Adaptive representation: Difference between revisions

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{{Short description|Theory about the nature of cognition}}
'''Adaptive representation''' is an extension by [[Francis Heylighen]]<ref>Heylighen, Francis (1990). ''Representation and Change: A Metarepresentational Framework for the Foundations of Physical and Cognitive Science''. Communication and Cognition, Ghent, Belgium.</ref> to [[Immanuel Kant|Kant]]'s [[epistemology|theory of knowledge]].
 
According to Kant, [[perception]] passes by the filters of the mind who observes the phenomena. In this line, there exists in the human mind invariant and ''[[A priori and a posteriori|a- priori]]'' principles of experience. As an example, one may have imprinted in the brain a [[Dualism (philosophy of mind)|Cartesian]] representation of space, a notion of time, color separation and others. This may be called "static representation".
 
Heylighen has proposed a revision of these Kantian ideas, in which these principles are not supposed to be invariant and necessary. [[A priori and a posteriori|a priori]]; insteadInstead, alternative principles exist for the organization of experience in adaptive representations. This opens a path for new investigations in the [[philosophy of mind]] and human [[cognition]].
 
==References==
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*[http://pcp.vub.ac.be/books/Rep&Change.pdf Web edition] of "Representation and Change" (1999).
 
[[Category:EpistemologyConcepts in epistemology]]
[[Category:Theories]]