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{{Use Hong Kong English|date=May 2019}}
{{Infobox Government agency
{{Use dmy dates|date=May 2019}}

{{Infobox government agency
|agency_name = Office of The Ombudsman
|agency_name = Office of The Ombudsman
|nativename_a = 申訴專員公署
|nativename_a = 申訴專員公署
|logo = Hong Kong Office of the Ombudsman Logo.svg
|logo = Hong Kong Office of the Ombudsman Logo.svg
|formed = {{Start date and age|df=yes|1989|3|1}}
|logo_width_160px
|headquarters = 30/F, China Merchants Tower, [[Shun Tak Centre]], 168-200 [[Connaught Road Central]], [[Hong Kong]]
|formed = 1989
|headquarters = 30/F, China Merchants Tower, Shun Tak Centre, 168-200 Connaught Road Central, Hong Kong
|employees = 90 (March 2007) [http://www.ombudsman.gov.hk/tc/annual/19_tc_content_2.pdf]
|employees = 90 (March 2007) [http://www.ombudsman.gov.hk/tc/annual/19_tc_content_2.pdf]
|budget = HK$85.1m (2008-09) [http://www.budget.gov.hk/2008/eng/pdf/head114.pdf]
|budget = HK$85.1m (2008-09) [http://www.budget.gov.hk/2008/eng/pdf/head114.pdf]
|chief1_name = Connie Lau Yin Hing, JP
|chief1_name = Jack CHAN Jick-chi
|chief1_position = Ombudsman
|chief1_position = Ombudsman
|chief2_name = Mr So Kam Shing
|chief2_name = Mr So Kam Shing<!--possibly no longer in office, at 2020-->
|chief2_position = Deputy Ombudsman
|chief2_position = Deputy Ombudsman
|website = [http://www.ombudsman.gov.hk/ www.ombudsman.gov.hk]
|website = [http://www.ombudsman.gov.hk/ www.ombudsman.gov.hk]
|footnotes =
|footnotes =
}}
}}
{{Infobox Chinese
'''The Office of Ombudsman''', is a statutory authorities established under the Ombudsman Ordinance set up in 1989. Its vision is to ensure Hong Kong is served by a fair and efficient public administration which is committed to accountable, openness and quality of services, mainly through means of investigation and giving recommendation to government department. They introduce themselves an organisation that “has been serving the community of Hong Kong by redressing grievances and addressing issues of maladministration in the public sector.” <ref name=":0">Ombudsman, HK. (2016). The 28th Annual Report of The Ombudsman. Office of the Ombudsman Hong Kong.</ref>
|t=申訴專員公署
|s=申诉专员公署
|y=Sān sou jyūn yùhn gūng chyúh
|j=San1 sou3 zyun1 jun4 gung2 cyu4
|p=Shēnsù Zhuānyuán Gōngshǔ
}}

'''The Office of Ombudsman''' is a Hong Kong statutory authority, established on 1 March 1989, charged with ensuring that [[Hong Kong]] is served by a fair and efficient public administration that is committed to accountability, openness and quality of services. It operates mainly by investigating and giving recommendations to government departments.<ref name=":0">Ombudsman, HK. (2016). The 28th Annual Report of The Ombudsman. Office of the Ombudsman Hong Kong.</ref>


== Functions ==
== Functions ==
The major purpose of Ombudsman is to investigate complaints against major public organisation, government department and its agencies. It also oversees the complaints against executive branches in relation to the non-compliance with the code of Access to information.<ref name=":0" /> Notably, the Ombudsman is empowered to initiate direct investigation into issues of potentially wide public interest and concern without the requirement of having a complainant. For instance, They have conducted 4-8 active investigation each year, for example the policy over special education service for students with emotional need after an enquiry by the Legislative Councillor. (Lau, 2016) Another example would be looking into the government policy on granting recreational lease and gave recommendation after the investigation.(Li, 2012)
The major purpose of the Ombudsman is to investigate complaints against major public organisations and government departments and agencies in Hong Kong. It also oversees complaints against the executive branch in relation to non-compliance with the [[Freedom of information laws by country#Hong Kong|Code on Access to Information]].<ref name=":0" /> Notably, the Ombudsman is empowered to initiate direct investigations into issues of potentially wide public interest and concern without the requirement of having a complainant. For instance, it conducts four to eight active investigations each year, such as regarding the policy over special education services for students with emotional needs, following an enquiry by a Legislative Councillor.<ref>Lau, 2016</ref> Another example would be looking into government policy on granting recreational lease<!-- is this 'leases', or 'release'?--> and then making recommendations.<ref>Li, 2012</ref>


The Ombudsman adopts different methods to handle complaint. The basic form is inquiry, referring to the practice that require the organisation to offer response for examination and giving suggestion thereafter. Yet when serious or further problems were observed, full investigation will follow. It applies when the complaint involves issues of principle, systematic flaws or serious maladministration (Lai, 2009). The in-depth full investigation will be conducted with prior notice the Head of the relevant department. In cases of minor maladministration, obtaining the consent of the complainant and the organisation concerned, investigators who are trained in mediation will serve as impartial mediator to settle the conflict. (Lai, 2012) ; Ombudsman, HK, 2013)
The Ombudsman adopts a variety of methods to handle complaints. The basic form is inquiry, referring to the practice that requires the organisation to offer a response for examination and give suggestions thereafter. When serious or further problems are observed, a full investigation follows. It applies when the complaint involves issues of principle, systemic flaws or serious maladministration.<ref>Lai, 2009</ref> A full investigation will be conducted with prior notice to the head of the department concerned. In cases of minor maladministration, with the consent of the complainant and the organisation concerned, investigators trained in mediation will serve as impartial mediators to settle the conflict.<ref>Lai, 2012</ref><ref>Ombudsman, HK, 2013</ref>


