Malayang Samahan
Malayang Samahan
Malayang Samahan
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to annul the decision of
the National Labor Relations Commission in an unfair labor practice case instituted by a local union
against its employer company and the officers of its national federation.
The petitioner, Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield, Inc., (B) (MSMG),
hereinafter referred to as the "local union", is an affiliate of the private respondent, United Lumber
and General Workers of the Philippines (ULGWP), referred to as the "federation". The collective
bargaining agreement between MSMG and M. Greenfield, Inc., names the parties as follows:
-and-
Sec. 1. Coverage andope. All employees who are covered by this Agreement and presently members
of the UNION shall remain members of the UNION for the duration of this Agreement as a condition
precedent to continued employment with the COMPANY.
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Sec. 4. Dismissal. Any such employee mentioned in Section 2 hereof, who fails to maintain his
membership in the UNION for non-payment of UNION dues, for resignation and for violation of
UNION's Constitution and By-Laws and any new employee as defined in Section 2 of this Article shall
upon written notice of such failure to join or to maintain membership in the UNION and upon written
recommendation to the COMPANY by the UNION, be dismissed from the employment by the
COMPANY; provided, however, that the UNION shall hold the COMPANY free and blameless from any
and all liabilities that may arise should the dismissed employee question, in any manner, his
dismissal; provided, further that the matter of the employee's dismissal under this Article may be
submitted as a grievance under Article XIII and, provided, finally, that no such written
recommendation shall be made upon the COMPANY nor shall COMPANY be compelled to act upon any
such recommendation within the period of sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of this Agreement
conformably to law.
Art. IX
Sec. 4. Program Fund The Company shall provide the amount of P10,000.00 a month for a continuing
labor education program which shall be remitted to the Federation . . . 2
On September 12, 1986, a local union election was held under the auspices of the ULGWP wherein the
herein petitioner, Beda Magdalena Villanueva, and the other union officers were proclaimed as
winners. Minutes of the said election were duly filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations on September
29, 1986.
On March 21, 1987, a Petition for Impeachment was filed with the national federation ULGWP by the
defeated candidates in the aforementioned election.
On June 16, 1987, the federation conducted an audit of the local union funds. The investigation did
not yield any unfavorable result and the local union officers were cleared of the charges of anomaly in
the custody, handling and disposition of the union funds.
The 14 defeated candidates filed a Petition for Impeachment/Expulsion of the local union officers with
the DOLE NCR on November 5, 1987, docketed as NCR-OD-M-11-780-87. However, the same was
dismissed on March 2, 1988, by Med-Arbiter Renato Parungo for failure to substantiate the charges
and to present evidence in support of the allegations.
On April 17, 1988, the local union held a general membership meeting at the Caruncho Complex in
Pasig. Several union members failed to attend the meeting, prompting the Executive Board to create a
committee tasked to investigate the non-attendance of several union members in the said assembly,
pursuant to Sections 4 and 5, Article V of the Constitution and By-Laws of the union, which read:
Seksyon 4. Ang mga kinukusang hindi pagdalo o hindi paglahok sa lahat ng hakbangin ng unyon ng
sinumang kasapi o pinuno ay maaaring maging sanhi ng pagtitiwalag o pagpapataw ng multa ng hindi
hihigit sa P50.00 sa bawat araw na nagkulang.
Seksyon 5. Ang sinumang dadalo na aalis ng hindi pa natatapos ang pulong ay ituturing na pagliban at
maparusahan itong alinsunod sa Article V, Seksyong 4 ng Saligang Batas na ito. Sino mang kasapi o
pisyales na mahuli and dating sa takdang oras ng di lalampas sa isang oras ay magmumulta ng
P25.00 at babawasin sa sahod sa pamamagitan ng salary deduction at higit sa isang oras ng
pagdating ng huli ay ituturing na pagliban.3
On June 27, 1988, the local union wrote respondent company a letter requesting it to deduct the
union fines from the wages/salaries of those union members who failed to attend the general
membership meeting. A portion of the said letter stated:
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In connection with Section 4 Article II of our existing Collective Bargaining Agreement, please deduct
the amount of P50.00 from each of the union members named in said annexes on the payroll of July
2-8, 1988 as fine for their failure to attend said general membership meeting. 4
In a Memorandum dated July 3, 1988, the Secretary General of the national federation, Godofredo
Paceño, Jr. disapproved the resolution of the local union imposing the P50.00 fine. The union officers
protested such action by the Federation in a Reply dated July 4, 1988.
