a kind of diplomatic language, even demanded from Erekle II to grant him the estate as a source of additional income. Later, in summer of 1771, he called on the Chechens to revolt against Russia. The Commandant of Kizlar, Neimch also reported that Nursal-Beg was recruiting the army to attack Dusheti (probably meaning Tusheti) (Macharadze 1997: 673). It is not surprising that under these circumstances, the extent of trust of King Erekle in Nutsal of Avaria had been significantly diminished.
From September 1770, at the instigation of the Ottomans, on the one hand, and obsessing with the desire for revenge the leaders of Gazikumukh, on the other hand, the Lezgins (the latter had been reconciled with Erekle II at that time), who had settled in Jar-Balakan, launched the attacks on the border lands of Kakheti. This presented the king with the new challenge: to firmly resolve the issue of Jar-Balakani Lezgins, so as to ensure the suppression of attacks in the rear of his kingdom from the most vulnerable side during the hostilities with the Ottomans. Hussein Khan of Shaki was deemed to be a reliable ally of the Jar Lezgins. Occasioned by this fact Erekle II made efforts to establish the allied relations with Fatali Khan of Quba ("to reconcile"), so that it could be hard for Jar Lezgins “to get help and thus, their strength would decrease."
On November 2, 1770, Erekle II instructed his envoy to Russia, Zaal Orbeliani, to ask the "first Minister" of the Empire (Count Nirita Panini) to mediate between the King of Kartli-Kakheti and Khan of Quba Fatali to resolve the relationships. Erekle II should not have found it difficult to achieve this goal. The Georgian king's victory at the Battle of Aspindza put an end to Fatali-Khan's aggressive plans against the Shaki and Karabakh khanates. Therefore, Quba Khan should have been content if the King of Kartli-Kakheti, whose authority was raised due to the successes achieved in the battle against the Ottomans, had desired to enter into the alliance with him, all the more so, if this bond was directed against any Khan of his concern. Indeed, the new alliance was formed: Quba Khan, faithful to the Russian monarch, sen...
The war having started between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in 1768 as well as the inclusion of ... more The war having started between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in 1768 as well as the inclusion of Erekle II, the king of Kartli-Kakheti in this war, that was conditioned by the decision of St. Petersburg having its "subversive" purposes in the South Caucasus and the northeastern parts of the Ottoman Empire, had more or less significant impact on the political relationships between the rulers of the East Caucasus. The situation was aggravated by the Porta's appeals to the Caucasian Muslim governors motivating them to defend their faith and join the fight against the "impious" northern enemy. Such appeals from the Sultan himself or the eastern pashas, on the orders of the Sultan, were supported by abundant money given away to the addressees. The political relations between the Caucasian rulers were also rapidly changing as well. The old allies sometimes became enemies towards each other, and sometimes the other way around. On November 14, 1771, the captain of the Terek army Khasbulat Shamurzin, who was in Russian military service, having returned from Dagestan reported to the commandant of Kizlar, Colonel F. Parker on the basis of the intelligence obtained by him: "even before my arrival in Avaria, the brother of this khan and his greater son with their people gathered, at the request of the Shaki khan Husein, went to him for help against the Georgian king Erekle, where even now the Lezgins and Tavlinians 1 gather from all places in the mountains. And they say that the Shaki Khan promised the Avar [Khan] upon their arrival to send them 3 thousand rubles of money, and to give [them], and everyone in the future, a sufficient salary, and they will all spend the winter there, and fight the battle in spring." From the same report we learn that due to the mentioned, Erekle II turned back from the successful war campaign toward Akhaltsikhe and while recording the report he was already standing with his army "on the borders against
თბილისი : უნივერსალი, 2015
In the folk story about Davit Garejeli`s activities in Tbilisi, the information about the histori... more In the folk story about Davit Garejeli`s activities in Tbilisi, the information about the historical reality might be observed. According to the chronology of Davit Garejeli`s activities, he should have settled near Tbilisi in about 539-540 AD. Therefore, the period described in the folk story should be identified as the 40-ies of the 6th century. This period corresponds exactly to the situation described in the legend. This was the time when the local royal authority in Kartli Kingdom (Eastern Georgia) was abolished by Iran and Zoroastrian magi sent by Persian Shah became especially active. Therefore, the times the ChristianOrthodox church were very hard. The folk memory about David Garejeli`s activities in Tbilisi was reflected in traditional lives of the people as well. During the centuries including the beginning of the last century, when Bolshevik _ atheistic authority became etablished in Georgia, on David Garejeli`s Day _ next Thursday after Ascension (and any other Thursday ...
