Papers by Georges Zaccour
We consider a differential game model for a marketing channel formed by one manufacturer and one ... more We consider a differential game model for a marketing channel formed by one manufacturer and one retailer. The latter sells the manufacturer's product and may also introduce a private label at a lower price than the manufacturer's brand. The aim of this paper is twofold. We first assess in a dynamic context the impact of a private label introduction on the players' payoffs. If this is beneficial for the retailer to propose his brand to consumers and detrimental to the manufacturer, we wish then to investigate if a cooperative advertising program could help the manufacturer to mitigate the negative impact of the private label.
INFOR: Information Systems and Operational …, 2010
This study proposes a game theoretic approach toward the analysis of renewable portfolio standard... more This study proposes a game theoretic approach toward the analysis of renewable portfolio standard policy (RPS), which is one of the main forces behind promotion of the use of renewable sources for electricity generation. The peculiar attribute of an RPS system, in tracking the compliance of individual profit-maximizer electricity producers with a collective target (share) for renewable sources, resembles a coupled constraint game. After presenting a generic game theoretic model for an RPS system, a special case study will be explored, to pave the path for an analytical outcome. This is accompanied by a result analysis section to investigate the impact of key parameters on the equilibrium, leading to recommendations and future research avenues.
ABSTRACT This paper constructs a dynamic game model to address the following groundwater manageme... more ABSTRACT This paper constructs a dynamic game model to address the following groundwater management problem, where quantity and quality of the water are taken into account. A group of farmers overexploits a groundwater stock and causes excessive pollution. A water agency wishes to regulate the farmers’ activity, in order to reach a minimum level of quantity and quality but is subject to a budget constraint and can only use regulatory policies that do not vary over time. The model takes into account the strategic interaction between farmers and the hierarchical relationship between the water agency and the farmers. Regulated and Laisser-Faire scenarios are compared. Results consist in a set of conditions under which constant policies can bring the groundwater resource back to the desired states. In an example, it is shown how this decision making tool could help define environmental tax policies.
ABSTRACT This paper constructs a dynamic game model to address the following groundwater manageme... more ABSTRACT This paper constructs a dynamic game model to address the following groundwater management problem, where quantity and quality of the water are taken into account. A group of farmers overexploits a groundwater stock and causes excessive pollution. A water agency wishes to regulate the farmers’ activity, in order to reach a minimum level of quantity and quality but is subject to a budget constraint and can only use regulatory policies that do not vary over time. The model takes into account the strategic interaction between farmers and the hierarchical relationship between the water agency and the farmers. Regulated and Laisser-Faire scenarios are compared. Results consist in a set of conditions under which constant policies can bring the groundwater resource back to the desired states. In an example, it is shown how this decision making tool could help define environmental tax policies.
Optimal Control Applications and Methods, 2009
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2009
We consider a duopolistic industry where the current sales of each firm is proportional to its go... more We consider a duopolistic industry where the current sales of each firm is proportional to its goodwill stock. The evolution of the latter depends positively on own advertising effort and negatively on competitor's advertising. A standard assumption in the literature in differential games of advertising is that the players remain active throughout the whole (infinite) duration of the game. We relax this assumption and characterize the circumstances under which a firm finds it optimal to remain or exit the industry. Among other things, it is shown that, if both players are "strong", then the unique Nash equilibrium is the same that one would obtain in the absence of interference from competitor's advertising.
Environmental Modeling & Assessment, 2005
We consider a game where players face environmental constraints. We derive and compare noncoopera... more We consider a game where players face environmental constraints. We derive and compare noncooperative, cooperative and umbrella scenarios. In the latter, the players couple their environmental constraints and implement Rosen's normalized equilibrium. It is shown that the cooperative outcome can be generated as a normalized equilibrium and that the results obtained in the literature do not necessarily generalize to this constrained setting.