It worths noting that the Ombudsman will not have right to investigate into the following decisions due to statutory restrictions: Prosecutorial policy, legal proceedings, imposition (or variation) of condition of land grant, personnel matters and commercial transactions. (Ombudsman Ordinance, Schedule 2) Also, as published through the advertisement, they will not take complaints that the complainant had knowledge but fails to contact them for more than two years. (s10(1) of Ombudsman Ordinance) They will not take complaints that the complainant was not person aggrieved or the subjects of complainant has no connection with Hong Kong. The Ombudsman also retain the discretion to reject trivial, frivolous complaints or those that was not made with good faith. (s10(2) of Ombudsman Ordinance)
It is worth noting that the Ombudsman is statutorily prevented from investigating: prosecutorial policy, legal proceedings, imposition (or variation) of condition of land grant, personnel matters and commercial transactions.<ref>Ombudsman Ordinance, Schedule 2</ref> Also, it will not take a complaint made more than two years after the complainant first knew of the situation.<ref>Ombudsman Ordinance (s10(1)</ref> The Ombudsman will not take complaints if the complainant is not the person aggrieved or if the complaint has no connection with Hong Kong. It also retains discretion to reject complaints that are trivial, frivolous or not made in good faith.<ref>Ombudsman Ordinance (s10(2)</ref>


== History ==
== History ==
In its establishment in 1989, it is first named “The Commissioner for Administrative Complaints” under the Commissioner for Administrative Complaints Ordinance. By that time, the Ombudsman was not a corporate unit and may only handle complaint that was referred from the Legislative Councillor.(Legislative Council Secretariat, 1998)
At its establishment in 1989, the office was known as “The Commissioner for Administrative Complaints”, under the Commissioner for Administrative Complaints Ordinance. The Ombudsman was not then a corporate unit and could handle only complaints that were referred from a [[Legislative Council of Hong Kong|Legislative Councillor]].<ref>Legislative Council Secretariat, 1998</ref>


Before its establishment, channels complaints were scattered, for example in Legislative Councillors, members in District Board or Urban Council. However, they do not have power to demand information to explanation.<ref name=":1">CWH Lo and R Wickins, “Towards an Accountable and Quality Public Administration in Hong Kong: Redressing Administration Grievances through the Ombudsman” (2002) 25 International Journal of Public Administration, pp 737-772.</ref> Petition to British government or judicial review was available but these channels failed to limit the discretion of the Governor. (s9 of Crown Rights (Re-entry and Vesting Remedies) Ordinance) The more institutional way is to complain through the Complaints Office under the Executive Councils. In corruption-related matters, they may express their grievance to the ICAC, however, a distinct and independent office on maladministration handling is lacking.
Before its establishment, complaints channels in Hong Kong were uncoordinated, being made through, for example, Legislative Councillors, members of [[District councils of Hong Kong|District Boards]] or the [[Urban Council]]. However, such persons did not have the power to demand information or explanation.<ref name=":1">CWH Lo and R Wickins, “Towards an Accountable and Quality Public Administration in Hong Kong: Redressing Administration Grievances through the Ombudsman” (2002) 25 International Journal of Public Administration, pp 737-772.</ref> A petition to the British government or a [[judicial review]] was available but these channels failed to limit the discretion of the [[Governor of Hong Kong|Governor]].<ref>Crown Rights (Re-entry and Vesting Remedies) Ordinance</ref> The more institutional way was to complain through the Complaints Office under the [[Executive Council of Hong Kong|Executive Council]]. In corruption-related matters, someone could express their grievance to the [[Independent Commission Against Corruption (Hong Kong)|Independent Commission Against Corruption]] (ICAC), however, there was no distinct and independent office to handle matters of maladministration.


The concept of Ombudsman system was introduced in the speech of the Legislative Council stressing the importance of ombudsman system first in February, 1965, and such proposal is supported by the councillors also urged for the establishment of the Ombudsman in the post-riot period after 1967. (Official Report of Proceedings, 1965) On 1986, the Government published the publication “Redress of Grievances” which reveals the majority view then that an independent and authorised organised to handle complaint should be created. (Hong Kong Government Printer, 1986) Scholars regards the establishment of Ombudsman was argued to be motivated by the Hong Kong Public Administration Reform that emphasised on “higher efficiency and better services”, and the growing political awareness and the democratization initiated since the mid-80s.<ref name=":1" />
The call for an ombudsman was first made in a speech in the [[Legislative Council of Hong Kong|Legislative Council]] in February 1965, and such a proposal was supported by the councillors who also urged the establishment of an ombudsman in the wake of the 1967 riots.<ref>Official Report of Proceedings, 1965</ref> In 1986, the Government published “Redress of Grievances”, which revealed the majority view then that an independent and authorised organisation to handle complaints should be created.<ref>Hong Kong Government Printer, 1986</ref> Scholars state that the establishment of an ombudsman was argued to be motivated by the Hong Kong Public Administration Reform that emphasised “higher efficiency and better services”, and growing political awareness and democratisation initiated from the mid-80s.<ref name=":1" />


When it is established, the Office consists of 27 members with its policy sources vested in the Directorate consisted of 5 members.<ref name=":2">Garcia, Arthur. The First Annual Report of the Commissioner for Administrative Complaints Hong Kong; The Government Printer: Hong Kong, June 1989, 22.</ref> They were respective divisions for development, assessment and investigation.<ref name=":2" /> They also have independent panels of professional advisors. Since most officials there were to be sent back to administrative department upon completion of secondment, the staff there is commented to be lack commitment, continuity and has limited vision in terms of the long-term development of the Ombudsman.<ref name=":3">Tai, Alice. The Eleventh Annual Report of the Commissioner for Administrative Complaints Hong Kong; The Government Printer: Hong Kong, June 1999, 27.</ref>
When it was established, the Office consisted of 27 members, led by a Directorate consisting of five members.<ref name=":2">Garcia, Arthur. The First Annual Report of the Commissioner for Administrative Complaints Hong Kong; The Government Printer: Hong Kong, June 1989, 22</ref> There were separate divisions for development, assessment and investigation.<ref name=":2" /> The new set-up also included independent panels of professional advisors. Since most officials in the body would return to the administrative department upon completion of secondment, there was concern regarding a lack of commitment on their part as well as problems of continuity and limited vision in terms of the long-term development of the Ombudsman office.<ref name=":3">Tai, Alice. The Eleventh Annual Report of the Commissioner for Administrative Complaints Hong Kong; The Government Printer: Hong Kong, June 1999, 27.</ref>


== Development ==
== Development ==
'''Situation as in 1988'''
'''Situation in 1988'''