თბილისი : უნივერსალი, 2011
ივ.ჯავახიშვილის ისტორიისა და ეთნოლოგიის ინსტიტუტი, 2014
კავკასიოლოგიის საერთაშორისო სამეცნიერო-კვლევითი საზოგადოებრივი ინსტიტუტი, 2017
ივ. ჯავახიშვილის სახ. თსუ კლასიკური ფილოლოგიის, ბიზანტინისტიკისა და ნეოგრეცისტიკის ინსტიტუტი; ილიას სახელმწიფო უნივერსიტეტის გიორგი წერეთლის სახელობის აღმოსავლეთმცოდნეობის ინსტიტუტი, 2011
In the folk story about Davit Garejeli`s activities in Tbilisi, the information about the histori... more In the folk story about Davit Garejeli`s activities in Tbilisi, the information about the historical reality might be observed. According to the chronology of Davit Garejeli`s activities, he should have settled near Tbilisi in about 539-540 AD. Therefore, the period described in the folk story should be identified as the 40-ies of the 6th century. This period corresponds exactly to the situation described in the legend. This was the time when the local royal authority in Kartli Kingdom (Eastern Georgia) was abolished by Iran and Zoroastrian magi sent by Persian Shah became especially active. Therefore, the times the ChristianOrthodox church were very hard. The folk memory about David Garejeli`s activities in Tbilisi was reflected in traditional lives of the people as well. During the centuries including the beginning of the last century, when Bolshevik _ atheistic authority became etablished in Georgia, on David Garejeli`s Day _ next Thursday after Ascension (and any other Thursday ...
Pro Georgia No 31
The goal of the present paper is to determine the specific location of the battle between Khalid ... more The goal of the present paper is to determine the specific location of the battle between Khalid ibn-Yazid and Sahak (Ishak), emir of Tbilisi. The Arab conquests in Transcaucasia and their dominion on the territory of the Eastern Georgia gave rise to the formation of Tbilisi emirate. In the beginning of the 9-th century Tbilisi emirs, deprived of the part of their domain, ceased to subordinate to the power of the Caliph and misappropriated collected tributes. Caliphs resorted to punitive expeditions to bring disobedient emirs to submission. In 842, during the expedition conducted by Khalid ibn-Yazid against emir of Tbilisi Sahak, the former was supported by Bagrat Kuropalate, while the latter received help from Kakheti (called “sanarians” in the Arab sources). The Georgian historical annals, like “Chronicle of Kartli” specify that the location of the battle is “Rekhi”. The author of the record tries to prove, contradictory to the assumptions of historiography, that “Rekhi” implies n...
BULLETIN OF THE INSTITUTE OF ORIENTAL STUDIES
In 1768, Fatali Khan of Quba together with Hussein Khan of Shaki took Shamakhi. Soon, however, th... more In 1768, Fatali Khan of Quba together with Hussein Khan of Shaki took Shamakhi. Soon, however, the former also tried to subdue the Shaki Khanate. For this purpose, Fatali offered King Erekle II of Kartli-Kakheti and Ibrahim Khan of Karabakh to campaign against the Shaki Khanate. But failed to get their consent. For his part, the Khan of Shaki asked Erekle II for help. The King demanded that Fatali Khan reconcile with the Khan of Shaki and threatened to provide military assistance to Hussein Khan.Ibrahim Khan of Karabakh also asked Erekle II for help in case of Fatali Khan’s aggression. Thus, an alliance between Erekle II, Hussein Khan and Ibrahim Khan against Fatali Khan was formed. The allies aimed to restore the rule of Aghasi Khan in Shamakhi, even on the condition of vassalage to Fatali Khan. In case of refusal, they intended to return the Quba Khanate to its former borders.The Russian government tried to limit the activity of Erekle II in the ongoing confrontation between the S...
The Caucasus On The Crossroads Of International Trade And Cultural Exchanges, 2022
In 1768 Fatali Khan of Quba together with Hussein Khan of Shaki took Shemakhi. Soon, however, he ... more In 1768 Fatali Khan of Quba together with Hussein Khan of Shaki took Shemakhi. Soon, however, he also tried to subdue Shaki Khanate. For this purpose, Fatali offered King Erekle II of Kartli-Kakheti and Ibrahim Khan of Karabakh to campaign against Shaki Khanate. But failed to get their consent. For his part, the Khan of Shaki asked Erekle II for help. The King demanded that Fatali Khan reconcile with Khan of Shaki and threatened to provide military assistance to Hussein Khan.
