Papers by Nicole ( S H E / H E R ) Ramsoomair
Feminist philosophy quarterly, Dec 21, 2019
In this paper, I derive a test for distinguishing between derogatory terms by expanding upon Sean... more In this paper, I derive a test for distinguishing between derogatory terms by expanding upon Seana Shiffrin’s recent “thinker-based approach.” Protection on her account extends to many forms of speech due to a connection between speech and an individual’s development of autonomous thought. Shiffrin questions whether there is protection for corporate and commercial speech. The latter have a tendency to interfere with autonomous thought processes and do not clearly serve their development. I argue that these reasons for limitation serve as a basis for making nuanced distinctions for general regulation and applying this approach to controversies surrounding derogatory team names in sport. Many kinds of speech can be offensive and derogatory, yet I argue that only some may be said to be parasitic on communicative endeavors and legitimately fall outside free speech values as a result. Regulation should not be concerned with the content of speech, the manner in which certain words are spoken, or even the speaker’s positive or negative intent. Instead, the focus should remain on autonomous mental development of speakers and hearers.
Society, Dec 1, 2019
Whether it is backlash from the publication of controversial papers or calls for no-platforming, ... more Whether it is backlash from the publication of controversial papers or calls for no-platforming, the question of freedom of expression in academia seems to be more pertinent than ever. The conflict here seems to then be one of freedom and responsibility: Freedom to engage in new and perhaps contrary ideas and responsibility to those whom these ideas impact. I address these themes by analyzing recent paper, by Emily Chamlee-Wright that questions when it might be appropriate to resist pressure from the status quo and speak despite the potential for negative feedback. I wish to supplement her account with the need to temper this question of appropriate deference with one of social responsibility. Like Chamlee-Wright, I argue that these have “both positive and negative effects on the quality of public and academic discourse”, but for different reasons. Stereotype and bias inherent in some speech and scholarship may harm the discursive environment and encourage self-censorship as well. These expanded threats in turn require a different solution that would urge deference when scholarship pertains to and impacts certain marginalized identity categories. Self-Censorship does not necessarily mean a lowered quality academic or public discourse, but a necessary element in balancing the concerns of power and perspective.
Dialogue, 2021
ABSTRACTWhether seen after a vehement denunciation of one's former values or a subtle change ... more ABSTRACTWhether seen after a vehement denunciation of one's former values or a subtle change of heart, it is often thought that significant change to one's evaluative character could undermine responsibility for past wrongdoing. In this article, I explore this intuition by analyzing Angela Smith's concept of “responsibility as answerability.” I introduce an alteration/replacement distinction to define the limits of answerability over time. These limits are then further qualified by drawing on Delia Graff's work on Sorites type cases to argue that persons are answerable for past wrongdoing if they remain “saliently similar” in some relevant respects
Dialogue, 2021
Whether seen after a vehement denunciation of one's former values or a subtle change of heart, it... more Whether seen after a vehement denunciation of one's former values or a subtle change of heart, it is often thought that significant change to one's evaluative character could undermine responsibility for past wrongdoing. In this article, I explore this intuition by analyzing Angela Smith's concept of "responsibility as answerability." I introduce an alteration/replacement distinction to define the limits of answerability over time. These limits are then further qualified by drawing on Delia Graff's work on Sorites type cases to argue that persons are answerable for past wrongdoing if they remain "saliently similar" in some relevant respects RÉSUMÉ : On pense souvent qu'un changement significatif de notre caractère évaluatif pourrait saper notre responsabilité par rapport à nos méfaits passés. Dans cet article, j'explore cette intuition en analysant les concepts de responsabilité et de l'obligation de rendre des comptes, tels que présentés par Angela Smith. J'introduis une distinction entre « modification » et « remplacement » pour définir les limites de la responsabilité au fil du temps. Ces limites sont ensuite précisées en s'inspirant des travaux de Delia Graff sur les arguments Sorites pour soutenir qu'une personne est responsable d'actes répréhensibles passés si elle demeure « manifestement similaire » à certains égards.
Society, 2019
Whether it is backlash from the publication of controversial papers or calls for no-platforming, ... more Whether it is backlash from the publication of controversial papers or calls for no-platforming, the question of freedom of expression in academia seems to be more pertinent than ever. The conflict here seems to then be one of freedom and responsibility: Freedom to engage in new and perhaps contrary ideas and responsibility to those whom these ideas impact. I address these themes by analyzing recent paper, by Emily Chamlee-Wright that questions when it might be appropriate to resist pressure from the status quo and speak despite the potential for negative feedback. I wish to supplement her account with the need to temper this question of appropriate deference with one of social responsibility. Like Chamlee-Wright, I argue that these have “both positive and negative effects on the quality of public and academic discourse”, but for different reasons. Stereotype and bias inherent in some speech and scholarship may harm the discursive environment and encourage self-censorship as well. These expanded threats in turn require a different solution that would urge deference when scholarship pertains to and impacts certain marginalized identity categories. Self-Censorship does not necessarily mean a lowered quality academic or public discourse, but a necessary element in balancing the concerns of power and perspective.
Feminist Philosophy Quarterly, 2019
In this paper, I derive a test for distinguishing between derogatory terms by expanding upon Sea... more In this paper, I derive a test for distinguishing between derogatory terms by expanding upon Seana Shiffrin’s recent “thinker-based approach.” Protection on her account extends to many forms of speech due to a connection between speech and an individual’s development of autonomous thought. Shiffrin questions whether there is protection for corporate and commercial speech. The latter have a tendency to interfere with autonomous thought processes and do not clearly serve their development. I argue that these reasons for limitation serve as a basis for making nuanced distinctions for general regulation and applying this approach to controversies surrounding derogatory team names in sport. Many kinds of speech can be offensive and derogatory, yet I argue that only some may be said to be parasitic on communicative endeavors and legitimately fall outside free speech values as a result. Regulation should not be concerned with the content of speech, the manner in which certain words are spoken, or even the speaker’s positive or negative intent. Instead, the focus should remain on autonomous mental development of speakers and hearers.
Uploads
Papers by Nicole ( S H E / H E R ) Ramsoomair