Jump to content

Determinism

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(Redirected from Physical determinism)

Determinism is the philosophical view that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable.[1] Deterministic theories throughout the history of philosophy have developed from diverse and sometimes overlapping motives and considerations. Like eternalism, determinism focuses on particular events rather than the future as a concept. The opposite of determinism is indeterminism, or the view that events are not deterministically caused but rather occur due to chance. Determinism is often contrasted with free will, although some philosophers claim that the two are compatible.[2][3]

Historically, debates about determinism have involved many philosophical positions and given rise to multiple varieties or interpretations of determinism. One topic of debate concerns the scope of determined systems. Some philosophers have maintained that the entire universe is a single determinate system, while others identify more limited determinate systems. Another common debate topic is whether determinism and free will can coexist; compatibilism and incompatibilism represent the opposing sides of this debate.

Determinism should not be confused with the self-determination of human actions by reasons, motives, and desires. Determinism is about interactions which affect cognitive processes in people's lives.[4] It is about the cause and the result of what people have done. Cause and result are always bound together in cognitive processes. It assumes that if an observer has sufficient information about an object or human being, that such an observer might be able to predict every consequent move of that object or human being. Determinism rarely requires that perfect prediction be practically possible.

Varieties

[edit]

Determinism may commonly refer to any of the following viewpoints.

Causal

[edit]

Causal determinism, sometimes synonymous with historical determinism (a sort of path dependence), is "the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature."[5] However, it is a broad enough term to consider that:[6]

...One's deliberations, choices, and actions will often be necessary links in the causal chain that brings something about. In other words, even though our deliberations, choices, and actions are themselves determined like everything else, it is still the case, according to causal determinism, that the occurrence or existence of yet other things depends upon our deliberating, choosing and acting in a certain way.

Causal determinism proposes that there is an unbroken chain of prior occurrences stretching back to the origin of the universe. The relation between events and the origin of the universe may not be specified. Causal determinists believe that there is nothing in the universe that has no cause or is self-caused. Causal determinism has also been considered more generally as the idea that everything that happens or exists is caused by antecedent conditions.[7] In the case of nomological determinism, these conditions are considered events also, implying that the future is determined completely by preceding events—a combination of prior states of the universe and the laws of nature.[5] These conditions can also be considered metaphysical in origin (such as in the case of theological determinism).[6]

Many philosophical theories of determinism frame themselves with the idea that reality follows a sort of predetermined path.

Nomological

[edit]

Nomological determinism is the most common form of causal determinism and is generally synonymous with physical determinism. This is the notion that the past and the present dictate the future entirely and necessarily by rigid natural laws and that every occurrence inevitably results from prior events. Nomological determinism is sometimes illustrated by the thought experiment of Laplace's demon.[8] Although sometimes called scientific determinism, the term is a misnomer for nomological determinism.

Necessitarianism

[edit]

Necessitarianism is a metaphysical principle that denies all mere possibility and maintains that there is only one possible way for the world to exist. Leucippus claimed there are no uncaused events and that everything occurs for a reason and by necessity.[9]

Predeterminism

[edit]

Predeterminism is the idea that all events are determined in advance.[10][11] The concept is often argued by invoking causal determinism, implying that there is an unbroken chain of prior occurrences stretching back to the origin of the universe. In the case of predeterminism, this chain of events has been pre-established, and human actions cannot interfere with the outcomes of this pre-established chain.

Predeterminism can be categorized as a specific type of determinism when it is used to mean pre-established causal determinism.[10][12] It can also be used interchangeably with causal determinism—in the context of its capacity to determine future events.[10][13] However, predeterminism is often considered as independent of causal determinism.[14][15]

Biological

[edit]

The term predeterminism is also frequently used in the context of biology and heredity, in which case it represents a form of biological determinism, sometimes called genetic determinism.[16] Biological determinism is the idea that all human behaviors, beliefs, and desires are fixed by human genetic nature.

Friedrich Nietzsche explained that human beings are "determined" by their bodies and are subject to its passions, impulses, and instincts.[17]

Fatalism

[edit]

Fatalism is normally distinguished from determinism,[18] as a form of teleological determinism. Fatalism is the idea that everything is fated to happen, resulting in humans having no control over their future. Fate has arbitrary power, and does not necessarily follow any causal or deterministic laws.[7] Types of fatalism include hard theological determinism and the idea of predestination, where there is a God who determines all that humans will do. This may be accomplished through either foreknowledge of their actions, achieved through omniscience[19] or by predetermining their actions.[20]

Theological

[edit]

Theological determinism is a form of determinism that holds that all events that happen are either preordained (i.e., predestined) to happen by a monotheistic deity, or are destined to occur given its omniscience. Two forms of theological determinism exist, referred to as strong and weak theological determinism.[21]

Strong theological determinism is based on the concept of a creator deity dictating all events in history: "everything that happens has been predestined to happen by an omniscient, omnipotent divinity."[22]

Weak theological determinism is based on the concept of divine foreknowledge—"because God's omniscience is perfect, what God knows about the future will inevitably happen, which means, consequently, that the future is already fixed."[23] There exist slight variations on this categorization, however. Some claim either that theological determinism requires predestination of all events and outcomes by the divinity—i.e., they do not classify the weaker version as theological determinism unless libertarian free will is assumed to be denied as a consequence—or that the weaker version does not constitute theological determinism at all.[24]

With respect to free will, "theological determinism is the thesis that God exists and has infallible knowledge of all true propositions including propositions about our future actions," more minimal criteria designed to encapsulate all forms of theological determinism.[25]

Theological determinism can also be seen as a form of causal determinism, in which the antecedent conditions are the nature and will of God.[6] Some have asserted that Augustine of Hippo introduced theological determinism into Christianity in 412 CE, whereas all prior Christian authors supported free will against Stoic and Gnostic determinism.[26] However, there are many Biblical passages that seem to support the idea of some kind of theological determinism.

Adequate

[edit]

Adequate determinism is the idea, because of quantum decoherence, that quantum indeterminacy can be ignored for most macroscopic events. Random quantum events "average out" in the limit of large numbers of particles (where the laws of quantum mechanics asymptotically approach the laws of classical mechanics).[27] Stephen Hawking explains a similar idea: he says that the microscopic world of quantum mechanics is one of determined probabilities. That is, quantum effects rarely alter the predictions of classical mechanics, which are quite accurate (albeit still not perfectly certain) at larger scales.[28] Something as large as an animal cell, then, would be "adequately determined" (even in light of quantum indeterminacy).[citation needed]

Many-worlds

[edit]

The many-worlds interpretation accepts the linear causal sets of sequential events with adequate consistency yet also suggests constant forking of causal chains creating "multiple universes" to account for multiple outcomes from single events.[29] Meaning the causal set of events leading to the present are all valid yet appear as a singular linear time stream within a much broader unseen conic probability field of other outcomes that "split off" from the locally observed timeline. Under this model causal sets are still "consistent" yet not exclusive to singular iterated outcomes.

The interpretation sidesteps the exclusive retrospective causal chain problem of "could not have done otherwise" by suggesting "the other outcome does exist" in a set of parallel universe time streams that split off when the action occurred. This theory is sometimes described with the example of agent based choices but more involved models argue that recursive causal splitting occurs with all wave functions at play.[30] This model is highly contested with multiple objections from the scientific community.[31][32]

Philosophical varieties

[edit]

Nature/nurture controversy

[edit]

Although some of the above forms of determinism concern human behaviors and cognition, others frame themselves as an answer to the debate on nature and nurture. They will suggest that one factor will entirely determine behavior. As scientific understanding has grown, however, the strongest versions of these theories have been widely rejected as a single-cause fallacy.[33] In other words, the modern deterministic theories attempt to explain how the interaction of both nature and nurture is entirely predictable. The concept of heritability has been helpful in making this distinction.