On July 11, 1988, the Federation wrote respondent company a letter advising the latter not to deduct
the fifty-peso fine from the salaries of the union members requesting that:
. . . any and all future representations by MSMG affecting a number of members be first cleared from
the federation before corresponding action by the Company. 5
The following day, respondent company sent a reply to petitioner union's request in a letter, stating
that it cannot deduct fines from the employees' salary without going against certain laws. The
company suggested that the union refer the matter to the proper government office for resolution in
order to avoid placing the company in the middle of the issue.
The imposition of P50.00 fine became the subject of bitter disagreement between the Federation and
the local union culminating in the latter's declaration of general autonomy from the former through
Resolution No. 10 passed by the local executive board and ratified by the general membership on July
16, 1988.
In retaliation, the national federation asked respondent company to stop the remittance of the local
union's share in the education funds effective August 1988. This was objected to by the local union
which demanded that the education fund be remitted to it in full.
The company was thus constrained to file a Complaint for Interpleader with a Petition for Declaratory
Relief with the Med-Arbitration Branch of the Department of Labor and Employment, docketed as Case
No. OD-M-8-435-88. This was resolved on October 28, 1988, by Med-Arbiter Anastacio Bactin in an
Order, disposing thus:
1. That the United Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines (ULGWP) through its local union
officers shall administer the collective bargaining agreement (CBA).
2. That petitioner company shall remit the P10,000.00 monthly labor education program fund to the
ULGWP subject to the condition that it shall use the said amount for its intended purpose.
3. That the Treasurer of the MSMG shall be authorized to collect from the 356 union members the
amount of P50.00 as penalty for their failure to attend the general membership assembly on April 17,
1988.
However, if the MSMG Officers could present the individual written authorizations of the 356 union
members, then the company is obliged to deduct from the salaries of the 356 union members the
P50.00 fine.6
On appeal, Director Pura-Ferrer Calleja issued a Resolution dated February 7, 1989, which modified in
part the earlier disposition, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed portion is hereby modified to the extent that the
company should remit the amount of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) of the P10,000.00 monthly
labor education program fund to ULGWP and the other P5,000.00 to MSMG, both unions to use the
same for its intended purpose.7
Meanwhile, on September 2, 1988, several local unions (Top Form, M. Greenfield, Grosby, Triumph
International, General Milling, and Vander Hons chapters) filed a Petition for Audit and Examination of
the federation and education funds of ULGWP which was granted by Med-Arbiter Rasidali Abdullah on
December 25, 1988 in an Order which directed the audit and examination of the books of account of
ULGWP.
On September 30, 1988, the officials of ULGWP called a Special National Executive Board Meeting at
Nasipit, Agusan del Norte where a Resolution was passed placing the MSMG under trusteeship and
appointing respondent Cesar Clarete as administrator.
On October 27, 1988, the said administrator wrote the respondent company informing the latter of its
designation of a certain Alfredo Kalingking as local union president and "disauthorizing" the incumbent
union officers from representing the employees. This action by the national federation was protested
by the petitioners in a letter to respondent company dated November 11, 1988.
On November 13, 1988, the petitioner union officers received identical letters from the administrator
requiring them to explain within 72 hours why they should not be removed from their office and
expelled from union membership.
(a) Questioning the validity of the alleged National Executive Board Resolution placing their union
under trusteeship;
(b) Justifying the action of their union in declaring a general autonomy from ULGWP due to the latter's
inability to give proper educational, organizational and legal services to its affiliates and the pendency
of the audit of the federation funds;
(c) Advising that their union did not commit any act of disloyalty as it has remained an affiliate of
ULGWP;
(d) Giving ULGWP a period of five (5) days to cease and desist from further committing acts of
coercion, intimidation and harassment.8
However, as early as November 21, 1988, the officers were expelled from the ULGWP. The termination
letter read:
Effective today, November 21, 1988, you are hereby expelled from UNITED LUMBER AND GENERAL
WORKERS OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULGWP) for committing acts of disloyalty and/or acts inimical to the
interest and violative to the Constitution and by-laws of your federation.
You failed and/or refused to offer an explanation inspite of the time granted to you.
