Migration by Francoise De Bel-Air
Registration form: https://grc-net.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_zzpBL5lVT_uALEV8qx-jAw#/registrati... more Registration form: https://grc-net.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_zzpBL5lVT_uALEV8qx-jAw#/registration
Questions
1. Recent innovations and improvements in the collection, processing, and dissemination of statistical data on labour, migration, and labour migration in GCC states?
2. Progresses made in the use of statistical data for socio-economic and demographic policymaking. Persisting challenges and possible ways to overcome these challenges?
3. Way(s) forward?
Short Abstract
To what extent do available data and statistics on labour and labour migration in GCC states allow policymakers, as well as the general public, to monitor and understand the rapid changes affecting GCC states’ labour markets since 2010? The webinar will review recent innovations and improvements in the collection, processing, and dissemination of statistical data on labour, migration, and labour migration in the six GCC states. I will assess progresses made in the use of statistical data for socio-economic and demographic policy making in the region. It will highlight challenges met by GCC National Statistical Organisations and other statistics producers in the region and reflect on possible ways to overcome these challenges.
Long Abstract
Gulf states hosted 30.1 million foreign citizens in 2020, or 11 percent of the world’s total migrant stock. Over the past decade, Gulf States’ economic and social reform masterplans stressed the urgency of socio-economic reforms, to lower the dependency of the region's citizens on public spending, to diminish dependency on hydrocarbon revenues, and reduce reliance on foreign labour. Labour force localization measures started attracting growing numbers of young citizens to increasingly innovation-savvy economies. To what extent do available data and statistics on labour and labour migration in Gulf states allow policymakers, as well as the public, to monitor and understand such rapid changes and their many aspects?
In the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis, the Sustainable Development Goals Report 2022 reaffirmed the need for “[t] imely, high-quality and disaggregated data [to] help trigger more targeted responses, anticipate future needs, and hone the design of urgently needed actions”, while Objective 1 of the UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration advocates for collecting and using accurate and disaggregated data as a basis for evidence-based policymaking.
The webinar will review recent innovations and improvements in the collection, processing, and dissemination of statistical data on labour, migration, and labour migration in the six GCC states. I will assess progresses made in the use of statistical data for socio-economic and demographic policy making in the region. It will highlight challenges met by GCC National Statistical Organisations and other statistics producers in the region and reflect on possible ways to overcome these challenges.
Organisation
The webinar is organized by the Gulf Labour Markets, Migration, and Population (GLMM) programme - https://gulfmigration.grc.net.
GLMM organizes this webinar as a first session of a regular GLMM Webinar Series on GCC Data for Evidence-based Policymaking that is scheduled from September 2023 onwards.
GLMM uses the GRC webinar platform and team that is successfully implementing a GCC-EU Webinar Series since October 2022 - https://webinars.grc.net.
Kumaraswamy, P. R. (Ed.). Palgrave Handbook of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan , Dec 2019
According to the last census in November 2015, Jordan’s population was 9.5 million, and out of th... more According to the last census in November 2015, Jordan’s population was 9.5 million, and out of this nearly 3 million (31 per cent) were foreign nationals, up from 392,300 recorded during the previous population census held in 2004. The country’s population was thus multiplied by 7.5 in one decade. Foreign nationals included some 1,265,000 Syrians and 636,000 Egyptians. This reflects the impact of immigration, forced and labour-related, on Jordan’s astonishing population growth rates, as well as pressure on its labour market. Waves of forced migrants channelled to Jordan by repeated and unending regional conflicts (Palestinians, Iraqis, Syrians and other nationalities) needed to earn a living and are now part of an estimated 1.4 million foreign workforce, of whom less than 400,000 are holding a work permit.
Out of a working-age population of over 4 million, only 40 per cent of Jordanian nationals were economically active in 2017 and only 13.4 per cent among women. Besides such low participation rates, Jordan suffers from growing unemployment, rising from 13 per cent in 2015 to 18.3 in 2017. Highly-educated women are particularly affected: 33 per cent were unemployed and as much as 54 per cent among university graduates in 2017. Nonetheless, over half of the jobs created in the private sector, predominantly low-skilled and low-paid, go to migrant workers. Moreover, international pressure led to the planned incorporation of 200,000 Syrian nationals within the country’s workforce.
The chapter describes the history of Jordan’s labour immigration and analyses its current immigration policies. These are confronted with the characteristics and dynamics of the foreign workforce. Socio-political factors could explain the persistent concomitance of high levels of unemployment among Jordanians and large labour migrants’ pools, most of them in the irregular administrative situation.
https://www.springer.com/fr/book/9789811391651?wt_mc=Internal.Event.1.SEM.ChapterAuthorCongrat#aboutAuthors
GLMM Explanatory Notes, 2019
As of December 2018, 70 per cent of residents in Kuwait were expatriates. Most came from Asia and... more As of December 2018, 70 per cent of residents in Kuwait were expatriates. Most came from Asia and especially from India (31 per cent of all foreign residents) as well as from Egypt (21 per cent of all foreign residents). Eighty-six per cent of expatriates aged 15 and more were economically active. They accounted for 85 per cent of the total active population and 96 per cent of the private sector’s workforce. Asians are mainly involved in the services and craft sectors, while Arabs more often fill managerial posts. Recent flows suggest a shift in recruitment policies towards upgrading expatriates’ level of qualifications and occupations, while policies aim to correct the country’s “demographic imbalance” and nationalise the labour force. Kuwait also has a sizeable population of stateless residents (the Biduns), who are considered illegal residents.