Determinism and prediction

[edit]

Other "deterministic"[opinion] theories actually seek only to highlight the importance of a particular factor in predicting the future. These theories often use the factor as a sort of guide or constraint on the future. They need not suppose that complete knowledge of that one factor would allow the making of perfect predictions.

Structural

[edit]

Structural determinism is the philosophical view that actions, events, and processes are predicated on and determined by structural factors.[35] Given any particular structure or set of estimable components, it is a concept that emphasizes rational and predictable outcomes. Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela popularized the notion, writing that a living system's general order is maintained via a circular process of ongoing self-referral, and thus its organization and structure defines the changes it undergoes.[36] According to the authors, a system can undergo changes of state (alteration of structure without loss of identity) or disintegrations (alteration of structure with loss of identity). Such changes or disintegrations are not ascertained by the elements of the disturbing agent, as each disturbance will only trigger responses in the respective system, which in turn, are determined by each system's own structure.

On an individualistic level, what this means is that human beings as free and independent entities are triggered to react by external stimuli or change in circumstance. However, their own internal state and existing physical and mental capacities determine their responses to those triggers. On a much broader societal level, structural determinists believe that larger issues in the society—especially those pertaining to minorities and subjugated communities—are predominantly assessed through existing structural conditions, making change of prevailing conditions difficult, and sometimes outright impossible. For example, the concept has been applied to the politics of race in the United States of America and other Western countries such as the United Kingdom and Australia, with structural determinists lamenting structural factors for the prevalence of racism in these countries.[37] Additionally, Marxists have conceptualized the writings of Karl Marx within the context of structural determinism as well. For example, Louis Althusser, a structural Marxist, argues that the state, in its political, economic, and legal structures, reproduces the discourse of capitalism, in turn, allowing for the burgeoning of capitalistic structures.

Proponents of the notion highlight the usefulness of structural determinism to study complicated issues related to race and gender, as it highlights often gilded structural conditions that block meaningful change.[38] Critics call it too rigid, reductionist and inflexible. Additionally, they also criticize the notion for overemphasizing deterministic forces such as structure over the role of human agency and the ability of the people to act. These critics argue that politicians, academics, and social activists have the capability to bring about significant change despite stringent structural conditions.

With free will

[edit]

Philosophers have debated both the truth of determinism, and the truth of free will. This creates the four possible positions in the figure. Compatibilism refers to the view that free will is, in some sense, compatible with determinism. The three incompatibilist positions deny this possibility. The hard incompatibilists hold that free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, the libertarians that determinism does not hold, and free will might exist, and the hard determinists that determinism does hold and free will does not exist. The Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza was a determinist thinker, and argued that human freedom can be achieved through knowledge of the causes that determine desire and affections. He defined human servitude as the state of bondage of anyone who is aware of their own desires, but ignorant of the causes that determined them. However, the free or virtuous person becomes capable, through reason and knowledge, to be genuinely free, even as they are being "determined". For the Dutch philosopher, acting out of one's own internal necessity is genuine freedom while being driven by exterior determinations is akin to bondage. Spinoza's thoughts on human servitude and liberty are respectively detailed in the fourth[39] and fifth[40] volumes of his work Ethics.

The standard argument against free will, according to philosopher J. J. C. Smart, focuses on the implications of determinism for free will.[41] He suggests free will is denied whether determinism is true or not. He says that if determinism is true, all actions are predicted and no one is assumed to be free; however, if determinism is false, all actions are presumed to be random and as such no one seems free because they have no part in controlling what happens.

With the soul

[edit]

Some determinists argue that materialism does not present a complete understanding of the universe, because while it can describe determinate interactions among material things, it ignores the minds or souls of conscious beings.

A number of positions can be delineated:

  • Immaterial souls are all that exist (idealism).
  • Immaterial souls exist and exert a non-deterministic causal influence on bodies (traditional free-will, interactionist dualism).[42][43]
  • Immaterial souls exist but are part of a deterministic framework.
  • Immaterial souls exist, but exert no causal influence, free or determined (epiphenomenalism, occasionalism)
  • Immaterial souls do not exist – there is no mind–body dichotomy, and there is a materialistic explanation for intuitions to the contrary.

With ethics and morality

[edit]

Another topic of debate is the implication that determinism has on morality.

Philosopher and incompatibilist Peter van Inwagen introduced this thesis, when arguments that free will is required for moral judgments, as such:[44]

  1. The moral judgment that X should not have been done implies that something else should have been done instead.
  2. That something else should have been done instead implies that there was something else to do.
  3. That there was something else to do, implies that something else could have been done.
  4. That something else could have been done implies that there is free will.
  5. If there is no free will to have done other than X we cannot make the moral judgment that X should not have been done.

History

[edit]

Determinism was developed by the Greek philosophers during the 7th and 6th centuries BCE by the Pre-socratic philosophers Heraclitus and Leucippus, later Aristotle, and mainly by the Stoics. Some of the main philosophers who have dealt with this issue are Marcus Aurelius, Omar Khayyam, Thomas Hobbes, Baruch Spinoza, Gottfried Leibniz, David Hume, Baron d'Holbach (Paul Heinrich Dietrich), Pierre-Simon Laplace, Arthur Schopenhauer, William James, Friedrich Nietzsche, Albert Einstein, Niels Bohr, Ralph Waldo Emerson and, more recently, John Searle, Ted Honderich, and Daniel Dennett.

Mecca Chiesa notes that the probabilistic or selectionistic determinism of B. F. Skinner comprised a wholly separate conception of determinism that was not mechanistic at all. Mechanistic determinism assumes that every event has an unbroken chain of prior occurrences, but a selectionistic or probabilistic model does not.[45][46]

Western tradition

[edit]

In the West, some elements of determinism have been expressed in Greece from the 6th century BCE by the Presocratics Heraclitus[47] and Leucippus.[48] The first notions of determinism appears to originate with the Stoics, as part of their theory of universal causal determinism.[49] The resulting philosophical debates, which involved the confluence of elements of Aristotelian Ethics with Stoic psychology, led in the 1st–3rd centuries CE in the works of Alexander of Aphrodisias to the first recorded Western debate over determinism and freedom,[50] an issue that is known in theology as the paradox of free will. The writings of Epictetus as well as middle Platonist and early Christian thought were instrumental in this development.[51] Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides said of the deterministic implications of an omniscient god:[52] "Does God know or does He not know that a certain individual will be good or bad? If thou sayest 'He knows', then it necessarily follows that [that] man is compelled to act as God knew beforehand he would act, otherwise God's knowledge would be imperfect."[53]

Newtonian mechanics

[edit]

Determinism in the West is often associated with Newtonian mechanics/physics, which depicts the physical matter of the universe as operating according to a set of fixed laws. The "billiard ball" hypothesis, a product of Newtonian physics, argues that once the initial conditions of the universe have been established, the rest of the history of the universe follows inevitably. If it were actually possible to have complete knowledge of physical matter and all of the laws governing that matter at any one time, then it would be theoretically possible to compute the time and place of every event that will ever occur (Laplace's demon). In this sense, the basic particles of the universe operate in the same fashion as the rolling balls on a billiard table, moving and striking each other in predictable ways to produce predictable results.

Whether or not it is all-encompassing in so doing, Newtonian mechanics deals only with caused events; for example, if an object begins in a known position and is hit dead on by an object with some known velocity, then it will be pushed straight toward another predictable point. If it goes somewhere else, the Newtonians argue, one must question one's measurements of the original position of the object, the exact direction of the striking object, gravitational or other fields that were inadvertently ignored, etc. Then, they maintain, repeated experiments and improvements in accuracy will always bring one's observations closer to the theoretically predicted results. When dealing with situations on an ordinary human scale, Newtonian physics has been successful. But it fails as velocities become some substantial fraction of the speed of light and when interactions at the atomic scale are studied. Before the discovery of quantum effects and other challenges to Newtonian physics, "uncertainty" was always a term that applied to the accuracy of human knowledge about causes and effects, and not to the causes and effects themselves.

