Elinor Mason

University of Edinburgh, Philosophy, Faculty Member

Followers

603

Following

Public Views

Address: Department of Philosophy
School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences
The University of Edinburgh
Dugald Stewart Building
3 Charles Street
Edinburgh
EH8 9AD

less

Daniel D. Hutto

University of Wollongong

Galen Strawson

The University of Texas at Austin

Gunnar Björnsson

Stockholm University

Andrea Peto

Central European University

Brian Leiter

University of Chicago

Remo Caponi

University of Cologne

Shaun Gallagher

University of Memphis

Carla Bagnoli

Università degli studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia

Martin O'Neill

University of York

Katerina Kolozova

Ss. Cyril and Methodius University/ Institute of Social Science and Humanities, Skopje

InterestsView All (6)

Uploads

Papers by Elinor Mason

Ways to be Blameworthy

This book examines the relationship between our deontic notions, rightness and wrongness, and our... more This book examines the relationship between our deontic notions, rightness and wrongness, and our responsibility notions, praise- and blameworthiness. The book presents a pluralistic view of both our deontic concepts and our responsibility concepts, identifying three different ways to be blameworthy. First, ordinary blameworthiness is essentially connected to subjective rightness and wrongness. Subjective obligation and ordinary blameworthiness apply only to those who are within our moral community, that is to say, those who understand and share our value system. By contrast, the second sort of blameworthiness, detached blameworthiness, can apply even when the agent is outside our moral community, and has no sense that her act is morally wrong. We blame agents for acting objectively wrongly, even if we do not have any view about their state of mind in so doing. Finally, the third sort of blameworthiness is ‘extended blameworthiness’, which applies in some contexts where the agent ha...

Ethics: Meta, Normative and Applied || Do Consequentialists Have One Thought Too Many?

SEXUAL REFUSAL: THE FRAGILITY OF WOMEN'S AUTHORITY

I expand on and defend a particular account of silencing that has been identified by Mary Kate Mc... more I expand on and defend a particular account of silencing that has been identified by Mary Kate McGowan. She suggests that one sort of silencing occurs when men do not think that women have the authority to refuse. I develop this proposal, arguing that it is usefully distinct from other forms of silencing, which attribute a radical misunderstanding to the perpetrator. Authority silencing, by contrast, allows that the perpetrator understands that the woman is trying to refuse. I examine the nature of authority, and of refusal, and argue that a normatively binding refusal requires authority, the normative capacity to make a determination that has a 'because I said so' structure. Women's authority in this sense is fragile. Authority to refuse sexual advances can be lost through women's attire, how much they have had to drink, location, or their profession. This account makes sense of the way that perpetrators both do and do not understand sexual refusal, and explains how they are blameworthy despite their misunderstanding.

Elinor Mason

Uploads

Papers by Elinor Mason

Log In