This article argues that businesses are morally responsible for compensating the people harmed by... more This article argues that businesses are morally responsible for compensating the people harmed by their activities even if they were not negligent, i.e., the businesses took reasonable precautions. Critics of this position maintain that responsibility requires choice, and by taking precautions, businesses choose not to harm others. This article accepts their argument's first premise but rejects the second premise. It contends that businesses often seek risky or innovative activities to increase profits, and the essence of innovative activities is that precautions cannot sufficiently reduce their foreseeable harmful consequences. The correct understanding of businesses' decisionmaking enables us to appreciate that businesses choose to undertake risky activities while knowing that they can harm others despite preventive measures. It follows that preventive measures should not serve as an excuse against liability for harm. A 5.7 magnitude earthquake hit Sandra Ladra's house in Oklahoma in 2011. She recalls that "rocks started raining down" as the walls shook, and the chimney toppled (Oklahoma's News Four 2017). Her legs were severely injured, and her knee required replacement. Later, Sandra brought a lawsuit seeking compensatory damages from several companies conducting hydraulic fracturing nearby. 1 Due to the link between hydraulic fracturing and seismic activity, there have been many such lawsuits (see Watson 2021). To win them and obtain compensation for plaintiffs in the United States, lawyers must show that the corporations were negligent, i.e., didn't take reasonable precautions. There are also other types of tort cases against businesses where lawyers must prove negligence. They include respiratory illnesses from polluting factories, land damages from oil leaks, and financial harms from mortgage contracts. Our moral intuitions seem torn regarding the responsibility for harm in such cases. On the one hand, it
G lobal justice theorists often seek to combat poverty throughmonetary transfers that redistribut... more G lobal justice theorists often seek to combat poverty throughmonetary transfers that redistribute wealth from rich countries to poor ones. Such proposals rely on global financial institutions, including intergovernmental bodies and multinational businesses, to mediate the transfers. However, what if these proposals strengthen the very institutions that sustain and abet poverty in the first place? Moreover, are mere monetary transfers adequate to fulfill the material needs of the global poor? InGlobal Justice and Finance, TimHayward raises these questions to problematize long-standing assumptions in the global justice debate. He argues that scholars have been amiss in assuming that monetary transfers can adequately address global poverty. Insofar as their solution leaves our financialized economic paradigm unquestioned, it may even reinforce an unjust institutional order. Hayward exposes the normative commitments underlying this paradigm and, in the process, successfully recenters the global justice debate around finance. The book’s first few chapters are devoted to analyzing the international financial system that grounds Hayward’s critique of the global justice theorists. Among other things, he argues that the system is disadvantageous to the global poor because money does not reliably perform its function as a medium of exchange and store of value in most countries where they reside (22-23). Hayward identifies two reasons why the poor may be unable to exchange money for goods and services. First, the currency they receive may depreciate and thereby lead to difficulties in affording the required goods; in other words, its value may erode through exchange rate movements. Second, goods and services may be unavailable. Their availability requires a sustained investment in infrastructure and skills. Money will not improve somebody’s health if there are no roads to reach the doctor or, worse, if there are no doctors at all. Hayward concludes that monetary aid would have limited effectiveness at addressing the poor’s basic needs. Hayward’s skepticism about monetary aid’s efficacy leads him to challenge wellknown philosophical solutions to global poverty. In chapter 5, he takes aim at Peter Singer, who argues that individuals should make as much money as possible and then give it away to the most effective charity (the one that saves the most lives per unit of money).1 Some of Singer’s students followed their professor’s advice by finding jobs at Wall Street banks and hedge funds. Hayward criticizes Singer’s advice about giving money to the most effective charities because the latter’s economistic understanding of “effective” ignores the long-term needs of a community. For example, importing the cheapest bed nets from Asia may temporarily save
John Rawls's political philosophy has been the subject of sustained criticism concerning both its... more John Rawls's political philosophy has been the subject of sustained criticism concerning both its justificatory method and its substantive content. In Rawls's Egalitarianism, Alexander Kaufman defends the prominent scholar against some of the most significant charges. He observes that 'error has been overlaid upon error' in the last two decades of commentary on Rawls and proceeds to take aim at scholars like G.A. Cohen, Robert Nozick, and Aaron James (p. 2). Through a deep engagement with their critiques, Kaufman intends to remove the distortions and ambiguities that beset a proper understanding of Rawls's work. His interpretation of Rawls's constructivist method and egalitarian view seeks to demonstrate both the remarkable consistency and continued relevance of his thought. Due to his consistent commitment to universalism, Kaufman's Rawls emerges as a deeply Kantian thinker whose insights guide action towards distributive justice. Kaufman begins his analysis with the question of whether Rawls's theory has a practical character. Scholars who read Rawls in this way argue that his theory stems from fundamental ideas implicit in a particular political tradition. On this reading, Rawls appreciates his situatedness. He writes from a specific place and time to argue for an overlapping consensus on the principles that govern society. For these interpreters, Rawls gives up the aspiration for a universal and objective argument that characterized his earlier works in favor of a more situated and accommodationist argument in his later works. Kaufman challenges this reading and contends instead that there is no such shift in Rawls's thought. His alternative reading places Rawls's idea of due reflection at the core of his justificatory method. For Kaufman, due reflection begins with an initial set of judgments that inform a conception of justice and then subjects that initial set to criticism. He argues that 'we have the capacity and the obligation to assess and, if necessary, revise and abandon any or all of the cultural ideas with which we begin our deliberations' (p. 43). In other words, reflection that begins from a specific culture and tradition need not remain tethered to it. Principles of justice are not bound by their starting points. Through