Newtonian mechanics, as well as any following physical theories, are results of observations and experiments, and so they describe "how it all works" within a tolerance. However, old western scientists believed if there are any logical connections found between an observed cause and effect, there must be also some absolute natural laws behind. Belief in perfect natural laws driving everything, instead of just describing what we should expect, led to searching for a set of universal simple laws that rule the world. This movement significantly encouraged deterministic views in Western philosophy,[54] as well as the related theological views of classical pantheism.

Eastern tradition

[edit]

Throughout history, the belief that the entire universe is a deterministic system subject to the will of fate or destiny has been articulated in both Eastern and Western religions, philosophy, music, and literature.[55][56][57][58][59]

The ancient Arabs that inhabited the Arabian Peninsula before the advent of Islam used to profess a widespread belief in fatalism (ḳadar) alongside a fearful consideration for the sky and the stars as divine beings, which they held to be ultimately responsible for every phenomena that occurs on Earth and for the destiny of humankind.[60] Accordingly, they shaped their entire lives in accordance with their interpretations of astral configurations and phenomena.[60]

In the I Ching and philosophical Taoism, the ebb and flow of favorable and unfavorable conditions suggests the path of least resistance is effortless (see: Wu wei). In the philosophical schools of the Indian Subcontinent, the concept of karma deals with similar philosophical issues to the Western concept of determinism. Karma is understood as a spiritual mechanism which causes the eternal cycle of birth, death, and rebirth (saṃsāra).[61] Karma, either positive or negative, accumulates according to an individual's actions throughout their life, and at their death determines the nature of their next life in the cycle of Saṃsāra.[61] Most major religions originating in India hold this belief to some degree, most notably Hinduism,[61] Jainism, Sikhism, and Buddhism.

The views on the interaction of karma and free will are numerous, and diverge from each other. For example, in Sikhism, god's grace, gained through worship, can erase one's karmic debts, a belief which reconciles the principle of karma with a monotheistic god one must freely choose to worship.[62] Jainists believe in compatibilism, in which the cycle of Saṃsara is a completely mechanistic process, occurring without any divine intervention. The Jains hold an atomic view of reality, in which particles of karma form the fundamental microscopic building material of the universe.

Ājīvika

[edit]

In ancient India, the Ājīvika school of philosophy founded by Makkhali Gosāla (around 500 BCE), otherwise referred to as "Ājīvikism" in Western scholarship,[63] upheld the Niyati ("Fate") doctrine of absolute fatalism or determinism,[63][64][65] which negates the existence of free will and karma, and is therefore considered one of the nāstika or "heterodox" schools of Indian philosophy.[63][64][65] The oldest descriptions of the Ājīvika fatalists and their founder Gosāla can be found both in the Buddhist and Jaina scriptures of ancient India.[63][65] The predetermined fate of all sentient beings and the impossibility to achieve liberation (mokṣa) from the eternal cycle of birth, death, and rebirth (saṃsāra) was the major distinctive philosophical and metaphysical doctrine of this heterodox school of Indian philosophy,[63][64][65] annoverated among the other Śramaṇa movements that emerged in India during the Second urbanization (600–200 BCE).[63]

Buddhism

[edit]

Buddhist philosophy contains several concepts which some scholars describe as deterministic to various levels. However, the direct analysis of Buddhist metaphysics through the lens of determinism is difficult, due to the differences between European and Buddhist traditions of thought.[66]

One concept which is argued to support a hard determinism is the doctrine of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) in the early Buddhist texts, which states that all phenomena (dharma) are necessarily caused by some other phenomenon, which it can be said to be dependent on, like links in a massive, never-ending chain; the basic principle is that all things (dharmas, phenomena, principles) arise in dependence upon other things, which means that they are fundamentally "empty" or devoid of any intrinsic, eternal essence and therefore are impermanent.[66][67] In traditional Buddhist philosophy, this concept is used to explain the functioning of the eternal cycle of birth, death, and rebirth (saṃsāra); all thoughts and actions exert a karmic force that attaches to the individual's consciousness, which will manifest through reincarnation and results in future lives.[66] In other words, righteous or unrighteous actions in one life will necessarily cause good or bad responses in another future life or more lives.[68] The early Buddhist texts and later Tibetan Buddhist scriptures associate dependent arising with the fundamental Buddhist doctrines of emptiness (śūnyatā) and non-self (anattā).[66][67]

Another Buddhist concept which many scholars perceive to be deterministic is the doctrine of non-self (anattā).[66] In Buddhism, attaining enlightenment involves one realizing that neither in humans nor any other sentient beings there is a fundamental core of permanent being, identity, or personality which can be called the "soul", and that all sentient beings (including humans) are instead made of several, constantly changing factors which bind them to the eternal cycle of birth, death, and rebirth (saṃsāra).[66][67] Sentient beings are composed of the five aggregates of existence (skandha): matter, sensation, perception, mental formations, and consciousness.[66] In the Saṃyutta Nikāya of the Pāli Canon, the historical Buddha is recorded as saying that "just as the word 'chariot' exists on the basis of the aggregation of parts, even so the concept of 'being' exists when the five aggregates are available."[69] The early Buddhist texts outline different ways in which dependent origination is a middle way between different sets of "extreme" views (such as "monist" and "pluralist" ontologies or materialist and dualist views of mind-body relation).[70] In the Kaccānagotta Sutta of the Pāli Canon (SN 12.15, parallel at SA 301), the historical Buddha stated that "this world mostly relies on the dual notions of existence and non-existence" and then explains the right view as follows:[71]

But when you truly see the origin of the world with right understanding, you won't have the notion of non-existence regarding the world. And when you truly see the cessation of the world with right understanding, you won't have the notion of existence regarding the world.[72]

Some Western scholars argue that the concept of non-self necessarily disproves the ideas of free will and moral responsibility.[66][73] If there is no autonomous self, in this view, and all events are necessarily and unchangeably caused by others, then no type of autonomy can be said to exist, moral or otherwise.[73] However, other scholars disagree, claiming that the Buddhist conception of the universe allows for a form of compatibilism.[66] Buddhism perceives reality occurring on two different levels: the ultimate reality, which can only be truly understood by the enlightened ones, and the illusory or false reality of the material world, which is considered to be "real" or "true" by those who are ignorant about the nature of metaphysical reality; i.e., those who still haven't achieved enlightenment.[66][67] Therefore, Buddhism perceives free will as a notion belonging to the illusory belief in the unchanging self or personhood that pertains to the false reality of the material world, while concepts like non-self and dependent origination belong to the ultimate reality; the transition between the two can be truly understood, Buddhists claim, by one who has attained enlightenment.[66][67][73]

Modern scientific perspective

[edit]

Generative processes

[edit]

Although it was once thought by scientists that any indeterminism in quantum mechanics occurred at too small a scale to influence biological or neurological systems, there is indication that nervous systems are influenced by quantum indeterminism due to chaos theory.[74] It is unclear what implications this has for the problem of free will given various possible reactions to the problem in the first place.[75] Many biologists do not grant determinism: Christof Koch, for instance, argues against it, and in favour of libertarian free will, by making arguments based on generative processes (emergence).[76] Other proponents of emergentist or generative philosophy, cognitive sciences, and evolutionary psychology, argue that a certain form of determinism (not necessarily causal) is true.[77][78][79][80] They suggest instead that an illusion of free will is experienced due to the generation of infinite behaviour from the interaction of finite-deterministic set of rules and parameters. Thus the unpredictability of the emerging behaviour from deterministic processes leads to a perception of free will, even though free will as an ontological entity does not exist.[77][78][79][80]

In Conway's Game of Life, the interaction of just four simple rules creates patterns that seem somehow "alive".