GLMM Explanatory Notes, 2018
As of November 15, 2018, estimates of the Sultanate’s total population stood at 4,655,366, of who... more As of November 15, 2018, estimates of the Sultanate’s total population stood at 4,655,366, of whom 2,047,690 (44 per cent) were foreign nationals. Foreign workers are overwhelmingly from the Asian subcontinent: Indians, Bangladeshis, and Pakistanis together make up 86 per cent of the total workforce and 93 per cent of the male workforce in 2018. Eighty-six per cent of all foreign workers were employed in the private sector that year, and 11 per cent were filling managerial and “white collar” posts. The flow of foreign workers to Oman rose over the 2000s up until 2016 but has been decreasing since then. High levels of youth unemployment and poverty spurred popular protests in 2011, which slowed down economic diversification and private sector’s development process. New cases of unrest late 2017 prompted the government to enact bans on recruiting foreign labourers in several economic sectors and to create government jobs. Omanisation quotas are also enforced and the hiring of Omani nationals in every business has become mandatory. Since 2010, frequent amnesty and deportation campaigns have also targeted foreign residents in irregular situation.
GLMM Explanatory Notes, 2019
Mid-2017, Bahrain’s population was estimated at 1,501,116, of whom 823,610 (55 per cent) were for... more Mid-2017, Bahrain’s population was estimated at 1,501,116, of whom 823,610 (55 per cent) were foreign nationals. Most were from Asia (85 per cent) and especially from India (half of all foreign residents). Seventy-four per cent of expatriates were employed in 2018. They accounted for 79 per cent of the employed population and 83 per cent of the private sector’s workforce. Asians were overwhelmingly involved in services and blue-collar occupations, while Arabs more often filled managerial posts.
Immigration flows to the Kingdom expanded significantly over the 2000s, fuelled by high oil prices and the ensuing boom in the construction and services sectors. During the 2010s, the foreign resident
population increased again. In order to accelerate the Bahrainisation of the workforce, while maximising economic productivity and flexibility of the labour market, a string of reforms were enacted starting 2004, among which were a partial loosening of the kafala system, measures to protect domestic workers and the introduction of a “flexi-permit” designed to incorporate some foreign workers in irregular situation
in the labour market.
GLMM Explanatory Notes, 2018
For many countries in Asia and the Arab world, Saudi Arabia is a prime destination and source of ... more For many countries in Asia and the Arab world, Saudi Arabia is a prime destination and source of remittances from workers. As of mid-2018, expatriates made up 37 per cent of the Kingdom’s population, most of them coming from South Asia. They accounted for 76 per cent of the employed population and 80 per cent of the private sector workforce. Since September 2011, and in spite of a spurt in foreign labour recruitment since the mid-2000s, a voluntary policy called ‘Nitaqat’ aimed at ‘Saudising’ the Kingdom’s workforce is being implemented. An array of labour market reform measures, introduction of taxation and dependents’ fees, as well as two large-scale campaigns of deportation of foreign residents in irregular administrative situation in 2013 and 2017 eventually led to a decrease in the number of expatriates in the Kingdom. About 800,000 left the country between 2017 and mid-2018. Approximately 2.7 million foreign nationals were deported from Saudi Arabia between April 2013 and August 2018.
This chapter focuses on the policies and politics of Arab migration to the
Gulf States in the pos... more This chapter focuses on the policies and politics of Arab migration to the
Gulf States in the post-Arab uprisings’ period. It explores the following question: how do political and economic factors interplay in the policymaking by Arab sending states? The chapter puts forward the argument that, despite the common assumption that migration to the Gulf States is chiefly driven by economics, politics plays a major role in Arab migration patterns and policies, at the domestic, regional, and bilateral levels.(...)
De Bel-Air F. (2018) Asian Migration to the Gulf States in the Twenty-first Century. In: Chowdhur... more De Bel-Air F. (2018) Asian Migration to the Gulf States in the Twenty-first Century. In: Chowdhury M., Irudaya Rajan S. (eds) South Asian Migration in the Gulf. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham (DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-71821-7; ISBN 978-3-319-71820-0), pp. 7-34).
The paper draws a general demographic picture of migration to the six Gulf countries, with an emphasis on Asian migrants. Section I assesses the link between oil prices, economic growth and labour needs. Section II highlights the political underpinnings of the national composition of migration flows to the region, until today. Section III examines some economic and socio-political challenges to reforming the kafala (sponsorship) system. Using most recent receiving countries’ statistics, Part IV describes Asian communities in the various GCC States, their size, national composition and most salient characteristics as of the mid-2010s. The conclusion assesses possible future trends for Asian migration to the GCC region, in the light of latest economic developments and the post-Arab uprisings’ political context.
GLMM Explanatory Notes, 2018
The objective of the paper is to draw a sketch of the population and migration dynamics of the Un... more The objective of the paper is to draw a sketch of the population and migration dynamics of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), using the data available from federal and emirate-level statistical bureaus.