There are several limitations in the 1988 Commissioner for Administrative Complaints Bill. Firstly, the Ordinance required complaints to be first made to Legislative Council members instead of the Commissioners. As a result, the system cannot be fully utilized due to the multi-layered bureaucracy. Besides, the penetration power of the Commissioners was limited to only 52 governmental departments. They were not allowed to investigate acts of police and ICAC, affairs related with security, international relations, legal actions and contracts, and even public enterprises and administration of civil servants.<ref>Commissioner for Administrative Complaints Bill 1988 (Cap. 397)</ref> This implied a failure to meet the legislation aim, which is to investigate minor mistakes of civil servants.<ref>Hong Kong Legislative Council,. (1988). OFFICIAL REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS. Hong Kong: Government Printer.</ref> Other than penetration power, the Commissioner also faced a lot of constraints in conducting investigations. The targeted administrative departments could hinder investigation into maladministration that involves public interests but do not have specific victims by refusing to disclose document without legitimate and persuasive explanations.
There were several limitations in the 1988 Commissioner for Administrative Complaints Bill. Firstly, the Ordinance required complaints to be first made to Legislative Councillors instead of the Commissioners, adding an obstructive layer of bureaucracy. Besides, the powers of the Commissioners were limited in application to only 52 [[List of Hong Kong government agencies|governmental departments]]. They were not allowed to investigate acts of the police or ICAC, affairs related to [[National security|security]], international relations, legal actions or contracts, or even public enterprises and the administration of civil servants.<ref>Commissioner for Administrative Complaints Bill 1988 (Cap. 397)</ref> This created a failure to meet the legislative aim, which was to investigate minor mistakes by civil servants.<ref>Hong Kong Legislative Council (1988). Official Report of Proceedings, Hong Kong</ref> As well as such a failure of reach, the Commissioner also faced significant constraints in the conduct of investigations. The targeted administrative departments could hinder an investigation into maladministration involving the public interest but without specific victims by refusing to disclose documents, claiming insufficient legitimate and persuasive explanation by the Commissioner.


In the following decade, the Ombudsman has undergone several reform to address different deficiencies until 2001, through amendment of legislation. The post-2001 has been a gradual process of development emphasizing both on investigation and publicity, leading to the present state of Ombudsman.
In the decade following, the Ombudsman underwent several reforms to address these various deficiencies until 2001, through the amendment of legislation. The period post-2001 saw gradual development in both investigative operations and publicity.


'''1994 Reform'''
'''1994 reform'''


To respond the change proposed by Chris Patten in 1992 and the limitations of the 1988 Ordinance, a Committee was set up to draft the “Commissioner for Administrative Complaints (Amendment) Ordinance. The amended ordinance was signed in 1994 incorporating several improvement in the institution of the Ombudsman.<ref name=":4">Bills Committees on Commissioner for Administrative Complaints (Amendment) Bill 1996</ref>
In response to changes proposed by Governor [[Chris Patten]] in 1992 and the limitations of the 1988 Ordinance, a Committee was set up to draft the “Commissioner for Administrative Complaints (Amendment) Ordinance. The amended ordinance, gazetted in 1994, incorporated several improvements in the institution of the Ombudsman.<ref name=":4">Bills Committees on Commissioner for Administrative Complaints (Amendment) Bill 1996</ref>


First, its degree of perpetration has been enhanced as 6 statutory bodies were then possible to be investigated by the Ombudsman. Some examples of them are Urban Council, Regional Council and the Housing Authority. Second, the power and capacity of the Ombudsman has been strengthened by enjoying the power to publish anonymous investigation reports that are related with public interest during any time of the year. This is an improvement since previously, investigation report was only permitted to be published in an annual report. The degree of authority and power enjoyed by the Ombudsman then has more than less similar to the present days. Yet, it is still criticised in terms of its confidentiality element in that it limits the capacity of Commissioner to disclose the necessary information and to exercise discretionary power.<ref name=":1" /> Third, the Chinese title of the Ombudsman was changed from “Administrative Affairs Ombudsman” to “Ombudsman”.
First, its reach was enhanced to include the potential to investigate a further six statutory bodies, including the [[Urban Council]], [[Regional Council (Hong Kong)|Regional Council]] and [[Hong Kong Housing Authority|Housing Authority]]. Second, the Ombudsman was given the power to publish anonymous investigation reports on issues of public interest, at any time of the year. Previously, investigation reports were permitted only within the annual report. The changes brought the authority and power enjoyed by the Ombudsman to more or less that of the present day. Yet it is still criticised in terms of its confidentiality element in that it limits the capacity of the Commissioner to disclose the necessary information and to exercise discretionary power.<ref name=":1" /> Third, the Chinese title of the Ombudsman was changed from “Administrative Affairs Ombudsman” to “Ombudsman”.


The most remarkable change in 1994 is the invention of a direct complaint system and abolition of the referral system.<ref>So, Andrew. The Eighth Annual Report of the Commissioner for Administrative Complaints Hong Kong; The Government Printer: Hong Kong, June 1996, 6.</ref> Citizen can therefore direct file complaint to the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman handles the complaints from its receival to conclusion, which is more independent and autonomous. However is an expansion of power but it magnifies the undersupply of resources of the Ombudsman in the pre-transition period. The number of complaints has dramatically rise. The workload of the Office has increased 17 fold comparing to 1989 but the size of establishment has only been tripled.<ref name=":3" /> The small office of 90-staff against 62 department with approximately 180,000 public servants are regarded as burdensome. The Ombudsman has made corresponding measures by eliminating the mandatory requirement to prepare report to the Head of the Department.Alternatively, with consented by the complainant, the investigation will be remitted to the relevant Department.<ref name=":1" /> That marked the removal of the mandatory requirement of investigation that lasted until now (i.e. 2016).
The most remarkable change in 1994 was the creation of a direct complaints channel and the abolition of the referral system.<ref>So, Andrew. The Eighth Annual Report of the Commissioner for Administrative Complaints Hong Kong; The Government Printer: Hong Kong, June 1996, 6.</ref> Citizens could now file complaints directly to the Ombudsman, who therefore handled complaints from receipt to conclusion, a more independent and autonomous process. However, the expansion of power also magnified the undersupply of resources of the Ombudsman in the pre-transition period. The number of complaints rose dramatically, increasing 17-fold compared with 1989 but met with personnel levels that had only tripled.<ref name=":3" /> Just 90 staff had to deal with 62 departments of approximately 180,000 public servants. The Ombudsman responded to the increased load by eliminating the mandatory requirement to prepare a report to the Head of the department. Alternatively, with the consent of the complainant, an investigation could be remitted to the relevant department,<ref name=":1" /> removing the mandatory requirement for investigation.