As an illustration, the strategy board-games chess and Go have rigorous rules in which no information (such as cards' face-values) is hidden from either player and no random events (such as dice-rolling) happen within the game. Yet, chess and especially Go with its extremely simple deterministic rules, can still have an extremely large number of unpredictable moves. When chess is simplified to 7 or fewer pieces, however, endgame tables are available that dictate which moves to play to achieve a perfect game. This implies that, given a less complex environment (with the original 32 pieces reduced to 7 or fewer pieces), a perfectly predictable game of chess is possible. In this scenario, the winning player can announce that a checkmate will happen within a given number of moves, assuming a perfect defense by the losing player, or fewer moves if the defending player chooses sub-optimal moves as the game progresses into its inevitable, predicted conclusion. By this analogy, it is suggested, the experience of free will emerges from the interaction of finite rules and deterministic parameters that generate nearly infinite and practically unpredictable behavioural responses. In theory, if all these events could be accounted for, and there were a known way to evaluate these events, the seemingly unpredictable behaviour would become predictable.[77][78][79][80] Another hands-on example of generative processes is John Horton Conway's playable Game of Life.[81] Nassim Taleb is wary of such models, and coined the term "ludic fallacy."

Compatibility with the existence of science

[edit]

Certain philosophers of science argue that, while causal determinism (in which everything including the brain/mind is subject to the laws of causality) is compatible with minds capable of science, fatalism and predestination is not. These philosophers make the distinction that causal determinism means that each step is determined by the step before and therefore allows sensory input from observational data to determine what conclusions the brain reaches, while fatalism in which the steps between do not connect an initial cause to the results would make it impossible for observational data to correct false hypotheses. This is often combined with the argument that if the brain had fixed views and the arguments were mere after-constructs with no causal effect on the conclusions, science would have been impossible and the use of arguments would have been a meaningless waste of energy with no persuasive effect on brains with fixed views.[82]

Mathematical models

[edit]

Many mathematical models of physical systems are deterministic. This is true of most models involving differential equations (notably, those measuring rate of change over time). Mathematical models that are not deterministic because they involve randomness are called stochastic. Because of sensitive dependence on initial conditions, some deterministic models may appear to behave non-deterministically; in such cases, a deterministic interpretation of the model may not be useful due to numerical instability and a finite amount of precision in measurement. Such considerations can motivate the consideration of a stochastic model even though the underlying system is governed by deterministic equations.[83][84][85]

Quantum and classical mechanics

[edit]

Day-to-day physics

[edit]

Since the beginning of the 20th century, quantum mechanics—the physics of the extremely small—has revealed previously concealed aspects of events. Before that, Newtonian physics—the physics of everyday life—dominated. Taken in isolation (rather than as an approximation to quantum mechanics), Newtonian physics depicts a universe in which objects move in perfectly determined ways. At the scale where humans exist and interact with the universe, Newtonian mechanics remain useful, and make relatively accurate predictions (e.g. calculating the trajectory of a bullet). But whereas in theory, absolute knowledge of the forces accelerating a bullet would produce an absolutely accurate prediction of its path, modern quantum mechanics casts reasonable doubt on this main thesis of determinism.

Quantum realm

[edit]

Quantum physics works differently in many ways from Newtonian physics. Physicist Aaron D. O'Connell explains that understanding the universe, at such small scales as atoms, requires a different logic than day-to-day life does. O'Connell does not deny that it is all interconnected: the scale of human existence ultimately does emerge from the quantum scale. O'Connell argues that we must simply use different models and constructs when dealing with the quantum world.[86] Quantum mechanics is the product of a careful application of the scientific method, logic and empiricism. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle is frequently confused with the observer effect. The uncertainty principle actually describes how precisely we may measure the position and momentum of a particle at the same time—if we increase the accuracy in measuring one quantity, we are forced to lose accuracy in measuring the other. "These uncertainty relations give us that measure of freedom from the limitations of classical concepts which is necessary for a consistent description of atomic processes."[87]

Although it is not possible to predict the arrival position or time for any particle, probabilities of arrival predict the final pattern of events.

This is where statistical mechanics come into play, and where physicists begin to require rather unintuitive mental models: A particle's path simply cannot be exactly specified in its full quantum description. "Path" is a classical, practical attribute in everyday life, but one that quantum particles do not meaningfully possess. The probabilities discovered in quantum mechanics do nevertheless arise from measurement (of the perceived path of the particle). As Stephen Hawking explains, the result is not traditional determinism, but rather determined probabilities.[88] In some cases, a quantum particle may indeed trace an exact path, and the probability of finding the particles in that path is one (certain to be true). In fact, as far as prediction goes, the quantum development is at least as predictable as the classical motion, but the key is that it describes wave functions that cannot be easily expressed in ordinary language. As far as the thesis of determinism is concerned, these probabilities, at least, are quite determined. These findings from quantum mechanics have found many applications, and allow people to build transistors and lasers. Put another way: personal computers, Blu-ray players and the Internet all work because humankind discovered the determined probabilities of the quantum world.[89]

On the topic of predictable probabilities, the double-slit experiments are a popular example. Photons are fired one-by-one through a double-slit apparatus at a distant screen. They do not arrive at any single point, nor even the two points lined up with the slits (the way it might be expected of bullets fired by a fixed gun at a distant target). Instead, the light arrives in varying concentrations at widely separated points, and the distribution of its collisions with the target can be calculated reliably. In that sense the behavior of light in this apparatus is predictable, but there is no way to predict where in the resulting interference pattern any individual photon will make its contribution (although, there may be ways to use weak measurement to acquire more information without violating the uncertainty principle).

Some (including Albert Einstein) have argued that the inability to predict any more than probabilities is simply due to ignorance.[90] The idea is that, beyond the conditions and laws can be observed or deduced, there are also hidden factors or "hidden variables" that determine absolutely in which order photons reach the detector screen. They argue that the course of the universe is absolutely determined, but that humans are screened from knowledge of the determinative factors. So, they say, it only appears that things proceed in a merely probabilistically determinative way. In actuality, they proceed in an absolutely deterministic way.

John S. Bell criticized Einstein's work in his famous Bell's theorem, which, under a strict set of assumptions, demonstrates that quantum mechanics can make statistical predictions that would be violated if local hidden variables really existed. A number of experiments have tried to verify such predictions, and so far they do not appear to be violated. Current experiments continue to verify the result, including the 2015 "Loophole Free Test" that plugged all known sources of error and the 2017 "Cosmic Bell Test" experiment that used cosmic data streaming from different directions toward the Earth, precluding the possibility the sources of data could have had prior interactions.

Bell's theorem has been criticized from the perspective of its strict set of assumptions. A foundational assumption to quantum mechanics is the Principle of locality. To abandon this assumption would require the construction of a non-local hidden variable theory. Therefore, it is possible to augment quantum mechanics with non-local hidden variables to achieve a deterministic theory that is in agreement with experiment.[91] An example is the Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics. Bohm's Interpretation, though, violates special relativity and it is highly controversial whether or not it can be reconciled without giving up on determinism.

Another foundational assumption to quantum mechanics is that of free will,[92] which has been argued[93] to be foundational to the scientific method as a whole. Bell acknowledged that abandoning this assumption would both allow for the maintenance of determinism as well as locality.[94] This perspective is known as superdeterminism, and is defended by some physicists such as Sabine Hossenfelder and Tim Palmer.[95]

More advanced variations on these arguments include quantum contextuality, by Bell, Simon B. Kochen and Ernst Specker, which argues that hidden variable theories cannot be "sensible", meaning that the values of the hidden variables inherently depend on the devices used to measure them.

