Papers by Angelo Caravaggio
The lack of a decisive British victory in the Mediterranean theater fundamen- tally affected Brit... more The lack of a decisive British victory in the Mediterranean theater fundamen- tally affected British maritime strategy throughout the Second World War. The Royal Italian Navy, or Regia Marina Italiana (RMI), exerted a disproportion- ate influence on British strategy and fleet disposition, because its existence could not be ignored and British operations to eliminate it failed. On 11 November 1940, Admiral Andrew Cunningham, the British commander of naval forces in the Mediterranean, had the opportunity to eliminate the entire complement of battleships from the Italian order of battle, at Taranto
Naval War College Review, 2014
C riticisms leveled at the Japanese for their "ill conceived" or "poorly planned" attack at Pearl... more C riticisms leveled at the Japanese for their "ill conceived" or "poorly planned" attack at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 have failed to consider the true depth of vision and professional intellect of its principal architect, Commander Minoru Genda. 1 Charges of failure to execute follow-on attacks against the harbor facilities, if any such attacks were planned at all, or to exploit the immediate advantages created in the Central Pacific after the attack are commonly made by both academic and professional military scholars. Genda has suffered the brunt of this criticism. But in fact Genda's plans were neither ill conceived nor poorly assembled-they were just not executed as originally envisioned. The generally understood intent behind the Pearl Harbor attack was to delay the westward advance of the U.S. Pacific Fleet for up to six months, allowing Japan to complete the occupation and consolidation of the area it had designated the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. 2 The attack at Pearl Harbor accomplished this aim. In the overall Japanese plan, the Southern Operation-the army's offensives toward the East Indies and Southeast Asia-was the main military effort. However, for Genda, the Pearl Harbor attack had to be much more than just a tactical strike; it had to be the decisive action of the war, and he conceptualized his operational plans accordingly. 3 A veritable treasure of unexamined transcripts of interviews conducted by the
Naval War College Review, 2006
Lieutenant Colonel Caravaggio has been co-chair of Officership Studies at the Canadian Forces Col... more Lieutenant Colonel Caravaggio has been co-chair of Officership Studies at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto since 1999, with responsibilities for courses in the fields of command, leadership, ethics and the profession of arms, and communication and media. He is a graduate of the Canadian Forces' Command and Staff College, has master's degrees in war and defense studies, and is currently working on a doctorate in Canadian military history at Wilfrid Laurier University.
The lack of a decisive British victory in the Mediterranean theater fundamentally affected Britis... more The lack of a decisive British victory in the Mediterranean theater fundamentally affected British maritime strategy throughout the Second World War. The Royal Italian Navy, or Regia Marina Italiana (RMI), exerted a disproportionate influence on British strategy and fleet disposition, because its existence could not be ignored and British operations to eliminate it failed. On 11 November 1940, Admiral Andrew Cunningham, the British commander of naval forces in the Mediterranean, had the opportunity to eliminate the entire complement of battleships from the Italian order of battle, at Taranto. However, questionable decisions in the planning process, combined with Cunningham’s decision to launch a considerably reduced strike force, succeeded in only temporarily reducing the Italian battle fleet from six to two battleships. More importantly, the British failed to capitalize on the operational-level opportunities resulting from the success of their attack. Britain held the initiative, b...
Canadian Military History, 2002
M ajor-General George Kitching was General Officer Commanding 4th Canadian Armoured Division from... more M ajor-General George Kitching was General Officer Commanding 4th Canadian Armoured Division from February until August 1944. Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, commander of 2nd Canadian Corps to which 4th Canadian Armoured Division belonged, relieved Kitching of command on 21 August, ostensibly for lack of leadership. The story of Major-General Kitching and 4th Canadian Armoured Division in Normandy has so far not been portrayed in an especially positive light. Most scholarship, including the official history of the Canadian Army, accepts that Simonds was justified in relieving Kitching from command. Criticism from contemporary American and British commanders, repeated by subsequent historians, claimed that attacks by 2nd Canadian Corps, with the object of closing the Falaise Gap, were not pressed forward with sufficient resolve and thereby resulted in the escape of some quarter million German soldiers. 1 The "poor" performance of 4th Canadian Armoured Division in general, and the supposed lacklustre command performance of Kitching in particular, have been convenient explanations for this failure. Simonds viewed the case as one of leadership potential that was never achieved by Kitching. The expectation was that the Canadians should have been more successful in Operations "Totalize" and "Tractable" and that 4th Canadian Armoured Division, as the spearhead for the Canadian advance, should have closed the Falaise Gap sooner. John English even goes so far as to state that the lacklustre performance of the Canadian army in Normandy laid squarely at the feet of the divisional commanders. 2
The author has granted a nonexclusive license allowing Library and Archives Canada to reproduce, ... more The author has granted a nonexclusive license allowing Library and Archives Canada to reproduce, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, communicate to the public by telecommunication or on the Internet, loan, distribute and sell theses worldwide, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, in microform, paper, electronic and/or any other formats. L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public par telecommunication ou par I'lnternet, preter, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans le monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, sur support microforme, papier, electronique et/ou autres formats.
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Papers by Angelo Caravaggio