Books by Ralph Jenkins
Synthese Library , 2022
This book defines a logical system called the Protocol-theoretic Logic of Epistemic Norms (PLEN),... more This book defines a logical system called the Protocol-theoretic Logic of Epistemic Norms (PLEN), it develops PLEN into a formal framework for representing and reasoning about epistemic norms, and it shows that PLEN is theoretically interesting and useful with regard to the aims of such a framework. In order to motivate the project, the author defends an account of epistemic norms called epistemic proceduralism. The core of this view is the idea that, in virtue of their indispensable, regulative role in cognitive life, epistemic norms are closely intertwined with procedural rules that restrict epistemic actions, procedures, and processes. The resulting organizing principle of the book is that epistemic norms are protocols for epistemic planning and control.
The core of the book is developing PLEN, which is essentially a novel variant of propositional dynamic logic (PDL) distinguished by more or less elaborate revisions of PDL’s syntax and semantics. The syntax encodes the procedural content of epistemic norms by means of the well-known protocol or program constructions of dynamic and epistemic logics. It then provides a novel language of operators on protocols, including a range of unique protocol equivalence relations, syntactic operations on protocols, and various procedural relations among protocols in addition to the standard dynamic (modal) operators of PDL. The semantics of the system then interprets protocol expressions and expressions embedding protocols over a class of directed multigraph-like structures rather than the standard labeled transition systems or modal frames. The intent of the system is to better represent epistemic dynamics, build a logic of protocols atop it, and then show that the resulting logic of protocols is useful as a logical framework for epistemic norms. The resulting theory of epistemic norms centers on notions of norm equivalence derived from theories of process equivalence familiar from the study of dynamic and modal logics. The canonical account of protocol equivalence in PLEN turns out to possess a number of interesting formal features, including satisfaction of important conditions on hyperintensional equivalence, a matter of recently recognized importance in the logic of norms, generally.
To show that the system is interesting and useful as a framework for representing and reasoning about epistemic norms, the author applies the logical system to the analysis of epistemic deontic operators, and, partly on the basis of this, establishes representation theorems linking protocols to the action-guiding content of epistemic norms. The protocol-theoretic logic of epistemic norms is then shown to almost immediately validate the main principles of epistemic proceduralism.
Dissertation by Ralph Jenkins
CUNY Graduate Center DIssertation , 2018
In this dissertation, I defend the protocol-theoretic account of epistemic norms. The protocol-th... more In this dissertation, I defend the protocol-theoretic account of epistemic norms. The protocol-theoretic account amounts to three theses: (i) There are norms of epistemic rationality that are procedural; epistemic rationality is at least partially defined by rules that restrict the possible ways in which epistemic actions and processes can be sequenced, combined, or chosen among under varying conditions. (ii) Epistemic rationality is ineliminably defined by procedural norms; procedural restrictions provide an irreducible unifying structure for even apparently non-procedural prescriptions and normative expressions, and they are practically indispensable in our cognitive lives. (iii) These procedural epistemic norms are best analyzed in terms of the protocol (or program) constructions of dynamic logic. I defend (i) and (ii) at length and in multi-faceted ways, and I argue that they entail a set of criteria of adequacy for models of epistemic dynamics and abstract accounts of epistemic norms. I then define PLEN, the protocol-theoretic logic of epistemic norms. PLEN is a dynamic logic that analyzes epistemic rationality norms with protocol constructions interpreted over multi-graph based models of epistemic dynamics. The kernel of the overall argument of the dissertation is showing that PLEN uniquely satisfies the criteria defended; none
Talks by Ralph Jenkins
SJSU Research Presentation Handout, 2020
I present a precis of my current research program and drill down into the arguments for some its... more I present a precis of my current research program and drill down into the arguments for some its key claims.
SJSU Research Presentation Slides, 2020
I present a precis of my research, focusing on the content of my current Synthese Library manuscr... more I present a precis of my research, focusing on the content of my current Synthese Library manuscript. I spend some time on the arguments for some of the main claims of the manuscript.
Drafts by Ralph Jenkins
Protocols, in an epistemic context, are rules or plans that (i) detail conditions for the selecti... more Protocols, in an epistemic context, are rules or plans that (i) detail conditions for the selection of basic epistemic procedures and (ii) thereby restrict the ways that temporally extended processes of epistemic state change can unfold. A cluster of difficult problems in the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of logic can be connected and illuminated-if not analyzed and solved outright-by conceiving of norms of epistemic rationality in terms of protocols. The foregoing thesis can be developed and defended by deploying a formalism based on work in Logical Dynamics; this is the project of the dissertation proposed in this prospectus. The prospectus motivates the model, outlines its main features, and briefly outlines its applications to the aforementioned cluster of problems with a detailed chapter plan.