Ibrahim Khan of Karabakh also asked Erekle II for help in case of Fatali Khan’s aggression. Thus was formed the political union of Erekle II, Hussein Khan and Ibrahim Khan against Fatali Khan. The allies aimed at restoring the rule of Aghasi Khan in Shemakhi, even on the condition of vassalage to Fatali Khan. In case of refusal, they intended to return Quba Khanate to its former borders by joining forces.
Russian government tried to limit the activity of Erekle II in the ongoing confrontation between the South Caucasian Khans. Nevertheless, in 1770, Erekle II sent an army to Ibrahim Khan of Karabakh to repel the attack of Fatali Khan. As a result, Fatali Khan’s campaign to Karabakh ended in failure.
In November-December 1773, Avar Khan Muhammad-Nutsal IV, along with Hussein Khan and Aghasi Khan, campaigned to Shemakhi. King Erekle helped Avar Khan with part of his army. Erekle II sent a detachment of his subordinate Muslim Borchaly Kazakhs against Fatali Khan, in order to make the participation of his subordinates less noticeable. But this did not go unnoticed by Russian intelligence.
At the same time, it is incorrect to name Erekle II as an ally of the Dagestani leaders united against Fatali Khan in the subsequent campaign of 1774. The King’s participation in the hostilities during this campaign is not confirmed by any source.
კავკასიოლოგიის საერთაშორისო სამეცნიერო-კვლევითი საზოგადოებრივი ინსტიტუტი, 2010
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Papers by Davit Merkviladze
expedition of Russian troops under the command of General Medem was sent to Dagestan,
after which, at the invitation of Fatali Khan of Derbent, these troops entered the city of
Derbent. King Erekle II of Kartli-Kakheti soon responded to this campaign and tried to interest
the Russian authorities in a long stay of Russian troops in the city of Derbent, and
also suggested that they continue the campaign of troops in the South Caucasus.
In a letter to General Medem dated May 6, 1775, Erekle II suggested that he move to
the South Caucasus with his army. Promising General Medem all-encompassing support on
behalf of all the Christians of Transcaucasia, King Erekle emphasized the ease and further
unhindered march of Russian troops. On May 29, King Erekle sent a letter to the head of
foreign policy of the Russian Empire, Nikita Panin, in which, reproaching the imperial
court for neglecting the interests of the Georgian Kingdom and all Transcaucasian Christians
in the last Russian-Turkish war (1768-1774), he asked to order General Medem to
continue the campaign in the South Caucasus. According to the King, in this case, given the
situation, all the inhabitants of the Transcaucasian khanates, both Christians and Muslims,
would declare obedience to Russia. In the words of King Erekle, such an action by the Russian
army would be a great consolation for all Christians living between Derbent and his
kingdom.
As a result of the analysis of the content of the above-mentioned letters, it can be concluded
that the “minimum plan” of Erekle II regarding the campaign of Medem to the
North-Eastern Caspian was to maximize the stay of Medem's troops in Derbent, and the
"maximum plan" was the advancement of these troops to Shirvan and their approach to the
borders of the Kartli-Kakheti Kingdom.
Naturally, in this case the King of Kartli-Kakheti was guided by the interests of his
kingdom. Probably, on the one hand, Erekle II wanted to use Medem's troops, if they entered
Shirvan, to spread and strengthen his power over some of the khanates of the South
Caucasus. And if Petersburg had not agreed to advance the army in Transcaucasia and
would have left them in Derbent, this circumstance would have made it easier for King
Erekle to fight against the predatory raids of the Dagestanis, and might have made it possible
to try to annex the East Kakhetian region - Char-Belakani, appropriated by the Dagestanis,
to his kingdom.
The aforementioned initiative of Erekle II was unsuccessful: Medem was ordered to
refrain from answering the King's letter. Soon Medem was recalled from Derbent, and then
part of the Russian troops stationed there left this strategic point. Such decisions of the Russian
Imperial Court largely determined the subsequent foreign policy steps of the Georgian
King, in particular his political rapprochement with the Ottoman Empire.
