Videos by Andrew Ka Pok Tam
Based upon the philosophical and historical studies mentioned above, this paper argues that Hong ... more Based upon the philosophical and historical studies mentioned above, this paper argues that Hong Kong manifests a special “Peninsula Self-Consciousness” in its Maritime and Continental “Fudo": Hong Kong is linked by Pearl river to both the mainland and the sea, making Hong Kong a place linking China the Continental nation and other Maritime nations like Britain and the United States. The Chinese term for the peninsula is 半島 “bandao”, which literally means “half-island”—it is neither an island nor an inland, but an in-betweener. I argue that such half-ness brings several characteristics to Hong Kong: (1) cultural interconnectedness, (2), inclusiveness, and, (3) freedom. 7 views
Published work by Andrew Ka Pok Tam
Humanities, 2024
Influenced by Hegel, modern Chinese philosophers (e.g., Mou Zong‐San, Lao Sze‐Kwang, etc.) and Ja... more Influenced by Hegel, modern Chinese philosophers (e.g., Mou Zong‐San, Lao Sze‐Kwang, etc.) and Japanese philosophers (e.g., Nishida Kitaro) were inclined to narrate Chinese or Japanese culture in terms of the Hegelian concept of ‘spirit’. Nevertheless, the Hegelian philosophy of culture assumes the existence of an unchangeable cultural spirit and was therefore criticised by Watsuji Tet‐ suro. Watsuji denies the existence of an unchangeable cultural spirit and argues that cultures arise from the aidagara (interactions) between Ningen (human society) and Fudo (nature). Yet Watsuji’s nar‐ ration of culture overemphasised the aidagara between Ningen and Fudo but disregarded that culture may also arise from the aidagara among cultures. Therefore, by reinterpreting Watsuji’s concept of aidagara, this paper proposes the concept of Bungen to explain the formation of cultures in terms of intercultural interactions and therefore highlight the diversity of East Asian cultures.
Asian Studies, 2024
Zia Nai-zin 謝乃壬, Xie Fu-ya or Hsieh Fu-yah 謝扶雅 (1892-1991), a remarkable Chinese Christian philos... more Zia Nai-zin 謝乃壬, Xie Fu-ya or Hsieh Fu-yah 謝扶雅 (1892-1991), a remarkable Chinese Christian philosopher, theologian, and translator, developed his unique philosophy of "in-ism" (唯中論) from the 1960s to 1980s to indigenize Christianity into the ideal "Chinese Christianity" (中華基督教). Zia declared that the essence of Confucianism is the concept of Zhong 中 (neutrality, avoidance of extremes) and compared the Confucian teaching of the Unity of Heaven and Humans (天人合一) with the Christian Christology, which argues that Jesus Christ is the unity of divinity and humanity. Zia further stated that New Confucians emphasize the Way of Humans over the Way of Heaven, while the Christian doctrine of incarnation balanced both divinity and humanity and achieved the Unity of Heaven and Humans. While Zia's reinterpretation of the Doctrine of the Mean is controversial, following the recently developed method of sublation, this paper aims to evaluate whether Zia's Christian reinterpretation of Zhongyong 中庸 has successfully sublated Confucianism and Christianity. I argue that although Zia's interpretation of Zhongyong contains certain philological flaws, overall he successfully produced new insights enriching both Christianity and Confucianism by grounding both on the same ontological ground of Zhong.
logos and pneuma, 2022
日本神學家北森嘉藏(1916-1998)在其著作《上帝之 痛的神學》指出「上帝之痛」就是上帝的本質。所謂上帝的 痛，就是「上帝之怒」與「上帝之愛」的矛盾:一方面，上 帝 憎 恨 罪 惡 ， 世 ... more 日本神學家北森嘉藏(1916-1998)在其著作《上帝之 痛的神學》指出「上帝之痛」就是上帝的本質。所謂上帝的 痛，就是「上帝之怒」與「上帝之愛」的矛盾:一方面，上 帝 憎 恨 罪 惡 ， 世 C 人 o 犯 p 罪y r 使 i g 神 h 人t I 關 S 係C 破S 裂2 0 ， 2 罪 2 人 成 為 上 帝 恨 惡 的對象;另一方面，上帝卻憐憫罪人，因而賜下其聖子耶穌 基督拯救世人，展現對世人的愛。兩者之矛盾構成上帝之 痛，並具體表現於上帝聖父犧牲聖子，使其為罪人死而復 活，從而拯救他們。然而，如果基督死而復活以後，人類的 罪已被赦免，神人關係復和，則上帝之怒亦消退，上帝之痛 亦因而消解，然而上帝依然存在的話，那麼上帝之痛即不是 上帝的本質。
考慮到北森同時受到日本京都學派及歐陸哲學(尤其 齊克果)及路德宗神學影響，本文修正北森神學的缺陷，指 出上帝之痛的發生是由於作為間柄的神人關係，以及由於 上帝之痛並非永恆的屬性，因此上帝之痛不是上帝的本質。
According to Japanese theologian Kitamori Kazoh’s (1916-1998) Theology of the Pain of God, God’s pain is the essence of God. The pain of God is the paradox between God’s anger and God’s love. On the one hand, God hates sins while sin destroys God-man relationship, so God is therefore angry with humans. On the other hand, God is merciful and therefore gives His Son Jesus Christ to save the world and so manifests God’s love. This paradox constitutes God’s pain and is manifested through God the Father’s sacrifice of God the Son, where Jesus died and was resurrected for the sinners, in order to save them. However, if Christ’s death and resurrection has already forgiven humans’ sins and reconciled the God-man relation, then God’s anger should perish, and therefore God’s pain should also cease to exist. Nevertheless, the absence of God’s pain has not prevented God’s existence. Therefore, God’s pain is not God’s essence.
Since Kitamori is influenced by both the Kyoto School, Continental Philosophy (especially Kierkegaard) and Lutheran theology, this article aims to correct Kitamori’s theoretical weakness by arguing that the pain of God comes from the God- man relationship as an aidagara, and therefore as God’s pain is not persistent, it cannot be God’s essence.
Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies, 2022
風土與人間的關係一直是和辻哲郎文化哲學的核心命題。在一九三五 年出版的《風土》一書裡，和辻定義文化為風土與人間之互動，並將世界 文化按風土分成三類:季風型、沙漠型和牧場型。其中，由於和辻曾於一... more 風土與人間的關係一直是和辻哲郎文化哲學的核心命題。在一九三五 年出版的《風土》一書裡，和辻定義文化為風土與人間之互動，並將世界 文化按風土分成三類:季風型、沙漠型和牧場型。其中，由於和辻曾於一 九二七年赴德留學時過境港滬兩地，因此在討論中國的季風型風土與文化 時，和辻除了引用客觀數據與二手文獻外，亦引用了自己的實地考察和親 身經歷。可是，基於和辻對於當時中國地理資訊掌握不足，他誤以為中國 的風土是「單調廣漠」的平原，而當時的中國人都是對政治「無動於 衷」，忽略了中國氣候與地形的複雜性以及文化及社會的多元性。
然而，本文認為，若風土論是一以自我意識的概念為基礎的文化哲 學，則只要修正了和辻的錯誤地理知識，人們仍可根據風土論重新分析中 國文化，發現其文化意識的多元性。自然及社會科學對中國氣候、地形、 社會、經濟、政治、文化的客觀描述不僅未有削弱風土論的理論價值，反 而兩者能夠相輔相成:前者描述了風土與人間之基本形態，後者則以自我 意識解釋兩者之互動如何生成文化。
The relationship between Fudo (Climate) and Ningen (Human Society) is an essential topic to Watsuji Tetsuro’s philosophy of culture. In his book Fudo published in 1935, Watsuji defines culture in terms of the interaction between Fudo and Ningen and categorizes the world cultures into three types: monsoon, desert and meadow. In particular, when discussing the monsoon fudo and culture in China, Watsuji refers to not only objective data and secondary literature but also his fieldwork and subjective experiences during his visit to Hong Kong and Shanghai in 1927 on his marine journey to Germany. However, due to Watsuji’s insufficient knowledge about the geography of China, he misunderstood that the Fudo of China is merely a “monotonous” plain and Chinese people are “unemotional” to politics and disregarded the complexity of the climate and topography of China and the diversity of Chinese culture and society.
Nevertheless, this paper argues that if Fudo study is a philosophy of culture based upon the concept of self-consciousness, once Watsuji’s misinformation about China is revised, it may still be employed to rediscover the diversity of Chinese culture consciousness. Natural and Social scientific researches on climate, topography, society, economy and politics of China does not weaken the theoretical value of Fudo study but actually complement each other: the former illustrates the structures of Fudo and Ningen while the later explains the formation of culture from the interaction between Fudo and Ningen in terms of self-consciousness.
道風:基督教文化評論, 2022
儘管牟宗三對於齊克果哲學的討論較少，在《中國哲學 的特質》裏，牟宗三p曾以齊克果為例，說明基督宗教與儒家 本體論之根本差異。牟宗三認為，儒家肯定個人道德主體， 但基督宗教卻將自我否定及消融於上帝... more 儘管牟宗三對於齊克果哲學的討論較少，在《中國哲學 的特質》裏，牟宗三p曾以齊克果為例，說明基督宗教與儒家 本體論之根本差異。牟宗三認為，儒家肯定個人道德主體， 但基督宗教卻將自我否定及消融於上帝的主體中。然而， 即使人們認同齊克果哲學能夠代表基督宗教的本體論立 場，本文認為「否定自我」並不足以形容齊克果哲學的全 相。齊克果認為，基督宗教乃由「肯定自我」之「宗教性甲」 及「否定自我」的「宗教性乙」共同組成，然而牟宗三似乎 忽略了前者。透過批評牟宗三以肯定自我與否定自我的過 度簡化二元劃分，本文重新檢視以牟宗三為代表之儒家與 以齊克果為代表之基督宗教兩套本體論就個人主體性問題 之立場，從而為耶儒對話提供新的方向。
Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2021
In 1959, Lao Sze-Kwang (勞思光 1927-2012), the well-known Chinese Kantian philosopher and the author... more In 1959, Lao Sze-Kwang (勞思光 1927-2012), the well-known Chinese Kantian philosopher and the author of the New Edition of the History of Chinese Philosophy, published the book On Existentialist Philosophy introducing existential philosophers to the Chinese readers. Nevertheless, this paper argues that Lao has misinterpreted Kierkegaard’s ultimate philosophical problem of “how to become a Christian” as a question of virtue completion, because he fails to acknowledge Kierkegaard’s distinctions among aesthetic passion, moral passion and religious passion. By clarifying Lao’s misinterpretation of Kierkegaard’s philosophy, this paper argues that Lao’s trichotomy of the self fails to acknowledge the independence of religiousness from morality and aesthetics
Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies, 2020
Watsuji Tetsurō’s idea of aidagara (間柄, often translated as ‘betweenness’) is an essential conce... more Watsuji Tetsurō’s idea of aidagara (間柄, often translated as ‘betweenness’) is an essential concept in his ningen rinrigaku with a robust Confucian heritage. As he begins his reflection on aidagara from Mencius’ concept of gorin or ‘five relationships’ it seems that Watsuji tries to reinterpret gorin. However, unlike Yangmingism and the twentieth-century Chinese New Confucianism, Watsuji does not emphasise individual subjectivity. Instead, in both Rinrigaku and Fūdo, Watsuji reduces individual self into aidagara and aidagara into the Buddhist notion of Kū.
In light of Mou Zongsan’s moral metaphysics, this paper argues that Watsuji’s ningen rinrigaku fails to provide a consistent interpretation of Mencius’ teaching of gorin. According to Mou, an individual’s subjectivity whose mind nature is granted by Heaven preceds and producs mutual relationships among human beings. However, such idea of Heaven is omitted in Watsuji’s anti-Neo-Confucian understanding of Mencius. Instead, Watsuji argues that the individual’s moral consciousness arises from aidagara, which is the negations of self and others. In fact, his notion of self-negation contradicts with Mencius 7A. However, instead of accusing Watsuji of misunderstanding Mencius, this paper suggests one may understand Watsuji’s ningen rinrigaku as non-Confucian ethics instead of a consistent interpretation of Mencius.
This thesis aims to establish a Kierkegaardian philosophy of culture to address the theoretical p... more This thesis aims to establish a Kierkegaardian philosophy of culture to address the theoretical problems of modern East Asian philosophy of culture, particularly Chinese New Confucianism and the Kyoto School (represented by Mou Zong-San and Watsuji Tetsuro respectively) who try to formulate their cultural subjectivities for the sake of cultural modernisation. Both schools adopt Hegelian philosophy of culture and therefore inherit the problems of Hegelian dialectics which Kierkegaard criticises. While Kierkegaard himself does not develop a philosophy of culture, this thesis argues that his concepts of culture in terms of the manifestations of passions, community and contemporaneity are useful resources for the formulation of East Asian cultural selves.
Firstly, in chapter 1, I argue that there are two tasks of modern East Asian philosophers of culture: how to understand a culture (epistemic task) and how to establish a cultural self (ontological task). Secondly, in chapter 2, I argue that there are three theoretical problems in Mou’s and Watsuji’s Hegelian philosophies of culture, namely, the impossibility of change in cultural value, the lack of empirical method and the neglect of openness of interpretation. Thirdly, in chapter 3, I argue that Kierkegaard’s definition of culture in terms of the manifestations of passions explain East Asian cultural development more consistently than Hegelian dialectics. Fourthly, in chapter 4, I establish a Kierkegaardian philosophy of culture and argue that a cultural self is formulated by the concepts of community and contemporaneity where individuals express their passions according to their free wills. Finally, I argue that Kierkegaardian philosophy of culture fulfils both the ontological and epistemic tasks of East Asian philosophers and solves the theoretical problems they encounter when they adopt Hegelian dialectics.