In 2016, the total population of the UAE was estimated to be 9,121,167, thirty-two times the population counted in 1971, the year the country was established. The Emirate of Fujeirah had the smallest share of foreign nationals in its total population (61 per cent) while Dubai had the largest (91 per cent). Most expatriates were from Asia and especially from India: the India-UAE corridor could be the second largest in the world, and Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani expatriates outnumbered Emirati citizens around 2015. In the employed population, foreign nationals accounted for an even larger share (96 per cent of Dubai’s employed population in 2011). In 2016, federal and local governmental bodies employee figures were as follows: 78.5 per cent Emirati and a mere 6 per cent foreign nationals. Expatriates mostly worked in the private sector (73 per cent), while nationals accounted only for 8.3 per cent. Fifty-two per cent of female expatriates were employed in the domestic sector in 2016. Unlike in other GCC states, a quarter of the working expatriates in the UAE were in managerial posts, employed in a spectrum of activities across all sectors. The number of expatriates shot up during the 2000s, a period of spectacular economic growth propelled by soaring oil prices. Since the financial downturn in 2008, however, the economy has recovered and the hiring of foreign workers is resuming, stimulated by large-scale infrastructure projects, especially in Dubai. Nonetheless, reforms in immigration policies are now being undertaken, fuelled by security concerns, pressures from human rights’ protection bodies, and the need to bolster citizens’ employment (Emiratisation) and upskill the labour force to implement a knowledge-based economy in the country.
To that end, the planned introduction of skills certification requirements for migrants by countries of destination is likely to have significant impact on the size and composition of future migration flows, migrants’ activities, and their expectations in terms of rights.
Migration from South and East Mediterranean (SEM) countries has been considered a growing securit... more Migration from South and East Mediterranean (SEM) countries has been considered a growing security threat in the EU and Gulf states following the 9/11 attacks and the Arab uprisings. Since 2011, the economic slowdown, regime changes and socio-political instability have spurred growing migration pressure from SEM countries. However, the securitisation of migration of young citizens from these countries in the EU and the Gulf states is manifested in the drastic limitation of migrants’ inflows, and in the selection of prospective migrants on demographic, socio-economic and political grounds. Today’s ‘governmentality’ of youth migration from SEM countries poses ethical and development-related issues.
In 2016, Qatar ranked first worldwide in terms of per capita GDP. This is due to its huge hydroca... more In 2016, Qatar ranked first worldwide in terms of per capita GDP. This is due to its huge hydrocarbon reserves and to the small size of its resident population (2.5 million in June 2017). Exploiting the hydrocarbon resources and channelling them into ambitious development policies required massive imports of foreign labour. The country’s total population has grown seven-fold since the mid-1980s; moreover, foreign nationals made up an estimated 91 per cent of all residents (aged 15 and above) and up to 95 per cent of all employed population in 2015. The awarding of the 2022 FIFA World Cup to Qatar in December 2010 turned the spotlight on the country’s dilemma regarding the “number vs. rights tradeoff” issue: Qatar has one of the most constraining kafala systems in the region, which underwent only minor changes in a reform enacted in December 2016. Paradoxically, demographic data also indicate that a growing share of foreigners live with their families and give birth in the country. Among these may be Syrian nationals who have come to the country since 2011. As of 2017, foreign population growth rates
have started decelerating, as past infrastructural projects achieved completion, new migration policies that privilege skills over number are initiated, and political uncertainty looms.
Since the late 2000s, all Gulf States have been conducting widely-publicized campaigns aiming at ... more Since the late 2000s, all Gulf States have been conducting widely-publicized campaigns aiming at regularizing foreign residents in irregular administrative situation, as well as clampdowns on so-called “illegal” migrants, detentions and deportations. Using the material gathered by the Gulf Labour Market and Migration (GLMM) programme, the chapter presents, discusses and assesses datasets touching on the topic of irregular migration, available in Gulf country statistics. Part I presents methodologies, statistical and administrative apparatuses involved in the production of data, and discusses estimates available on undocumented migrant stocks in the region. Part II assesses the sources and the limits posed by datasets aiming at estimating flows of migrants in irregular situation to and from Gulf States. Part III deals with their socio-demographic profile. The paper concludes that data is scarce in most countries in the region. The various aspects of irregularity and the process of falling into this state cannot be traced with existing datasets. These focus on specific subpopulations constructed for the purpose of policy action: deported or regularized populations, border arrests, etc., hence fragmenting the stocks and flows of undocumented migrants in various categories, categories that are sometimes overlapping, or disconnected from each other. Available data thus have to be used with caution: political stakes are at play in the constructions and representations of irregularity; and in the selection of the data released to the public. Defining irregularity as a clear-cut and stable phenomenon is impossible.
In 2014, an estimated 885,000 Lebanese migrants, (i.e., first-generation, born in Lebanon) reside... more In 2014, an estimated 885,000 Lebanese migrants, (i.e., first-generation, born in Lebanon) resided abroad. Meanwhile, in early 2016, it was said that “Lebanon hosts approximately 1.1 million refugees from Syria which amounts to around one in five people in the country”, or “one in four” according to other estimates (...cont'd).
In April 2014, the population of Tunisia stood at 10,982,754, only 0.5 percent of whom were forei... more In April 2014, the population of Tunisia stood at 10,982,754, only 0.5 percent of whom were foreign immigrants according to the country’s sixth census. First-generation, Tunisia-born migrants residing abroad stood at around 543,000, of whom 81 percent were to be found in Europe that year. As for “Tunisians Residing Abroad” (Tunisiens Résidant à l’Etranger”), first-generation migrants and born-abroad second and third generation Tunisians, they numbered about 1.2 million according to the records of the Office for Tunisians Abroad (OTE). Tunisia is, therefore, primarily an emigration country.
