GA 1: 1–15, ‘‘Das Realitatsproblem in der modernen Philosophie (1912)’’ = ‘‘The Problem of Realit... more GA 1: 1–15, ‘‘Das Realitatsproblem in der modernen Philosophie (1912)’’ = ‘‘The Problem of Reality in Modern Philosophy,’’ trans. Philip J. Bossert, revised Aaron Bunch, Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings, 1910–1927, ed. Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007, 20–9. [Earlier, ‘‘The Problem of Reality in Modern Philosophy (1912),’’ trans. Philip J. Bossert and John van Buren, Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond, ed. John van Buren, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002, 39–48.] GA 1: 17–43, ‘‘Neuere Forschungen uber Logik (1912)’’ = ‘‘Recent Research in Logic,’’ trans. in part Theodore Kisiel, Becoming Heidegger, 31–44. (See above.) GA 1: 55.23–57.14 [‘‘Antrittsrede, Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften’’ (1957)]’’ = ‘‘A Recollective ‘Vita,’ (1957),’’ trans. Hans Seigfried, in Becoming Heidegger, 9–10. (See above.)
Meillassoux defines “correlationism” as the view that we can only access the mutual dependence of... more Meillassoux defines “correlationism” as the view that we can only access the mutual dependence of thought and being—specifically, subjectivity and objectivity—which he attributes to Heidegger. This attribution is inapt. It is only by accessing being—via existential analysis—that we can properly distinguish beings like subjects and objects. I propose that Meillassoux’s misattribution ignores the ontological difference that drives Heidegger’s project. First, I demonstrate the inadequacy of Meillassoux’s account of correlationism as a criticism of Heidegger and dispense with an objection. Second, I argue that Meillassoux’s neglect of the ontological difference stems from a question-begging appeal to transcendental realism, which is at odds with Heidegger’s twin claims for a variety of transcendental idealism in Being and Time. Third, I offer a reflection on three general marks of transcendental idealism.
This paper provides a historical redescription and reinterpretation of Alain Badiou’s major work,... more This paper provides a historical redescription and reinterpretation of Alain Badiou’s major work, Being and Event. The work is approached historically, as a text that uses Heideggerian metaphysics to perform an allegorical exegesis of mathematical set theory and does so as a means of fashioning a supremacist spiritual pedagogy for a philosophical elite in the context of a national intellectual subculture.
I Overcoming nihilism? Do we live in the age of fulfilled nihilism? If so, can we overcome such n... more I Overcoming nihilism? Do we live in the age of fulfilled nihilism? If so, can we overcome such nihilism? These are two of the questions that inform the extraordinary open letter that Martin Heidegger published in 1955 in a Festschrift celebrating Ernst Jünger's sixtieth birthday. 2 Heidegger's letter was in response to an essay that Jünger had contributed six years earlier, in 1949, to a Festschrift on Heidegger's own sixtieth birthday. So there was a certain reciprocity in the exchange: a favor returned, a public gesture of respect mirroring an earlier one. No doubt it was a heartfelt gesture on Heidegger's part, especially since the Festschrift in his own honor, the one to which Jünger had contributed, had come at the worst period in Heidegger's career, when he was isolated, under suspicion for his pro-Nazi activities in the 1930s, still forbidden to teach at any German university, and trying to put his life back together 1 This text develops themes that found an initial expression in "Nihilism, Facticity, and the Economized Lethe," in Heidegger: A Centennial Appraisal (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1990), pp. 28-61. The present text is dedicated, as was the earlier one, to Prof. William J. Richardson, S.J.
The realist credentials of post-Kantian philosophy are often disputed by those who worry that gro... more The realist credentials of post-Kantian philosophy are often disputed by those who worry that grounding ontology on the human standpointvariously construed by Kant, German idealism, phenomenology, and existentialism-bars us from an otherwise accessible reality, impoverishing our cognitive grasp, and betraying the promise of natural science. While many such critics ally with the so-called analytic tradition, the past decade has seen the rise of thinkers versed in the so-called continental tradition who, under the loose and controversial banner of "speculative realism," seek to overcome the alleged anthropocentrism of Kantian and post-Kantian thought by developing theories of cognitive access to human-transcendent being.
Philosophy has no other legitimate aim except to help find the new names that will bring into exi... more Philosophy has no other legitimate aim except to help find the new names that will bring into existence the unknown world that is only waiting for us because we are waiting for it. Alain Badiou 1 As I have often said, philosophy does not lead me to any renunciation, since I do not abstain from saying something, but rather abandon a certain combination of words as senseless. In another sense, however, philosophy does require a resignation, but one of feeling, not of intellect. And maybe that is what makes it so difficult for many. It can be difficult not to use an expression, just as it is difficult to hold back tears, or an outburst of rage.