Since you are no longer a member of good standing, ULGWP is constrained to recommend for your
termination from your employment, and provided in Article II Section 4, known as UNION SECURITY,
in the Collective Bargaining agreement.9
On the same day, the federation advised respondent company of the expulsion of the 30 union officers
and demanded their separation from employment pursuant to the Union Security Clause in their
collective bargaining agreement. This demand was reiterated twice, through letters dated February 21
and March 4, 1989, respectively, to respondent company.
Thereafter, the Federation filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to
compel the company to effect the immediate termination of the expelled union officers.
On March 7, 1989, under the pressure of a threatened strike, respondent company terminated the 30
union officers from employment, serving them identical copies of the termination letter reproduced
below:
We received a demand letter dated 21 November 1988 from the United Lumber and General Workers
of the Philippines (ULGWP) demanding for your dismissal from employment pursuant to the provisions
of Article II, Section 4 of the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). In the said demand
letter, ULGWP informed us that as of November 21, 1988, you were expelled from the said federation
"for committing acts of disloyalty and/or acts inimical to the interest of ULGWP and violative to its
Constitution and By-laws particularly Article V, Section 6, 9, and 12, Article XIII, Section 8.
In subsequent letters dated 21 February and 4 March 1989, the ULGWP reiterated its demand for your
dismissal, pointing out that notwithstanding your expulsion from the federation, you have continued in
your employment with the company in violation of Sec. 1 and 4 of Article II of our CBA, and of existing
provisions of law.
In view thereof, we are left with no alternative but to comply with the provisions of the Union Security
Clause of our CBA. Accordingly, we hereby serve notice upon you that we are dismissing you from
your employment with M. Greenfield, Inc., pursuant to Sections 1 and 4, Article II of the CBA effective
immediately.10
On that same day, the expelled union officers assigned in the first shift were physically or bodily
brought out of the company premises by the company's security guards. Likewise, those assigned to
the second shift were not allowed to report for work. This provoked some of the members of the local
union to demonstrate their protest for the dismissal of the said union officers. Some union members
left their work posts and walked out of the company premises.
On the other hand, the Federation, having achieved its objective, withdrew the Notice of Strike filed
with the NCMB.
On March 8, 1989, the petitioners filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB, DOLE, Manila, docketed as
Case No. NCMB-NCR-NS-03-216-89, alleging the following grounds for the strike:
(a) Discrimination
The following day, March 9, 1989, a strike vote referendum was conducted and out of 2, 103 union
members who cast their votes, 2,086 members voted to declare a strike.
On March 10, 1989, the thirty (30) dismissed union officers filed an urgent petition, docketed as Case
No. NCMB-NCR-NS-03-216-89, with the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment praying for the suspension of the effects of their termination from employment. However,
the petition was dismissed by then Secretary Franklin Drilon on April 11, 1989, the pertinent portion of
which stated as follows:
At this point in time, it is clear that the dispute at M. Greenfield is purely an intra-union matter. No
mass lay-off is evident as the terminations have been limited to those allegedly leading the
secessionist group leaving MSMG-ULGWP to form a union under the KMU. . . .
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WHEREFORE, finding no sufficient jurisdiction to warrant the exercise of our extraordinary authority
under Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.11
On March 13 and 14, 1989, a total of 78 union shop stewards were placed under preventive
suspension by respondent company. This prompted the union members to again stage a walk-out and
resulted in the official declaration of strike at around 3:30 in the afternoon of March 14, 1989. The
strike was attended with violence, force and intimidation on both sides resulting to physical injuries to
several employees, both striking and non-striking, and damage to company properties.
The employees who participated in the strike and allegedly figured in the violent incident were placed
under preventive suspension by respondent company. The company also sent return-to-work notices
to the home addresses of the striking employees thrice successively, on March 27, April 8 and April
31, 1989, respectively. However, respondent company admitted that only 261 employees were
eventually accepted back to work. Those who did not respond to the return-to-work notice were sent
termination letters dated May 17, 1989, reproduced below:
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On March 14, 1989, without justifiable cause and without due notice, you left your work assignment at
the prejudice of the Company's operations. On March 27, April 11, and April 21, 1989, we sent you
notices to report to the Company. Inspite of your receipt of said notices, we have not heard from you
up to this date.
Accordingly, for your failure to report, it is construed that you have effectively abandoned your
employment and the Company is, therefore, constrained to dismiss you for said cause.