'''1996 Improvement'''
'''1996 improvement'''


In 1996, the Commissioner for Administrative Complaints was given a new English title of “the Ombudsman” and the “Office of the Ombudsman” (Ombudsman, HK, 2016).
In 1996, the Commissioner for Administrative Complaints was given a new English title of “the Ombudsman” and the “Office of the Ombudsman” (Ombudsman, HK, 2016).


In order to enhance the maladministration handling system, a drafted Ombudsman (Amendment) ordinance was proposed to further expand the power and enhance the operation of the Ombudsman. The Ordinance came into effect on 27 December 1996.
In order to enhance the system to handle complaints of maladministration, an Ombudsman (Amendment) ordinance was proposed to further expand the power and enhance the operation of the Ombudsman. The Ordinance came into effect on 27 December 1996.


The degree of penetration has been enhanced. The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman was expanded to cover the Hong Kong Police Force, Hong Kong Auxiliary Police Force, Independent Commission Against Corruption, Independent Police Complaints Council and Public Service Commission (Ombudsman Ordinance (Cap. 397)). The Ombudsman was empowered to investigate into these organizations regarding the Code on Access to Information,<ref>Chau, P.K. (2006). The Jurisdiction of Ombudsman Systems in Selected Places. Research and Library Services Division, Legislative Council Secretariat.</ref> however, there are still a certain degree of limitation on their actions relating to the ICAC and the Hong Kong Police Force. As stated in the Ombudsman Ordinance (Cap. 397) Schedule 2:
The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman was further expanded to cover the [[Hong Kong Police Force]], [[Hong Kong Auxiliary Police Force]], ICAC, [[Independent Police Complaints Council]] and [[Public Service Commission (Hong Kong)|Public Service Commission]] (Ombudsman Ordinance (Cap. 397)). The Ombudsman was empowered to investigate these organisations regarding the Code on Access to Information,<ref>Chau, P.K. (2006). The Jurisdiction of Ombudsman Systems in Selected Places. Research and Library Services Division, Legislative Council Secretariat.</ref> However, there remained certain limitations on its actions relating to the ICAC and the police force. As stated in the Ombudsman Ordinance (Cap. 397) Schedule 2:


Any action taken by the Independent Commission Against Corruption, the Hong Kong Auxiliary Police Force or the Hong Kong Police Force in relation to the prevention, detection or investigation of any crime or offence, whether or not the action is taken solely by any one of these organizations, or jointly by more than one of these organizations or by any one or more of them together with any other organizations or persons.
''Any action taken by the Independent Commission Against Corruption, the Hong Kong Auxiliary Police Force or the Hong Kong Police Force in relation to the prevention, detection or investigation of any crime or offence, whether or not the action is taken solely by any one of these organisations, or jointly by more than one of these organisations or by any one or more of them together with any other organisations or persons.''


Furthermore, the Ombudsman was no longer required by rules to come up with investigation reports in verified complaint cases (Ombudsman Ordinance (Cap 397 s 16(1)). Discretionary power is granted to the Ombudsman on their investigations.<ref name=":4" />
Furthermore, the Ombudsman was no longer required by its rules to deliver investigation reports in verified complaint cases (Ombudsman Ordinance (Cap 397 s 16(1)). Discretionary power was granted to the Ombudsman regarding its investigations.<ref name=":4" />


In terms of responsibility, the Obligation of Confidentiality expressly required the Ombudsman and its officers to have no disclosure on the content of investigation as well as the any other matters related to the complaint that they have received.<ref name=":1" /> An expanded interpretation on confidentiality regulations had been set out in 1996, stating that when and only when the disclosure of the information could lead to enforcement of the investigation under the Ordinance, the Ombudsman and its officer has the power to disclose that information (Ombudsman Ordinance (Cap. 397) s 13(3)(a)).
In terms of responsibility, the Obligation of Confidentiality expressly requires the Ombudsman and its officers to not disclose any content of their investigations or other information relating to a complaint.<ref name=":1" /> An expanded interpretation of confidentiality regulations was set out in 1996, stating that only when sufficient to lead to enforcement of the investigation under the Ordinance could the Ombudsman and its officers disclose its information.<ref>Ombudsman Ordinance (Cap. 397) s 13(3)(a)</ref>


Despite the improvement such as that the obligation of confidentiality has been relaxed, the Ombudsman still possess no right to publish and publicize the investigation report to the public. The lack of independence and flexibility still remain as a problem found in the operation of the Ombudsman.<ref name=":5">Chan, C.Y (2014). 香港申訴專員制度研究-以歷數史制度主義為視角</ref>
Despite improvements such as the relaxation of the obligation of confidentiality, the Ombudsman still possessed no right to publish or publicise its investigation reports to the public. The lack of independence and flexibility remained a problem in the operation of the Ombudsman.<ref name=":5">Chan, C.Y (2014). 香港申訴專員制度研究-以歷數史制度主義為視角</ref>


'''2001 Reform'''
'''2001 reform'''


In face of the constraints encountered the implementation of the 1996 Ordinance, the Head of the Ombudsman raised the suggestion of bringing the Ombudsman out of government and civil servant hierarchy so as to build an independent maladministration-handling system with separate financial management. In support of the independence, the government was concurrently encouraged to think from the perspective of ‘managing maladministration’ and was urged to delegate necessary power in order to ensure the effective working and management after the departure from the government structure.<ref name=":5" />
In the face of constraints encountered the implementation of the 1996 Ordinance, the Head of the Ombudsman raised the suggestion of bringing the Ombudsman out of government and the civil service hierarchy so as to build an independent system to handle complaints of maladministration, with separate financial management. In support of the independence, the government was concurrently encouraged to think from the perspective of ‘managing maladministration’ and was urged to delegate necessary powers in order to ensure the effective working and management after the Ombudsman's departure from the government structure.<ref name=":5" />


Therefore, in response to the demand from the Ombudsman, a Committee was once again set up to draft the ‘Ombudsman (Amendment) Ordinance 2001’, which then remains to be the effective Ordinance in Hong Kong.
In response to this request from the Ombudsman, a committee was set up to draft the ‘Ombudsman (Amendment) Ordinance 2001’, which remains the effective ordinance in Hong Kong.


