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{{redirect|Grue and bleenblue|the linguistic term "grue", used for translation from natural languages|Distinction of blue and green in various languages}}
'''Grue''' and '''bleen''' are examples of logical [[Predicate (mathematical logic)|predicates]] coined by [[Nelson Goodman]] in ''[[Fact, Fiction, and Forecast]]'' to illustrate the "'''new riddle of induction'''" – a successor to [[problem of induction|Hume's original problem]]. These predicates are unusual because their application is time-dependent; many have tried to solve the new riddle on those terms, but [[Hilary Putnam]] and others have argued such time-dependency depends on the language adopted, and in some languages it is equally true for natural-sounding predicates such as "green." For Goodman they illustrate the problem of projectible predicates and ultimately, which empirical generalizations are [[Scientific law|law-like]] and which are not.<ref name="Goodman.1946">{{cite journal| author=Nelson Goodman| title=A Query on Confirmation| journal=The Journal of Philosophy|date=Jul 1946| volume=43| number=14| pages=383–385| url=http://wordsmatter.caltech.edu/~franz/Confirmation%20and%20Induction/PDFs/Nelson%20Goodman%20-%20A%20Query%20on%20Confirmation.pdf| doi=10.2307/2020332| jstor=2020332}}</ref><ref name="Goodman.1983">{{cite book|author=Nelson Goodman|title=Fact, fiction, and forecast|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=i97_LdPXwrAC|accessdate=8 March 2012|year=1983|publisher=Harvard University Press|isbn=978-0-674-29071-6|page=74}}</ref>
Goodman's construction and use of ''grue'' and ''bleen'' illustrates how philosophers use simple examples in [[analytic philosophy|conceptual analysis]].