The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2018
The works of Lao Sze-kwang (Lao Siguang) cover a wide range of philosophies, including Confuciani... more The works of Lao Sze-kwang (Lao Siguang) cover a wide range of philosophies, including Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, Kantianism, Hegelianism, and, most importantly, the philosophy of culture. Like many other Chinese philosophers of the 20th century, Lao was personally affected by the Chinese Revolution of 1949 and made his career outside of mainland China, having first fled to Taiwan and then Hong Kong after the victory of Mao Zedong’s Communist forces in China’s civil war. Along with other modern Chinese philosophers, Lao was deeply interested in the problem of China’s modernization and actively participated in politics. These two aspects of his intellectual biography, in turn, help to define his work as a philosopher, which focused on contextualizing Chinese philosophy in relation to Western thought as well as emphasizing the practical, as opposed to purely theoretical, dimension of Chinese philosophy.
In his multi-volume New Edition of the History of Chinese Philosophy (1984-1986), he tried to reconstruct traditional Chinese philosophy with the help of modern Western philosophy but in ways that both resembled and differed from the work of so-called “New Confucians” such as Mou Zongsan and Tang Junyi. This work highly influenced the study of Chinese philosophy in Hong Kong and Taiwan and helped shape several generations of Chinese scholars’ understanding of traditional Chinese thought. Unlike Feng Youlan or Hu Shi, each of whom authored competing histories of Chinese philosophy, Lao attempted to define Chinese philosophy not in terms of what it is (an essentialist approach) but in terms of what it does (a functionalist approach). For Lao, Chinese philosophy functions primarily in an “orientative” manner, shaping and guiding Chinese people’s values at a deep level rather than merely advocating particular propositions or theories. In this way, Lao thought, Chinese philosophy was distinct from other social philosophies, particularly those of the West.
Having summarized the legacies of both traditional Chinese and modern Western thought, Lao later developed a philosophy of culture that preoccupied him from the 1990s until his death in 2012. In his Lectures on Philosophy of Culture (2003), Lao declared that his philosophy was driven by a cultural crisis of consciousness, as he realized that he grew up in a frustrating age in which traditional Chinese culture was declining in influence while modern culture was yet to be established as a new cultural order. Lao criticized both traditionalist and anti-traditionalist approaches to the modernization of Chinese culture and tried to develop his own approach.
Drafts by Andrew Ka Pok Tam
Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies, Dec 2020
Note: this is an accepted journal paper expected to be published in Dec 2020. For the quotation p... more Note: this is an accepted journal paper expected to be published in Dec 2020. For the quotation please follow the format of Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies: Tam, Andrew Ka Pok, 'On the Relation between Watsuji’s Ningen Rinrigaku and Mencius’ Five Relationships', Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies 17, no. 2, (Dec, 2020)
Watsuji Tetsurō’s idea of aidagara (間柄, often translated as ‘betweenness’) is an essential concept in his ningen rinrigaku with a robust Confucian heritage as he begins his reflection on aidagara from Mencius’ concept of gorin or five relationships; it seems that Watsuji tries to reinterpret gorin. However, unlike Yangmingism and the twentieth-century Chinese New Confucianism, Watsuji does not emphasise individual subjectivity; instead, in both Rinrigaku and Fūdo, Watsuji reduces individual self into aidagara and aidagara into the Buddhist notion of Kū.
Based upon Mou Zongsan’s moral metaphysics, this paper argues that Watsuji’s ningen rinrigaku fails to provide a consistent interpretation of Mencius’ teaching of gorin. According to Mou, an individual’s subjectivity whose mind nature is granted by Heaven precedes and produces mutual relationships among human beings; but the idea of Heaven is omitted in Watsuji’s anti-Neo-Confucian understanding of Mencius. Instead, Watsuji that the individual’s moral consciousness arises from aidagara, which is the negations of self and others, while the notion of self-negation contradicts with Mencius 7A. However, instead of accusing Watsuji of misunderstanding Mencius, this paper suggests one may understand Watsuji’s ningen rinrigaku as non-Confucian ethics instead of a consistent interpretation of Mencius.
「間柄」是和辻哲郎的人間倫理學中深受儒學影響的重要概念。他對間柄的 反思始於孟子的五倫概念;故此，和辻似乎嘗試重新詮釋五倫。然而，與陽明學 及二十世紀中國新儒家相反，和辻並不強調個人主體性;反之，在《人間倫理學》 及《風土》裡，和辻把個人主體還原成間柄，又將間柄歸於佛教「空」的概念。
根據牟宗三的道德形而上學，本文認為和辻的人間倫理學無法為孟子之五倫 提供一致的詮釋。根據牟宗三，個人主體所具有天賦之心性乃先於並生出人倫關 係。然而，「天」的概念卻不見於和辻對《孟子》的反理學詮釋。和辻認為個人 道德意識緣起於作為對自我與他者否定之間柄，可是自我否定之主張卻與《孟子. 盡心上》的說法相違。然而，本文指出，除了批評和辻曲解《孟子》以外，讀者 或可理解和辻的人間倫理學為一非儒學的新倫理學，而非對孟子的一致詮釋。
Kierkegaard Study Yearbook, 2021
In 1959, Lao Sze-Kwang (勞思光 1927-2012), the well-known Chinese Kantian philosopher and the author... more In 1959, Lao Sze-Kwang (勞思光 1927-2012), the well-known Chinese Kantian philosopher and the author of the New Edition of the History of Chinese Philosophy, published the book On Existentialist Philosophy introducing existential philosophers to the Chinese readers. Nevertheless, this paper argues that Lao has misinterpreted Kierkegaard's ultimate philosophical problem of "how to become a Christian" as a question of virtue completion, because he fails to acknowledge Kierkegaard's distinctions among aesthetic passion, moral passion and religious passion. By clarifying Lao's misinterpretation of Kierkegaard's philosophy, this paper argues that Lao's trichotomy of the self fails to acknowledge the independence of religiousness from morality and aesthetics.
draft presentation paper for ENOJP 2019 conference at Nanzan University, Nagoya, Japan
Watsuji T... more draft presentation paper for ENOJP 2019 conference at Nanzan University, Nagoya, Japan
Watsuji Tetsuro’s idea of aidagara (間柄, often translated as ‘mutual relationship’) is an essential concept in his ethics with a strong Confucian heritage However, unlike Yangmingism and the twentieth century Chinese New Confucianism, Watsuji does not emphasize individual subjectivity and moral autonomy; rather, in both Ririgaku and Fudo, Watsuji reduces individual self into aidagara and aidagara into the Buddhist notion of kū.