I Overcoming nihilism? Do we live in the age of fulfilled nihilism? If so, can we overcome such n... more I Overcoming nihilism? Do we live in the age of fulfilled nihilism? If so, can we overcome such nihilism? These are two of the questions that inform the extraordinary open letter that Martin Heidegger published in 1955 in a Festschrift celebrating Ernst Jünger's sixtieth birthday. 2 Heidegger's letter was in response to an essay that Jünger had contributed six years earlier, in 1949, to a Festschrift on Heidegger's own sixtieth birthday. So there was a certain reciprocity in the exchange: a favor returned, a public gesture of respect mirroring an earlier one. No doubt it was a heartfelt gesture on Heidegger's part, especially since the Festschrift in his own honor, the one to which Jünger had contributed, had come at the worst period in Heidegger's career, when he was isolated, under suspicion for his pro-Nazi activities in the 1930s, still forbidden to teach at any German university, and trying to put his life back together 1 This text develops themes that found an initial expression in "Nihilism, Facticity, and the Economized Lethe," in Heidegger: A Centennial Appraisal (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1990), pp. 28-61. The present text is dedicated, as was the earlier one, to Prof. William J. Richardson, S.J.
In his 1924 lecture 'The Concept of Time' 1 , which has been called the 'Urform' of Being and Tim... more In his 1924 lecture 'The Concept of Time' 1 , which has been called the 'Urform' of Being and Time 2 , Heidegger begins with the question 'What is time?' and shows how it gradually transforms itself into the question 'Who is time?' Time cannot be grasped by means of the question of essence, which enquires into 'the what' (das Was) of things. The traditional understanding of 'whatness' or 'essence' operates on the basis of a prior hypostatization of time as presence. Ousia is understood as Vorhandenheit, presence-at-hand (though Heidegger is not yet using this vocabulary in 1924). Thus the question 'What is time?' prejudges the very nature of the phenomenon about which it enquires by reducing it to the status of a specific way of being in time: being-present. But time is precisely that which is never merely present: its way of being cannot be grasped on the basis of being-present. So we cannot simply assume that time's way of being is that of intra-temporal entities. To understand how time is and how its way of being differs from that of intra-temporal entities, we must first understand how we originally come to grasp the various senses of temporal being, how temporal things are. But this entails grasping the intimate relation between those varieties of temporal being and our own being as that within which temporal phenomena are encountered. Thus for Heidegger the enquiry into how time is necessitates an enquiry into the way of being of that entity on whose basis we originally come to access the varieties of temporal being. That being is of course our own: Dasein. Its defining characteristics are temporal specificity (Jeweiligkeit) and mineness (Jemeinigkeit). Dasein is always mine: 'The specificity of the "I am" is constitutive for Dasein. Just as primarily as it is being-in-the-world, Dasein is therefore also my Dasein. It
GA 1: 1–15, ‘‘Das Realitatsproblem in der modernen Philosophie (1912)’’ = ‘‘The Problem of Realit... more GA 1: 1–15, ‘‘Das Realitatsproblem in der modernen Philosophie (1912)’’ = ‘‘The Problem of Reality in Modern Philosophy,’’ trans. Philip J. Bossert, revised Aaron Bunch, Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings, 1910–1927, ed. Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007, 20–9. [Earlier, ‘‘The Problem of Reality in Modern Philosophy (1912),’’ trans. Philip J. Bossert and John van Buren, Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond, ed. John van Buren, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002, 39–48.] GA 1: 17–43, ‘‘Neuere Forschungen uber Logik (1912)’’ = ‘‘Recent Research in Logic,’’ trans. in part Theodore Kisiel, Becoming Heidegger, 31–44. (See above.) GA 1: 55.23–57.14 [‘‘Antrittsrede, Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften’’ (1957)]’’ = ‘‘A Recollective ‘Vita,’ (1957),’’ trans. Hans Seigfried, in Becoming Heidegger, 9–10. (See above.)
Meillassoux defines “correlationism” as the view that we can only access the mutual dependence of... more Meillassoux defines “correlationism” as the view that we can only access the mutual dependence of thought and being—specifically, subjectivity and objectivity—which he attributes to Heidegger. This attribution is inapt. It is only by accessing being—via existential analysis—that we can properly distinguish beings like subjects and objects. I propose that Meillassoux’s misattribution ignores the ontological difference that drives Heidegger’s project. First, I demonstrate the inadequacy of Meillassoux’s account of correlationism as a criticism of Heidegger and dispense with an objection. Second, I argue that Meillassoux’s neglect of the ontological difference stems from a question-begging appeal to transcendental realism, which is at odds with Heidegger’s twin claims for a variety of transcendental idealism in Being and Time. Third, I offer a reflection on three general marks of transcendental idealism.
This paper provides a historical redescription and reinterpretation of Alain Badiou’s major work,... more This paper provides a historical redescription and reinterpretation of Alain Badiou’s major work, Being and Event. The work is approached historically, as a text that uses Heideggerian metaphysics to perform an allegorical exegesis of mathematical set theory and does so as a means of fashioning a supremacist spiritual pedagogy for a philosophical elite in the context of a national intellectual subculture.