The paper seeks to explore the reasons behind the persistent exclusion of young migrants from Sou... more The paper seeks to explore the reasons behind the persistent exclusion of young migrants from South and East Mediterranean (SEM) countries in their two main areas of destination, the Gulf States and the EU. It focuses on youth from Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon and Turkey, during the key period of the Arab uprisings and their aftermath. The paper covers the period until June 2015. Its aim is two-fold: first, to describe the characteristics and institutional background of the migration policies applied to youth from the six countries, in their two main areas of destination; second, to understand the political motives underlying recent changes
to these policies, following the uprisings. In a perspective of political demography informed by Foucault’s theories, migration policies are envisaged as technocratic discursive practices.
As of 2015, the population of Turkey stood at 78,741,053, of whom 1,592,437 were, according to Tu... more As of 2015, the population of Turkey stood at 78,741,053, of whom 1,592,437 were, according to Turkish statistics, migrants (born abroad). If we add to this figure the three million refugees registered in the country (of whom about 2.7 million are from Syria), a minimal estimate of the share of the foreign-born immigrants in Turkey’s total population as of December 2015 would be 5.6 percent.
Jordan's last population census gave the total population of the country as 9,531,712 in November... more Jordan's last population census gave the total population of the country as 9,531,712 in November 2015, 2,918,125 (31 per cent) of whom were foreign nationals. If accurate, these numbers indicate that Jordan is a major migrant-receiving country. Jordan has the highest refugee-to-population ratio and the country is also now the top refugee hosting country in absolute numbers. Indeed, it hosted more than 2.7 million registered refugees as of September 2016; of whom 2.1 million persons of Palestinian descent registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) who have lived in the country for decades; and 664,100 refugees under UNHCR's mandate including Syrians and Iraqis. Besides, Jordan is a migrant-sending country too: an estimated 10 percent of Jordan's nationals (700 to 800,000) are expatriated abroad, most of them to the Gulf States.
The chapter reviews migration patterns to and from the 22 Arab countries, and the profile of youn... more The chapter reviews migration patterns to and from the 22 Arab countries, and the profile of young Arab migrants in the GCC and in Western OECD countries. It then examines young Arabs’ reasons to migrate and possible exclusion factors, and envisages the role of migration policies in receiving or sending states, before emphasizing the role of inclusion in the migration process. Lastly, the chapter highlights impediments to the mobility of labor. The chapter emphasizes the range and diversity of capabilities allowing young Arabs to migrate in sizeable number to other countries inside the region, as well as outside the Arab region. However, it also questions the origin countries’ continuous reliance on youth’ exit in order to curb unemployment and increase national households’ income through remittances.
In September 2014, the total population of Morocco stood at
33,848,242, and only 0.2 per cent wer... more In September 2014, the total population of Morocco stood at
33,848,242, and only 0.2 per cent were foreign immigrants.
Morocco is, indeed, a major migrant-sending country. First generation, Morocco-born migrants residing abroad stood at
2.8 million, of whom 2.4 million were in Europe as of 2011, the
largest number from any Southern Mediterranean country. As for “Moroccans Residing Abroad” (“Marocains Résidant à l’Etranger”), who are first-generation migrants and born-abroad second and third generations, estimates vary between 4 and 4.5 million. (Cont'd)
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Migration by Francoise De Bel-Air
Questions
1. Recent innovations and improvements in the collection, processing, and dissemination of statistical data on labour, migration, and labour migration in GCC states?
2. Progresses made in the use of statistical data for socio-economic and demographic policymaking. Persisting challenges and possible ways to overcome these challenges?
3. Way(s) forward?
Short Abstract
To what extent do available data and statistics on labour and labour migration in GCC states allow policymakers, as well as the general public, to monitor and understand the rapid changes affecting GCC states’ labour markets since 2010? The webinar will review recent innovations and improvements in the collection, processing, and dissemination of statistical data on labour, migration, and labour migration in the six GCC states. I will assess progresses made in the use of statistical data for socio-economic and demographic policy making in the region. It will highlight challenges met by GCC National Statistical Organisations and other statistics producers in the region and reflect on possible ways to overcome these challenges.
Long Abstract
Gulf states hosted 30.1 million foreign citizens in 2020, or 11 percent of the world’s total migrant stock. Over the past decade, Gulf States’ economic and social reform masterplans stressed the urgency of socio-economic reforms, to lower the dependency of the region's citizens on public spending, to diminish dependency on hydrocarbon revenues, and reduce reliance on foreign labour. Labour force localization measures started attracting growing numbers of young citizens to increasingly innovation-savvy economies. To what extent do available data and statistics on labour and labour migration in Gulf states allow policymakers, as well as the public, to monitor and understand such rapid changes and their many aspects?
In the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis, the Sustainable Development Goals Report 2022 reaffirmed the need for “[t] imely, high-quality and disaggregated data [to] help trigger more targeted responses, anticipate future needs, and hone the design of urgently needed actions”, while Objective 1 of the UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration advocates for collecting and using accurate and disaggregated data as a basis for evidence-based policymaking.
The webinar will review recent innovations and improvements in the collection, processing, and dissemination of statistical data on labour, migration, and labour migration in the six GCC states. I will assess progresses made in the use of statistical data for socio-economic and demographic policy making in the region. It will highlight challenges met by GCC National Statistical Organisations and other statistics producers in the region and reflect on possible ways to overcome these challenges.