Recruitment of Avarian troops by Shaki Khan Hussein in 1771 and Erekle (Heraclius) II
The war having started between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in 1768 as well as the inclusion of Erekle II, the king of Kartli-Kakheti in this war, that was conditioned by the decision of St. Petersburg having its "subversive" purposes in the South Caucasus and the north-eastern parts of the Ottoman Empire, had more or less significant impact on the political relationships between the rulers of the East Caucasus. The situation was aggravated by the Porta’s appeals to the Caucasian Muslim governors motivating them to defend their faith and join the fight against the "impious" northern enemy. Such appeals from the Sultan himself or the eastern pashas, on the orders of the Sultan, were supported by abundant money given away to the addressees. The political relations between the Caucasian rulers were also rapidly changing as well. The old allies sometimes became enemies towards each other, and sometimes the other way around.
On November 14, 1771, the captain of the Russian Terek army Khasbulat Shamurzin, who was in Russian military service, having returned from Dagestan reported to the commandant of Kizlar, Colonel F. Parker on the basis of the intelligence obtained by him: “even before my arrival in Avaria, the brother of this khan and his greater son with their people gathered, at the request of the Shaki khan Husein, went to him for help against the Georgian king Erekle, where even now the Lezgins and Tavlinians gather from all places in the mountains. And they say that the Shaki Khan promised the Avar [Khan] upon their arrival to send them 3 thousand rubles of money, and to give [them], and everyone in the future, a sufficient salary, and they will all spend the winter there, and fight the battle in spring.” From the same report we learn that due to the mentioned, Erekle II turned back from the successful war campaign toward Akhaltsikhe and while recording the report he was already standing with his army "on the borders against Hussein Khan”. The mercenaries who went from Dagestan to help Shaki Khan were going to winter there, so no significant attacks were expected on this side (i.e. on the borders of Russia – D.M.), added the captain of the Terek army.
It is worth noting that soon events unfolded quite differently from the plan described in the report: Hussein Khan sent his own and mercenary army not to the west, to the borders of the Kartli-Kakheti Kingdom, but in the opposite direction to Shamakhi, in order to drive away Fath-Ali Khan (Fatali Khan) of Quba and Derbent, who had captured these lands. And for this reason, the Dagestan mercenaries did not have to winter in Shaki at all, and together with their allies they fought the battle against the army of Fatali Khan in December 1771 or in January of the following year.
It is also worth noting that Erekle II had previously supported Hussein Khan in his confrontation with Khan of Quba. In 1768 having completely conquered Shamakhi, the extremely strengthened Fatali Khan made an attempt to subdue Hussein Khan, who participated in the conspiracy of Shamakhian noblemen intending to be liberated from Fatali Khan’s dominance. At this time King Erekle not only rejected Quba Khan’s appeal to jointly act against the Shaki Khanate, but he sided with Hussein Khan and forced Fatali-Khan to reconcile with the latter. Erekle II’ support to Hussein Khan as well as his military assistance later provided to Karabakh khan Ibrahim were conditioned by the King's decision to prevent Fatali Khan's excessive reinforcements in the region. Later, in the spring of 1770, Hussein Khan (along with Ibrahim Khan) offered the Georgian King to form alliance and applied for his assistance with the expulsion of Fatali Khan from Shirvan (Shamakhi) and the restoration of local power of Aghasi Khan having been deposed. Erekle II was driven by the same desire, but since he was already involved in the war against the Ottomans at that time, he refrained from directly participating in the afore-mentioned plan, although he declared his support and encouraged the Khans of Shaki and Karabakh.
As regards Nursal-Beg of Khunzakh, i.e. Khan (//Nutsal) Mehmed (//Muhammad) IV of Avaria, after his unsuccessful large military campaigns in Georgia, Erekle II had already settled relations with him years before and even found a kind of ally in him. In exchange for the service provided to the King of Kartli-Kakheti the ruler of Khunzakh was appointed the salary by the King: "he wanted to make peace with us, we have reconciled and we give a kind of salary to him” – Erekle II reported to the Russian government.
Taking into account the above-mentioned circumstances (the allied relations of King Erekle II with Shaki Khan Hussein and Nursal-Beg, the ruler of Khunzakh as well as the joint campaign of the latter against Fatali-Khan), at a glance it seems as if the report of the captain of Terek army to the commandant of Kizlar did not correspond at all to the political situation of that time. However, at the same time it is also worth noting that waging the war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire and dragging the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti in this war brought about the salient changes in intra-Caucasian political relations.
