The Evolving Relationship between China, the EU, and the USA (Routledge), 2019
(Introduction only)
China’s economic revitalization has been followed by an increasing role and ... more (Introduction only)
China’s economic revitalization has been followed by an increasing role and influence on issues related to international security, as its significant involvement in the Iranian and North Korean nuclear crises, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), and the fight against climate change and other regional and global traditional and non-traditional security issues reveal. China has shifted the focus of its foreign policy from emphasizing the principle of ‘concealing one’s capabilities and biding one’s time’ during the early years of its modernization, to stressing the principle of ‘making a modest contribution’ (Wang & Song 2016: 3), and more recently, as President Xi Jinping has emphasized, to taking a place at the center stage of international politics and striving for the achievement of a ‘community of common destiny for humankind’ (Mardell 2017). There is a growing literature on the ‘China threat’, and theories of ‘hegemonic transition’ and the ‘Thucydides trap’, which argue that war is a most likely outcome when a rising power displaces a ruling power, have been applied to predict the impact China’s continuous revitalization will have on international relations (Allison 2017). Whether China’s continuous revitalization will lead to an intense security competition and great power struggle with the US, a great power war between them, or whether China’s revitalization is a threat to the liberal international order in general, have become central topics in the study of international relations. According to Chen, world order can be defined as a set of sustainable arrangements in the international system to allow political entities, and the peoples within them, to enjoy a meaningful level of peace, welfare, and justice (Chen 2016a: 776). Kissinger further argues that the arrangements of world order are based on two fundamental components: (i) a balance of power and (ii) a consensus on the legitimacy of the existing arrangements (Kissinger 2014: 26). Since China’s rise has been achieved within the existing arrangements, it should not be difficult to understand that China has an interest in safeguarding them. There is a consensus among policy-makers in China that in order to modernize in the age of globalization, it is important for China to integrate itself with the rest of the world and to maintain the world order (Wang & James 2009: 11). This has been asserted by Chinese leaders several times on different occasions. In his national New Year speech in 2018, for instance, President Xi Jinping stated that China ‘always will be a builder of world peace, contributor of global development, and keeper of international order’ (Xinhua 2017b). Also, China’s Ambassador to the EU stated that by ‘the middle of this century’, China will be turned into a ‘great modern country that is strong, prosperous, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful’ and that for this end, it is of crucial importance for China to have a ‘peaceful and stable world, and to work with others with an open mind’ (Ming 2018).However, it is also clear that China, together with partners from the developing world, perceives several aspects of the existing arrangements of the international order as instruments of Western dominance, and with the shift in the global distribution of power wants to make more inclusive and egalitarian these arrangements that currently marginalize the interests of those countries that were absent during their creation after WWII. At a study session of the politburo of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee (CPCC) in 2016, President Xi Jinping underlined that as the ‘international balance of power has shifted and global challenges are increasing, global governance system reform has emerged as a trend of the times’, and that China must take the ‘chance and ride the wave to make the international order more reasonable and just to protect the common interests of China and other developing countries’ (Xinhua 2016). The main argument of this chapter is that China has a fundamental interest in maintaining the existing arrangements of world order and that at the same time is engaged in order‐reforming activities, seeking to enhance the legitimacy of the existing arrangements of the international system at a time of global power shift (Chen 2016a: 780). Furthermore, following Chen (2016b), we argue that China follows two basic strategies in its order-reforming activities: ‘reform from inside’ and ‘reform from outside’. Focusing on international security, this chapter argues that China’s revitalization will have a fundamental impact on the future of global security governance, and that the future relationship, both bilaterally and multilaterally, between China, the US, and the EU, on international security will be of key importance in this regard.This chapter is organized as follows. First, it deals with China’s bilateral relationship with the US and with the EU on international security, respectively. Second, it looks at the US-EU relationship from a Chinese perspective, and how the dynamics in the transatlantic relationship impact the perception China has of these major actors in its own foreign and security policy. Third, it discusses the triangular relationship between China, the US, and the EU, and how this relationship impacts the evolution of global governance. Finally, the concluding section argues that in an era of US withdrawal from its traditional global leadership role, the China-EU relationship, which is one of the most comprehensive partnerships between two major powers, has the potential to become the most potent force for preventing the fragmentation of the global governance architecture.