Organisation
The webinar is organized by the Gulf Labour Markets, Migration, and Population (GLMM) programme - https://gulfmigration.grc.net.
GLMM organizes this webinar as a first session of a regular GLMM Webinar Series on GCC Data for Evidence-based Policymaking that is scheduled from September 2023 onwards.
GLMM uses the GRC webinar platform and team that is successfully implementing a GCC-EU Webinar Series since October 2022 - https://webinars.grc.net.
Workshop of the Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population (GLMM) Programme at the 11th Gulf Research Meeting (GRM), 23-24 July 2021
Directed by Francoise De Bel-Air, Philippe Fargues and Nasra M. Shah
The workshop focuses on the impact of COVID-19 in the Gulf states from two different points of view: the health-related crisis and the socio-economic crisis generated initially by low oil prices and aggravated by the coronavirus-induced economic slowdown. It seeks to describe and analyse the outcomes of the two crises on the Gulf national and foreign resident populations. The workshop welcomes paper proposals focusing on these issues, documenting and analysing the outcomes of the two crises on Gulf national and foreign resident populations. Priority is given to first-hand observation or material (new datasets, field surveys conducted in Gulf states, direct observation, …) and to papers that focus on the Gulf states (not on the countries of origin of migrants).
For a full description of the workshop:
- Website
https://gulfresearchmeeting.net/workshops/the-covid19-health-and-socioeconomic-crises-consequences-on-population-and-migration-in-the-gulf/8
- PDF
https://gulfresearchmeeting.net/documents/600ec75fc5e7dTheCOVID19HealthandSocioeconomicCrises.pdf
Apply here: https://www.gulfresearchmeeting.net/register-paper-user
Deadline for applications: 12 March 2021
For further information: [email protected]
Past GLMM workshops at GRM resulted in the publication of papers in peer reviewed journals as well as two GLMM peer reviewed volumes:
- Migration to the Gulf: Policies in Sending and Receiving Countries
https://gulfmigration.org/publications/book_grm2017/
- Skilful Survival: Irregular Migration to the Gulf
https://gulfmigration.org/publications/book/
Out of a working-age population of over 4 million, only 40 per cent of Jordanian nationals were economically active in 2017 and only 13.4 per cent among women. Besides such low participation rates, Jordan suffers from growing unemployment, rising from 13 per cent in 2015 to 18.3 in 2017. Highly-educated women are particularly affected: 33 per cent were unemployed and as much as 54 per cent among university graduates in 2017. Nonetheless, over half of the jobs created in the private sector, predominantly low-skilled and low-paid, go to migrant workers. Moreover, international pressure led to the planned incorporation of 200,000 Syrian nationals within the country’s workforce.
The chapter describes the history of Jordan’s labour immigration and analyses its current immigration policies. These are confronted with the characteristics and dynamics of the foreign workforce. Socio-political factors could explain the persistent concomitance of high levels of unemployment among Jordanians and large labour migrants’ pools, most of them in the irregular administrative situation.
https://www.springer.com/fr/book/9789811391651?wt_mc=Internal.Event.1.SEM.ChapterAuthorCongrat#aboutAuthors
Immigration flows to the Kingdom expanded significantly over the 2000s, fuelled by high oil prices and the ensuing boom in the construction and services sectors. During the 2010s, the foreign resident
population increased again. In order to accelerate the Bahrainisation of the workforce, while maximising economic productivity and flexibility of the labour market, a string of reforms were enacted starting 2004, among which were a partial loosening of the kafala system, measures to protect domestic workers and the introduction of a “flexi-permit” designed to incorporate some foreign workers in irregular situation
in the labour market.
Gulf States in the post-Arab uprisings’ period. It explores the following question: how do political and economic factors interplay in the policymaking by Arab sending states? The chapter puts forward the argument that, despite the common assumption that migration to the Gulf States is chiefly driven by economics, politics plays a major role in Arab migration patterns and policies, at the domestic, regional, and bilateral levels.(...)
The paper draws a general demographic picture of migration to the six Gulf countries, with an emphasis on Asian migrants. Section I assesses the link between oil prices, economic growth and labour needs. Section II highlights the political underpinnings of the national composition of migration flows to the region, until today. Section III examines some economic and socio-political challenges to reforming the kafala (sponsorship) system. Using most recent receiving countries’ statistics, Part IV describes Asian communities in the various GCC States, their size, national composition and most salient characteristics as of the mid-2010s. The conclusion assesses possible future trends for Asian migration to the GCC region, in the light of latest economic developments and the post-Arab uprisings’ political context.
