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{{short description|Problem in epistemology that any proposition can be endlessly questioned}}
[[File:Infinite regress en.svg|thumb|Infinite regress]]
The argument is also known as '''''diallelus'''''<ref>[[Nicholas Rescher]],
{{Google books|id=pqez0V0w1MUC|title=Epistemology: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge|page=22}}</ref> ([[Latin]]) or '''''diallelon''''', from [[
==Structure==
Assuming that knowledge is [[justified true belief]], then:
# Suppose that P is some piece of knowledge. Then P is a ''justified'' true belief.
# The only thing that can justify P is another statement – let's call it P<sub>1</sub>; so P<sub>1</sub> justifies P.
# But if P<sub>1</sub> is to be a satisfactory justification for P, then we must ''know'' that P<sub>1</sub> is true.
# But for P<sub>1</sub> to be known, it must also be a ''justified'' true belief.
# ''That'' justification will be another statement - let's call it P<sub>2</sub>; so P<sub>2</sub> justifies P<sub>1</sub>.
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== Responses ==
Throughout
* some statements do not need justification, * the chain of reasoning loops back on itself, * the sequence never finishes, * belief cannot be justified as beyond doubt. ===Foundationalism===
Perhaps the chain begins with a belief that is justified, but which is not justified by another belief. Such beliefs are called [[basic belief]]s. In this solution, which is called [[foundationalism]], all beliefs are justified by basic beliefs. Foundationalism seeks to escape the regress argument by claiming that there are some beliefs for which it is improper to ask for a justification. (See also ''[[A priori and a posteriori|a priori]]''.)
Foundationalism is the belief that a chain of justification begins with a belief that is justified, but which is not justified by another belief. Thus, a belief is justified [[if and only if]]:
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[[Infinitism]] argues that the chain can go on forever. Critics argue that this means there is never adequate justification for any statement in the chain.
===
[[Philosophical skepticism|Skeptics]] reject the three above responses and argue that beliefs cannot be justified as beyond doubt. Note that many skeptics do not deny that things may appear in a certain way. However, such sense impressions cannot, in the skeptical view, be used to find beliefs that cannot be doubted. Also, skeptics do not deny that, for example, many laws of nature give the appearance of working or that doing certain things give the appearance of producing pleasure/pain or even that reason and logic seem to be useful tools. Skepticism is in this view valuable since it encourages continued investigation.<ref>[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/ skepticism] on ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''</ref>
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==See also==
*
* {{annotated link|Cogito, ergo sum}}
* {{annotated link|Infinite regress}}
*
* [[Plato]]'s
*
*
*
*[[Justification (epistemology)]]
== References ==
{{reflist}}
{{skepticism}}
{{epistemology}}
[[Category:Concepts in epistemology]]
[[Category:Justification (epistemology)]]
[[Category:Philosophical arguments]]
[[Category:Philosophical problems]]
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