This paper argues that the absence of individual subjectivity in Watsuji’s ethics results from his de-metaphysical approach. By contrast, New Confucian Mou Zongsan’s moral metaphysics guarantees an individual’s moral autonomy which precedes and produces mutual relationships among human beings. Through the comparative study between Watsuji and Mou, I argue that if one wish to preserve the individual subjectivity as an ontological ground of mutual relationships in Confucian tradition, one must reject Watsuji’s de-metaphysical approach.
The Rise and the Fall of Hong Kong Localism
Abstract
The Chinese cultural invasion, in addition ... more The Rise and the Fall of Hong Kong Localism
Abstract
The Chinese cultural invasion, in addition to political oppression and economic exploitation in Hong Kong since the handover in 1997 lead to the rise of Hong Kong localism in recent years. Hong Kong localism is a political ideology which aims to distinguish Hong Kong identity from Chinese identity and defend the Hong Kongese's interests. Different activists, however, propose not only different political visions for the defence of Hong Kongese's interests, but also define Hong Kong identity and subjectivity in a very different sense. Wan Chin, the scholar and the author of the book On Hong Kong City-State, defines Hong Kongese as inheritors of the ancient and orthodox Hua Xia culture which has already been disappeared in China, while a group of students in Hong Kong University who publish the book Hong Kong Nationalism, defines Hong Kongese as a nation. Both schools however never gain majority supports and decline after the corrupted and manipulated General Election in September 2016. However, this paper argues that both localist theories contain serious problems: the former provides an over exclusive Hong Kong identity by appealing to ancient “Huaxia culture”, while the latter provides an over inclusive Hong Kong identity by appealing to anti-communist attitude.
Keywords: Hong Kong, Localism, Wan Chin, Hong Kong Nationalism, On Hong Kong City-State
How can we differentiate cultures? It is a difficult question for westerners to distinguish Hong ... more How can we differentiate cultures? It is a difficult question for westerners to distinguish Hong Kongese culture from Chinese, Taiwanese, Korean and Japanese, for they are too similar to each other. In order to maintain the political security and the national unity of China, Chinese Communist government keeps on oppressing local cultural identities, particularly Hong Kong cultural identity in recent year, although Hong Kong is an autonomous region (known as " Special Administrative Region ") which should be free from Chinese political intervention. Traditional philosophy of culture, which de fines culture as " spirit " or value systems, can hardly help us differentiate cultures in East Asia, particularly when globalisation and regionalisation further diversify the values of cultures there. For instance, you can hardly de fine a clear value system of Hong Kong Culture. As the author of the new book A Discourse on Hong Kong Culture (Traditional Chinese: 香港文化論), in my presentation I would like to introduce a new definition of culture in my book (known as " existential hermeneutical definition "), that culture as a power of interpretation provided by the community. I would argue that without our own culture we shall lose our ability of interpretation. When the people in a community shares a similar existential situation (similar history, same geographical location and social-economic interaction), the same language, similar values, similar ways of living and they are linked by a community network, they form a cultural self. Using Hong Kong culture as a case study I am going to demonstrate that the cultural self is emergent when an individual member realises that someone is culturally different from him. The new concept of culture may be applied in not only cultural studies, but also the political theories and social activisms for separatism, nationalism or localism.
Thesis Chapters by Andrew Ka Pok Tam
This thesis aims to establish a Kierkegaardian philosophy of culture to address the theoretical p... more This thesis aims to establish a Kierkegaardian philosophy of culture to address the theoretical problems of modern East Asian philosophy of culture, particularly Chinese New Confucianism and the Kyoto School (represented by Mou Zong-San and Watsuji Tetsuro respectively) who try to formulate their cultural subjectivities for the sake of cultural modernisation. Both schools adopt Hegelian philosophy of culture and therefore inherit the problems of Hegelian dialectics which Kierkegaard criticises. While Kierkegaard himself does not develop a philosophy of culture, this thesis argues that his concepts of culture in terms of the manifestations of passions, community and contemporaneity are useful resources for the formulation of East Asian cultural selves.
Firstly, in chapter 1, I argue that there are two tasks of modern East Asian philosophers of culture: how to understand a culture (epistemic task) and how to establish a cultural self (ontological task). Secondly, in chapter 2, I argue that there are three theoretical problems in Mou’s and Watsuji’s Hegelian philosophies of culture, namely, the impossibility of change in cultural value, the lack of empirical method and the neglect of openness of interpretation. Thirdly, in chapter 3, I argue that Kierkegaard’s definition of culture in terms of the manifestations of passions explain East Asian cultural development more consistently than Hegelian dialectics. Fourthly, in chapter 4, I establish a Kierkegaardian philosophy of culture and argue that a cultural self is formulated by the concepts of community and contemporaneity where individuals express their passions according to their free wills. Finally, I argue that Kierkegaardian philosophy of culture fulfils both the ontological and epistemic tasks of East Asian philosophers and solves the theoretical problems they encounter when they adopt Hegelian dialectics.
According to Hegel, the development of consciousness is determined by God the absolute and the pr... more According to Hegel, the development of consciousness is determined by God the absolute and the process of development must be rational and necessary, which provides little room for individual's freedom. However, like other philosophers, due to the consideration on the problem of retribution of ethical responsibility to individuals, Hegel tries to argue that individual's freedom is still compatible with his deterministic philosophy of history.
However, based upon Kosch's interpretation of Kierkegaard's two senses of freedom, this paper argue that under Hegel's philosophy of history freedom is impossible. For under Hegel's philosophy he must deny the individual's freedom as capacity to form intentions that are independent from determination by prior events (including mental states), and therefore individuals cannot posit choices on their own. However, without the ability to posit choices, individuals cannot have real freedom. Therefore individual's freedom is incompatible with Hegel's philosophy of history. If we think individual's freedom really exist, than we must reject Hegel's philosophy.
This paper only argues that the Hegel's philosophy must imply there is no individual freedom, instead of proving the existence of individual's freedom or denying the system of Hegel's philosophy.
Teaching Documents by Andrew Ka Pok Tam
The Development of Neo-Confucian thought, 1962
This is the English translation of 《為中國文化敬告世界人士宣言：我們對中國學術研究及中國文化與世界文化前途之共同認識》（A Manifesto on the ... more This is the English translation of 《為中國文化敬告世界人士宣言：我們對中國學術研究及中國文化與世界文化前途之共同認識》（A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture：Our Joint Understanding of the Sinological Study Relating to World Cultural Outlook, 1958）written by Dr. Zhang Junmai. The manifesto was drafted and signed by New Confucian philosophers including Mou Zongsan, Tang Jungyi, Zhang Junmai and Xu Fuguan, and is widely considered as the declaration defining New Confucian movement.
While the Chinese version circulates among scholar rapidly, Zhang's English translation did not draw lots of attention. It is extremely difficult to find his English translation of the Manifesto. The attached file is scanned from Zhang's The Development of Neo-Confucian thought Vol. 2 (1962).