The most remarkable change in the 2001 Reform was the growth of independence of the Ombudsman. It was stipulated in the Ordinance that the Ombudsman is a single legal and permanent entity that can sue or be sued. The law also empowers the Ombudsman to determine the terms and conditions of those he delegate. The Ombudsman cannot be seen as agency or employee of the government of have a position in the government, with controlling officer of bribery prevention as the only exception. Hence, Ombudsman does not enjoy the status, exemption and privileges available to the government.<ref name=":4" />
The most remarkable change in the 2001 reform was the growth of independence of the Ombudsman. It was stipulated in the ordinance that the Ombudsman is a single legal and permanent entity that can sue or be sued. The law also empowers the Ombudsman to determine the terms and conditions he or she delegates<!-- need to check that this is the cited meaning-->. The aim was that the Ombudsman would not be seen as an agency or employee of the government of to have a position in the government, with its controlling officer of bribery prevention as the only exception. Hence, the Ombudsman does not enjoy the status, exemption and privileges available to the government.<ref name=":4" />


However, checks and balances are maintained simultaneously. As expressly stipulated in The Ombudsman Amendment Ordinance 2001, the Ombudsman have to submit working report, account statement and an auditor’s report to the Chief Executive each year, which will then be submitted to the Legislative Council. They should also submit to the LegCo on their resource management status. Therefore, it could be said that the CE and LegCo may supervise their operation and management. Financially, the Auditor General may in any financial year evaluate the efficiency of the Ombudsman without questioning their policy goal. Although being a separate legal entity, just as other statutory bodies, the Ombudsman and the staff of its office is still subject to supervision of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (THE OMBUDSMAN (AMENDMENT) ORDINANCE 2001) .
However, checks and balances are maintained simultaneously. As expressly stipulated in The Ombudsman (Amendment) Ordinance 2001, the Ombudsman must each year submit a working report, accounts statement and auditor's report to the Chief Executive, which will then be submitted to the Legislative Council. It must also submit a report to LegCo on its resource management status. Therefore, it can be said that the Chief Executive and LegCo supervise its operation and management. Financially, the [[Director of Audit (Hong Kong)|Director of Audit]] may in any financial year evaluate the efficiency of the Ombudsman without questioning its policy goals. As a separate legal entity, like other statutory bodies, the Ombudsman and the staff of its office are still subject to the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance.<ref>The Ombudsman (Amendment) Ordinance 2001</ref>


'''Post-2001 - Gradual development with growing focus on publicity initiatives'''
'''Post-2001 - gradual development with growing focus on publicity initiatives'''


'''Increase in Direct Investigation'''
'''Increase in direct investigation'''


Come the turn of the 21st century, the HKSAR Ombudsman’s Office has adopted a far more progressive outlook towards civic unification, and amendment within political and socio-economic maladministration, focusing notably on the use of modern resources to best ensure efficiency. To be more specific, the Ombudsman’s Office has, since 2001, prioritized the conduction of a far more thorough range of preliminary enquiries towards the direct investigation of issues, in doing so allowing for a more effective assessment of the social and financial viability of proposed reform policies, prior to their implementation. For example, the annual Ombudsman’s report from 2003–04, refers to the need of a more analytical, or “global view”,<ref name=":3" /> towards addressing maladministration within Hong Kong, given the emergence of a set of identified patterns within public complaints, most notably including, though not limited to, the “reluctance in enforcement”,<ref name=":3" /> along with interdepartmental coordination, etc.
Come the turn of the 21st century, the HKSAR Ombudsman's Office had adopted a far more progressive outlook towards civic unification, and amendment within political and socio-economic maladministration, focusing notably on the use of modern resources to best ensure efficiency. Specifically, the Ombudsman's Office, from 2001, prioritised the conduct of a wider range of preliminary enquiries towards the direct investigation of issues, which allowed for a more effective assessment of the social and financial viability of proposed reform policies, prior to their implementation. For example, from 2003 to 2004 the annual Ombudsman's report referred to the need for a more analytical, or “global view”,<ref name=":3" /> towards addressing maladministration within Hong Kong, given the emergence of a set of identified patterns within public complaints, most notably, though not limited to, the “reluctance in enforcement”,<ref name=":3" /> along with interdepartmental coordination.


'''Publicity'''
'''Publicity'''


Having acknowledged the discrepancies within the relationship between the public and the Ombudsman, the latter therefore embarked on increasing awareness as to their role, along with the prevalence of one's social, or civic duty, via a range of contemporary publicity initiatives, such as the wider use of media and technology to better inform Hong Kong’s public not just as to what issues were of most importance to society, but more so how they could be more involved in facilitating social, political and economic paradigms, and bring about progress. This was best exemplified by the Ombudsman’s Offices’ cooperation with Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK), over the production of an 8 episode television series, in 2013 (Lai, 2013) , in addition to entirely restructuring their website, so as to make it more user friendly. Earlier implemented social initiatives had a near immediate impact as well, as by 2005 the Ombudsman’s Office had received record high 15,626 enquiries along with over 5,600 complaints,<ref name=":3" /> completing 4 direct investigations, symbolizing a positive and progressive trend in public and civic interaction through to 2015-16, wherein 8 direct investigations were completed. (Lau, 2015)
Having acknowledged the discrepancies within the relationship between the public and the Ombudsman, the latter therefore embarked on increasing awareness as to its role, along with the prevalence of one's social, or civic duty, via a range of publicity initiatives, such as the wider use of media and technology to better inform Hong Kong's public not just as to what issues were of most importance to society, but more so how they could be more involved in facilitating social, political and economic paradigms, and bring about progress. This was best exemplified by the Ombudsman's Offices’ cooperation with [[Radio Television Hong Kong]], over the production of an eight-episode television series, in 2013.<ref>Lai, 2013</ref> Earlier implemented social initiatives had a near-immediate impact as well, as by 2005 the Ombudsman's Office had received a record-high 15,626 enquiries along with over 5,600 complaints,<ref name=":3" /> completing four direct investigations, symbolising a positive and progressive trend in public and civic interaction through to 2015–16, when eight direct investigations were completed.<ref>Lau, 2015</ref>


'''Government department’s perception on ombudsman'''
'''Government departments’ perceptions of the Ombudsman'''