In 2016, the total population of the UAE was estimated to be 9,121,167, thirty-two times the population counted in 1971, the year the country was established. The Emirate of Fujeirah had the smallest share of foreign nationals in its total population (61 per cent) while Dubai had the largest (91 per cent). Most expatriates were from Asia and especially from India: the India-UAE corridor could be the second largest in the world, and Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani expatriates outnumbered Emirati citizens around 2015. In the employed population, foreign nationals accounted for an even larger share (96 per cent of Dubai’s employed population in 2011). In 2016, federal and local governmental bodies employee figures were as follows: 78.5 per cent Emirati and a mere 6 per cent foreign nationals. Expatriates mostly worked in the private sector (73 per cent), while nationals accounted only for 8.3 per cent. Fifty-two per cent of female expatriates were employed in the domestic sector in 2016. Unlike in other GCC states, a quarter of the working expatriates in the UAE were in managerial posts, employed in a spectrum of activities across all sectors. The number of expatriates shot up during the 2000s, a period of spectacular economic growth propelled by soaring oil prices. Since the financial downturn in 2008, however, the economy has recovered and the hiring of foreign workers is resuming, stimulated by large-scale infrastructure projects, especially in Dubai. Nonetheless, reforms in immigration policies are now being undertaken, fuelled by security concerns, pressures from human rights’ protection bodies, and the need to bolster citizens’ employment (Emiratisation) and upskill the labour force to implement a knowledge-based economy in the country.
To that end, the planned introduction of skills certification requirements for migrants by countries of destination is likely to have significant impact on the size and composition of future migration flows, migrants’ activities, and their expectations in terms of rights.
have started decelerating, as past infrastructural projects achieved completion, new migration policies that privilege skills over number are initiated, and political uncertainty looms.
to these policies, following the uprisings. In a perspective of political demography informed by Foucault’s theories, migration policies are envisaged as technocratic discursive practices.
33,848,242, and only 0.2 per cent were foreign immigrants.
Morocco is, indeed, a major migrant-sending country. First generation, Morocco-born migrants residing abroad stood at
2.8 million, of whom 2.4 million were in Europe as of 2011, the
largest number from any Southern Mediterranean country. As for “Moroccans Residing Abroad” (“Marocains Résidant à l’Etranger”), who are first-generation migrants and born-abroad second and third generations, estimates vary between 4 and 4.5 million. (Cont'd)
Questions
1. Recent innovations and improvements in the collection, processing, and dissemination of statistical data on labour, migration, and labour migration in GCC states?
2. Progresses made in the use of statistical data for socio-economic and demographic policymaking. Persisting challenges and possible ways to overcome these challenges?
3. Way(s) forward?
Short Abstract
To what extent do available data and statistics on labour and labour migration in GCC states allow policymakers, as well as the general public, to monitor and understand the rapid changes affecting GCC states’ labour markets since 2010? The webinar will review recent innovations and improvements in the collection, processing, and dissemination of statistical data on labour, migration, and labour migration in the six GCC states. I will assess progresses made in the use of statistical data for socio-economic and demographic policy making in the region. It will highlight challenges met by GCC National Statistical Organisations and other statistics producers in the region and reflect on possible ways to overcome these challenges.
Long Abstract
Gulf states hosted 30.1 million foreign citizens in 2020, or 11 percent of the world’s total migrant stock. Over the past decade, Gulf States’ economic and social reform masterplans stressed the urgency of socio-economic reforms, to lower the dependency of the region's citizens on public spending, to diminish dependency on hydrocarbon revenues, and reduce reliance on foreign labour. Labour force localization measures started attracting growing numbers of young citizens to increasingly innovation-savvy economies. To what extent do available data and statistics on labour and labour migration in Gulf states allow policymakers, as well as the public, to monitor and understand such rapid changes and their many aspects?
In the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis, the Sustainable Development Goals Report 2022 reaffirmed the need for “[t] imely, high-quality and disaggregated data [to] help trigger more targeted responses, anticipate future needs, and hone the design of urgently needed actions”, while Objective 1 of the UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration advocates for collecting and using accurate and disaggregated data as a basis for evidence-based policymaking.
The webinar will review recent innovations and improvements in the collection, processing, and dissemination of statistical data on labour, migration, and labour migration in the six GCC states. I will assess progresses made in the use of statistical data for socio-economic and demographic policy making in the region. It will highlight challenges met by GCC National Statistical Organisations and other statistics producers in the region and reflect on possible ways to overcome these challenges.
Organisation
The webinar is organized by the Gulf Labour Markets, Migration, and Population (GLMM) programme - https://gulfmigration.grc.net.
GLMM organizes this webinar as a first session of a regular GLMM Webinar Series on GCC Data for Evidence-based Policymaking that is scheduled from September 2023 onwards.
GLMM uses the GRC webinar platform and team that is successfully implementing a GCC-EU Webinar Series since October 2022 - https://webinars.grc.net.
Workshop of the Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population (GLMM) Programme at the 11th Gulf Research Meeting (GRM), 23-24 July 2021
Directed by Francoise De Bel-Air, Philippe Fargues and Nasra M. Shah
The workshop focuses on the impact of COVID-19 in the Gulf states from two different points of view: the health-related crisis and the socio-economic crisis generated initially by low oil prices and aggravated by the coronavirus-induced economic slowdown. It seeks to describe and analyse the outcomes of the two crises on the Gulf national and foreign resident populations. The workshop welcomes paper proposals focusing on these issues, documenting and analysing the outcomes of the two crises on Gulf national and foreign resident populations. Priority is given to first-hand observation or material (new datasets, field surveys conducted in Gulf states, direct observation, …) and to papers that focus on the Gulf states (not on the countries of origin of migrants).