Already in October 1769, the first reports appeared, that Ottoman emissaries arrived in Dagestan as well as to Quba Khan in order to engage Dagestan commanders and Fatali-Khan in the ongoing war against Russia. It soon became clear that Sultan Mustafa III received Haji Gerai (Aji Garay), the son of Gazikumukh’s ruler, in his palace, bestowed the title of Pasha upon him and gave him a large sum of money to raise the army of Dagestan people, with whose help he hoped to defend the desolate north-eastern borders of the Ottoman Empire. The similar invitation was also sent to the ruler of Khunzakh, who sent a messenger to Erekle II for advice on how to act in such a situation. The king restrained him from the participation in the event.
Haji Gerai along with the other Dagestan leaders died in the famous battle of Aspindza on April 20, 1770. Having taken offence at this fact and in order to take revenge Khan of Gazikumukh - Muhammad (1743-1789) urgently embarked on the attempts to form a large military coalition with the participation of Dagestan’s and other Caucasian Khans against the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti. Then Nutsal of Khunzakh (Avaria) informed King Erekle of this news and added that he had already responded to the proposal, "that the brotherly and faithful friendship had been established with us and Erekle Khan and we will never break it." However, after the appearance and activation of the Russian army in the South Caucasus, the peculiar hesitations and signs of double game could be observed in Nursal-Beg’s actions. He sent his son to the sword-wielding Gazikumukh Khan to avenge the Georgians and justified his conduct before Erekle II by saying that he had learned about Muhammad Gazikumukh Khan's goal to launch the military campaign against Georgia and involving Avaria in this event from his son only after having sent him there and therefore, he responded to Muhammad Khan with a firm refusal. In the tense political situation created in the Caucasus due to the Russian-Ottoman war, Nursal-Beg also made attempt to raise the price for his "loyalty" towards Erekle II and thereby gain new benefits. “When the Sultan demanded to come to Akhaltsikhe with my army through his ambassadors, I sent my envoy to you, who having returned told me the following: “the King declared that if Nutsal wants, he will give him the estate”, that's why I gave up my intention to go to Akhaltsikhe,” – Nursal-Beg wrote to the King of Kartli-Kakheti. Thus, Nursal-Beg, using a kind of diplomatic language, even demanded from Erekle II to grant him the estate as a source of additional income. Later, in summer of 1771, he called on the Chechens to revolt against Russia. The Commandant of Kizlar, Neimch also reported that Nursal-Beg was recruiting the army to attack Dusheti (probably meaning Tusheti) (Macharadze 1997: 673). It is not surprising that under these circumstances, the extent of trust of King Erekle in Nutsal of Avaria had been significantly diminished.
From September 1770, at the instigation of the Ottomans, on the one hand, and obsessing with the desire for revenge the leaders of Gazikumukh, on the other hand, the Lezgins (the latter had been reconciled with Erekle II at that time), who had settled in Jar-Balakan, launched the attacks on the border lands of Kakheti. This presented the king with the new challenge: to firmly resolve the issue of Jar-Balakani Lezgins, so as to ensure the suppression of attacks in the rear of his kingdom from the most vulnerable side during the hostilities with the Ottomans. Hussein Khan of Shaki was deemed to be a reliable ally of the Jar Lezgins. Occasioned by this fact Erekle II made efforts to establish the allied relations with Fatali Khan of Quba ("to reconcile"), so that it could be hard for Jar Lezgins “to get help and thus, their strength would decrease."
On November 2, 1770, Erekle II instructed his envoy to Russia, Zaal Orbeliani, to ask the "first Minister" of the Empire (Count Nirita Panini) to mediate between the King of Kartli-Kakheti and Khan of Quba Fatali to resolve the relationships. Erekle II should not have found it difficult to achieve this goal. The Georgian king's victory at the Battle of Aspindza put an end to Fatali-Khan's aggressive plans against the Shaki and Karabakh khanates. Therefore, Quba Khan should have been content if the King of Kartli-Kakheti, whose authority was raised due to the successes achieved in the battle against the Ottomans, had desired to enter into the alliance with him, all the more so, if this bond was directed against any Khan of his concern. Indeed, the new alliance was formed: Quba Khan, faithful to the Russian monarch, sen...
Ibrahim Khan of Karabakh also asked Erekle II for help in case of Fatali Khan’s aggression. Thus was formed the political union of Erekle II, Hussein Khan and Ibrahim Khan against Fatali Khan. The allies aimed at restoring the rule of Aghasi Khan in Shemakhi, even on the condition of vassalage to Fatali Khan. In case of refusal, they intended to return Quba Khanate to its former borders by joining forces.