By:
On August 7, 1989, the petitioners filed a verified complaint with the Arbitration Branch, National
Capital Region, DOLE, Manila, docketed as Case No. NCR-00-09-04199-89, charging private
respondents of unfair labor practice which consists of union busting, illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension, interference in union activities, discrimination, threats, intimidation, coercion, violence,
and oppression.
After the filing of the complaint, the lease contracts on the respondent company's office and factory at
Merville Subdivision, Parañaque expired and were not renewed. Upon demand of the owners of the
premises, the company was compelled to vacate its office and factory.
Thereafter, the company transferred its administration and account/client servicing department at
AFP-RSBS Industrial Park in Taguig, Metro Manila. For failure to find a suitable place in Metro Manila
for relocation of its factory and manufacturing operations, the company was constrained to move the
said departments to Tacloban, Leyte. Hence, on April 16, 1990, respondent company accordingly
notified its employees of a temporary shutdown in operations. Employees who were interested in
relocating to Tacloban were advised to enlist on or before April 23, 1990.
The complaint for unfair labor practice was assigned to Labor Arbiter Manuel Asuncion but was
thereafter reassigned to Labor Arbiter Cresencio Ramos when respondents moved to inhibit him from
acting on the case.
On December 15, 1992, finding the termination to be valid in compliance with the union security
clause of the collective bargaining agreement, Labor Arbiter Cresencio Ramos dismissed the
complaint.
Petitioners then appealed to the NLRC. During its pendency, Commissioner Romeo Putong retired from
the service, leaving only two commissioners, Commissioner Vicente Veloso III and Hon. Chairman
Bartolome Carale in the First Division. When Commissioner Veloso inhibited himself from the case,
Commissioner Joaquin Tanodra of the Third Division was temporarily designated to sit in the First
Division for the proper disposition of the case.
The First Division affirmed the Labor Arbiter's disposition. With the denial of their motion for
reconsideration on January 28, 1994, petitioners elevated the case to this Court, attributing grave
abuse of discretion to public respondent NLRC in:
I. UPHOLDING THE DISMISSAL OF THE UNION OFFICERS BY RESPONDENT COMPANY AS VALID;
III. HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONER EMPLOYEES WERE DEEMED TO HAVE ABANDONED THEIR WORK
AND HENCE, VALIDLY DISMISSED BY RESPONDENT COMPANY; AND
IV. NOT FINDING RESPONDENT COMPANY AND RESPONDENT FEDERATION OFFICERS GUILTY OF
ACTS OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE.
Notwithstanding the several issues raised by the petitioners and respondents in the voluminous
pleadings presented before the NLRC and this Court, they revolve around and proceed from the issue
of whether or not respondent company was justified in dismissing petitioner employees merely upon
the labor federation's demand for the enforcement of the union security clause embodied in their
collective bargaining agreement.
Before delving into the main issue, the procedural flaw pointed out by the petitioners should first be
resolved.
Petitioners contend that the decision rendered by the First Division of the NLRC is not valid because
Commissioner Tanodra, who is from the Third Division, did not have any lawful authority to sit, much
less write the ponencia, on a case pending before the First Division. It is claimed that a commissioner
from one division of the NLRC cannot be assigned or temporarily designated to another division
because each division is assigned a particular territorial jurisdiction. Thus, the decision rendered did
not have any legal effect at all for being irregularly issued.
Petitioners' argument is misplaced. Article 213 of the Labor Code in enumerating the powers of the
Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission provides that:
The concurrence of two (2) Commissioners of a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a
judgment or resolution. Whenever the required membership in a division is not complete and the
concurrence of two (2) commissioners to arrive at a judgment or resolution cannot be obtained, the
Chairman shall designate such number of additional Commissioners from the other divisions as may
be necessary.
It must be remembered that during the pendency of the case in the First Division of the NLRC, one of
the three commissioners, Commissioner Romeo Putong, retired, leaving Chairman Bartolome Carale
and Commissioner Vicente Veloso III. Subsequently, Commissioner Veloso inhibited himself from the
case because the counsel for the petitioners was his former classmate in law school. The First Division
was thus left with only one commissioner. Since the law requires the concurrence of two
commissioners to arrive at a judgment or resolution, the Commission was constrained to temporarily
designate a commissioner from another division to complete the First Division. There is nothing
irregular at all in such a temporary designation for the law empowers the Chairman to make
temporary assignments whenever the required concurrence is not met. The law does not say that a
commissioner from the first division cannot be temporarily assigned to the second or third division to
fill the gap or vice versa. The territorial divisions do not confer exclusive jurisdiction to each division
and are merely designed for administrative efficiency.