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powers to advance their autonomy, their ability to do so was very much constrained by the level of tensions between the great powers. It was only during periods with low tensions that the small powers could pursue the desired policies of neutrality and bridge building, while during periods with high tensions, they had to prioritize their immediate security concerns and thus seek protection from one great power to deter another one, or in the absence of a protective great power, to accommodate the threatening great power. The model developed and its ability to explain the behavior of these countries towards the regional great powers offers an original contribution to the realist understanding of small power behavior.
Books by Ciwan M. Can
China’s economic revitalization has been followed by an increasing role and influence on issues related to international security, as its significant involvement in the Iranian and North Korean nuclear crises, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), and the fight against climate change and other regional and global traditional and non-traditional security issues reveal. China has shifted the focus of its foreign policy from emphasizing the principle of ‘concealing one’s capabilities and biding one’s time’ during the early years of its modernization, to stressing the principle of ‘making a modest contribution’ (Wang & Song 2016: 3), and more recently, as President Xi Jinping has emphasized, to taking a place at the center stage of international politics and striving for the achievement of a ‘community of common destiny for humankind’ (Mardell 2017). There is a growing literature on the ‘China threat’, and theories of ‘hegemonic transition’ and the ‘Thucydides trap’, which argue that war is a most likely outcome when a rising power displaces a ruling power, have been applied to predict the impact China’s continuous revitalization will have on international relations (Allison 2017). Whether China’s continuous revitalization will lead to an intense security competition and great power struggle with the US, a great power war between them, or whether China’s revitalization is a threat to the liberal international order in general, have become central topics in the study of international relations. According to Chen, world order can be defined as a set of sustainable arrangements in the international system to allow political entities, and the peoples within them, to enjoy a meaningful level of peace, welfare, and justice (Chen 2016a: 776). Kissinger further argues that the arrangements of world order are based on two fundamental components: (i) a balance of power and (ii) a consensus on the legitimacy of the existing arrangements (Kissinger 2014: 26). Since China’s rise has been achieved within the existing arrangements, it should not be difficult to understand that China has an interest in safeguarding them. There is a consensus among policy-makers in China that in order to modernize in the age of globalization, it is important for China to integrate itself with the rest of the world and to maintain the world order (Wang & James 2009: 11). This has been asserted by Chinese leaders several times on different occasions. In his national New Year speech in 2018, for instance, President Xi Jinping stated that China ‘always will be a builder of world peace, contributor of global development, and keeper of international order’ (Xinhua 2017b). Also, China’s Ambassador to the EU stated that by ‘the middle of this century’, China will be turned into a ‘great modern country that is strong, prosperous, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful’ and that for this end, it is of crucial importance for China to have a ‘peaceful and stable world, and to work with others with an open mind’ (Ming 2018).However, it is also clear that China, together with partners from the developing world, perceives several aspects of the existing arrangements of the international order as instruments of Western dominance, and with the shift in the global distribution of power wants to make more inclusive and egalitarian these arrangements that currently marginalize the interests of those countries that were absent during their creation after WWII. At a study session of the politburo of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee (CPCC) in 2016, President Xi Jinping underlined that as the ‘international balance of power has shifted and global challenges are increasing, global governance system reform has emerged as a trend of the times’, and that China must take the ‘chance and ride the wave to make the international order more reasonable and just to protect the common interests of China and other developing countries’ (Xinhua 2016). The main argument of this chapter is that China has a fundamental interest in maintaining the existing arrangements of world order and that at the same time is engaged in order‐reforming activities, seeking to enhance the legitimacy of the existing arrangements of the international system at a time of global power shift (Chen 2016a: 780). Furthermore, following Chen (2016b), we argue that China follows two basic strategies in its order-reforming activities: ‘reform from inside’ and ‘reform from outside’. Focusing on international security, this chapter argues that China’s revitalization will have a fundamental impact on the future of global security governance, and that the future relationship, both bilaterally and multilaterally, between China, the US, and the EU, on international security will be of key importance in this regard.This chapter is organized as follows. First, it deals with China’s bilateral relationship with the US and with the EU on international security, respectively. Second, it looks at the US-EU relationship from a Chinese perspective, and how the dynamics in the transatlantic relationship impact the perception China has of these major actors in its own foreign and security policy. Third, it discusses the triangular relationship between China, the US, and the EU, and how this relationship impacts the evolution of global governance. Finally, the concluding section argues that in an era of US withdrawal from its traditional global leadership role, the China-EU relationship, which is one of the most comprehensive partnerships between two major powers, has the potential to become the most potent force for preventing the fragmentation of the global governance architecture.
powers to advance their autonomy, their ability to do so was very much constrained by the level of tensions between the great powers. It was only during periods with low tensions that the small powers could pursue the desired policies of neutrality and bridge building, while during periods with high tensions, they had to prioritize their immediate security concerns and thus seek protection from one great power to deter another one, or in the absence of a protective great power, to accommodate the threatening great power. The model developed and its ability to explain the behavior of these countries towards the regional great powers offers an original contribution to the realist understanding of small power behavior.