Despite exemplary developmental progress from within the HK Ombudsman’s Office, post the handover going into the 21st century, their authority has nonetheless come under question, and been criticized on occasion. For example, during the 2013-2014 term (Lau, 2014) , a government department from within the administrative infrastructure, challenged the Ombudsman’s Office, over issues relating to their contractual obligations or protocol, during a sales contract between two parties. Given further investigation, and ample consultation from a wide array of advisors, the Ombudsman Office reaffirmed their authority and jurisdiction over matters under complaint, given the fact that contract was not commercial in nature (thus under public sector review), and that its nature was against that of accepted policy. (Lau, 2014)
Despite exemplary developmental progress from within the Ombudsman's Office, after the handover going into the 21st century, its authority nonetheless came under question and was criticised on occasion. For example, during the 2013–2014 term,<ref name=Lau2014>Lau, 2014</ref> a government department the Ombudsman's Office over issues relating to its contractual obligations or protocol, during a sales contract between two parties. After investigation, the Ombudsman's Office reaffirmed their authority and jurisdiction over the matters under complaint, given the fact that the contract was not commercial in nature (thus under public sector review), and that its nature was against that of accepted policy.<ref name=Lau2014/>


==Ombudsman==
==Ombudsman==
{| class="wikitable"
* 2001-2009 - [[Alice Tai (ombudsman)|Alice Tai]]
|+
* 1 April 2009 - 31 March 2014 - [[Alan Lai]]
!No.
* 1 Apr 2014 - 31 March 2019 - Connie Lau Yin Hing<ref>[http://www.news.gov.hk/en/categories/admin/html/2014/03/20140317_151919.shtml New Ombudsman appointed], news.gov.hk, 17 March 2014</ref>
!Name
!Term began
!Term ended
!Length of term
|-
|1
|{{interlanguage link|Arthur Garcia|zh|賈施雅}}, <small>CBE, JP</small>
|1 February 1989
|31 January 1994
|{{age in years and days|1989|2|1|1994|1|31|sep=and|duration=on}}
|-
|2
|[[Andrew So]], <small>SBS, OBE, JP</small>
|1 February 1994
|31 March 1999
|{{age in years and days|1994|2|1|1999|3|31|sep=and|duration=on}}
|-
|3
|Alice Tai, <small>GBS, OBE, JP</small>
|1 April 1999
|31 March 2009
|{{age in years and days|1999|4|1|2009|3|31|sep=and|duration=on}}
|-
|4
|[[Alan Lai]], <small>GBS, JP</small>
|1 April 2009
|31 March 2014
|{{age in years and days|2009|4|1|2014|3|31|sep=and|duration=on}}
|-
|5
|Connie Lau, <small>SBS, JP</small>
|1 April 2014
|31 March 2019
|{{age in years and days|2014|4|1|2019|3|31|sep=and|duration=on}}
|-
|6
|Winnie Chiu, <small>PDSM, PMSM</small>
|1 April 2019
|31 March 2024
|{{age in years and days|2019|4|1|2024|3|31|sep=and|duration=on}}
|-
|7
|Jack Chan
|1 April 2024
|''Incumbent''
|{{age in years and days|2024|4|1|sep=and|duration=on}}
|}


==See also==
==See also==
Line 108: Line 165:
{{Office of the Chief Executive (Hong Kong)}}
{{Office of the Chief Executive (Hong Kong)}}


{{authority control}}
[[Category:Ombudsman posts]]

[[Category:Hong Kong government departments and agencies]]
[[Category:1989 establishments in Hong Kong]]
[[Category:Ombudsman posts|Hong Kong, Ombudsman]]
[[Category:Statutory bodies in Hong Kong]]
[[Category:Statutory bodies in Hong Kong]]
[[Category:Hong Kong government departments and agencies]]

Latest revision as of 09:27, 7 May 2024

Office of The Ombudsman
申訴專員公署
Agency overview
Formed1 March 1989; 35 years ago (1989-03-01)
Headquarters30/F, China Merchants Tower, Shun Tak Centre, 168-200 Connaught Road Central, Hong Kong
Employees90 (March 2007) [1]
Annual budgetHK$85.1m (2008-09) [2]
Agency executives
  • Jack CHAN Jick-chi, Ombudsman
  • Mr So Kam Shing, Deputy Ombudsman
Websitewww.ombudsman.gov.hk
Office of the Ombudsman
Traditional Chinese申訴專員公署
Simplified Chinese申诉专员公署
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinShēnsù Zhuānyuán Gōngshǔ
Yue: Cantonese
Yale RomanizationSān sou jyūn yùhn gūng chyúh
JyutpingSan1 sou3 zyun1 jun4 gung2 cyu4

The Office of Ombudsman is a Hong Kong statutory authority, established on 1 March 1989, charged with ensuring that Hong Kong is served by a fair and efficient public administration that is committed to accountability, openness and quality of services. It operates mainly by investigating and giving recommendations to government departments.[1]

Functions

[edit]

The major purpose of the Ombudsman is to investigate complaints against major public organisations and government departments and agencies in Hong Kong. It also oversees complaints against the executive branch in relation to non-compliance with the Code on Access to Information.[1] Notably, the Ombudsman is empowered to initiate direct investigations into issues of potentially wide public interest and concern without the requirement of having a complainant. For instance, it conducts four to eight active investigations each year, such as regarding the policy over special education services for students with emotional needs, following an enquiry by a Legislative Councillor.[2] Another example would be looking into government policy on granting recreational lease and then making recommendations.[3]

The Ombudsman adopts a variety of methods to handle complaints. The basic form is inquiry, referring to the practice that requires the organisation to offer a response for examination and give suggestions thereafter. When serious or further problems are observed, a full investigation follows. It applies when the complaint involves issues of principle, systemic flaws or serious maladministration.[4] A full investigation will be conducted with prior notice to the head of the department concerned. In cases of minor maladministration, with the consent of the complainant and the organisation concerned, investigators trained in mediation will serve as impartial mediators to settle the conflict.[5][6]

It is worth noting that the Ombudsman is statutorily prevented from investigating: prosecutorial policy, legal proceedings, imposition (or variation) of condition of land grant, personnel matters and commercial transactions.[7] Also, it will not take a complaint made more than two years after the complainant first knew of the situation.[8] The Ombudsman will not take complaints if the complainant is not the person aggrieved or if the complaint has no connection with Hong Kong. It also retains discretion to reject complaints that are trivial, frivolous or not made in good faith.[9]

History

[edit]

At its establishment in 1989, the office was known as “The Commissioner for Administrative Complaints”, under the Commissioner for Administrative Complaints Ordinance. The Ombudsman was not then a corporate unit and could handle only complaints that were referred from a Legislative Councillor.[10]

Before its establishment, complaints channels in Hong Kong were uncoordinated, being made through, for example, Legislative Councillors, members of District Boards or the Urban Council. However, such persons did not have the power to demand information or explanation.[11] A petition to the British government or a judicial review was available but these channels failed to limit the discretion of the Governor.[12] The more institutional way was to complain through the Complaints Office under the Executive Council. In corruption-related matters, someone could express their grievance to the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), however, there was no distinct and independent office to handle matters of maladministration.