Going into the merits of the case, the court finds that the Complaint for unfair labor practice filed by
the petitioners against respondent company which charges union busting, illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension, interference in union activities, discrimination, threats, intimidation, coercion, violence,
and oppression actually proceeds from one main issue which is the termination of several employees
by respondent company upon the demand of the labor federation pursuant to the union security
clause embodied in their collective bargaining agreement.
Petitioners contend that their dismissal from work was effected in an arbitrary, hasty, capricious and
illegal manner because it was undertaken by the respondent company without any prior administrative
investigation; that, had respondent company conducted prior independent investigation it would have
found that their expulsion from the union was unlawful similarly for lack of prior administrative
investigation; that the federation cannot recommend the dismissal of the union officers because it was
not a principal party to the collective bargaining agreement between the company and the union; that
public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion when they declared petitioners' dismissals as
valid and the union strike as illegal and in not declaring that respondents were guilty of unfair labor
practice.
Private respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the thirty dismissed employees who were
former officers of the federation have no cause of action against the company, the termination of their
employment having been made upon the demand of the federation pursuant to the union security
clause of the CBA; the expelled officers of the local union were accorded due process of law prior to
their expulsion from their federation; that the strike conducted by the petitioners was illegal for
noncompliance with the requirements; that the employees who participated in the illegal strike and in
the commission of violence thereof were validly terminated from work; that petitioners were deemed
to have abandoned their employment when they did not respond to the three return to work notices
sent to them; that petitioner labor union has no legal personality to file and prosecute the case for and
on behalf of the individual employees as the right to do so is personal to the latter; and that, the
officers of respondent company cannot be liable because as mere corporate officers, they acted within
the scope of their authority.
Public respondent, through the Labor Arbiter, ruled that the dismissed union officers were validly and
legally terminated because the dismissal was effected in compliance with the union security clause of
the CBA which is the law between the parties. And this was affirmed by the Commission on appeal.
Moreover, the Labor Arbiter declared that notwithstanding the lack of a prior administrative
investigation by respondent company, under the union security clause provision in the CBA, the
company cannot look into the legality or illegality of the recommendation to dismiss by the union nd
the obligation to dismiss is ministerial on the part of the company. 13
This ruling of the NLRC is erroneous. Although this Court has ruled that union security clauses
embodied in the collective bargaining agreement may be validly enforced and that dismissals pursuant
thereto may likewise be valid, this does not erode the fundamental requirement of due process. The
reason behind the enforcement of union security clauses which is the sanctity and inviolability of
contracts14 cannot override one's right to due process.
In the case of Cariño vs. National Labor Relations Commission,15 this Court pronounced that while the
company, under a maintenance of membership provision of the collective bargaining agreement, is
bound to dismiss any employee expelled by the union for disloyalty upon its written request, this
undertaking should not be done hastily and summarily. The company acts in bad faith in dismissing a
worker without giving him the benefit of a hearing.
The power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of the employer. However, this is not without limitation.
The employer is bound to exercise caution in terminating the services of his employees especially so
when it is made upon the request of a labor union pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement, . .
. Dismissals must not be arbitrary and capricious. Due process must be observed in dismissing an
employee because it affects not only his position but also his means of livelihood. Employers should
respect and protect the rights of their employees, which include the right to labor.
In the case under scrutiny, petitioner union officers were expelled by the federation for allegedly
committing acts of disloyalty and/or inimical to the interest of ULGWP and in violation of its
Constitution and By-laws. Upon demand of the federation, the company terminated the petitioners
without conducting a separate and independent investigation. Respondent company did not inquire
into the cause of the expulsion and whether or not the federation had sufficient grounds to effect the
same. Relying merely upon the federation's allegations, respondent company terminated petitioners
from employment when a separate inquiry could have revealed if the federation had acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in expelling the union officers. Respondent company's allegation that petitioners were
accorded due process is belied by the termination letters received by the petitioners which state that
the dismissal shall be immediately effective.