This is very old; it was one of my first drafts of a Qualifying Paper for coursework at CUNY. It ... more This is very old; it was one of my first drafts of a Qualifying Paper for coursework at CUNY. It passed, eventually. Who knows, maybe I'll revisit it.
Epistemological theories (i) articulate conceptions of epistemic states (states of knowledge, belief, or credence (inter alia)) and (ii) model epistemic dynamics ((normative) change of epistemic state). This paper surveys the core formalisms of a small neighborhood of epistemological theories, centering on the well-known AGM belief revision theory. I articulate three philosophical objections that epistemological theories must face. I then propose that fortification against these objections is a criterion of comparative evaluation, locating the formalisms surveyed relative to these objections. Finally, I argue that AGM and its relatives and neighbors share an underlying model of epistemic norms. The convergence of these accounts of epistemic norms renders the model theoretically robust.
This draft emerged out of a non-classical logic course at the CUNY Grad Center. I haven't revisit... more This draft emerged out of a non-classical logic course at the CUNY Grad Center. I haven't revisited it in some time, so it's pretty out of date and/or bad. Also, it mis-uses the term "depravity" - at least, it uses it in exactly the opposite way that Plantinga uses it. I'm leaving it as is until I have a worthwhile revised draft.
The interest of Curry paradoxes lies in the fact that they generate triviality when coupled with relatively meager logical resources. Defenders of the weak relevant logic B have shown how B can be a robust and interesting logic without the resources for paradox. This paper aims to defend B from the worry that B is depraved, i.e., that B doesn't have an (uncontroversial) informative semantics. This is the Informative Semantics Objection. The main line of argument in this paper is that the demand for an informative semantics can be understood as an undefended bias in a reconstruction of our logical theory preference procedure. I offer a defensible alternative bias that reduces demand for informative semantics to zero. The main line of that argument follows: Endorsing accounts of the relation between logics and the norms of reasoning biases the theory preference model. We need good reasons to bias the theory preference model or else we are building in undefended biases - and that's bad. Some reasons are given for endorsing a particular account of the relation between logics and reasoning norms. Endorsing said view, the Informative Semantics Objection is irrelevant to the canonical role of logic. Insisting on the informativeness of a logical semantics requires insisting on an alternative view of the relation in question. The onus is shifted to the opponent of B to support this view.
Teaching Documents by Ralph Jenkins
I present some of the more prevalent and bothersome cognitive biases by means of simple classroom... more I present some of the more prevalent and bothersome cognitive biases by means of simple classroom activities. These lay the groundwork for discussing de-biasing strategies with a focus on learning and training in normative rule systems.
I present two exercises derived from Douglas Hofstadter's MU Puzzle for students in introductory... more I present two exercises derived from Douglas Hofstadter's MU Puzzle for students in introductory logic classes. The exercises provide an accessible and low-stakes introduction to the main notions of formalization and give students some practice using formal systems - identifying well-formed strings, using inference rules, etc.. I've found it to be something of a helpful on-ramp to formal logic.
Papers by Ralph Jenkins
The Philosophical Foundations of PLEN: A Protocol-theoretic Logic of Epistemic Norms
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Books by Ralph Jenkins
The core of the book is developing PLEN, which is essentially a novel variant of propositional dynamic logic (PDL) distinguished by more or less elaborate revisions of PDL’s syntax and semantics. The syntax encodes the procedural content of epistemic norms by means of the well-known protocol or program constructions of dynamic and epistemic logics. It then provides a novel language of operators on protocols, including a range of unique protocol equivalence relations, syntactic operations on protocols, and various procedural relations among protocols in addition to the standard dynamic (modal) operators of PDL. The semantics of the system then interprets protocol expressions and expressions embedding protocols over a class of directed multigraph-like structures rather than the standard labeled transition systems or modal frames. The intent of the system is to better represent epistemic dynamics, build a logic of protocols atop it, and then show that the resulting logic of protocols is useful as a logical framework for epistemic norms. The resulting theory of epistemic norms centers on notions of norm equivalence derived from theories of process equivalence familiar from the study of dynamic and modal logics. The canonical account of protocol equivalence in PLEN turns out to possess a number of interesting formal features, including satisfaction of important conditions on hyperintensional equivalence, a matter of recently recognized importance in the logic of norms, generally.
To show that the system is interesting and useful as a framework for representing and reasoning about epistemic norms, the author applies the logical system to the analysis of epistemic deontic operators, and, partly on the basis of this, establishes representation theorems linking protocols to the action-guiding content of epistemic norms. The protocol-theoretic logic of epistemic norms is then shown to almost immediately validate the main principles of epistemic proceduralism.