The call for an ombudsman was first made in a speech in the Legislative Council in February 1965, and such a proposal was supported by the councillors who also urged the establishment of an ombudsman in the wake of the 1967 riots.[13] In 1986, the Government published “Redress of Grievances”, which revealed the majority view then that an independent and authorised organisation to handle complaints should be created.[14] Scholars state that the establishment of an ombudsman was argued to be motivated by the Hong Kong Public Administration Reform that emphasised “higher efficiency and better services”, and growing political awareness and democratisation initiated from the mid-80s.[11]

When it was established, the Office consisted of 27 members, led by a Directorate consisting of five members.[15] There were separate divisions for development, assessment and investigation.[15] The new set-up also included independent panels of professional advisors. Since most officials in the body would return to the administrative department upon completion of secondment, there was concern regarding a lack of commitment on their part as well as problems of continuity and limited vision in terms of the long-term development of the Ombudsman office.[16]

Development

[edit]

Situation in 1988

There were several limitations in the 1988 Commissioner for Administrative Complaints Bill. Firstly, the Ordinance required complaints to be first made to Legislative Councillors instead of the Commissioners, adding an obstructive layer of bureaucracy. Besides, the powers of the Commissioners were limited in application to only 52 governmental departments. They were not allowed to investigate acts of the police or ICAC, affairs related to security, international relations, legal actions or contracts, or even public enterprises and the administration of civil servants.[17] This created a failure to meet the legislative aim, which was to investigate minor mistakes by civil servants.[18] As well as such a failure of reach, the Commissioner also faced significant constraints in the conduct of investigations. The targeted administrative departments could hinder an investigation into maladministration involving the public interest but without specific victims by refusing to disclose documents, claiming insufficient legitimate and persuasive explanation by the Commissioner.

In the decade following, the Ombudsman underwent several reforms to address these various deficiencies until 2001, through the amendment of legislation. The period post-2001 saw gradual development in both investigative operations and publicity.

1994 reform

In response to changes proposed by Governor Chris Patten in 1992 and the limitations of the 1988 Ordinance, a Committee was set up to draft the “Commissioner for Administrative Complaints (Amendment) Ordinance. The amended ordinance, gazetted in 1994, incorporated several improvements in the institution of the Ombudsman.[19]

First, its reach was enhanced to include the potential to investigate a further six statutory bodies, including the Urban Council, Regional Council and Housing Authority. Second, the Ombudsman was given the power to publish anonymous investigation reports on issues of public interest, at any time of the year. Previously, investigation reports were permitted only within the annual report. The changes brought the authority and power enjoyed by the Ombudsman to more or less that of the present day. Yet it is still criticised in terms of its confidentiality element in that it limits the capacity of the Commissioner to disclose the necessary information and to exercise discretionary power.[11] Third, the Chinese title of the Ombudsman was changed from “Administrative Affairs Ombudsman” to “Ombudsman”.

The most remarkable change in 1994 was the creation of a direct complaints channel and the abolition of the referral system.[20] Citizens could now file complaints directly to the Ombudsman, who therefore handled complaints from receipt to conclusion, a more independent and autonomous process. However, the expansion of power also magnified the undersupply of resources of the Ombudsman in the pre-transition period. The number of complaints rose dramatically, increasing 17-fold compared with 1989 but met with personnel levels that had only tripled.[16] Just 90 staff had to deal with 62 departments of approximately 180,000 public servants. The Ombudsman responded to the increased load by eliminating the mandatory requirement to prepare a report to the Head of the department. Alternatively, with the consent of the complainant, an investigation could be remitted to the relevant department,[11] removing the mandatory requirement for investigation.

1996 improvement

In 1996, the Commissioner for Administrative Complaints was given a new English title of “the Ombudsman” and the “Office of the Ombudsman” (Ombudsman, HK, 2016).

In order to enhance the system to handle complaints of maladministration, an Ombudsman (Amendment) ordinance was proposed to further expand the power and enhance the operation of the Ombudsman. The Ordinance came into effect on 27 December 1996.

The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman was further expanded to cover the Hong Kong Police Force, Hong Kong Auxiliary Police Force, ICAC, Independent Police Complaints Council and Public Service Commission (Ombudsman Ordinance (Cap. 397)). The Ombudsman was empowered to investigate these organisations regarding the Code on Access to Information,[21] However, there remained certain limitations on its actions relating to the ICAC and the police force. As stated in the Ombudsman Ordinance (Cap. 397) Schedule 2:

Any action taken by the Independent Commission Against Corruption, the Hong Kong Auxiliary Police Force or the Hong Kong Police Force in relation to the prevention, detection or investigation of any crime or offence, whether or not the action is taken solely by any one of these organisations, or jointly by more than one of these organisations or by any one or more of them together with any other organisations or persons.

Furthermore, the Ombudsman was no longer required by its rules to deliver investigation reports in verified complaint cases (Ombudsman Ordinance (Cap 397 s 16(1)). Discretionary power was granted to the Ombudsman regarding its investigations.[19]

In terms of responsibility, the Obligation of Confidentiality expressly requires the Ombudsman and its officers to not disclose any content of their investigations or other information relating to a complaint.[11] An expanded interpretation of confidentiality regulations was set out in 1996, stating that only when sufficient to lead to enforcement of the investigation under the Ordinance could the Ombudsman and its officers disclose its information.[22]

Despite improvements such as the relaxation of the obligation of confidentiality, the Ombudsman still possessed no right to publish or publicise its investigation reports to the public. The lack of independence and flexibility remained a problem in the operation of the Ombudsman.[23]

2001 reform

In the face of constraints encountered the implementation of the 1996 Ordinance, the Head of the Ombudsman raised the suggestion of bringing the Ombudsman out of government and the civil service hierarchy so as to build an independent system to handle complaints of maladministration, with separate financial management. In support of the independence, the government was concurrently encouraged to think from the perspective of ‘managing maladministration’ and was urged to delegate necessary powers in order to ensure the effective working and management after the Ombudsman's departure from the government structure.[23]

In response to this request from the Ombudsman, a committee was set up to draft the ‘Ombudsman (Amendment) Ordinance 2001’, which remains the effective ordinance in Hong Kong.