As held in the aforecited case of Cariño, "the right of an employee to be informed of the charges
against him and to reasonable opportunity to present his side in a controversy with either the
company or his own union is not wiped away by a union security clause or a union shop clause in a
collective bargaining agreement. An employee is entitled to be protected not only from a company
which disregards his rights but also from his own union the leadership of which could yield to the
temptation of swift and arbitrary expulsion from membership and mere dismissal from his job.
While respondent company may validly dismiss the employees expelled by the union for disloyalty
under the union security clause of the collective bargaining agreement upon the recommendation by
the union, this dismissal should not be done hastily and summarily thereby eroding the employees'
right to due process, self-organization and security of tenure. The enforcement of union security
clauses is authorized by law provided such enforcement is not characterized by arbitrariness, and
always with due process.16 Even on the assumption that the federation had valid grounds to expel the
union officers, due process requires that these union officers be accorded a separate hearing by
respondent company.
In its decision, public respondent also declared that if complainants (herein petitioners) have any
recourse in law, their right of action is against the federation and not against the company or its
officers, relying on the findings of the Labor Secretary that the issue of expulsion of petitioner union
officers by the federation is a purely intra-union matter.
Again, such a contention is untenable. While it is true that the issue of expulsion of the local union
officers is originally between the local union and the federation, hence, intra-union in character, the
issue was later on converted into a termination dispute when the company dismissed the petitioners
from work without the benefit of a separate notice and hearing. As a matter of fact, the records reveal
that the termination was effective on the same day that the termination notice was served on the
petitioners.
In the case of Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union vs. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc.17, the Court held the
company liable for the payment of backwages for having acted in bad faith in effecting the dismissal of
the employees.
. . . Bad faith on the part of the respondent company may be gleaned from the fact that the petitioner
workers were dismissed hastily and summarily. At best, it was guilty of a tortious act, for which it
must assume solidary liability, since it apparently chose to summarily dismiss the workers at the
union's instance secure in the union's contractual undertaking that the union would hold it "free from
any liability" arising from such dismissal.
Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the dismissal was at the instance of the federation and that it
undertook to hold the company free from any liability resulting from such a dismissal, the company
may still be held liable if it was remiss in its duty to accord the would-be dismissed employees their
right to be heard on the matter.
Anent petitioners contention that the federation was not a principal party to the collective bargaining
agreement between the company and the union, suffice it to say that the matter was already ruled
upon in the Interpleader case filed by respondent company. Med-Arbiter Anastacio Bactin thus ruled:
After a careful examination of the facts and evidences presented by the parties, this Officer hereby
renders its decision as follows:
1.) It appears on record that in Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) which took effect on July 1,
1986, the contracting parties are M. Greenfield, Inc. (B) and Malayang Samahan ng Mga Manggagawa
sa M. Greenfield, Inc. (B) (MSMG)/United Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines (ULGWP).
However, MSMG was not yet registered labor organization at the time of the signing of the CBA.
Hence, the union referred to in the CBA is the ULGWP. 18
Likewise on appeal, Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja put the issue to rest as follows:
It is undisputed that ULGWP is the certified sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent of all the
regular rank-and-file workers of the company, M. Greenfield, Inc. (pages 31-32 of the records).
It has been established also that the company and ULGWP signed a 3-year collective bargaining
agreement effective July 1, 1986 up to June 30, 1989. 19
Although the issue of whether or not the federation had reasonable grounds to expel the petitioner
union officers is properly within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor Relations,
being an intra-union conflict, this Court deems it justifiable that such issue be nonetheless ruled upon,
as the Labor Arbiter did, for to remand the same to the Bureau of Labor Relations would be to
intolerably delay the case.
The Labor Arbiter found that petitioner union officers were justifiably expelled from the federation for
committing acts of disloyalty when it "undertook to disaffiliate from the federation by charging ULGWP
with failure to provide any legal, educational or organizational support to the local. . . . and declared
autonomy, wherein they prohibit the federation from interfering in any internal and external affairs of
the local union."20
It is well-settled that findings of facts of the NLRC are entitled to great respect and are generally
binding on this Court, but it is equally well-settled that the Court will not uphold erroneous conclusions
of the NLRC as when the Court finds insufficient or insubstantial evidence on record to support those
factual findings. The same holds true when it is perceived that far too much is concluded, inferred or
deduced from the bare or incomplete facts appearing of record. 21
In its decision, the Labor Arbiter declared that the act of disaffiliation and declaration of autonomy by
the local union was part of its "plan to take over the respondent federation." This is purely conjecture
and speculation on the part of public respondent, totally unsupported by the evidence.