Uploads
Videos by Andrew Ka Pok Tam
Published work by Andrew Ka Pok Tam
考慮到北森同時受到日本京都學派及歐陸哲學(尤其 齊克果)及路德宗神學影響，本文修正北森神學的缺陷，指 出上帝之痛的發生是由於作為間柄的神人關係，以及由於 上帝之痛並非永恆的屬性，因此上帝之痛不是上帝的本質。
According to Japanese theologian Kitamori Kazoh’s (1916-1998) Theology of the Pain of God, God’s pain is the essence of God. The pain of God is the paradox between God’s anger and God’s love. On the one hand, God hates sins while sin destroys God-man relationship, so God is therefore angry with humans. On the other hand, God is merciful and therefore gives His Son Jesus Christ to save the world and so manifests God’s love. This paradox constitutes God’s pain and is manifested through God the Father’s sacrifice of God the Son, where Jesus died and was resurrected for the sinners, in order to save them. However, if Christ’s death and resurrection has already forgiven humans’ sins and reconciled the God-man relation, then God’s anger should perish, and therefore God’s pain should also cease to exist. Nevertheless, the absence of God’s pain has not prevented God’s existence. Therefore, God’s pain is not God’s essence.
Since Kitamori is influenced by both the Kyoto School, Continental Philosophy (especially Kierkegaard) and Lutheran theology, this article aims to correct Kitamori’s theoretical weakness by arguing that the pain of God comes from the God- man relationship as an aidagara, and therefore as God’s pain is not persistent, it cannot be God’s essence.
然而，本文認為，若風土論是一以自我意識的概念為基礎的文化哲 學，則只要修正了和辻的錯誤地理知識，人們仍可根據風土論重新分析中 國文化，發現其文化意識的多元性。自然及社會科學對中國氣候、地形、 社會、經濟、政治、文化的客觀描述不僅未有削弱風土論的理論價值，反 而兩者能夠相輔相成:前者描述了風土與人間之基本形態，後者則以自我 意識解釋兩者之互動如何生成文化。
The relationship between Fudo (Climate) and Ningen (Human Society) is an essential topic to Watsuji Tetsuro’s philosophy of culture. In his book Fudo published in 1935, Watsuji defines culture in terms of the interaction between Fudo and Ningen and categorizes the world cultures into three types: monsoon, desert and meadow. In particular, when discussing the monsoon fudo and culture in China, Watsuji refers to not only objective data and secondary literature but also his fieldwork and subjective experiences during his visit to Hong Kong and Shanghai in 1927 on his marine journey to Germany. However, due to Watsuji’s insufficient knowledge about the geography of China, he misunderstood that the Fudo of China is merely a “monotonous” plain and Chinese people are “unemotional” to politics and disregarded the complexity of the climate and topography of China and the diversity of Chinese culture and society.
Nevertheless, this paper argues that if Fudo study is a philosophy of culture based upon the concept of self-consciousness, once Watsuji’s misinformation about China is revised, it may still be employed to rediscover the diversity of Chinese culture consciousness. Natural and Social scientific researches on climate, topography, society, economy and politics of China does not weaken the theoretical value of Fudo study but actually complement each other: the former illustrates the structures of Fudo and Ningen while the later explains the formation of culture from the interaction between Fudo and Ningen in terms of self-consciousness.
In light of Mou Zongsan’s moral metaphysics, this paper argues that Watsuji’s ningen rinrigaku fails to provide a consistent interpretation of Mencius’ teaching of gorin. According to Mou, an individual’s subjectivity whose mind nature is granted by Heaven preceds and producs mutual relationships among human beings. However, such idea of Heaven is omitted in Watsuji’s anti-Neo-Confucian understanding of Mencius. Instead, Watsuji argues that the individual’s moral consciousness arises from aidagara, which is the negations of self and others. In fact, his notion of self-negation contradicts with Mencius 7A. However, instead of accusing Watsuji of misunderstanding Mencius, this paper suggests one may understand Watsuji’s ningen rinrigaku as non-Confucian ethics instead of a consistent interpretation of Mencius.
Firstly, in chapter 1, I argue that there are two tasks of modern East Asian philosophers of culture: how to understand a culture (epistemic task) and how to establish a cultural self (ontological task). Secondly, in chapter 2, I argue that there are three theoretical problems in Mou’s and Watsuji’s Hegelian philosophies of culture, namely, the impossibility of change in cultural value, the lack of empirical method and the neglect of openness of interpretation. Thirdly, in chapter 3, I argue that Kierkegaard’s definition of culture in terms of the manifestations of passions explain East Asian cultural development more consistently than Hegelian dialectics. Fourthly, in chapter 4, I establish a Kierkegaardian philosophy of culture and argue that a cultural self is formulated by the concepts of community and contemporaneity where individuals express their passions according to their free wills. Finally, I argue that Kierkegaardian philosophy of culture fulfils both the ontological and epistemic tasks of East Asian philosophers and solves the theoretical problems they encounter when they adopt Hegelian dialectics.
In his multi-volume New Edition of the History of Chinese Philosophy (1984-1986), he tried to reconstruct traditional Chinese philosophy with the help of modern Western philosophy but in ways that both resembled and differed from the work of so-called “New Confucians” such as Mou Zongsan and Tang Junyi. This work highly influenced the study of Chinese philosophy in Hong Kong and Taiwan and helped shape several generations of Chinese scholars’ understanding of traditional Chinese thought. Unlike Feng Youlan or Hu Shi, each of whom authored competing histories of Chinese philosophy, Lao attempted to define Chinese philosophy not in terms of what it is (an essentialist approach) but in terms of what it does (a functionalist approach). For Lao, Chinese philosophy functions primarily in an “orientative” manner, shaping and guiding Chinese people’s values at a deep level rather than merely advocating particular propositions or theories. In this way, Lao thought, Chinese philosophy was distinct from other social philosophies, particularly those of the West.
Having summarized the legacies of both traditional Chinese and modern Western thought, Lao later developed a philosophy of culture that preoccupied him from the 1990s until his death in 2012. In his Lectures on Philosophy of Culture (2003), Lao declared that his philosophy was driven by a cultural crisis of consciousness, as he realized that he grew up in a frustrating age in which traditional Chinese culture was declining in influence while modern culture was yet to be established as a new cultural order. Lao criticized both traditionalist and anti-traditionalist approaches to the modernization of Chinese culture and tried to develop his own approach.
Drafts by Andrew Ka Pok Tam
Watsuji Tetsurō’s idea of aidagara (間柄, often translated as ‘betweenness’) is an essential concept in his ningen rinrigaku with a robust Confucian heritage as he begins his reflection on aidagara from Mencius’ concept of gorin or five relationships; it seems that Watsuji tries to reinterpret gorin. However, unlike Yangmingism and the twentieth-century Chinese New Confucianism, Watsuji does not emphasise individual subjectivity; instead, in both Rinrigaku and Fūdo, Watsuji reduces individual self into aidagara and aidagara into the Buddhist notion of Kū.