For a full description of the workshop:
- Website
https://gulfresearchmeeting.net/workshops/the-covid19-health-and-socioeconomic-crises-consequences-on-population-and-migration-in-the-gulf/8
- PDF
https://gulfresearchmeeting.net/documents/600ec75fc5e7dTheCOVID19HealthandSocioeconomicCrises.pdf
Apply here: https://www.gulfresearchmeeting.net/register-paper-user
Deadline for applications: 12 March 2021
For further information: [email protected]
Past GLMM workshops at GRM resulted in the publication of papers in peer reviewed journals as well as two GLMM peer reviewed volumes:
- Migration to the Gulf: Policies in Sending and Receiving Countries
https://gulfmigration.org/publications/book_grm2017/
- Skilful Survival: Irregular Migration to the Gulf
https://gulfmigration.org/publications/book/
Out of a working-age population of over 4 million, only 40 per cent of Jordanian nationals were economically active in 2017 and only 13.4 per cent among women. Besides such low participation rates, Jordan suffers from growing unemployment, rising from 13 per cent in 2015 to 18.3 in 2017. Highly-educated women are particularly affected: 33 per cent were unemployed and as much as 54 per cent among university graduates in 2017. Nonetheless, over half of the jobs created in the private sector, predominantly low-skilled and low-paid, go to migrant workers. Moreover, international pressure led to the planned incorporation of 200,000 Syrian nationals within the country’s workforce.
The chapter describes the history of Jordan’s labour immigration and analyses its current immigration policies. These are confronted with the characteristics and dynamics of the foreign workforce. Socio-political factors could explain the persistent concomitance of high levels of unemployment among Jordanians and large labour migrants’ pools, most of them in the irregular administrative situation.
https://www.springer.com/fr/book/9789811391651?wt_mc=Internal.Event.1.SEM.ChapterAuthorCongrat#aboutAuthors
Immigration flows to the Kingdom expanded significantly over the 2000s, fuelled by high oil prices and the ensuing boom in the construction and services sectors. During the 2010s, the foreign resident
population increased again. In order to accelerate the Bahrainisation of the workforce, while maximising economic productivity and flexibility of the labour market, a string of reforms were enacted starting 2004, among which were a partial loosening of the kafala system, measures to protect domestic workers and the introduction of a “flexi-permit” designed to incorporate some foreign workers in irregular situation
in the labour market.
Gulf States in the post-Arab uprisings’ period. It explores the following question: how do political and economic factors interplay in the policymaking by Arab sending states? The chapter puts forward the argument that, despite the common assumption that migration to the Gulf States is chiefly driven by economics, politics plays a major role in Arab migration patterns and policies, at the domestic, regional, and bilateral levels.(...)
The paper draws a general demographic picture of migration to the six Gulf countries, with an emphasis on Asian migrants. Section I assesses the link between oil prices, economic growth and labour needs. Section II highlights the political underpinnings of the national composition of migration flows to the region, until today. Section III examines some economic and socio-political challenges to reforming the kafala (sponsorship) system. Using most recent receiving countries’ statistics, Part IV describes Asian communities in the various GCC States, their size, national composition and most salient characteristics as of the mid-2010s. The conclusion assesses possible future trends for Asian migration to the GCC region, in the light of latest economic developments and the post-Arab uprisings’ political context.
In 2016, the total population of the UAE was estimated to be 9,121,167, thirty-two times the population counted in 1971, the year the country was established. The Emirate of Fujeirah had the smallest share of foreign nationals in its total population (61 per cent) while Dubai had the largest (91 per cent). Most expatriates were from Asia and especially from India: the India-UAE corridor could be the second largest in the world, and Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani expatriates outnumbered Emirati citizens around 2015. In the employed population, foreign nationals accounted for an even larger share (96 per cent of Dubai’s employed population in 2011). In 2016, federal and local governmental bodies employee figures were as follows: 78.5 per cent Emirati and a mere 6 per cent foreign nationals. Expatriates mostly worked in the private sector (73 per cent), while nationals accounted only for 8.3 per cent. Fifty-two per cent of female expatriates were employed in the domestic sector in 2016. Unlike in other GCC states, a quarter of the working expatriates in the UAE were in managerial posts, employed in a spectrum of activities across all sectors. The number of expatriates shot up during the 2000s, a period of spectacular economic growth propelled by soaring oil prices. Since the financial downturn in 2008, however, the economy has recovered and the hiring of foreign workers is resuming, stimulated by large-scale infrastructure projects, especially in Dubai. Nonetheless, reforms in immigration policies are now being undertaken, fuelled by security concerns, pressures from human rights’ protection bodies, and the need to bolster citizens’ employment (Emiratisation) and upskill the labour force to implement a knowledge-based economy in the country.
To that end, the planned introduction of skills certification requirements for migrants by countries of destination is likely to have significant impact on the size and composition of future migration flows, migrants’ activities, and their expectations in terms of rights.
have started decelerating, as past infrastructural projects achieved completion, new migration policies that privilege skills over number are initiated, and political uncertainty looms.
to these policies, following the uprisings. In a perspective of political demography informed by Foucault’s theories, migration policies are envisaged as technocratic discursive practices.
33,848,242, and only 0.2 per cent were foreign immigrants.
Morocco is, indeed, a major migrant-sending country. First generation, Morocco-born migrants residing abroad stood at
2.8 million, of whom 2.4 million were in Europe as of 2011, the
largest number from any Southern Mediterranean country. As for “Moroccans Residing Abroad” (“Marocains Résidant à l’Etranger”), who are first-generation migrants and born-abroad second and third generations, estimates vary between 4 and 4.5 million. (Cont'd)
irreversible. The levels of childbearing were steadily declining. And yet
suddenly they have begun to rise, a rare occurrence in any society. The
reasons are many, complex and overturn common beliefs.