A local union has the right to disaffiliate from its mother union or declare its autonomy. A local union,
being a separate and voluntary association, is free to serve the interests of all its members including
the freedom to disaffiliate or declare its autonomy from the federation to which it belongs when
circumstances warrant, in accordance with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association. 22
. . . is to increase by collective action the bargaining power in respect of the terms and conditions of
labor. Yet the locals remained the basic units of association, free to serve their own and the common
interest of all, subject to the restraints imposed by the Constitution and By-Laws of the Association,
and free also to renounce the affiliation for mutual welfare upon the terms laid down in the agreement
which brought it into existence.23
Thus, a local union which has affiliated itself with a federation is free to sever such affiliation anytime
and such disaffiliation cannot be considered disloyalty. In the absence of specific provisions in the
federation's constitution prohibiting disaffiliation or the declaration of autonomy of a local union, a
local may dissociate with its parent union.24
The evidence on hand does not show that there is such a provision in ULGWP's constitution.
Respondents' reliance upon Article V, Section 6, of the federation's constitution is not right because
said section, in fact, bolsters the petitioner union's claim of its right to declare autonomy:
Sec. 6. The autonomy of a local union affiliated with ULGWP shall be respected insofar as it pertains to
its internal affairs, except as provided elsewhere in this Constitution.
There is no disloyalty to speak of, neither is there any violation of the federation's constitution
because there is nothing in the said constitution which specifically prohibits disaffiliation or declaration
of autonomy. Hence, there cannot be any valid dismissal because Article II, Section 4 of the union
security clause in the CBA limits the dismissal to only three (3) grounds, to wit: failure to maintain
membership in the union (1) for non-payment of union dues, (2) for resignation; and (3) for violation
of the union's Constitution and By-Laws.
To support the finding of disloyalty, the Labor Arbiter gave weight to the fact that on February 26,
1989, the petitioners declared as vacant all the responsible positions of ULGWP, filled these vacancies
through an election and filed a petition for the registration of UWP as a national federation. It should
be pointed out, however, that these occurred after the federation had already expelled the union
officers. The expulsion was effective November 21, 1988. Therefore, the act of establishing a different
federation, entirely separate from the federation which expelled them, is but a normal retaliatory
reaction to their expulsion.
With regard to the issue of the legality or illegality of the strike, the Labor Arbiter held that the strike
was illegal for the following reasons: (1) it was based on an intra-union dispute which cannot properly
be the subject of a strike, the right to strike being limited to cases of bargaining deadlocks and unfair
labor practice (2) it was made in violation of the "no strike, no lock-out" clause in the CBA, and (3) it
was attended with violence, force and intimidation upon the persons of the company officials, other
employees reporting for work and third persons having legitimate business with the company,
resulting to serious physical injuries to several employees and damage to company property.
On the submission that the strike was illegal for being grounded on a non-strikeable issue, that is, the
intra-union conflict between the federation and the local union, it bears reiterating that when
respondent company dismissed the union officers, the issue was transformed into a termination
dispute and brought respondent company into the picture. Petitioners believed in good faith that in
dismissing them upon request by the federation, respondent company was guilty of unfair labor
practice in that it violated the petitioner's right to self-organization. The strike was staged to protest
respondent company's act of dismissing the union officers. Even if the allegations of unfair labor
practice are subsequently found out to be untrue, the presumption of legality of the strike prevails. 25
Another reason why the Labor Arbiter declared the strike illegal is due to the existence of a no strike
no lockout provision in the CBA. Again, such a ruling is erroneous. A no strike, no lock out provision
can only be invoked when the strike is economic in nature, i.e. to force wage or other concessions
from the employer which he is not required by law to grant. 26 Such a provision cannot be used to
assail the legality of a strike which is grounded on unfair labor practice, as was the honest belief of
herein petitioners. Again, whether or not there was indeed unfair labor practice does not affect the
strike.
On the allegation of violence committed in the course of the strike, it must be remembered that the
Labor Arbiter and the Commission found that "the parties are agreed that there were violent
incidents . . . resulting to injuries to both sides, the union and management." 27 The evidence on record
show that the violence cannot be attributed to the striking employees alone for the company itself
employed hired men to pacify the strikers. With violence committed on both sides, the management
and the employees, such violence cannot be a ground for declaring the strike as illegal.