Based upon Mou Zongsan’s moral metaphysics, this paper argues that Watsuji’s ningen rinrigaku fails to provide a consistent interpretation of Mencius’ teaching of gorin. According to Mou, an individual’s subjectivity whose mind nature is granted by Heaven precedes and produces mutual relationships among human beings; but the idea of Heaven is omitted in Watsuji’s anti-Neo-Confucian understanding of Mencius. Instead, Watsuji that the individual’s moral consciousness arises from aidagara, which is the negations of self and others, while the notion of self-negation contradicts with Mencius 7A. However, instead of accusing Watsuji of misunderstanding Mencius, this paper suggests one may understand Watsuji’s ningen rinrigaku as non-Confucian ethics instead of a consistent interpretation of Mencius.
「間柄」是和辻哲郎的人間倫理學中深受儒學影響的重要概念。他對間柄的 反思始於孟子的五倫概念;故此，和辻似乎嘗試重新詮釋五倫。然而，與陽明學 及二十世紀中國新儒家相反，和辻並不強調個人主體性;反之，在《人間倫理學》 及《風土》裡，和辻把個人主體還原成間柄，又將間柄歸於佛教「空」的概念。
根據牟宗三的道德形而上學，本文認為和辻的人間倫理學無法為孟子之五倫 提供一致的詮釋。根據牟宗三，個人主體所具有天賦之心性乃先於並生出人倫關 係。然而，「天」的概念卻不見於和辻對《孟子》的反理學詮釋。和辻認為個人 道德意識緣起於作為對自我與他者否定之間柄，可是自我否定之主張卻與《孟子. 盡心上》的說法相違。然而，本文指出，除了批評和辻曲解《孟子》以外，讀者 或可理解和辻的人間倫理學為一非儒學的新倫理學，而非對孟子的一致詮釋。
Watsuji Tetsuro’s idea of aidagara (間柄, often translated as ‘mutual relationship’) is an essential concept in his ethics with a strong Confucian heritage However, unlike Yangmingism and the twentieth century Chinese New Confucianism, Watsuji does not emphasize individual subjectivity and moral autonomy; rather, in both Ririgaku and Fudo, Watsuji reduces individual self into aidagara and aidagara into the Buddhist notion of kū.
This paper argues that the absence of individual subjectivity in Watsuji’s ethics results from his de-metaphysical approach. By contrast, New Confucian Mou Zongsan’s moral metaphysics guarantees an individual’s moral autonomy which precedes and produces mutual relationships among human beings. Through the comparative study between Watsuji and Mou, I argue that if one wish to preserve the individual subjectivity as an ontological ground of mutual relationships in Confucian tradition, one must reject Watsuji’s de-metaphysical approach.
Abstract
The Chinese cultural invasion, in addition to political oppression and economic exploitation in Hong Kong since the handover in 1997 lead to the rise of Hong Kong localism in recent years. Hong Kong localism is a political ideology which aims to distinguish Hong Kong identity from Chinese identity and defend the Hong Kongese's interests. Different activists, however, propose not only different political visions for the defence of Hong Kongese's interests, but also define Hong Kong identity and subjectivity in a very different sense. Wan Chin, the scholar and the author of the book On Hong Kong City-State, defines Hong Kongese as inheritors of the ancient and orthodox Hua Xia culture which has already been disappeared in China, while a group of students in Hong Kong University who publish the book Hong Kong Nationalism, defines Hong Kongese as a nation. Both schools however never gain majority supports and decline after the corrupted and manipulated General Election in September 2016. However, this paper argues that both localist theories contain serious problems: the former provides an over exclusive Hong Kong identity by appealing to ancient “Huaxia culture”, while the latter provides an over inclusive Hong Kong identity by appealing to anti-communist attitude.
Keywords: Hong Kong, Localism, Wan Chin, Hong Kong Nationalism, On Hong Kong City-State
Thesis Chapters by Andrew Ka Pok Tam
Firstly, in chapter 1, I argue that there are two tasks of modern East Asian philosophers of culture: how to understand a culture (epistemic task) and how to establish a cultural self (ontological task). Secondly, in chapter 2, I argue that there are three theoretical problems in Mou’s and Watsuji’s Hegelian philosophies of culture, namely, the impossibility of change in cultural value, the lack of empirical method and the neglect of openness of interpretation. Thirdly, in chapter 3, I argue that Kierkegaard’s definition of culture in terms of the manifestations of passions explain East Asian cultural development more consistently than Hegelian dialectics. Fourthly, in chapter 4, I establish a Kierkegaardian philosophy of culture and argue that a cultural self is formulated by the concepts of community and contemporaneity where individuals express their passions according to their free wills. Finally, I argue that Kierkegaardian philosophy of culture fulfils both the ontological and epistemic tasks of East Asian philosophers and solves the theoretical problems they encounter when they adopt Hegelian dialectics.
However, based upon Kosch's interpretation of Kierkegaard's two senses of freedom, this paper argue that under Hegel's philosophy of history freedom is impossible. For under Hegel's philosophy he must deny the individual's freedom as capacity to form intentions that are independent from determination by prior events (including mental states), and therefore individuals cannot posit choices on their own. However, without the ability to posit choices, individuals cannot have real freedom. Therefore individual's freedom is incompatible with Hegel's philosophy of history. If we think individual's freedom really exist, than we must reject Hegel's philosophy.
This paper only argues that the Hegel's philosophy must imply there is no individual freedom, instead of proving the existence of individual's freedom or denying the system of Hegel's philosophy.
Teaching Documents by Andrew Ka Pok Tam
While the Chinese version circulates among scholar rapidly, Zhang's English translation did not draw lots of attention. It is extremely difficult to find his English translation of the Manifesto. The attached file is scanned from Zhang's The Development of Neo-Confucian thought Vol. 2 (1962).
考慮到北森同時受到日本京都學派及歐陸哲學(尤其 齊克果)及路德宗神學影響，本文修正北森神學的缺陷，指 出上帝之痛的發生是由於作為間柄的神人關係，以及由於 上帝之痛並非永恆的屬性，因此上帝之痛不是上帝的本質。
According to Japanese theologian Kitamori Kazoh’s (1916-1998) Theology of the Pain of God, God’s pain is the essence of God. The pain of God is the paradox between God’s anger and God’s love. On the one hand, God hates sins while sin destroys God-man relationship, so God is therefore angry with humans. On the other hand, God is merciful and therefore gives His Son Jesus Christ to save the world and so manifests God’s love. This paradox constitutes God’s pain and is manifested through God the Father’s sacrifice of God the Son, where Jesus died and was resurrected for the sinners, in order to save them. However, if Christ’s death and resurrection has already forgiven humans’ sins and reconciled the God-man relation, then God’s anger should perish, and therefore God’s pain should also cease to exist. Nevertheless, the absence of God’s pain has not prevented God’s existence. Therefore, God’s pain is not God’s essence.