I Overcoming nihilism? Do we live in the age of fulfilled nihilism? If so, can we overcome such n... more I Overcoming nihilism? Do we live in the age of fulfilled nihilism? If so, can we overcome such nihilism? These are two of the questions that inform the extraordinary open letter that Martin Heidegger published in 1955 in a Festschrift celebrating Ernst Jünger's sixtieth birthday. 2 Heidegger's letter was in response to an essay that Jünger had contributed six years earlier, in 1949, to a Festschrift on Heidegger's own sixtieth birthday. So there was a certain reciprocity in the exchange: a favor returned, a public gesture of respect mirroring an earlier one. No doubt it was a heartfelt gesture on Heidegger's part, especially since the Festschrift in his own honor, the one to which Jünger had contributed, had come at the worst period in Heidegger's career, when he was isolated, under suspicion for his pro-Nazi activities in the 1930s, still forbidden to teach at any German university, and trying to put his life back together 1 This text develops themes that found an initial expression in "Nihilism, Facticity, and the Economized Lethe," in Heidegger: A Centennial Appraisal (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1990), pp. 28-61. The present text is dedicated, as was the earlier one, to Prof. William J. Richardson, S.J.
The realist credentials of post-Kantian philosophy are often disputed by those who worry that gro... more The realist credentials of post-Kantian philosophy are often disputed by those who worry that grounding ontology on the human standpointvariously construed by Kant, German idealism, phenomenology, and existentialism-bars us from an otherwise accessible reality, impoverishing our cognitive grasp, and betraying the promise of natural science. While many such critics ally with the so-called analytic tradition, the past decade has seen the rise of thinkers versed in the so-called continental tradition who, under the loose and controversial banner of "speculative realism," seek to overcome the alleged anthropocentrism of Kantian and post-Kantian thought by developing theories of cognitive access to human-transcendent being.
Philosophy has no other legitimate aim except to help find the new names that will bring into exi... more Philosophy has no other legitimate aim except to help find the new names that will bring into existence the unknown world that is only waiting for us because we are waiting for it. Alain Badiou 1 As I have often said, philosophy does not lead me to any renunciation, since I do not abstain from saying something, but rather abandon a certain combination of words as senseless. In another sense, however, philosophy does require a resignation, but one of feeling, not of intellect. And maybe that is what makes it so difficult for many. It can be difficult not to use an expression, just as it is difficult to hold back tears, or an outburst of rage.
I Overcoming nihilism? Do we live in the age of fulfilled nihilism? If so, can we overcome such n... more I Overcoming nihilism? Do we live in the age of fulfilled nihilism? If so, can we overcome such nihilism? These are two of the questions that inform the extraordinary open letter that Martin Heidegger published in 1955 in a Festschrift celebrating Ernst Jünger's sixtieth birthday. 2 Heidegger's letter was in response to an essay that Jünger had contributed six years earlier, in 1949, to a Festschrift on Heidegger's own sixtieth birthday. So there was a certain reciprocity in the exchange: a favor returned, a public gesture of respect mirroring an earlier one. No doubt it was a heartfelt gesture on Heidegger's part, especially since the Festschrift in his own honor, the one to which Jünger had contributed, had come at the worst period in Heidegger's career, when he was isolated, under suspicion for his pro-Nazi activities in the 1930s, still forbidden to teach at any German university, and trying to put his life back together 1 This text develops themes that found an initial expression in "Nihilism, Facticity, and the Economized Lethe," in Heidegger: A Centennial Appraisal (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1990), pp. 28-61. The present text is dedicated, as was the earlier one, to Prof. William J. Richardson, S.J.
In his 1924 lecture 'The Concept of Time' 1 , which has been called the 'Urform' of Being and Tim... more In his 1924 lecture 'The Concept of Time' 1 , which has been called the 'Urform' of Being and Time 2 , Heidegger begins with the question 'What is time?' and shows how it gradually transforms itself into the question 'Who is time?' Time cannot be grasped by means of the question of essence, which enquires into 'the what' (das Was) of things. The traditional understanding of 'whatness' or 'essence' operates on the basis of a prior hypostatization of time as presence. Ousia is understood as Vorhandenheit, presence-at-hand (though Heidegger is not yet using this vocabulary in 1924). Thus the question 'What is time?' prejudges the very nature of the phenomenon about which it enquires by reducing it to the status of a specific way of being in time: being-present. But time is precisely that which is never merely present: its way of being cannot be grasped on the basis of being-present. So we cannot simply assume that time's way of being is that of intra-temporal entities. To understand how time is and how its way of being differs from that of intra-temporal entities, we must first understand how we originally come to grasp the various senses of temporal being, how temporal things are. But this entails grasping the intimate relation between those varieties of temporal being and our own being as that within which temporal phenomena are encountered. Thus for Heidegger the enquiry into how time is necessitates an enquiry into the way of being of that entity on whose basis we originally come to access the varieties of temporal being. That being is of course our own: Dasein. Its defining characteristics are temporal specificity (Jeweiligkeit) and mineness (Jemeinigkeit). Dasein is always mine: 'The specificity of the "I am" is constitutive for Dasein. Just as primarily as it is being-in-the-world, Dasein is therefore also my Dasein. It
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