Russian government tried to limit the activity of Erekle II in the ongoing confrontation between the South Caucasian Khans. Nevertheless, in 1770, Erekle II sent an army to Ibrahim Khan of Karabakh to repel the attack of Fatali Khan. As a result, Fatali Khan’s campaign to Karabakh ended in failure.
In November-December 1773, Avar Khan Muhammad-Nutsal IV, along with Hussein Khan and Aghasi Khan, campaigned to Shemakhi. King Erekle helped Avar Khan with part of his army. Erekle II sent a detachment of his subordinate Muslim Borchaly Kazakhs against Fatali Khan, in order to make the participation of his subordinates less noticeable. But this did not go unnoticed by Russian intelligence.
At the same time, it is incorrect to name Erekle II as an ally of the Dagestani leaders united against Fatali Khan in the subsequent campaign of 1774. The King’s participation in the hostilities during this campaign is not confirmed by any source.
expedition of Russian troops under the command of General Medem was sent to Dagestan,
after which, at the invitation of Fatali Khan of Derbent, these troops entered the city of
Derbent. King Erekle II of Kartli-Kakheti soon responded to this campaign and tried to interest
the Russian authorities in a long stay of Russian troops in the city of Derbent, and
also suggested that they continue the campaign of troops in the South Caucasus.
In a letter to General Medem dated May 6, 1775, Erekle II suggested that he move to
the South Caucasus with his army. Promising General Medem all-encompassing support on
behalf of all the Christians of Transcaucasia, King Erekle emphasized the ease and further
unhindered march of Russian troops. On May 29, King Erekle sent a letter to the head of
foreign policy of the Russian Empire, Nikita Panin, in which, reproaching the imperial
court for neglecting the interests of the Georgian Kingdom and all Transcaucasian Christians
in the last Russian-Turkish war (1768-1774), he asked to order General Medem to
continue the campaign in the South Caucasus. According to the King, in this case, given the
situation, all the inhabitants of the Transcaucasian khanates, both Christians and Muslims,
would declare obedience to Russia. In the words of King Erekle, such an action by the Russian
army would be a great consolation for all Christians living between Derbent and his
kingdom.
As a result of the analysis of the content of the above-mentioned letters, it can be concluded
that the “minimum plan” of Erekle II regarding the campaign of Medem to the
North-Eastern Caspian was to maximize the stay of Medem's troops in Derbent, and the
"maximum plan" was the advancement of these troops to Shirvan and their approach to the
borders of the Kartli-Kakheti Kingdom.
Naturally, in this case the King of Kartli-Kakheti was guided by the interests of his
kingdom. Probably, on the one hand, Erekle II wanted to use Medem's troops, if they entered
Shirvan, to spread and strengthen his power over some of the khanates of the South
Caucasus. And if Petersburg had not agreed to advance the army in Transcaucasia and
would have left them in Derbent, this circumstance would have made it easier for King
Erekle to fight against the predatory raids of the Dagestanis, and might have made it possible
to try to annex the East Kakhetian region - Char-Belakani, appropriated by the Dagestanis,
to his kingdom.
The aforementioned initiative of Erekle II was unsuccessful: Medem was ordered to
refrain from answering the King's letter. Soon Medem was recalled from Derbent, and then
part of the Russian troops stationed there left this strategic point. Such decisions of the Russian
Imperial Court largely determined the subsequent foreign policy steps of the Georgian
King, in particular his political rapprochement with the Ottoman Empire.
Recruitment of Avarian troops by Shaki Khan Hussein in 1771 and Erekle (Heraclius) II
The war having started between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in 1768 as well as the inclusion of Erekle II, the king of Kartli-Kakheti in this war, that was conditioned by the decision of St. Petersburg having its "subversive" purposes in the South Caucasus and the north-eastern parts of the Ottoman Empire, had more or less significant impact on the political relationships between the rulers of the East Caucasus. The situation was aggravated by the Porta’s appeals to the Caucasian Muslim governors motivating them to defend their faith and join the fight against the "impious" northern enemy. Such appeals from the Sultan himself or the eastern pashas, on the orders of the Sultan, were supported by abundant money given away to the addressees. The political relations between the Caucasian rulers were also rapidly changing as well. The old allies sometimes became enemies towards each other, and sometimes the other way around.