Dissertation by Ralph Jenkins
Talks by Ralph Jenkins
Drafts by Ralph Jenkins
Epistemological theories (i) articulate conceptions of epistemic states (states of knowledge, belief, or credence (inter alia)) and (ii) model epistemic dynamics ((normative) change of epistemic state). This paper surveys the core formalisms of a small neighborhood of epistemological theories, centering on the well-known AGM belief revision theory. I articulate three philosophical objections that epistemological theories must face. I then propose that fortification against these objections is a criterion of comparative evaluation, locating the formalisms surveyed relative to these objections. Finally, I argue that AGM and its relatives and neighbors share an underlying model of epistemic norms. The convergence of these accounts of epistemic norms renders the model theoretically robust.
The interest of Curry paradoxes lies in the fact that they generate triviality when coupled with relatively meager logical resources. Defenders of the weak relevant logic B have shown how B can be a robust and interesting logic without the resources for paradox. This paper aims to defend B from the worry that B is depraved, i.e., that B doesn't have an (uncontroversial) informative semantics. This is the Informative Semantics Objection. The main line of argument in this paper is that the demand for an informative semantics can be understood as an undefended bias in a reconstruction of our logical theory preference procedure. I offer a defensible alternative bias that reduces demand for informative semantics to zero. The main line of that argument follows: Endorsing accounts of the relation between logics and the norms of reasoning biases the theory preference model. We need good reasons to bias the theory preference model or else we are building in undefended biases - and that's bad. Some reasons are given for endorsing a particular account of the relation between logics and reasoning norms. Endorsing said view, the Informative Semantics Objection is irrelevant to the canonical role of logic. Insisting on the informativeness of a logical semantics requires insisting on an alternative view of the relation in question. The onus is shifted to the opponent of B to support this view.
Teaching Documents by Ralph Jenkins
Papers by Ralph Jenkins
The core of the book is developing PLEN, which is essentially a novel variant of propositional dynamic logic (PDL) distinguished by more or less elaborate revisions of PDL’s syntax and semantics. The syntax encodes the procedural content of epistemic norms by means of the well-known protocol or program constructions of dynamic and epistemic logics. It then provides a novel language of operators on protocols, including a range of unique protocol equivalence relations, syntactic operations on protocols, and various procedural relations among protocols in addition to the standard dynamic (modal) operators of PDL. The semantics of the system then interprets protocol expressions and expressions embedding protocols over a class of directed multigraph-like structures rather than the standard labeled transition systems or modal frames. The intent of the system is to better represent epistemic dynamics, build a logic of protocols atop it, and then show that the resulting logic of protocols is useful as a logical framework for epistemic norms. The resulting theory of epistemic norms centers on notions of norm equivalence derived from theories of process equivalence familiar from the study of dynamic and modal logics. The canonical account of protocol equivalence in PLEN turns out to possess a number of interesting formal features, including satisfaction of important conditions on hyperintensional equivalence, a matter of recently recognized importance in the logic of norms, generally.
To show that the system is interesting and useful as a framework for representing and reasoning about epistemic norms, the author applies the logical system to the analysis of epistemic deontic operators, and, partly on the basis of this, establishes representation theorems linking protocols to the action-guiding content of epistemic norms. The protocol-theoretic logic of epistemic norms is then shown to almost immediately validate the main principles of epistemic proceduralism.
Epistemological theories (i) articulate conceptions of epistemic states (states of knowledge, belief, or credence (inter alia)) and (ii) model epistemic dynamics ((normative) change of epistemic state). This paper surveys the core formalisms of a small neighborhood of epistemological theories, centering on the well-known AGM belief revision theory. I articulate three philosophical objections that epistemological theories must face. I then propose that fortification against these objections is a criterion of comparative evaluation, locating the formalisms surveyed relative to these objections. Finally, I argue that AGM and its relatives and neighbors share an underlying model of epistemic norms. The convergence of these accounts of epistemic norms renders the model theoretically robust.
The interest of Curry paradoxes lies in the fact that they generate triviality when coupled with relatively meager logical resources. Defenders of the weak relevant logic B have shown how B can be a robust and interesting logic without the resources for paradox. This paper aims to defend B from the worry that B is depraved, i.e., that B doesn't have an (uncontroversial) informative semantics. This is the Informative Semantics Objection. The main line of argument in this paper is that the demand for an informative semantics can be understood as an undefended bias in a reconstruction of our logical theory preference procedure. I offer a defensible alternative bias that reduces demand for informative semantics to zero. The main line of that argument follows: Endorsing accounts of the relation between logics and the norms of reasoning biases the theory preference model. We need good reasons to bias the theory preference model or else we are building in undefended biases - and that's bad. Some reasons are given for endorsing a particular account of the relation between logics and reasoning norms. Endorsing said view, the Informative Semantics Objection is irrelevant to the canonical role of logic. Insisting on the informativeness of a logical semantics requires insisting on an alternative view of the relation in question. The onus is shifted to the opponent of B to support this view.