Papers by Achilles Zaluar
Cadernos de Estudos Estratégicos, 2006
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Dec 31, 2010
Shared, But Not Equal Responsibilities Mohamed I. Shaker 40 CHAPTER 8 Shared Responsibilities, Sh... more Shared, But Not Equal Responsibilities Mohamed I. Shaker 40 CHAPTER 8 Shared Responsibilities, Shared Rights Achilles Zaluar 45 CONTRIBUTORS INTRODUCTION The pursuit of nuclear disarmament has been a central component of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, starting with the initial signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. The inclusion under Article VI of the NPT of a commitment to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" reflected the desire of the non-nuclear-weapons states (NNWS) not to create a regime that would allow nuclear-weapons states (NWS) to retain their weapons in perpetuity. Governments in Washington, Moscow, and London-representing the only three nuclear powers that signed the NPT in 1968-insisted, however, that no precise standards and no time-bound guarantees about when disarmament would be achieved were possible. The interest and emphasis given to nuclear disarmament by the leaders of the nuclear weapons powers have waxed and waned throughout the history of the NPT, and for much of the past decade, many governments in NNWS have complained that the disarmament goal has been given short shrift by those with nuclear weapons. Renewed interest in arms control and restated commitments to the longterm goal of nuclear disarmament have clearly increased over recent years, most dramatically with President Barack Obama's April 2009 speech in Prague. With that change in focus comes an opportunity for the international community to rethink how Article VI of the NPT is traditionally interpreted and to move beyond the cycle of repeated complaints from the "have-nots" that the "haves" are not doing enough to disarm themselves and repeated retorts by the "haves" that they are already taking every step that is realistic or prudent. The promise of a different approach to the commitments made under the NPT forms the basis of the Scott Sagan's valuable article-"Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament"-which was the concluding essay in the Fall 2009 special issue of Daedalus that focused on the global nuclear future. Sagan's paper, and its call for rethinking the balance of responsibilities and the relationship between different articles in the NPT, now provides the basis for a series of invited response papers from seven distinguished authors. These international scholars and diplomats present their interpretations of the commitments made under the NPT regime and suggest new ways in which shared responsibilities for nuclear disarmament may or may not be realized in practice. Their contributions serve to expand the discussion that was started by the original Daedalus article-and together they are intended to spark renewed policy debates about how best to pursue global disarmament, debates that will be prominent at the May 2010 NPT Review Conference in New York City and in the years following that important meeting. The distinguished authors in this American Academy of Arts and Sciences Occasional Paper come from a diverse set of countries and reflect a diverse and crosscutting set of perspectives on the disarmament debate. With respect to nuclear arsenals, Scott Sagan (United States) and James Acton (United Kingdom) are from NWS; Harald Müller (Germany), Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka), Mustafa Kibaroglu (Turkey), Yukio Satoh (Japan), Mohamed Shaker (Egypt), and Achilles Zaluar (Brazil) are leading specialists from NNWS. Three of these states-Germany, Turkey, and Japan-are U.S. allies and come under extended nuclear deterrence guarantees; Sri Lanka, Egypt, and Brazil, however, do not. With respect to the use of nuclear energy today, Brazil, Germany, Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom all maintain nuclear power plants. Sri Lanka, Egypt, and Turkey are aspirant nuclear energy states and have not yet constructed the power plants that they hope to use in the future. The differences in national perspectives and the differences in individual opinions about appropriate disarmament steps among the authors should not mask a commitment they all share. The contributors to this volume agree that new thinking and continued debate about how best to maintain momentum toward nuclear disarmament is to be welcomed. Only by seeking out, and taking into consideration, a cross section of views can progress toward the goal of a nuclear-weapons-free world continue. We hope that this Occasional Paper may therefore serve as an important contribution to a global disarmament debate that has become increasingly prominent over the past couple of years. This Occasional Paper is part of the American Academy's Global Nuclear Future Initiative, which is guided by the Academy's Committee on International Security Studies. The Initiative examines the safety, security, and nonproliferation implications of the global spread of nuclear energy and is developing pragmatic recommendations for managing the emerging nuclear order. The Global Nuclear Future Initiative is supported by generous grants from Stephen D. Bechtel, Jr.; the S.D. Bechtel Foundation; the Carnegie Corporation of New York; the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation; the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation; the Flora Family Foundation; and the Kavli Foundation. We thank these funders for their support. The Academy is grateful to the principal investigators of the Global Nuclear Future Initiative-Steven E. Miller, Scott D. Sagan, Robert Rosner, and Thomas Isaacs-along with expert members of the project's advisory committee-John W. Rowe, Richard A. Meserve, and Albert Carnesale-for contributing their time, experience, and expertise to the work of the Initiative. We would also like to thank the authors for bringing their knowledge and insight to bear on these important issues.