Since Kitamori is influenced by both the Kyoto School, Continental Philosophy (especially Kierkegaard) and Lutheran theology, this article aims to correct Kitamori’s theoretical weakness by arguing that the pain of God comes from the God- man relationship as an aidagara, and therefore as God’s pain is not persistent, it cannot be God’s essence.
然而，本文認為，若風土論是一以自我意識的概念為基礎的文化哲 學，則只要修正了和辻的錯誤地理知識，人們仍可根據風土論重新分析中 國文化，發現其文化意識的多元性。自然及社會科學對中國氣候、地形、 社會、經濟、政治、文化的客觀描述不僅未有削弱風土論的理論價值，反 而兩者能夠相輔相成:前者描述了風土與人間之基本形態，後者則以自我 意識解釋兩者之互動如何生成文化。
The relationship between Fudo (Climate) and Ningen (Human Society) is an essential topic to Watsuji Tetsuro’s philosophy of culture. In his book Fudo published in 1935, Watsuji defines culture in terms of the interaction between Fudo and Ningen and categorizes the world cultures into three types: monsoon, desert and meadow. In particular, when discussing the monsoon fudo and culture in China, Watsuji refers to not only objective data and secondary literature but also his fieldwork and subjective experiences during his visit to Hong Kong and Shanghai in 1927 on his marine journey to Germany. However, due to Watsuji’s insufficient knowledge about the geography of China, he misunderstood that the Fudo of China is merely a “monotonous” plain and Chinese people are “unemotional” to politics and disregarded the complexity of the climate and topography of China and the diversity of Chinese culture and society.
Nevertheless, this paper argues that if Fudo study is a philosophy of culture based upon the concept of self-consciousness, once Watsuji’s misinformation about China is revised, it may still be employed to rediscover the diversity of Chinese culture consciousness. Natural and Social scientific researches on climate, topography, society, economy and politics of China does not weaken the theoretical value of Fudo study but actually complement each other: the former illustrates the structures of Fudo and Ningen while the later explains the formation of culture from the interaction between Fudo and Ningen in terms of self-consciousness.
In light of Mou Zongsan’s moral metaphysics, this paper argues that Watsuji’s ningen rinrigaku fails to provide a consistent interpretation of Mencius’ teaching of gorin. According to Mou, an individual’s subjectivity whose mind nature is granted by Heaven preceds and producs mutual relationships among human beings. However, such idea of Heaven is omitted in Watsuji’s anti-Neo-Confucian understanding of Mencius. Instead, Watsuji argues that the individual’s moral consciousness arises from aidagara, which is the negations of self and others. In fact, his notion of self-negation contradicts with Mencius 7A. However, instead of accusing Watsuji of misunderstanding Mencius, this paper suggests one may understand Watsuji’s ningen rinrigaku as non-Confucian ethics instead of a consistent interpretation of Mencius.
Firstly, in chapter 1, I argue that there are two tasks of modern East Asian philosophers of culture: how to understand a culture (epistemic task) and how to establish a cultural self (ontological task). Secondly, in chapter 2, I argue that there are three theoretical problems in Mou’s and Watsuji’s Hegelian philosophies of culture, namely, the impossibility of change in cultural value, the lack of empirical method and the neglect of openness of interpretation. Thirdly, in chapter 3, I argue that Kierkegaard’s definition of culture in terms of the manifestations of passions explain East Asian cultural development more consistently than Hegelian dialectics. Fourthly, in chapter 4, I establish a Kierkegaardian philosophy of culture and argue that a cultural self is formulated by the concepts of community and contemporaneity where individuals express their passions according to their free wills. Finally, I argue that Kierkegaardian philosophy of culture fulfils both the ontological and epistemic tasks of East Asian philosophers and solves the theoretical problems they encounter when they adopt Hegelian dialectics.
In his multi-volume New Edition of the History of Chinese Philosophy (1984-1986), he tried to reconstruct traditional Chinese philosophy with the help of modern Western philosophy but in ways that both resembled and differed from the work of so-called “New Confucians” such as Mou Zongsan and Tang Junyi. This work highly influenced the study of Chinese philosophy in Hong Kong and Taiwan and helped shape several generations of Chinese scholars’ understanding of traditional Chinese thought. Unlike Feng Youlan or Hu Shi, each of whom authored competing histories of Chinese philosophy, Lao attempted to define Chinese philosophy not in terms of what it is (an essentialist approach) but in terms of what it does (a functionalist approach). For Lao, Chinese philosophy functions primarily in an “orientative” manner, shaping and guiding Chinese people’s values at a deep level rather than merely advocating particular propositions or theories. In this way, Lao thought, Chinese philosophy was distinct from other social philosophies, particularly those of the West.
Having summarized the legacies of both traditional Chinese and modern Western thought, Lao later developed a philosophy of culture that preoccupied him from the 1990s until his death in 2012. In his Lectures on Philosophy of Culture (2003), Lao declared that his philosophy was driven by a cultural crisis of consciousness, as he realized that he grew up in a frustrating age in which traditional Chinese culture was declining in influence while modern culture was yet to be established as a new cultural order. Lao criticized both traditionalist and anti-traditionalist approaches to the modernization of Chinese culture and tried to develop his own approach.
Watsuji Tetsurō’s idea of aidagara (間柄, often translated as ‘betweenness’) is an essential concept in his ningen rinrigaku with a robust Confucian heritage as he begins his reflection on aidagara from Mencius’ concept of gorin or five relationships; it seems that Watsuji tries to reinterpret gorin. However, unlike Yangmingism and the twentieth-century Chinese New Confucianism, Watsuji does not emphasise individual subjectivity; instead, in both Rinrigaku and Fūdo, Watsuji reduces individual self into aidagara and aidagara into the Buddhist notion of Kū.
Based upon Mou Zongsan’s moral metaphysics, this paper argues that Watsuji’s ningen rinrigaku fails to provide a consistent interpretation of Mencius’ teaching of gorin. According to Mou, an individual’s subjectivity whose mind nature is granted by Heaven precedes and produces mutual relationships among human beings; but the idea of Heaven is omitted in Watsuji’s anti-Neo-Confucian understanding of Mencius. Instead, Watsuji that the individual’s moral consciousness arises from aidagara, which is the negations of self and others, while the notion of self-negation contradicts with Mencius 7A. However, instead of accusing Watsuji of misunderstanding Mencius, this paper suggests one may understand Watsuji’s ningen rinrigaku as non-Confucian ethics instead of a consistent interpretation of Mencius.