On November 14, 1771, the captain of the Russian Terek army Khasbulat Shamurzin, who was in Russian military service, having returned from Dagestan reported to the commandant of Kizlar, Colonel F. Parker on the basis of the intelligence obtained by him: “even before my arrival in Avaria, the brother of this khan and his greater son with their people gathered, at the request of the Shaki khan Husein, went to him for help against the Georgian king Erekle, where even now the Lezgins and Tavlinians gather from all places in the mountains. And they say that the Shaki Khan promised the Avar [Khan] upon their arrival to send them 3 thousand rubles of money, and to give [them], and everyone in the future, a sufficient salary, and they will all spend the winter there, and fight the battle in spring.” From the same report we learn that due to the mentioned, Erekle II turned back from the successful war campaign toward Akhaltsikhe and while recording the report he was already standing with his army "on the borders against Hussein Khan”. The mercenaries who went from Dagestan to help Shaki Khan were going to winter there, so no significant attacks were expected on this side (i.e. on the borders of Russia – D.M.), added the captain of the Terek army.
It is worth noting that soon events unfolded quite differently from the plan described in the report: Hussein Khan sent his own and mercenary army not to the west, to the borders of the Kartli-Kakheti Kingdom, but in the opposite direction to Shamakhi, in order to drive away Fath-Ali Khan (Fatali Khan) of Quba and Derbent, who had captured these lands. And for this reason, the Dagestan mercenaries did not have to winter in Shaki at all, and together with their allies they fought the battle against the army of Fatali Khan in December 1771 or in January of the following year.
It is also worth noting that Erekle II had previously supported Hussein Khan in his confrontation with Khan of Quba. In 1768 having completely conquered Shamakhi, the extremely strengthened Fatali Khan made an attempt to subdue Hussein Khan, who participated in the conspiracy of Shamakhian noblemen intending to be liberated from Fatali Khan’s dominance. At this time King Erekle not only rejected Quba Khan’s appeal to jointly act against the Shaki Khanate, but he sided with Hussein Khan and forced Fatali-Khan to reconcile with the latter. Erekle II’ support to Hussein Khan as well as his military assistance later provided to Karabakh khan Ibrahim were conditioned by the King's decision to prevent Fatali Khan's excessive reinforcements in the region. Later, in the spring of 1770, Hussein Khan (along with Ibrahim Khan) offered the Georgian King to form alliance and applied for his assistance with the expulsion of Fatali Khan from Shirvan (Shamakhi) and the restoration of local power of Aghasi Khan having been deposed. Erekle II was driven by the same desire, but since he was already involved in the war against the Ottomans at that time, he refrained from directly participating in the afore-mentioned plan, although he declared his support and encouraged the Khans of Shaki and Karabakh.
As regards Nursal-Beg of Khunzakh, i.e. Khan (//Nutsal) Mehmed (//Muhammad) IV of Avaria, after his unsuccessful large military campaigns in Georgia, Erekle II had already settled relations with him years before and even found a kind of ally in him. In exchange for the service provided to the King of Kartli-Kakheti the ruler of Khunzakh was appointed the salary by the King: "he wanted to make peace with us, we have reconciled and we give a kind of salary to him” – Erekle II reported to the Russian government.
Taking into account the above-mentioned circumstances (the allied relations of King Erekle II with Shaki Khan Hussein and Nursal-Beg, the ruler of Khunzakh as well as the joint campaign of the latter against Fatali-Khan), at a glance it seems as if the report of the captain of Terek army to the commandant of Kizlar did not correspond at all to the political situation of that time. However, at the same time it is also worth noting that waging the war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire and dragging the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti in this war brought about the salient changes in intra-Caucasian political relations.
Already in October 1769, the first reports appeared, that Ottoman emissaries arrived in Dagestan as well as to Quba Khan in order to engage Dagestan commanders and Fatali-Khan in the ongoing war against Russia. It soon became clear that Sultan Mustafa III received Haji Gerai (Aji Garay), the son of Gazikumukh’s ruler, in his palace, bestowed the title of Pasha upon him and gave him a large sum of money to raise the army of Dagestan people, with whose help he hoped to defend the desolate north-eastern borders of the Ottoman Empire. The similar invitation was also sent to the ruler of Khunzakh, who sent a messenger to Erekle II for advice on how to act in such a situation. The king restrained him from the participation in the event.