This article argues that businesses are morally responsible for compensating the people harmed by... more This article argues that businesses are morally responsible for compensating the people harmed by their activities even if they were not negligent, i.e., the businesses took reasonable precautions. Critics of this position maintain that responsibility requires choice, and by taking precautions, businesses choose not to harm others. This article accepts their argument's first premise but rejects the second premise. It contends that businesses often seek risky or innovative activities to increase profits, and the essence of innovative activities is that precautions cannot sufficiently reduce their foreseeable harmful consequences. The correct understanding of businesses' decisionmaking enables us to appreciate that businesses choose to undertake risky activities while knowing that they can harm others despite preventive measures. It follows that preventive measures should not serve as an excuse against liability for harm. A 5.7 magnitude earthquake hit Sandra Ladra's house in Oklahoma in 2011. She recalls that "rocks started raining down" as the walls shook, and the chimney toppled (Oklahoma's News Four 2017). Her legs were severely injured, and her knee required replacement. Later, Sandra brought a lawsuit seeking compensatory damages from several companies conducting hydraulic fracturing nearby. 1 Due to the link between hydraulic fracturing and seismic activity, there have been many such lawsuits (see Watson 2021). To win them and obtain compensation for plaintiffs in the United States, lawyers must show that the corporations were negligent, i.e., didn't take reasonable precautions. There are also other types of tort cases against businesses where lawyers must prove negligence. They include respiratory illnesses from polluting factories, land damages from oil leaks, and financial harms from mortgage contracts. Our moral intuitions seem torn regarding the responsibility for harm in such cases. On the one hand, it
G lobal justice theorists often seek to combat poverty throughmonetary transfers that redistribut... more G lobal justice theorists often seek to combat poverty throughmonetary transfers that redistribute wealth from rich countries to poor ones. Such proposals rely on global financial institutions, including intergovernmental bodies and multinational businesses, to mediate the transfers. However, what if these proposals strengthen the very institutions that sustain and abet poverty in the first place? Moreover, are mere monetary transfers adequate to fulfill the material needs of the global poor? InGlobal Justice and Finance, TimHayward raises these questions to problematize long-standing assumptions in the global justice debate. He argues that scholars have been amiss in assuming that monetary transfers can adequately address global poverty. Insofar as their solution leaves our financialized economic paradigm unquestioned, it may even reinforce an unjust institutional order. Hayward exposes the normative commitments underlying this paradigm and, in the process, successfully recenters the global justice debate around finance. The book’s first few chapters are devoted to analyzing the international financial system that grounds Hayward’s critique of the global justice theorists. Among other things, he argues that the system is disadvantageous to the global poor because money does not reliably perform its function as a medium of exchange and store of value in most countries where they reside (22-23). Hayward identifies two reasons why the poor may be unable to exchange money for goods and services. First, the currency they receive may depreciate and thereby lead to difficulties in affording the required goods; in other words, its value may erode through exchange rate movements. Second, goods and services may be unavailable. Their availability requires a sustained investment in infrastructure and skills. Money will not improve somebody’s health if there are no roads to reach the doctor or, worse, if there are no doctors at all. Hayward concludes that monetary aid would have limited effectiveness at addressing the poor’s basic needs. Hayward’s skepticism about monetary aid’s efficacy leads him to challenge wellknown philosophical solutions to global poverty. In chapter 5, he takes aim at Peter Singer, who argues that individuals should make as much money as possible and then give it away to the most effective charity (the one that saves the most lives per unit of money).1 Some of Singer’s students followed their professor’s advice by finding jobs at Wall Street banks and hedge funds. Hayward criticizes Singer’s advice about giving money to the most effective charities because the latter’s economistic understanding of “effective” ignores the long-term needs of a community. For example, importing the cheapest bed nets from Asia may temporarily save
John Rawls's political philosophy has been the subject of sustained criticism concerning both its... more John Rawls's political philosophy has been the subject of sustained criticism concerning both its justificatory method and its substantive content. In Rawls's Egalitarianism, Alexander Kaufman defends the prominent scholar against some of the most significant charges. He observes that 'error has been overlaid upon error' in the last two decades of commentary on Rawls and proceeds to take aim at scholars like G.A. Cohen, Robert Nozick, and Aaron James (p. 2). Through a deep engagement with their critiques, Kaufman intends to remove the distortions and ambiguities that beset a proper understanding of Rawls's work. His interpretation of Rawls's constructivist method and egalitarian view seeks to demonstrate both the remarkable consistency and continued relevance of his thought. Due to his consistent commitment to universalism, Kaufman's Rawls emerges as a deeply Kantian thinker whose insights guide action towards distributive justice. Kaufman begins his analysis with the question of whether Rawls's theory has a practical character. Scholars who read Rawls in this way argue that his theory stems from fundamental ideas implicit in a particular political tradition. On this reading, Rawls appreciates his situatedness. He writes from a specific place and time to argue for an overlapping consensus on the principles that govern society. For these interpreters, Rawls gives up the aspiration for a universal and objective argument that characterized his earlier works in favor of a more situated and accommodationist argument in his later works. Kaufman challenges this reading and contends instead that there is no such shift in Rawls's thought. His alternative reading places Rawls's idea of due reflection at the core of his justificatory method. For Kaufman, due reflection begins with an initial set of judgments that inform a conception of justice and then subjects that initial set to criticism. He argues that 'we have the capacity and the obligation to assess and, if necessary, revise and abandon any or all of the cultural ideas with which we begin our deliberations' (p. 43). In other words, reflection that begins from a specific culture and tradition need not remain tethered to it. Principles of justice are not bound by their starting points. Through
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