This debate is relevant because there are possibly specific situations in which the arrival of an electron at a screen at a certain point and time would trigger one event, whereas its arrival at another point would trigger an entirely different event (e.g. see Schrödinger's cat—a thought experiment used as part of a deeper debate).

In his 1939 address "The Relation between Mathematics and Physics",[96] Paul Dirac points out that purely deterministic classical mechanics cannot explain the cosmological origins of the universe; today the early universe is modeled quantum mechanically.[97]

Thus, quantum physics casts reasonable doubt on the traditional determinism of classical, Newtonian physics in so far as reality does not seem to be absolutely determined. This was the subject of the famous Bohr–Einstein debates between Einstein and Niels Bohr and there is still no consensus.[98][99]

Adequate determinism (see Varieties, above) is the reason that Stephen Hawking called libertarian free will "just an illusion".[88]

References

[edit]

Notes

[edit]
  1. ^ "Determinism | Definition, Philosophers, & Facts | Britannica". www.britannica.com. Retrieved 23 February 2024.
  2. ^ For example, see Franklin, Richard Langdon (1968). Freewill and Determinism: A Study of Rival Conceptions of Man. Routledge & K. Paul. ISBN 978-0710031570.
  3. ^ Conceptually (20 January 2019). "Determinism – Explanation and examples". conceptually.org. Retrieved 20 January 2019.
  4. ^ Ismael, Jenann (1 October 2019). "Determinism, Counterpredictive Devices, and the Impossibility of Laplacean Intelligences". The Monist. 102 (4): 478–498. doi:10.1093/monist/onz021. ISSN 0026-9662.
  5. ^ a b Hoefer, Carl (2008). "Causal Determinism". In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 ed.).
  6. ^ a b c Eshleman, Andrew (2009). "Moral Responsibility". In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 ed.).
  7. ^ a b "Arguments for Incompatibilism". Arguments for Incompatibilism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 2018.
  8. ^ Laplace posited that an omniscient observer, knowing with infinite precision all the positions and velocities of every particle in the universe, could predict the future entirely. For a discussion, see Robert C. Solomon; Kathleen M. Higgins (2009). "Free will and determinism". The Big Questions: A Short Introduction to Philosophy (8th ed.). Cengage Learning. p. 232. ISBN 978-0495595151. Another view of determinism is discussed by Ernest Nagel (1999). "§V: Alternative descriptions of physical state". The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation (2nd ed.). Hackett. pp. 285–292. ISBN 978-0915144716. A theory is deterministic if, and only if, given its state variables for some initial period, the theory logically determines a unique set of values for those variables for any other period.
  9. ^ Leucippus, Fragment 569 – from Fr. 2 Actius I, 25, 4.
  10. ^ a b c McKewan, Jaclyn (2009). "Evolution, Chemical". In H. James Birx" (ed.). Predeterminism. Encyclopedia of Time: Science, Philosophy, Theology, & Culture. Sage Publications, Inc. pp. 1035–1036. doi:10.4135/9781412963961.n191. ISBN 978-1412941648.
  11. ^ "Predeterminism". Oxford Dictionaries. 2010. Archived from the original on 4 September 2012. Retrieved 20 December 2012.. See also "Predeterminism". Collins English Dictionary. Collins. Retrieved 20 December 2012.
  12. ^ "Some Varieties of Free Will and Determinism". Philosophy 302: Ethics. philosophy.lander.edu. Retrieved 19 December 2012. Predeterminism: the philosophical and theological view that combines God with determinism. On this doctrine events throughout eternity have been foreordained by some supernatural power in a causal sequence.
  13. ^ See for example Hooft, G. (2001). "How does god play dice? (Pre-)determinism at the Planck scale". arXiv:hep-th/0104219. Predeterminism is here defined by the assumption that the experimenter's 'free will' in deciding what to measure (such as his choice to measure the x- or the y-component of an electron's spin), is in fact limited by deterministic laws, hence not free at all, and Sukumar, C.V. (1996). "A new paradigm for science and architecture". City. 1 (1–2): 181–183. Bibcode:1996City....1..181S. doi:10.1080/13604819608900044. Quantum Theory provided a beautiful description of the behaviour of isolated atoms and nuclei and small aggregates of elementary particles. Modern science recognized that predisposition rather than predeterminism is what is widely prevalent in nature.
  14. ^ Borst, C. (1992). "Leibniz and the Compatibilist Account of Free Will". Studia Leibnitiana. 24 (1): 49–58. JSTOR 40694201. Leibniz presents a clear case of a philosopher who does not think that predeterminism requires universal causal determinism.
  15. ^ Far Western Philosophy of Education Society (1971). Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society. Far Western Philosophy of Education Society. p. 12. 'Determinism' is, in essence, the position which holds that all behavior is caused by prior behavior. "Predeterminism" is the position which holds that all behavior is caused by conditions which predate behavior altogether (such impersonal boundaries as "the human conditions", instincts, the will of God, inherent knowledge, fate, and such).
  16. ^ "Predeterminism". Merriam-Webster Dictionary. Merriam-Webster, Inc. Retrieved 20 December 2012. See for example Ormond, A.T. (1894). "Freedom and psycho-genesis". Psychological Review. 1 (3): 217–229. doi:10.1037/h0065249. The problem of predeterminism is one that involves the factors of heredity and environment, and the point to be debated here is the relation of the present self that chooses to these predetermining agencies., and Garris, M.D.; et al. (1992). "A Platform for Evolving Genetic Automata for Text Segmentation (GNATS)". Science of Artificial Neural Networks. 1710: 714–724. Bibcode:1992SPIE.1710..714G. doi:10.1117/12.140132. S2CID 62639035. However, predeterminism is not completely avoided. If the codes within the genotype are not designed properly, then the organisms being evolved will be fundamentally handicapped.
  17. ^ Nietzsche, Friedrich (1974). The Gay Science. Vintage. p. 7. ISBN 978-0394719856.
  18. ^ SEP, Causal Determinism. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 2016.
  19. ^ Fischer, John Martin (1989) God, Foreknowledge and Freedom. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. ISBN 1-55786-857-3.
  20. ^ Watt, Montgomery (1948) Free-Will and Predestination in Early Islam. London: Luzac & Co.
  21. ^ Anne Lockyer Jordan; Anne Lockyer Jordan Neil Lockyer Edwin Tate; Neil Lockyer; Edwin Tate (2004). Philosophy of Religion for A Level (OCR ed.). Nelson Thornes. p. 211. ISBN 978-0-7487-8078-5. Retrieved 22 December 2012.
  22. ^ Iannone, Abel Pablo (2001). "Determinism". Dictionary of World Philosophy. Taylor & Francis. p. 194. ISBN 978-0-415-17995-9. Theological determinism, or the doctrine of predestination: the view that everything which happens has been predestined to happen by an omniscient, omnipotent divinity. A weaker version holds that, though not predestined to happen, everything that happens has been eternally known by virtue of the divine foreknowledge of an omniscient divinity. If this divinity is also omnipotent, as in the case of the Judeo-Christian religions, this weaker version is hard to distinguish from the previous one because, though able to prevent what happens and knowing that it is going to happen, God lets it happen. To this, advocates of free will reply that God permits it to happen in order to make room for the free will of humans.