The most remarkable change in the 2001 reform was the growth of independence of the Ombudsman. It was stipulated in the ordinance that the Ombudsman is a single legal and permanent entity that can sue or be sued. The law also empowers the Ombudsman to determine the terms and conditions he or she delegates. The aim was that the Ombudsman would not be seen as an agency or employee of the government of to have a position in the government, with its controlling officer of bribery prevention as the only exception. Hence, the Ombudsman does not enjoy the status, exemption and privileges available to the government.[19]

However, checks and balances are maintained simultaneously. As expressly stipulated in The Ombudsman (Amendment) Ordinance 2001, the Ombudsman must each year submit a working report, accounts statement and auditor's report to the Chief Executive, which will then be submitted to the Legislative Council. It must also submit a report to LegCo on its resource management status. Therefore, it can be said that the Chief Executive and LegCo supervise its operation and management. Financially, the Director of Audit may in any financial year evaluate the efficiency of the Ombudsman without questioning its policy goals. As a separate legal entity, like other statutory bodies, the Ombudsman and the staff of its office are still subject to the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance.[24]

Post-2001 - gradual development with growing focus on publicity initiatives

Increase in direct investigation

Come the turn of the 21st century, the HKSAR Ombudsman's Office had adopted a far more progressive outlook towards civic unification, and amendment within political and socio-economic maladministration, focusing notably on the use of modern resources to best ensure efficiency. Specifically, the Ombudsman's Office, from 2001, prioritised the conduct of a wider range of preliminary enquiries towards the direct investigation of issues, which allowed for a more effective assessment of the social and financial viability of proposed reform policies, prior to their implementation. For example, from 2003 to 2004 the annual Ombudsman's report referred to the need for a more analytical, or “global view”,[16] towards addressing maladministration within Hong Kong, given the emergence of a set of identified patterns within public complaints, most notably, though not limited to, the “reluctance in enforcement”,[16] along with interdepartmental coordination.

Publicity

Having acknowledged the discrepancies within the relationship between the public and the Ombudsman, the latter therefore embarked on increasing awareness as to its role, along with the prevalence of one's social, or civic duty, via a range of publicity initiatives, such as the wider use of media and technology to better inform Hong Kong's public not just as to what issues were of most importance to society, but more so how they could be more involved in facilitating social, political and economic paradigms, and bring about progress. This was best exemplified by the Ombudsman's Offices’ cooperation with Radio Television Hong Kong, over the production of an eight-episode television series, in 2013.[25] Earlier implemented social initiatives had a near-immediate impact as well, as by 2005 the Ombudsman's Office had received a record-high 15,626 enquiries along with over 5,600 complaints,[16] completing four direct investigations, symbolising a positive and progressive trend in public and civic interaction through to 2015–16, when eight direct investigations were completed.[26]

Government departments’ perceptions of the Ombudsman

Despite exemplary developmental progress from within the Ombudsman's Office, after the handover going into the 21st century, its authority nonetheless came under question and was criticised on occasion. For example, during the 2013–2014 term,[27] a government department the Ombudsman's Office over issues relating to its contractual obligations or protocol, during a sales contract between two parties. After investigation, the Ombudsman's Office reaffirmed their authority and jurisdiction over the matters under complaint, given the fact that the contract was not commercial in nature (thus under public sector review), and that its nature was against that of accepted policy.[27]

Ombudsman

[edit]
No. Name Term began Term ended Length of term
1 Arthur Garcia [zh], CBE, JP 1 February 1989 31 January 1994 5 years and 0 days
2 Andrew So, SBS, OBE, JP 1 February 1994 31 March 1999 5 years and 59 days
3 Alice Tai, GBS, OBE, JP 1 April 1999 31 March 2009 10 years and 0 days
4 Alan Lai, GBS, JP 1 April 2009 31 March 2014 5 years and 0 days
5 Connie Lau, SBS, JP 1 April 2014 31 March 2019 5 years and 0 days
6 Winnie Chiu, PDSM, PMSM 1 April 2019 31 March 2024 5 years and 0 days
7 Jack Chan 1 April 2024 Incumbent 228 days

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ a b Ombudsman, HK. (2016). The 28th Annual Report of The Ombudsman. Office of the Ombudsman Hong Kong.
  2. ^ Lau, 2016
  3. ^ Li, 2012
  4. ^ Lai, 2009
  5. ^ Lai, 2012
  6. ^ Ombudsman, HK, 2013
  7. ^ Ombudsman Ordinance, Schedule 2
  8. ^ Ombudsman Ordinance (s10(1)
  9. ^ Ombudsman Ordinance (s10(2)
  10. ^ Legislative Council Secretariat, 1998
  11. ^ a b c d e CWH Lo and R Wickins, “Towards an Accountable and Quality Public Administration in Hong Kong: Redressing Administration Grievances through the Ombudsman” (2002) 25 International Journal of Public Administration, pp 737-772.
  12. ^ Crown Rights (Re-entry and Vesting Remedies) Ordinance
  13. ^ Official Report of Proceedings, 1965
  14. ^ Hong Kong Government Printer, 1986
  15. ^ a b Garcia, Arthur. The First Annual Report of the Commissioner for Administrative Complaints Hong Kong; The Government Printer: Hong Kong, June 1989, 22
  16. ^ a b c d e Tai, Alice. The Eleventh Annual Report of the Commissioner for Administrative Complaints Hong Kong; The Government Printer: Hong Kong, June 1999, 27.
  17. ^ Commissioner for Administrative Complaints Bill 1988 (Cap. 397)
  18. ^ Hong Kong Legislative Council (1988). Official Report of Proceedings, Hong Kong
  19. ^ a b c Bills Committees on Commissioner for Administrative Complaints (Amendment) Bill 1996
  20. ^ So, Andrew. The Eighth Annual Report of the Commissioner for Administrative Complaints Hong Kong; The Government Printer: Hong Kong, June 1996, 6.
  21. ^ Chau, P.K. (2006). The Jurisdiction of Ombudsman Systems in Selected Places. Research and Library Services Division, Legislative Council Secretariat.
  22. ^ Ombudsman Ordinance (Cap. 397) s 13(3)(a)
  23. ^ a b Chan, C.Y (2014). 香港申訴專員制度研究-以歷數史制度主義為視角
  24. ^ The Ombudsman (Amendment) Ordinance 2001
  25. ^ Lai, 2013
  26. ^ Lau, 2015
  27. ^ a b Lau, 2014
[edit]