International Review of the Red Cross, 1997
Before addressing the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) itself, we should point out that a... more Before addressing the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) itself, we should point out that any view of the treaty from a Southern perspective can be only partial, that is, one perspective among many possible others. Developing and non-aligned countries may have different — and equally legitimate — interests and expectations regarding a particular international instrument. In fact, this diversity is itself one of the defining characteristics of the “South”, a term we use to categorize developing States whose main point in common is the absence of alignment with any great power and, indeed, with each other.
Revista Internacional de la Cruz Roja, 1997
ABSTRACT En materia de desarme, las diversas posiciones adoptadas por los distintos bloques de pa... more ABSTRACT En materia de desarme, las diversas posiciones adoptadas por los distintos bloques de países en desarrollo constituyen una serie de intentos para definir un común denominador sobre diversas cuestiones. Son el resultado de un proceso de negociación, algunas veces arduo pero indispensable, a fin de que los países del Sur puedan evitar que las grandes potencias y las alianzas más consolidadas del Norte los dejen de lado. No hay que confundir los principios generales articulados por los coordinadores de grupo, a menudo con elocuencia y capacidad de previsión, con los diversos significados que puede tener un determinado tratado para los diferentes países en desarrollo.
in a fascinating “thought experiment”—a “Gedankenexperiment” in the parlance of the German philos... more in a fascinating “thought experiment”—a “Gedankenexperiment” in the parlance of the German philosophers and scientists, most notably Albert Einstein, who employed and popularized this useful technique. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, thought experiments are a “device of the imagination used to investigate the nature of things.”1 Here we are challenged to investigate how nuclear weapons could be prohibited in ways that would leave the world more secure, that is to say, what would be the implications if states were to seek to implement the nuclear disarmament obligation contained in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)? The authors fear, with reason, that failure to demonstrate progress toward the fulfillment of this legally binding obligation will continue to undermine the nonproliferation regime. They are to be commended for challenging the assumption that nuclear disarmament is futile because nuclear weapons “cannot be disinvented.” It is the knowl...
Revista Internacional De La Cruz Roja, 1997
Revue Internationale De La Croix Rouge, 1997
Avant d'aborder la Convention sur les armes biologiques elle-même, nous souhaitons releve... more Avant d'aborder la Convention sur les armes biologiques elle-même, nous souhaitons relever que toute manière d'appréhender ce traité en se plaçant dans la perspective des pays du Sud ne peut être que partiale, car elle ne constitue qu'un point de vue parmi beaucoup d'autres. Un instrument international peut susciter dans les pays en développement et les pays non alignés des intérêts et des attentes différents, mais tout aussi légitimes. En fait, cette diversité constitue, en elle-même, l'un des traits qui caractérisent «le Sud», terme que nous utilisons pour regrouper au sein d'une même catégorie les pays en développement ayant pour principal point commun leur non-alignement, tant à l'égard des grandes puissances qu'à l'égard de leurs pairs.
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Papers by Achilles Zaluar