With respect to the dismissal of individual petitioners, the Labor Arbiter declared that their refusal to
heed respondent's recall to work notice is a clear indication that they were no longer interested in
continuing their employment and is deemed abandonment. It is admitted that three return to work
notices were sent by respondent company to the striking employees on March 27, April 11, and April
21, 1989 and that 261 employees who responded to the notice were admitted back to work.
However, jurisprudence holds that for abandonment of work to exist, it is essential (1) that the
employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable
reason; and (2) that there must have been a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship manifested by some overt acts. 28 Deliberate and unjustified refusal on the part of the
employee to go back to his work post amd resume his employment must be established. Absence
must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not
want to work anymore.29 And the burden of proof to show that there was unjustified refusal to go back
to work rests on the employer.
In the present case, respondents failed to prove that there was a clear intention on the part of the
striking employees to sever their employer-employee relationship. Although admittedly the company
sent three return to work notices to them, it has not been substantially proven that these notices were
actually sent and received by the employees. As a matter of fact, some employees deny that they
ever received such notices. Others alleged that they were refused entry to the company premises by
the security guards and were advised to secure a clearance from ULGWP and to sign a waiver. Some
employees who responded to the notice were allegedly told to wait for further notice from respondent
company as there was lack of work.
Furthermore, this Court has ruled that an employee who took steps to protest his lay-off cannot be
said to have abandoned his work.30 The filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with
the allegation of abandonment. In the case under consideration, the petitioners did, in fact, file a
complaint when they were refused reinstatement by respondent company.
Anent public respondent's finding that there was no unfair labor practice on the part of respondent
company and federation officers, the Court sustains the same. As earlier discussed, union security
clauses in collective bargaining agreements, if freely and voluntarily entered into, are valid and
binding. Corollary, dismissals pursuant to union security clauses are valid and legal subject only to the
requirement of due process, that is, notice and hearing prior to dismissal. Thus, the dismissal of an
employee by the company pursuant to a labor union's demand in accordance with a union security
agreement does not constitute unfair labor practice. 31
However, the dismissal was invalidated in this case because of respondent company's failure to accord
petitioners with due process, that is, notice and hearing prior to their termination. Also, said dismissal
was invalidated because the reason relied upon by respondent Federation was not valid. Nonetheless,
the dismissal still does not constitute unfair labor practice.
Lastly, the Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that respondent company officials cannot be held
personally liable for damages on account of the employees' dismissal because the employer
corporation has a personality separate and distinct from its officers who merely acted as its agents.
It has come to the attention of this Court that the 30-day prior notice requirement for the dismissal of
employees has been repeatedly violated and the sanction imposed for such violation enunciated
in Wenphil Corporation vs. NLRC32 has become an ineffective deterrent. Thus, the Court recently
promulgated a decision to reinforce and make more effective the requirement of notice and hearing, a
procedure that must be observed before termination of employment can be legally effected.
In Ruben Serrano vs. NLRC and Isetann Department Store (G.R. No. 117040, January 27, 2000), the
Court ruled that an employee who is dismissed, whether or not for just or authorized cause but
without prior notice of his termination, is entitled to full backwages from the time he was terminated
until the decision in his case becomes final, when the dismissal was for cause; and in case the
dismissal was without just or valid cause, the backwages shall be computed from the time of his
dismissal until his actual reinstatement. In the case at bar, where the requirement of notice and
hearing was not complied with, the aforecited doctrine laid down in the Serrano case applies.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in
Case No. NCR-00-09-04199-89 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the respondent company is hereby
ordered to immediately reinstate the petitioners to their respective positions. Should reinstatement be
not feasible, respondent company shall pay separation pay of one month salary for every year of
service. Since petitioners were terminated without the requisite written notice at least 30 days prior to
their termination, following the recent ruling in the case of Ruben Serrano vs. National Labor Relations
Commission and Isetann Department Store, the respondent company is hereby ordered to pay full
backwages to petitioner-employees while the Federation is also ordered to pay full backwages to
petitioner-union officers who were dismissed upon its instigation. Since the dismissal of petitioners
was without cause, backwages shall be computed from the time the herein petitioner employees and
union officers were dismissed until their actual reinstatement. Should reinstatement be not feasible,
their backwages shall be computed from the time petitioners were terminated until the finality of this
decision. Costs against the respondent company.
SO ORDERED.