  23. ^ Wentzel Van Huyssteen (2003). "Theological determinism". Encyclopedia of Science and Religion. Vol. 1. Macmillan Reference. p. 217. ISBN 978-0-02-865705-9. Retrieved 22 December 2012. Theological determinism constitutes a fifth kind of determinism. There are two types of theological determinism, both compatible with scientific and metaphysical determinism. In the first, God determines everything that happens, either in one all-determining single act at the initial creation of the universe or through continuous divine interactions with the world. Either way, the consequence is that everything that happens becomes God's action, and determinism is closely linked to divine action and God's omnipotence. According to the second type of theological determinism, God has perfect knowledge of everything in the universe because God is omniscient. And, as some say, because God is outside of time, God has the capacity of knowing past, present, and future in one instance. This means that God knows what will happen in the future. And because God's omniscience is perfect, what God knows about the future will inevitably happen, which means, consequently, that the future is already fixed.
  24. ^ Raymond J. VanArragon (2010). Key Terms in Philosophy of Religion. Continuum International Publishing Group. p. 21. ISBN 978-1-4411-3867-5. Retrieved 22 December 2012. Theological determinism, on the other hand, claims that all events are determined by God. On this view, God decree that everything will go thus-and-so and ensure that everything goes that way, so that ultimately God is the cause of everything that happens and everything that happens is part of God's plan. We might think of God here as the all-powerful movie director who writes script and causes everything to go accord with it. We should note, as an aside, that there is some debate over what would be sufficient for theological determinism to be true. Some people claim that God's merely knowing what will happen determines that it will, while others believe that God must not only know but must also cause those events to occur in order for their occurrence to be determined.
  25. ^ Vihvelin, Kadri (2011). "Arguments for Incompatibilism". In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 ed.).
  26. ^ Wilson, Kenneth (2018). Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology in the series Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum 111. Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck. pp. 273–298. ISBN 978-3161557538.
  27. ^ The Information Philosopher, "Adequate Determinism", from the site: "We are happy to agree with scientists and philosophers who feel that quantum effects are for the most part negligible in the macroscopic world. We particularly agree that they are negligible when considering the causally determined will and the causally determined actions set in motion by decisions of that will."
  28. ^ Grand Design (2010), p. 32: "The molecular basis of biology shows that biological processes are governed by the laws of physics and chemistry and therefore are as determined as the orbits of the planets.", and p. 72: "Quantum physics might seem to undermine the idea that nature is governed by laws, but that is not the case. Instead it leads us to accept a new form of determinism: Given the state of a system at some time, the laws of nature determine the probabilities of various futures and pasts rather than determining the future and past with certainty." (Emphasis in original, discussing a many worlds interpretation.)
  29. ^ Kent, Adrian. "One world versus many: the inadequacy of Everettian accounts of evolution, probability, and scientific confirmation." Many worlds (2010): 307–354.
  30. ^ Vaidman, Lev "Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/qm-manyworlds.
  31. ^ Melinda, Baldwin (11 July 2017). "Q&A: Gerard 't Hooft on the future of quantum mechanics". Physics Today. No. 7. doi:10.1063/PT.6.4.20170711a.
  32. ^ Peres, Asher (1995). Quantum Theory: Concepts and Methods. Kluwer Academic Publishers. p. 374. ISBN 0-7923-2549-4.
  33. ^ Inmaculada de Melo-Martín (2005). "Firing up the nature/nurture controversy: Bioethics and genetic determinism". Journal of Medical Ethics. 31 (9): 526–530. doi:10.1136/jme.2004.008417. PMC 1734214. PMID 16131554.
  34. ^ Andrew, Sluyter (2003). "Neo-Environmental Determinism, Intellectual Damage Control, and Nature/Society Science". Antipode. 35 (4): 813–817. Bibcode:2003Antip..35..813S. doi:10.1046/j.1467-8330.2003.00354.x.
  35. ^ Proulx, J (2008). "Structural determinism as hindrance to teachers' learning: Implications for teacher education". Proceedings of PME-33 and PME-NA-20. 4.
  36. ^ Leyland, M.L (1988). "An introduction to some of the ideas of Humberto Maturana". Journal of Family Therapy. 10 (4): 357–374. doi:10.1046/j..1988.00323.x.
  37. ^ Tate, W (1997). "Critical Race Theory and Education: History, Theory, and Implications" (PDF). Review of Research in Education. 22: 195–247. doi:10.3102/0091732X022001195. S2CID 53626156. Archived (PDF) from the original on 19 August 2020.
  38. ^ Pleasants, N (2019). "Free Will, Determinism and the 'Problem' of Structure and Agency in the Social Sciences". Philosophy of the Social Sciences. 49: 3–30. doi:10.1177/0048393118814952. hdl:10871/34537. S2CID 149735710.
  39. ^ "Human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I name bondage: for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is not his own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune: so much so, that he is often compelled, while seeing that which is better for him, to follow that which is worse." – Ethics, Book IV, Preface
  40. ^ "At length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which is concerned with the way leading to freedom. I shall therefore treat therein of the power of the reason, showing how far the reason can control the emotions, and what is the nature of Mental Freedom or Blessedness; we shall then be able to see, how much more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant." Ethics, book V, Preface
  41. ^ J. J. C. Smart, "Free-Will, Praise and Blame," Mind, July 1961, pp. 293–294.
  42. ^ By "soul" is meant an autonomous immaterial agent that has the power to control the body but not to be controlled by the body (this theory of determinism thus conceives of conscious agents in dualistic terms). Therefore the soul stands to the activities of the individual agent's body as does the creator of the universe to the universe. The creator of the universe put in motion a deterministic system of material entities that would, if left to themselves, carry out the chain of events determined by ordinary causation. But the creator also provided for souls that could exert a causal force analogous to the primordial causal force and alter outcomes in the physical universe via the acts of their bodies. Thus, it emerges that no events in the physical universe are uncaused. Some are caused entirely by the original creative act and the way it plays itself out through time, and some are caused by the acts of created souls. But those created souls were not created by means of physical processes involving ordinary causation. They are another order of being entirely, gifted with the power to modify the original creation. However, determinism is not necessarily limited to matter; it can encompass energy as well. The question of how these immaterial entities can act upon material entities is deeply involved in what is generally known as the "mind–body problem". It is a significant problem which philosophers have not reached agreement about.
  43. ^ "Free Will". Free Will (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 2022.
  44. ^ van Inwagen, Peter (2009). The Powers of Rational Beings: Freedom of the Will. Oxford.[page needed]
  45. ^ Chiesa, Mecca (2004) Radical Behaviorism: The Philosophy & The Science.
  46. ^ Ringen, J. D. (1993). "Adaptation, teleology, and selection by consequences". Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis. 60 (1): 3–15. doi:10.1901/jeab.1993.60-3. PMC 1322142. PMID 16812698.
  47. ^ Stobaeus Eclogae I 5 (Heraclitus)
  48. ^ Stobaeus Eclogae I 4 (Leucippus)
  49. ^ Susanne Bobzien Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy (Oxford 1998) chapter 1.
  50. ^ Susanne Bobzien The Inadvertent Conception and Late Birth of the Free-Will Problem (Phronesis 43, 1998).
  51. ^ Michael Frede A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought (Berkeley 2011).
  52. ^ Though Moses Maimonides was not arguing against the existence of God, but rather for the incompatibility between the full exercise by God of his omniscience and genuine human free will, his argument is considered by some as affected by modal fallacy.
