enakshi mitra

University of Delhi, Department of Philosophy, Faculty Member

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I teach in the Dept of Philosophy, University of Delhi. My research interests include Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Action - with a special focus on the later Wittgenstein. Apart from several papers on Wittgenstein, Russell, I have published a book on later Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics, and have a manuscript on later Wittgenstein's view on reference. In the latter I have tried to synthesise the semantic notion of reference with his views of action. space and time. I am presently trying to situate Wittgenstein's views on perception, space, time within a broader framework of philosophy of science (including that of quantum gravity.

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Wittgenstein and Davidson on Actions: A Contrastive Analysis

Humanities and social sciences, 2015

There are several philosophical issues which are usually woven around the notion of actions. Apar... more There are several philosophical issues which are usually woven around the notion of actions. Apart from the dominant question as to how actions (as contrasted with involuntary happenings) are different from, and related with, cognition, wish and willóa question which boils down to the controversy whether actions are caused by these mental antecedents or justified (rationalized) atemporallyóthere arises the further dispute about which of the ontological categories like particulars, universals, events, substance, etc., will be suitable to house them. From the standpoint of philosophy of language, issues like analysis of the logical form and semantics of action-words and action-sentences demand special attention. A typically semantic problem regarding the difference between reference and description comes up with regard to actions, for the same action seems to be available to several descriptions. To take an instance cited by Davidson, the same action of flipping the switch may alternatively be described as ëdriving off a batí, ëchecking the degree of luminanceí, ëchecking the functionality of the power pointí, ëilluminating the roomí, ëdisturbing air moleculesí, ëalerting a prowlerí, etc. The strong suggestion that it is the very same action that is intentional under some of these descriptions and unintentional under other ones stirs up some prevalent philosophical anxietiesóthose regarding the extensional identity of the action, the ontology of its attributes and their mutual relationówith a fresh resurgence. In this paper, I seek to bring out the difference between the later Wittgensteinís 1 and Davidsonís view of actions with a special focus. This will be an attempt to compare and contrast their respective approaches to the correlative notions of wish, will (intention) and actions, an issue which has customarily been categorized as ëreasoní-approach of Wittgenstein as against the ëmental causationí theory endorsed by Davidson. I have sought to integrate this theme with the semantic issue of the distinction

Gandhi on Caturvarṇa and Niṣkāma Karma: A Re-interpretation

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research

Gandhi's writings on the issue of Caturvarṇa, despite their apparent lacunas, dogmatic tones and ... more Gandhi's writings on the issue of Caturvarṇa, despite their apparent lacunas, dogmatic tones and seeming inconsistencies, are available to a convincing reconstruction. With this purpose in view, the first section of this paper will attempt to give an anti-foundational reading of Caturvarṇa-where varṇa is seen to be based neither on the different proportions of the three guṇas (sattva, rajas and tamas), nor on a system of hereditary professions, but as abstract dimensions that are not mutually exclusive-and at best serves to give an orientation to our cognition and actions. This reading, while borrowing heavily from Shri Aurobindo's reading of Caturvarṇa, will seek to give it a more neutral and expansive direction, shorn of all associated suggestions of intransigence and empirical contingencies, in order to effect the best possible synthesis with Gandhi. The second section of this paper will concentrate on appropriate portions of Gandhi's commentary on Gῑtā, trying to track down Gandhi's reservations against any psychological determinism with respect to varṇa. His direct but scattered observations on varṇa and caste will be addressed in the last section-to see how far our neutral reading of Caturvarṇa can be responsibly reconciled with his distinction between varṇa and caste-indicating a way to dissolve the Gandhi-Ambedkar debate on varṇabheda and jātibheda. Overall, this paper attempts a paradigmatic reconstruction of Gandhian Caturvarṇa in the light of his approach to the notion of niṣkāma karma.

enakshi mitra

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