Se explica de modo didáctico la estructura general del razonamiento, explicando lo que significa ... more Se explica de modo didáctico la estructura general del razonamiento, explicando lo que significa la forma de un argumento, la relación inferencial, distinguiendo entre inferencia deductiva y no deductiva. Se muestra cpomo diferentes formas de argumento se enmarcan en esa forma y poseen una relación inferencial. Se trata de un texto agotado ampliamente empleado en la enseñanza de la argumentación.
In this paper we argue in favor of an epistemic way to understand paraconsistency. We briefly arg... more In this paper we argue in favor of an epistemic way to understand paraconsistency. We briefly argue that examples like "It rains and it does not rain" are inadequate to defend the idea of an ontological inconsistency as a foundation for paraconsistent logic. Epistemic inconsistency centers its efforts on modeling the notion of paraconsistent inference rather than inconsistent statements. In this paper representation of statements is seen as depending on the inferential issue. We will center on the representation of a scientific theory and will defend that it requires the modeling of epistemic inconsistency. We do that by means of an analysis of empirical testing schemas, interpreting scientific hypothesis as fallible statements of a specific kind. Then paraconsistency must coexist with fallibility in an appropriate model representing scientific theories. Finally, we propose some very general characteristics, which, we consider, should be modeled on a logic of epistemic paraconsistency.
Let us assume that a set of sentences explains a phenomenon within a system of beliefs and rules.... more Let us assume that a set of sentences explains a phenomenon within a system of beliefs and rules. Such rules and beliefs may vary and this could have as a collateral effect that different sets of sentences may become explanations relative to the new system, while other ones no longer count as such. In this paper we offer a general formal framework to study this phenomenon. We also give examples of such variations as we replace rules of classical deductive logic with rules more in the spirit of da Costa's paraconsistent calculi, Reiter's default theories, or even a combination of them. This paper generalizes the notion of epistemic system in [6]. That notion was used to analyze the concept of explanation, using Reiter's default theories and a specific paraconsistent logic of da Costa. Our proposal is a formal framework, GMD, based on doxastic systems, which allows us to analyze the interaction between theoretical constructs (in this case, explanations), theories and logics. We mention some obstacles, we develop the formal framework, and finally we apply it to the modeling of scientific explanation. Along the way, we try to shed light on different kinds of interaction between paraconsistency and non-monotonicity.
Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology, 2019
By means of an epistemological analysis of the internal components of default reasoning, and revi... more By means of an epistemological analysis of the internal components of default reasoning, and revisiting Geffner’s proposal about causal asymmetries, it is given in this paper an answer to the problem of soundness in default reasoning. The kernel of that answer is an intentionalist view of certain kind of connections inside the internal structure of a default rule. This intentionalist view consists partially in assuming certain strong relationships between the prerequisite, the justifications and the conclusion in a default. Another ingredient of this perspective is the distinction between the context-dependence of a relationship and that of its relatas. It is offered a formal representation of the internal structure of default reasoning. Then it is built an intuitive characterization of the notion of default logical consequence. This notion is similar to the traditional notion in the sense that it attends to the challenge of clarifying the inferential mechanism of a schema, even whe...
Dov Gabbay y John Woods defendieron un enfoque no tradicional para entender formalmente la abducc... more Dov Gabbay y John Woods defendieron un enfoque no tradicional para entender formalmente la abducción. Una parte significativa de la defensa que proponen Gabbay y Woods está basada en una robusta crítica contra lo que podría llamarse "el enfoque formal tradicional de la abducción". En este artículo realizaré una evaluación de un punto específico de esta crítica, el cual está relacionado con la noción de explicación. Haré esta evaluación a la luz del importante debate que sobre la caracterización de la explicación científica ha tomado ya más de 5 décadas de discusión fructífera en el ámbito de la Filosofía. Finalmente propondré que hay una falla importante en la crítica realizada por estos autores y que tal falla nos lleva a revalorar la importancia de la interacción entre dos disciplinas de investigación involucradas en estos enfoques: la Inteligencia Artificial y la Filosofía dela Ciencia.
Resumen: EL ensayo introduce de manera informal la logica del razonamiento por default, a traves ... more Resumen: EL ensayo introduce de manera informal la logica del razonamiento por default, a traves de la caracterizaci6n de las principals propiedades que Reiter propuso para modelar el razonamiento de sentido cumun. Terminos clave: logica default, razonamiento del sentido comun, 16gica no-monotonica.
En su libro Teoria del discurso y Derechos Humanos, Robert Alexy propone dos argumentos centrales... more En su libro Teoria del discurso y Derechos Humanos, Robert Alexy propone dos argumentos centrales : el primero para fundamentarlas reglas del discurso practico general y el segundo para fundamentar los derechos humanos.