  53. ^ The Eight Chapters of Maimonides on Ethics (Semonah Perakhim), edited, annotated, and translated with an Introduction by Joseph I. Gorfinkle, pp. 99–100. (New York: AMS Press), 1966.
  54. ^ Swartz, Norman (2003) The Concept of Physical Law. Chapter 10: "Free Will and Determinism" https://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/physical-law/
  55. ^ Durmaz, H.; Çapik, C. (March 2023). "Are Health Fatalism and Styles of Coping with Stress Affected by Poverty? A Field Study". Iranian Journal of Public Health. 52 (3). Tehran University of Medical Sciences: 575–583. doi:10.18502/ijph.v52i3.12140. ISSN 2251-6093. PMC 10135518. PMID 37124894. S2CID 257501917. Fatalism is the belief that everything an individual may encounter in his life is determined against his will and that this destiny cannot be changed by effort. In a fatalistic attitude, individuals believe that they cannot control their lives and that there is no point in making choices. Fatalism is a response to overwhelming threats that seem uncontrollable.
  56. ^ Rice, Hugh (Winter 2018). "Fatalism". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University: Center for the Study of Language and Information. Retrieved 5 April 2020.
  57. ^ Solomon, Robert C. (October 2003). "On Fate and Fatalism". Philosophy East and West. 53 (4). University of Hawaii Press: 435–454. doi:10.1353/pew.2003.0047. JSTOR 1399977. S2CID 170753493.
  58. ^ Stambaugh, Joan (1994). "Amor dei and Amor fati: Spinoza and Nietzsche". The Other Nietzsche. SUNY Press. pp. 79–81. ISBN 9781438420929. Turkish fatalism contains the fundamental error of placing man and fate opposite each other like two separate things: Man, it says, can strive against fate, can try to defeat it, but in the end it always remains the winner, for which reason the smartest thing to do is to give up or live just any way at all. The truth is that every man himself is a piece of fate; when he thinks he is striving against fate in the way described, fate is being realized here, too; the struggle is imaginary, but so is resignation to fate; all these imaginary ideas are included in fate. The fear that most people have of the doctrine of determinism of the will is precisely the fear of this Turkish fatalism. They think man will give up weakly and stand before the future with folded hands because he cannot change anything about it; or else he will give free rein to his total caprice because even this cannot make what is once determined still worse. The follies of man are just as much a part of fate as his cleverness: this fear of the belief in fate is also fate. You yourself, poor frightened man, are the invincible Moira reigning far above the gods; for everything that comes, you are blessing or curse and in any case the bonds in which the strongest man lies. In you the whole future of the human world is predetermined; it will not help you if you are terrified of yourself.
  59. ^ Taylor, Richard (January 1962). "Fatalism". The Philosophical Review. 71 (1). Duke University Press on behalf of the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell University: 56–66. doi:10.2307/2183681. ISSN 1558-1470. JSTOR 2183681.
  60. ^ a b al-Abbasi, Abeer Abdullah (August 2020). "The Arabsʾ Visions of the Upper Realm". Marburg Journal of Religion. 22 (2). University of Marburg: 1–28. doi:10.17192/mjr.2020.22.8301. ISSN 1612-2941. Retrieved 23 May 2022.
  61. ^ a b c Bodewitz, Henk (2019). "Chapter 1 – The Hindu Doctrine of Transmigration: Its Origin and Background". In Heilijgers, Dory H.; Houben, Jan E. M.; van Kooij, Karel (eds.). Vedic Cosmology and Ethics: Selected Studies. Gonda Indological Studies. Vol. 19. Leiden and Boston: Brill Publishers. pp. 3–19. doi:10.1163/9789004400139_002. ISBN 978-90-04-40013-9. ISSN 1382-3442.
  62. ^ House, H. Wayne. 1991. "Resurrection, Reincarnation, and Humanness." Bibliotheca Sacra 148 (590). Retrieved 29 November 2013.
  63. ^ a b c d e f Balcerowicz, Piotr (2016). "Determinism, Ājīvikas, and Jainism". Early Asceticism in India: Ājīvikism and Jainism. Routledge Advances in Jaina Studies (1st ed.). London and New York: Routledge. pp. 136–174. ISBN 9781317538530. The Ājīvikas' doctrinal signature was indubitably the idea of determinism and fate, which traditionally incorporated four elements: the doctrine of destiny (niyati-vāda), the doctrine of predetermined concurrence of factors (saṅgati-vāda), the doctrine of intrinsic nature (svabhāva-vāda), occasionally also linked to materialists, and the doctrine of fate (daiva-vāda), or simply fatalism. The Ājīvikas' emphasis on fate and determinism was so profound that later sources would consistently refer to them as niyati-vādins, or 'the propounders of the doctrine of destiny'.
  64. ^ a b c Leaman, Oliver, ed. (1999). "Fatalism". Key Concepts in Eastern Philosophy. Routledge Key Guides (1st ed.). London and New York: Routledge. pp. 80–81. ISBN 9780415173636. Fatalism. Some of the teachings of Indian philosophy are fatalistic. For example, the Ajivika school argued that fate (nyati) governs both the cycle of birth and rebirth, and also individual lives. Suffering is not attributed to past actions, but just takes place without any cause or rationale, as does relief from suffering. There is nothing we can do to achieve moksha, we just have to hope that all will go well with us. [...] But the Ajivikas were committed to asceticism, and they justified this in terms of its practice being just as determined by fate as anything else.
  65. ^ a b c d Basham, Arthur L. (1981) [1951]. "Chapter XII: Niyati". History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas, a Vanished Indian Religion. Lala L. S. Jain Series (1st ed.). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. pp. 224–238. ISBN 9788120812048. OCLC 633493794. The fundamental principle of Ājīvika philosophy was Fate, usually called Niyati. Buddhist and Jaina sources agree that Gosāla was a rigid determinist, who exalted Niyati to the status of the motive factor of the universe and the sole agent of all phenomenal change. This is quite clear in our locus classicus, the Samaññaphala Sutta. Sin and suffering, attributed by other sects to the laws of karma, the result of evil committed in the previous lives or in the present one, were declared by Gosāla to be without cause or basis, other, presumably, than the force of destiny. Similarly, the escape from evil, the working off of accumulated evil karma, was likewise without cause or basis.
  66. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Garfield, Jay L. (2014). "Just Another Word for Nothing Left to Lose: Freedom, Agency, and Ethics for Mādhyamikas". In Dasti, Matthew R.; Bryant, Edwin F. (eds.). Free Will, Agency, and Selfhood in Indian Philosophy. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 172–185. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199922734.003.0008. ISBN 9780199395675. LCCN 2013017925.
  67. ^ a b c d e Thakchoe, Sonam (Summer 2022). "The Theory of Two Truths in Tibet". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University. ISSN 1095-5054. OCLC 643092515. Archived from the original on 28 May 2022. Retrieved 5 July 2022.
  68. ^ Goldstein, Joseph (4 June 2008). "Dependent Origination: The Twelve Links Explained". Tricycle: The Buddhist Review. Retrieved 26 January 2020.
  69. ^ David Kalupahana, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. The University Press of Hawaii, 1975, page 78.
  70. ^ Choong, Mun-keat (2000). The Fundamental Teachings of Early Buddhism: A Comparative Study Based on the Sutranga Portion of the Pali Samyutta-Nikaya and the Chinese Samyuktagama, pp. 192-197. Otto Harrassowitz Verlag.
  71. ^ Choong, Mun-keat (2000). The Fundamental Teachings of Early Buddhism: A Comparative Study Based on the Sutranga Portion of the Pali Samyutta-Nikaya and the Chinese Samyuktagama, p. 192. Otto Harrassowitz Verlag.
  72. ^ Kaccānagottasutta SN 12.15 SN ii 16, translated by Bhikkhu Sujato https://suttacentral.net/sn12.15/en/sujato
  73. ^ a b c Repetti, Ricardo (2012). "Buddhist Hard Determinism: No Self, No Free Will, No Responsibility" (PDF). Journal of Buddhist Ethics. 19: 136–137, 143–145.