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Abstract Horizontal cooperation among franchisees is now a well-known reality in franchising, as ... more Abstract Horizontal cooperation among franchisees is now a well-known reality in franchising, as exemplified by the growing number,of franchisee associations and advertising coopera- tives. However, there is little understanding of the circumstances that favor cooperation
This note deals with time-consistency and agreeability, two dynamic individual rationality concep... more This note deals with time-consistency and agreeability, two dynamic individual rationality concepts, in special linear-quadratic differential games. Conditions ensuring their satisfaction are derived and a link between sustainability of cooperation and fair sharing of cooperation surplus is established.
International Series In Quantitative Marketing, 2004
L'Actualité économique, 1998
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des ser... more Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents scientifiques depuis 1998. Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, 2005
Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, 2006
Advances in Computational Management Science, 2002
We investigate the effects of retailer’s myopic behavior on channel members strategies and on sal... more We investigate the effects of retailer’s myopic behavior on channel members strategies and on sales in a single-manufacturer single-retailer distribution network (bilateral monopoly). The manufacturer controls her marketing effort and the retailer his price and marketing effort. Demand depends on, among other variables, goodwill whose evolution is function of both players’ marketing efforts. It is shown that a myopic retailer prices at a lower price than a nonmyopic one but invests less in marketing effort. The manufacturer confronted to a myopic retailer sets her marketing effort at a higher level. Manufacturer’s performance is hurt by a myopic retailer.
The Manchester School, 2006
The paper analyzes the options open to monopoly firms that sell Internet services. We consider tw... more The paper analyzes the options open to monopoly firms that sell Internet services. We consider two groups of customers that are different in their reservation prices. The monopoly uses price discrimination between customers by producing two versions of the product at positive price for high-quality product and a free version at zero price for lower-quality product. The monopoly can sell advertising space to increase its revenue but risks losing customers who are annoyed by advertising. Network externalities increase the incentive to increase output; thus we find cases where the profit maximization is consistent with maximum social welfare.
Management Science, 2004
W e propose a numerical approach to compute stationary Markov perfect Nash equilibrium advertisin... more W e propose a numerical approach to compute stationary Markov perfect Nash equilibrium advertising strategies of the Lanchester model. The algorithm can be implemented using a standard mathematical package, and, importantly, it does not require that the players discount their future earnings at a zero rate, an assumption that has been made in the literature.
Journal of Retailing, 2000
The paper studies a two-member channel in which a manufacturer and an exclusive retailer can make... more The paper studies a two-member channel in which a manufacturer and an exclusive retailer can make advertising expenditures that have both short and long term impacts on the retailer's sales. The manufacturer can also support both retailer's advertising efforts through a cooperative advertising program. Four scenarios are considered. In the first, which acts as a benchmark, the manufacturer provides no support to the retailer's advertising. In the second, the manufacturer supports both types of retailer advertising. In the two remaining cases, the manufacturer supports only one of the two types of retailer advertising efforts. In all cases we assume that the manufacturer wishes to coordinate the channel so as to obtain maximal profits for himself. Our analysis of these options shows that supporting both types of retailer advertising provides more profit to both channel members than any of the two cases of partial support. The latter is, however, better than no support. We derive managerial implications from the theoretical results.
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2009
We propose a dynamic model where i) several adjacent tourist resorts their tourist flows and ii) ... more We propose a dynamic model where i) several adjacent tourist resorts their tourist flows and ii) invest in order to remedy to the detrimental effects tourism flows have on local environmental amenities. The overall tourist presence and the sum of investments made by tourist resorts jointly define the quality of the touristic product offered by this tourism destination. We assume that this quality cannot be observed by consumers at the time of purchase. However, in this situation of imperfect information, consumers form expectations about the quality of the touristic product offered at any point of time. These expectations define the collective reputation of tourist resorts, determine the position of the tourist resorts'' demand curve and constitute the state variable in the differential game. We characterize and compare equilibrium strategies under a noncooperative and investments coordination regimes.
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2000
The paper identifies conditions under which time consistency and agreeability, two intertemporal ... more The paper identifies conditions under which time consistency and agreeability, two intertemporal individual rationality concepts, can be verified in linear-state differential games. An illustrative example drawn from environmental economics is provided.
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Papers by Georges Zaccour