Se explica de modo didáctico la estructura general del razonamiento, explicando lo que significa ... more Se explica de modo didáctico la estructura general del razonamiento, explicando lo que significa la forma de un argumento, la relación inferencial, distinguiendo entre inferencia deductiva y no deductiva. Se muestra cpomo diferentes formas de argumento se enmarcan en esa forma y poseen una relación inferencial. Se trata de un texto agotado ampliamente empleado en la enseñanza de la argumentación.
In this paper we argue in favor of an epistemic way to understand paraconsistency. We briefly arg... more In this paper we argue in favor of an epistemic way to understand paraconsistency. We briefly argue that examples like "It rains and it does not rain" are inadequate to defend the idea of an ontological inconsistency as a foundation for paraconsistent logic. Epistemic inconsistency centers its efforts on modeling the notion of paraconsistent inference rather than inconsistent statements. In this paper representation of statements is seen as depending on the inferential issue. We will center on the representation of a scientific theory and will defend that it requires the modeling of epistemic inconsistency. We do that by means of an analysis of empirical testing schemas, interpreting scientific hypothesis as fallible statements of a specific kind. Then paraconsistency must coexist with fallibility in an appropriate model representing scientific theories. Finally, we propose some very general characteristics, which, we consider, should be modeled on a logic of epistemic paraconsistency.
Let us assume that a set of sentences explains a phenomenon within a system of beliefs and rules.... more Let us assume that a set of sentences explains a phenomenon within a system of beliefs and rules. Such rules and beliefs may vary and this could have as a collateral effect that different sets of sentences may become explanations relative to the new system, while other ones no longer count as such. In this paper we offer a general formal framework to study this phenomenon. We also give examples of such variations as we replace rules of classical deductive logic with rules more in the spirit of da Costa's paraconsistent calculi, Reiter's default theories, or even a combination of them. This paper generalizes the notion of epistemic system in [6]. That notion was used to analyze the concept of explanation, using Reiter's default theories and a specific paraconsistent logic of da Costa. Our proposal is a formal framework, GMD, based on doxastic systems, which allows us to analyze the interaction between theoretical constructs (in this case, explanations), theories and logics. We mention some obstacles, we develop the formal framework, and finally we apply it to the modeling of scientific explanation. Along the way, we try to shed light on different kinds of interaction between paraconsistency and non-monotonicity.
Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology, 2019
By means of an epistemological analysis of the internal components of default reasoning, and revi... more By means of an epistemological analysis of the internal components of default reasoning, and revisiting Geffner’s proposal about causal asymmetries, it is given in this paper an answer to the problem of soundness in default reasoning. The kernel of that answer is an intentionalist view of certain kind of connections inside the internal structure of a default rule. This intentionalist view consists partially in assuming certain strong relationships between the prerequisite, the justifications and the conclusion in a default. Another ingredient of this perspective is the distinction between the context-dependence of a relationship and that of its relatas. It is offered a formal representation of the internal structure of default reasoning. Then it is built an intuitive characterization of the notion of default logical consequence. This notion is similar to the traditional notion in the sense that it attends to the challenge of clarifying the inferential mechanism of a schema, even whe...
Dov Gabbay y John Woods defendieron un enfoque no tradicional para entender formalmente la abducc... more Dov Gabbay y John Woods defendieron un enfoque no tradicional para entender formalmente la abducción. Una parte significativa de la defensa que proponen Gabbay y Woods está basada en una robusta crítica contra lo que podría llamarse "el enfoque formal tradicional de la abducción". En este artículo realizaré una evaluación de un punto específico de esta crítica, el cual está relacionado con la noción de explicación. Haré esta evaluación a la luz del importante debate que sobre la caracterización de la explicación científica ha tomado ya más de 5 décadas de discusión fructífera en el ámbito de la Filosofía. Finalmente propondré que hay una falla importante en la crítica realizada por estos autores y que tal falla nos lleva a revalorar la importancia de la interacción entre dos disciplinas de investigación involucradas en estos enfoques: la Inteligencia Artificial y la Filosofía dela Ciencia.
Resumen: EL ensayo introduce de manera informal la logica del razonamiento por default, a traves ... more Resumen: EL ensayo introduce de manera informal la logica del razonamiento por default, a traves de la caracterizaci6n de las principals propiedades que Reiter propuso para modelar el razonamiento de sentido cumun. Terminos clave: logica default, razonamiento del sentido comun, 16gica no-monotonica.
En su libro Teoria del discurso y Derechos Humanos, Robert Alexy propone dos argumentos centrales... more En su libro Teoria del discurso y Derechos Humanos, Robert Alexy propone dos argumentos centrales : el primero para fundamentarlas reglas del discurso practico general y el segundo para fundamentar los derechos humanos.
Uploads
Papers by David Gaytán