「間柄」是和辻哲郎的人間倫理學中深受儒學影響的重要概念。他對間柄的 反思始於孟子的五倫概念;故此，和辻似乎嘗試重新詮釋五倫。然而，與陽明學 及二十世紀中國新儒家相反，和辻並不強調個人主體性;反之，在《人間倫理學》 及《風土》裡，和辻把個人主體還原成間柄，又將間柄歸於佛教「空」的概念。
根據牟宗三的道德形而上學，本文認為和辻的人間倫理學無法為孟子之五倫 提供一致的詮釋。根據牟宗三，個人主體所具有天賦之心性乃先於並生出人倫關 係。然而，「天」的概念卻不見於和辻對《孟子》的反理學詮釋。和辻認為個人 道德意識緣起於作為對自我與他者否定之間柄，可是自我否定之主張卻與《孟子. 盡心上》的說法相違。然而，本文指出，除了批評和辻曲解《孟子》以外，讀者 或可理解和辻的人間倫理學為一非儒學的新倫理學，而非對孟子的一致詮釋。
Watsuji Tetsuro’s idea of aidagara (間柄, often translated as ‘mutual relationship’) is an essential concept in his ethics with a strong Confucian heritage However, unlike Yangmingism and the twentieth century Chinese New Confucianism, Watsuji does not emphasize individual subjectivity and moral autonomy; rather, in both Ririgaku and Fudo, Watsuji reduces individual self into aidagara and aidagara into the Buddhist notion of kū.
This paper argues that the absence of individual subjectivity in Watsuji’s ethics results from his de-metaphysical approach. By contrast, New Confucian Mou Zongsan’s moral metaphysics guarantees an individual’s moral autonomy which precedes and produces mutual relationships among human beings. Through the comparative study between Watsuji and Mou, I argue that if one wish to preserve the individual subjectivity as an ontological ground of mutual relationships in Confucian tradition, one must reject Watsuji’s de-metaphysical approach.
Abstract
The Chinese cultural invasion, in addition to political oppression and economic exploitation in Hong Kong since the handover in 1997 lead to the rise of Hong Kong localism in recent years. Hong Kong localism is a political ideology which aims to distinguish Hong Kong identity from Chinese identity and defend the Hong Kongese's interests. Different activists, however, propose not only different political visions for the defence of Hong Kongese's interests, but also define Hong Kong identity and subjectivity in a very different sense. Wan Chin, the scholar and the author of the book On Hong Kong City-State, defines Hong Kongese as inheritors of the ancient and orthodox Hua Xia culture which has already been disappeared in China, while a group of students in Hong Kong University who publish the book Hong Kong Nationalism, defines Hong Kongese as a nation. Both schools however never gain majority supports and decline after the corrupted and manipulated General Election in September 2016. However, this paper argues that both localist theories contain serious problems: the former provides an over exclusive Hong Kong identity by appealing to ancient “Huaxia culture”, while the latter provides an over inclusive Hong Kong identity by appealing to anti-communist attitude.
Keywords: Hong Kong, Localism, Wan Chin, Hong Kong Nationalism, On Hong Kong City-State
Firstly, in chapter 1, I argue that there are two tasks of modern East Asian philosophers of culture: how to understand a culture (epistemic task) and how to establish a cultural self (ontological task). Secondly, in chapter 2, I argue that there are three theoretical problems in Mou’s and Watsuji’s Hegelian philosophies of culture, namely, the impossibility of change in cultural value, the lack of empirical method and the neglect of openness of interpretation. Thirdly, in chapter 3, I argue that Kierkegaard’s definition of culture in terms of the manifestations of passions explain East Asian cultural development more consistently than Hegelian dialectics. Fourthly, in chapter 4, I establish a Kierkegaardian philosophy of culture and argue that a cultural self is formulated by the concepts of community and contemporaneity where individuals express their passions according to their free wills. Finally, I argue that Kierkegaardian philosophy of culture fulfils both the ontological and epistemic tasks of East Asian philosophers and solves the theoretical problems they encounter when they adopt Hegelian dialectics.
However, based upon Kosch's interpretation of Kierkegaard's two senses of freedom, this paper argue that under Hegel's philosophy of history freedom is impossible. For under Hegel's philosophy he must deny the individual's freedom as capacity to form intentions that are independent from determination by prior events (including mental states), and therefore individuals cannot posit choices on their own. However, without the ability to posit choices, individuals cannot have real freedom. Therefore individual's freedom is incompatible with Hegel's philosophy of history. If we think individual's freedom really exist, than we must reject Hegel's philosophy.
This paper only argues that the Hegel's philosophy must imply there is no individual freedom, instead of proving the existence of individual's freedom or denying the system of Hegel's philosophy.
While the Chinese version circulates among scholar rapidly, Zhang's English translation did not draw lots of attention. It is extremely difficult to find his English translation of the Manifesto. The attached file is scanned from Zhang's The Development of Neo-Confucian thought Vol. 2 (1962).
‘betweenness’) is an essential concept in his ningen rinrigaku with a robust
Confucian heritage. As he begins his reflection on aidagara from Mencius’
concept of gorin or ‘five relationships’ it seems that Watsuji tries to
reinterpret gorin. However, unlike Yangmingism and the twentieth-century
Chinese New Confucianism, Watsuji does not emphasise individual
subjectivity. Instead, in both Rinrigaku and Fūdo, Watsuji reduces
individual self into aidagara and aidagara into the Buddhist notion of Kū.
In light of Mou Zongsan’s moral metaphysics, this paper argues that
Watsuji’s ningen rinrigaku fails to provide a consistent interpretation of
Mencius’ teaching of gorin. According to Mou, an individual’s subjectivity
whose mind nature is granted by Heaven preceds and producs mutual
relationships among human beings. However, such idea of Heaven is
omitted in Watsuji’s anti-Neo-Confucian understanding of Mencius.
Instead, Watsuji argues that the individual’s moral consciousness arises
from aidagara, which is the negations of self and others. In fact, his notion
of self-negation contradicts with Mencius 7A. However, instead of accusing
Watsuji of misunderstanding Mencius, this paper suggests one may
understand Watsuji’s ningen rinrigaku as non-Confucian ethics instead of a
consistent interpretation of Mencius.
Based upon the philosophical and historical studies mentioned above, this paper argues that Hong Kong manifests a special “Peninsula Self-Consciousness” in its Maritime and Continental Fudo: Hong Kong is linked by Pearl river to both the mainland and the sea, making Hong Kong a place linking China the Continental nation and other Maritime nations like Britain and the United States. The Chinese term for the peninsula is bandao, which literally means “half-island”—it is neither an island nor an inland, but an in-betweener.
To answer the question, this paper introduces Kierkegaard’s theory of revolution which argues that all revolutions are caused by aesthetic passion; mass mobilization takes place when individuals’ passions are relate en masse. Nevertheless, this paper argues that (1) since in Kierkegaard’s philosophy passions are defined as motivation and inclinations which can be aesthetic, ethical or religious, it is possible that ethical passion can also motivate revolutions, (2) Mengzi’s mind nature is equivalent to Kierkegaard’s ethical passion, which does not only prefer to moral good individually but is inclined to manifest moral values socially, and therefore, (3) Tang-Wu revolutions were motivated by ethical passions.