منه. فقد كان عدد الأطفال لكل امرأة في انخفاض منتظم. وها هو يعود للارتفاع،
مشكّلا ظاهرة نادرة في المجتمعات كافة. ولهذه الظاهرة أسباب عدّة، معقّدة،
مناقضة لكلّ الأفكار المسبقة
Thematic issue on "Marriage and Family in the Gulf today", forthcoming in the peer-reviewed journal Arabian Humanities, Spring 2018.
Peer-reviewed, leading French scientific journal on the Gulf Peninsula (social sciences).
Issue will be in English.
Deadline for the reception of the proposals: 3 January 2017.
Réception des propositions: 3 janvier 2017.
Mariage et famille dans le Golfe arabe : vers un bouleversement politique ?
Depuis la fin des années 1970, la nuptialité a connu des transformations importantes dans tous les pays arabes, dont les plus significatives sont l’augmentation de l’âge moyen au premier mariage et l’émergence du célibat féminin. Les États du Golfe, étudiés dans cet article, n’échappent pas à cette évolution. Or, le mariage dans le monde arabe, rite de passage à l’âge adulte, est aussi le lieu de la reproduction des institutions : le mariage est donc une question politique. Après une présentation des évolutions récentes de la nuptialité dans les six pays du Golfe, l’article analyse l’impact de ces mutations sur les dynamiques sociales caractérisant cette région (les contraintes socio-économiques posées au choix du conjoint, les relations entre sexes et entre générations, l’évolution des structures familiales). Les données montrent que sont partout défiés l’idéal arabe du mariage précoce et universel, la domination masculine et celle des aînés. En conséquence, cette évolution des comportements sociodémographiques pourrait également menacer les pouvoirs autoritaires et « néopatriarcaux » de la région. Une analyse des débats populaires et politiques menés sur la question du mariage en Arabie saoudite montre en effet que celle-ci est instrumentalisée dans le processus de réforme sociopolitique en cours dans le royaume, afin de contrer l’emprise de certains acteurs sur le champ social.
Mots clés : nuptialité ; mariage ; divorce ; famille ; structures familiales, démographie politique ; politique démographique ; politique sociale ; pays du Golfe ; Arabie Saoudite ; Koweït ; Émirats arabes unis ; Oman ; Qatar ; Bahreïn.
Marriage and Family in the Arab Gulf States: Towards a Political Transition?
Since the end of the 1970’s, marriage patterns have undergone tremendous changes in every Arab country. Most significant among them are the increase in the age at first marriage and the emergence of female celibacy, as experienced in the Arab Gulf. Yet, marriage in the Arab world is a rite of passage to adulthood, as well as an essential element in the process of reproducing sociopolitical institutions. This gives the marriage issue a political outreach which is the topic of the paper. After describing recent changes in the marriage patterns experienced in the six Arab Gulf States over the last four decades, the paper analyses the impact of such changes on the social dynamics characterizing the region (socioeconomic constraints put to marrying and spouse’ choice; male-female and intergenerational relationships; the evolution of family structures). Data emphasize that everywhere in the region, the ideal of early and universal marriages, as well as males’ and elders’ domination are fading. Therefore, the evolution of socio-demographic behaviors may challenge authoritarian and “neopatriarcal” powers in the region. As the matter of facts, the analysis of popular and political debates tackling the marriage issue in Saudi Arabia shows that the topic is instrumentalised within the reform process ongoing in the Kingdom, in order to counter the influence of some political forces.
Keywords: marriage; divorce; family; family structures; political demography; demographic policy; social policy; Gulf States; Saudi Arabia; Kuwait; United Arab Emirates; Oman; Qatar; Bahrain.
Keywords: youth unemployment, graduates’ unemployment, labor force, labor policy, Mashreq, Gulf Cooperation Council, political demography, political alienation, clientelism, waithood
Using Foucault’ approach of public policies in terms of “police”, this paper explores, in the case of Jordan, the political outreach of defining, measuring and acting upon poverty using UNDP’s Human Development concept and indices. The paper analyses the 2004’ Jordan Human Development Report (JHDR), which “places the poor at the centre of analysis and attempts to capture the diverse and dynamic characteristics of poverty through the eyes of the poor themselves”, and addresses poverty as a lack of human development. Yet, in this case human development rather appears as an instrument of institutional reform attempting at “making up people”, at engineering the moulding of a new society, globalised and market-led.
Lutter contre la pauvreté, “façonner” une nouvelle société. Autour de l’usage du Développement humain en Jordanie.
Cette contribution vise à éclairer la portée politique de l’utilisation du concept et des indices de développement humain du PNUD pour l’analyse du phénomène de la pauvreté, sur le terrain de la Jordanie. L’article porte sur le Rapport sur le Développement humain (RDH) en Jordanie de 2004, qui « place les pauvres au centre de l’analyse et cherche à saisir de la bouche des pauvres eux-mêmes les caractéristiques de la pauvreté », en abordant le phénomène comme résultant d’un niveau insuffisant de développement humain. Pourtant, notre analyse montre que cette publication ressort plutôt d’une opération de « police » (selon les termes de Foucault), qu’elle sous-tend un processus de réforme institutionnelle visant à « façonner les gens », sur le modèle d’une société inscrite dans la globalisation néolibérale.