China’s economic revitalization has been followed by an increasing role and influence on issues related to international security, as its significant involvement in the Iranian and North Korean nuclear crises, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), and the fight against climate change and other regional and global traditional and non-traditional security issues reveal. China has shifted the focus of its foreign policy from emphasizing the principle of ‘concealing one’s capabilities and biding one’s time’ during the early years of its modernization, to stressing the principle of ‘making a modest contribution’ (Wang & Song 2016: 3), and more recently, as President Xi Jinping has emphasized, to taking a place at the center stage of international politics and striving for the achievement of a ‘community of common destiny for humankind’ (Mardell 2017). There is a growing literature on the ‘China threat’, and theories of ‘hegemonic transition’ and the ‘Thucydides trap’, which argue that war is a most likely outcome when a rising power displaces a ruling power, have been applied to predict the impact China’s continuous revitalization will have on international relations (Allison 2017). Whether China’s continuous revitalization will lead to an intense security competition and great power struggle with the US, a great power war between them, or whether China’s revitalization is a threat to the liberal international order in general, have become central topics in the study of international relations. According to Chen, world order can be defined as a set of sustainable arrangements in the international system to allow political entities, and the peoples within them, to enjoy a meaningful level of peace, welfare, and justice (Chen 2016a: 776). Kissinger further argues that the arrangements of world order are based on two fundamental components: (i) a balance of power and (ii) a consensus on the legitimacy of the existing arrangements (Kissinger 2014: 26). Since China’s rise has been achieved within the existing arrangements, it should not be difficult to understand that China has an interest in safeguarding them. There is a consensus among policy-makers in China that in order to modernize in the age of globalization, it is important for China to integrate itself with the rest of the world and to maintain the world order (Wang & James 2009: 11). This has been asserted by Chinese leaders several times on different occasions. In his national New Year speech in 2018, for instance, President Xi Jinping stated that China ‘always will be a builder of world peace, contributor of global development, and keeper of international order’ (Xinhua 2017b). Also, China’s Ambassador to the EU stated that by ‘the middle of this century’, China will be turned into a ‘great modern country that is strong, prosperous, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful’ and that for this end, it is of crucial importance for China to have a ‘peaceful and stable world, and to work with others with an open mind’ (Ming 2018).However, it is also clear that China, together with partners from the developing world, perceives several aspects of the existing arrangements of the international order as instruments of Western dominance, and with the shift in the global distribution of power wants to make more inclusive and egalitarian these arrangements that currently marginalize the interests of those countries that were absent during their creation after WWII. At a study session of the politburo of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee (CPCC) in 2016, President Xi Jinping underlined that as the ‘international balance of power has shifted and global challenges are increasing, global governance system reform has emerged as a trend of the times’, and that China must take the ‘chance and ride the wave to make the international order more reasonable and just to protect the common interests of China and other developing countries’ (Xinhua 2016). The main argument of this chapter is that China has a fundamental interest in maintaining the existing arrangements of world order and that at the same time is engaged in order‐reforming activities, seeking to enhance the legitimacy of the existing arrangements of the international system at a time of global power shift (Chen 2016a: 780). Furthermore, following Chen (2016b), we argue that China follows two basic strategies in its order-reforming activities: ‘reform from inside’ and ‘reform from outside’. Focusing on international security, this chapter argues that China’s revitalization will have a fundamental impact on the future of global security governance, and that the future relationship, both bilaterally and multilaterally, between China, the US, and the EU, on international security will be of key importance in this regard.This chapter is organized as follows. First, it deals with China’s bilateral relationship with the US and with the EU on international security, respectively. Second, it looks at the US-EU relationship from a Chinese perspective, and how the dynamics in the transatlantic relationship impact the perception China has of these major actors in its own foreign and security policy. Third, it discusses the triangular relationship between China, the US, and the EU, and how this relationship impacts the evolution of global governance. Finally, the concluding section argues that in an era of US withdrawal from its traditional global leadership role, the China-EU relationship, which is one of the most comprehensive partnerships between two major powers, has the potential to become the most potent force for preventing the fragmentation of the global governance architecture.