Haji Gerai along with the other Dagestan leaders died in the famous battle of Aspindza on April 20, 1770. Having taken offence at this fact and in order to take revenge Khan of Gazikumukh - Muhammad (1743-1789) urgently embarked on the attempts to form a large military coalition with the participation of Dagestan’s and other Caucasian Khans against the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti. Then Nutsal of Khunzakh (Avaria) informed King Erekle of this news and added that he had already responded to the proposal, "that the brotherly and faithful friendship had been established with us and Erekle Khan and we will never break it." However, after the appearance and activation of the Russian army in the South Caucasus, the peculiar hesitations and signs of double game could be observed in Nursal-Beg’s actions. He sent his son to the sword-wielding Gazikumukh Khan to avenge the Georgians and justified his conduct before Erekle II by saying that he had learned about Muhammad Gazikumukh Khan's goal to launch the military campaign against Georgia and involving Avaria in this event from his son only after having sent him there and therefore, he responded to Muhammad Khan with a firm refusal. In the tense political situation created in the Caucasus due to the Russian-Ottoman war, Nursal-Beg also made attempt to raise the price for his "loyalty" towards Erekle II and thereby gain new benefits. “When the Sultan demanded to come to Akhaltsikhe with my army through his ambassadors, I sent my envoy to you, who having returned told me the following: “the King declared that if Nutsal wants, he will give him the estate”, that's why I gave up my intention to go to Akhaltsikhe,” – Nursal-Beg wrote to the King of Kartli-Kakheti. Thus, Nursal-Beg, using a kind of diplomatic language, even demanded from Erekle II to grant him the estate as a source of additional income. Later, in summer of 1771, he called on the Chechens to revolt against Russia. The Commandant of Kizlar, Neimch also reported that Nursal-Beg was recruiting the army to attack Dusheti (probably meaning Tusheti) (Macharadze 1997: 673). It is not surprising that under these circumstances, the extent of trust of King Erekle in Nutsal of Avaria had been significantly diminished.
From September 1770, at the instigation of the Ottomans, on the one hand, and obsessing with the desire for revenge the leaders of Gazikumukh, on the other hand, the Lezgins (the latter had been reconciled with Erekle II at that time), who had settled in Jar-Balakan, launched the attacks on the border lands of Kakheti. This presented the king with the new challenge: to firmly resolve the issue of Jar-Balakani Lezgins, so as to ensure the suppression of attacks in the rear of his kingdom from the most vulnerable side during the hostilities with the Ottomans. Hussein Khan of Shaki was deemed to be a reliable ally of the Jar Lezgins. Occasioned by this fact Erekle II made efforts to establish the allied relations with Fatali Khan of Quba ("to reconcile"), so that it could be hard for Jar Lezgins “to get help and thus, their strength would decrease."
On November 2, 1770, Erekle II instructed his envoy to Russia, Zaal Orbeliani, to ask the "first Minister" of the Empire (Count Nirita Panini) to mediate between the King of Kartli-Kakheti and Khan of Quba Fatali to resolve the relationships. Erekle II should not have found it difficult to achieve this goal. The Georgian king's victory at the Battle of Aspindza put an end to Fatali-Khan's aggressive plans against the Shaki and Karabakh khanates. Therefore, Quba Khan should have been content if the King of Kartli-Kakheti, whose authority was raised due to the successes achieved in the battle against the Ottomans, had desired to enter into the alliance with him, all the more so, if this bond was directed against any Khan of his concern. Indeed, the new alliance was formed: Quba Khan, faithful to the Russian monarch, sen...
Ibrahim Khan of Karabakh also asked Erekle II for help in case of Fatali Khan’s aggression. Thus was formed the political union of Erekle II, Hussein Khan and Ibrahim Khan against Fatali Khan. The allies aimed at restoring the rule of Aghasi Khan in Shemakhi, even on the condition of vassalage to Fatali Khan. In case of refusal, they intended to return Quba Khanate to its former borders by joining forces.
Russian government tried to limit the activity of Erekle II in the ongoing confrontation between the South Caucasian Khans. Nevertheless, in 1770, Erekle II sent an army to Ibrahim Khan of Karabakh to repel the attack of Fatali Khan. As a result, Fatali Khan’s campaign to Karabakh ended in failure.
In November-December 1773, Avar Khan Muhammad-Nutsal IV, along with Hussein Khan and Aghasi Khan, campaigned to Shemakhi. King Erekle helped Avar Khan with part of his army. Erekle II sent a detachment of his subordinate Muslim Borchaly Kazakhs against Fatali Khan, in order to make the participation of his subordinates less noticeable. But this did not go unnoticed by Russian intelligence.
At the same time, it is incorrect to name Erekle II as an ally of the Dagestani leaders united against Fatali Khan in the subsequent campaign of 1774. The King’s participation in the hostilities during this campaign is not confirmed by any source.