  74. ^ Lewis, Edwin R.; Macgregor, Ronald J. (1 June 2006). "On indeterminism, chaos, and small number particle systems in the brain". Journal of Integrative Neuroscience. 05 (2): 223–247. doi:10.1142/S0219635206001112. ISSN 0219-6352. PMID 16783870.
  75. ^ Lewis, E.R.; MacGregor, R.J. (2006). "On Indeterminism, Chaos, and Small Number Particle Systems in the Brain" (PDF). Journal of Integrative Neuroscience. 5 (2): 223–247. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.361.7065. doi:10.1142/S0219635206001112. PMID 16783870. Archived (PDF) from the original on 8 June 2011.
  76. ^ Koch, Christof (2009). "Free Will, Physics, Biology and the Brain". In Murphy, Nancy; Ellis, George; O'Connor, Timothy (eds.). Downward Causation and the Neurobiology of Free Will. New York: Springer. Bibcode:2009dcnf.book.....M. ISBN 978-3-642-03204-2.
  77. ^ a b c Kenrick, D. T.; Li, N. P.; Butner, J. (2003). "Dynamical evolutionary psychology: Individual decision rules and emergent social norms" (PDF). Psychological Review. 110 (1): 3–28. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.526.5218. doi:10.1037/0033-295x.110.1.3. PMID 12529056. S2CID 43306158.
  78. ^ a b c Nowak A., Vallacher R.R., Tesser A., Borkowski W., (2000) "Society of Self: The emergence of collective properties in self-structure", Psychological Review 107.
  79. ^ a b c Epstein J.M. and Axtell R. (1996) Growing Artificial Societies – Social Science from the Bottom. Cambridge MA, MIT Press.[ISBN missing]
  80. ^ a b c Epstein J.M. (1999) "Agent Based Models and Generative Social Science". Complexity, IV (5)
  81. ^ "John Conway's Game of Life".
  82. ^ Karl Popper: Conjectures and rRefutations[page needed]
  83. ^ Werndl, Charlotte (2009). "Are Deterministic Descriptions and Indeterministic Descriptions Observationally Equivalent?". Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics. 40 (3): 232–242. arXiv:1310.1615. Bibcode:2009SHPMP..40..232W. doi:10.1016/j.shpsb.2009.06.004. S2CID 11515304.
  84. ^ Werndl, Charlotte (2009). Deterministic Versus Indeterministic Descriptions: Not That Different After All?. In: A. Hieke and H. Leitgeb (eds), "Reduction, Abstraction, Analysis", Proceedings of the 31st International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium. Ontos, 63–78.
  85. ^ J. Glimm, D. Sharp, Stochastic Differential Equations: Selected Applications in Continuum Physics, in: R.A. Carmona, B. Rozovskii (ed.) Stochastic Partial Differential Equations: Six Perspectives, American Mathematical Society (1998) ISBN 0-8218-0806-0[page needed]
  86. ^ "Struggling with quantum logic: Q&A with Aaron O'Connell". 2 June 2011.
  87. ^ Heisenberg, Werner (1949). Physikalische Prinzipien der Quantentheorie [Physical Principles of Quantum Theory]. Leipzig: Hirzel/University of Chicago Press. p. 4. ISBN 978-0486601137.
  88. ^ a b Hawking, Stephen; Mlodinow, Leonard (2010). The Grand Design. Bantam Books. ISBN 978-0-553-80537-6.
  89. ^ "What is Quantum Mechanics Good For?". Scientific American.
  90. ^ Albert Einstein insisted that, "I am convinced God does not play dice" in a private letter to Max Born, 4 December 1926, Albert Einstein Archives Archived 19 August 2010 at the Wayback Machine reel 8, item 180
  91. ^ Jabs, Arthur (2016). "A conjecture concerning determinism, reduction, and measurement in quantum mechanics". Quantum Studies: Mathematics and Foundations. 3 (4): 279–292. arXiv:1204.0614. Bibcode:2016QSMF....3..279J. doi:10.1007/s40509-016-0077-7. S2CID 32523066.
  92. ^ Zeilinger, Anton (2010). Dance of the Photons: From Einstein to Quantum Teleportation. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. p. 261. ISBN 978-0-374-23966-4. A new picture of the world must encompass three properties that evidently seem to play a significant role in quantum experiments[...]The second important property of the world that we always implicitly assume is the freedom of the individual experimentalist. This is the assumption of free will. It is a free decision what measurement one wants to perform.
  93. ^ Gisin, Nicolas (2014). Quantum Chance: Nonlocality, Teleportation and Other Quantum Marvels. Switzerland: Sringer International Publishing. p. 90. ISBN 978-3-319-05472-8. not only does free will exist, but it is a prerequisite for science, philosophy, and our very ability to think rationally in a meaningful way. Without free will, there could be no rational thought. As a consequence, it is quite simply impossible for science and philosophy to deny free will.
  94. ^ BBC Radio interview with Paul Davies, 1985: "There is a way to escape the inference of superluminal speeds and spooky action at a distance. But it involves absolute determinism in the universe, the complete absence of free will. Suppose the world is super-deterministic, with not just inanimate nature running on behind-the-scenes clockwork, but with our behavior, including our belief that we are free to choose to do one experiment rather than another, absolutely predetermined, including the 'decision' by the experimenter to carry out one set of measurements rather than another, the difficulty disappears."
  95. ^ Hossenfelder, Sabine; Palmer, Tim (2020). "Rethinking Superdeterminism". Frontiers in Physics. 8: 139. arXiv:1912.06462. Bibcode:2020FrP.....8..139P. doi:10.3389/fphy.2020.00139. ISSN 2296-424X.
  96. ^ Dirac, P. A. M. (1940). "XI.—The Relation between Mathematics and Physics". Proceedings of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. 59: 122–129. doi:10.1017/S0370164600012207. ISSN 0370-1646.
  97. ^ Lehners, Jean-Luc (June 2023). "Review of the no-boundary wave function". Physics Reports. 1022: 1–82. arXiv:2303.08802. Bibcode:2023PhR..1022....1L. doi:10.1016/j.physrep.2023.06.002.
  98. ^ Bishop, Robert C. (2011). "Chaos, Indeterminism, and Free Will". In Kane, Robert (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (2nd ed.). Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press. p. 90. ISBN 978-0195399691. OCLC 653483691. The key question is whether to understand the nature of this probability as epistemic or ontic. Along epistemic lines, one possibility is that there is some additional factor (i.e., a hidden mechanism) such that once we discover and understand this factor, we would be able to predict the observed behavior of the quantum stoplight with certainty (physicists call this approach a "hidden variable theory"; see, e.g., Bell 1987, 1–13, 29–39; Bohm 1952a, 1952b; Bohm and Hiley 1993; Bub 1997, 40–114, Holland 1993; see also the preceding essay in this volume by Hodgson). Or perhaps there is an interaction with the broader environment (e.g., neighboring buildings, trees) that we have not taken into account in our observations that explains how these probabilities arise (physicists call this approach decoherence or consistent histories15). Under either of these approaches, we would interpret the observed indeterminism in the behavior of stoplights as an expression of our ignorance about the actual workings. Under an ignorance interpretation, indeterminism would not be a fundamental feature of quantum stoplights, but merely epistemic in nature due to our lack of knowledge about the system. Quantum stoplights would turn to be deterministic after all.
  99. ^ Baggott, Jim E. (2004). "Complementarity and Entanglement". Beyond Measure: Modern Physics, Philosophy, and the Meaning of Quantum Theory. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press. p. 203. ISBN 978-0-19-852536-3. OCLC 52486237. So, was Einstein wrong? In the sense that the EPR paper argued in favor of an objective reality for each quantum particle in an entangled pair independent of the other and of the measuring device, the answer must be yes. But if Einstein was wrong to hold to the realist's belief that the physics of the universe should be objective and deterministic, it must be acknowledged that no answer exists for such a question. It is in the nature of theoretical science that there can be no such thing as certainty. A theory is only "true" for as long as the majority of the scientific community maintain a consensus view that the theory is the one best able to explain the observations. And the story of quantum theory is not over yet.

Bibliography

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
[edit]