Shiryo Kohon (史料稿本) is a modern Japanese manuscript that describes Japanese history in chronologi... more Shiryo Kohon (史料稿本) is a modern Japanese manuscript that describes Japanese history in chronological form. It was part of the initial phase of the so-called state-led history writing led by the Japanese government and influenced the writing of subsequent history books. This study examines how the Imjin War of 1592 is described in Shiryo Kohon. The Imjin War was a significant event not only for Korea but also for Japan. Therefore, a review of Shiryo Kohon's accounts of the Imjin War will show, at its fundamental level, how the war was described in the process of defining modern Japanese history. The editors of Shiryo Kohon did not describe the purpose and causes of the Imjin War in clear terms. Although they wanted to produce empirical evidence based on an examination of historical material, it seems they did not have enough historical data to define the war as a "war against the Ming Dynasty." Furthermore, the Japanese troops, disciplined by the military rules under the command of Hideyoshi Toyotomi, were depicted as upright men who did not use deceitful tactics against their opponents. On the other side were placed the Ming soldiers who were portrayed as being deceitful, and requesting negotiations when at a disadvantage. Joseon armed forces appeared only as rabble-rousers that "rebelled" against the Japanese or as mere subjects of rule. The editors of Shiryo Kohon had a fundamental disadvantage, namely that it was difficult for them to write empirical history based on the critique of historical material, which was something they purported to do. In addition to the the absence of historical material on Joseon, they showed a lack of balance in their critique of historical material, such as giving interpretations favorable to Japan when the data were conflicting. The description of the prewar years and the initial stages of the Imjin War in Shiryo Kohon tries to be as accurate as empirical history writing based on modern research methods. However, although modern historical studies had only recently been imported from the West, and setting aside the limitations related to the fact that they were manuscripts, it is clear that their description is in many parts less than objective and based on empirical evidence. It is important to note that the narrative tone and the way historical materials were used in Shiryo Kohon are found in subsequent historical publications. Therefore, comprehensive research on Shiryo Kohon must be carried out.
Kōun Zuihitsu (江雲隨筆) is a collection of documents which is presumed to be compiled by a monk, in ... more Kōun Zuihitsu (江雲隨筆) is a collection of documents which is presumed to be compiled by a monk, in charge of diplomatic discourse with Joseon. Being dispatched to Tsushima from Kyoto, the monk collected various diplomatic documents from Kyoto, Tsushima, and other places. The Kenninji in Kyoto(建仁寺) has held the original documents and the Historiographical Institute the University of Tokyo(東京大學 史料編纂所) houses the mimeographed copy of the documents. This collection of documents contains important historiographical materials related to peace negotiation during Imjin War: a credential from Toyotomi Hideyoshi(豊臣秀吉) to Seonjo, the King of Joseon, written right before the Imjin War(1590), an order from Hideyoshi to hands-on staffs of the peace negotiation, the whole texts of seven provisions of terms of peace, correspondences between negotiating delegate from Ming Army and Konishi Yukinaga(小西行長), a letter from Hideyoshi to Joseon envoy(通信使) in 1596, a document which Ming Emperor gave to Hideyoshi with regard to Hideyoshi’s investiture and so forth. This study will introduce the original text of certain documents in the collection and present the translation of each document. This study will contribute to the hereafter studies of Korean researchers who are working on the Imjin War.
This paper sheds light on the conflict among the Joseon government, the expeditionary force of th... more This paper sheds light on the conflict among the Joseon government, the expeditionary force of the Ming, and the Ming government during the days of peace negotiation amid the Imjin War. In April 1593 the Ming forces and its Japanese counterpart entered into full-scale peace negotiation. Due to the huge gulf between the two on the terms of peace, however, difficulties ensued. The internecine struggle within the Ming government was another obstacle, where the officials were divided into pros and cons of the negotiation itself. Meanwhile, the Ming forces concealed the true picture of battlegrounds from Beijing government : Joseon government strived to let the Beijing government know of the ‘actual’ process of the peace negotiation. Ming forces blocked the mission sent from the Joseon government, which was heading for Beijing. This struggles led to manifold conflict. Joseon’s continued attempts to reveal the reality exacerbated the discord, resulting in a series of replacements in the Ming forces’ high command. Faced with the consistent pressure of the Ming forces, however, Joseon government had no choice but to request the investiture (册封) of Toyotomi Hideyoshi Japan to the Ming government. Concerned with the possibility that excessive resistance might render her own position precarious, Joseon made the decision aforementioned. The conflict made the connection of interests among the individual subjects obvious ; Joseon and Ming could better understand the political structure and the way of decision making of each other. Simultaneously, however, mutual distrust was deepened. Such being the case, political disputes had influence on the peace negotiation. Negotiations reached impasse and unexpected situations followed. Structure of conflict during this period of peace negotiation lingered on well into the late 1590s, the time period when the peace negotiation broke down and another war broke out and ceased.
The purpose of this study was to identify the causes behind the rupture of peace negotiations dur... more The purpose of this study was to identify the causes behind the rupture of peace negotiations during Imjin War. Through peace negotiations, ToyotomiHideyoshi gave up on his intention of having the territory of Joseon cededto him. Instead, he decided to take the prince of Joseon as a hostage anddisguise the war as Japan`s victory. He consented to the idea that thecondition of prince of Joseon was replaced with Tongshinsa(Joseon envoy)but raised complaints about a series of events that took place in the dispatchprocess of Chaekbongsa(Ming envoy) and Tongshinsa including the form of dispatched Tongshinsa. He reached a judgment that his plan to end the waras Japan`s victory failed and declared the rupture of negotiations. However, there was no immediate outbreak of war. Hideyoshi made an attempt at negotiations with the condition of taking the prince of Joseon as ahostage once again. Considering that taking the prince of Joseon as a hostage was the full condition claimed by Japan in the negotiation process, it isapparent that the cession of Joseon territory was not the cause of rupture of negotiations. Both Joseon and Ming showed positive responses to thecondition of sending envoys, being firmly determined to stop war. Judgingthat Joseon`s responses were not active, however, Hideyoshi decided to invade Joseon for the second time. Judging from the negotiation process from the declaration of rupture to the decision of another invasion and the combatguidelines for the second invasion, it is clear that the second invasion was close to armed provocation to get trophies he desired rather than a large-scalewar for the invasion of the continent and division of territory.
Kato Kiyomasa(加藤淸正) was a Japanese general in the 2nd Corps that invaded Joseon during the Imjin ... more Kato Kiyomasa(加藤淸正) was a Japanese general in the 2nd Corps that invaded Joseon during the Imjin War(壬辰戰爭 : 1592~1598). Upon landing Joseon, he started the most vehement acts of invasion. He even moved up to Hamgyeong Province(咸鏡道) and captured the party of a Joseon prince. In later days of the war, he exerted huge influences on every aspect of the war including battles and peace negotiations. However, he has been considered only as a Japanese commander who was "warlike" and consistently opposed "peace negotiations" both in Korea and Japan. His actions have been interpreted based on such a simple character description as many of the studies on Imjin War focused on the analysis of battle patterns over time. This study adopted a framework of "military merits" and "peace negotiations" and made an attempt for alternative narration to analyze his actions in the overall context of time and space throughout the war, not being lost in character analysis. He was determined to lead the war in many aspects and achieve his own military merits all the time. He continued his march north even after reaching Hamgyeong Province because he wanted to capture the Joseon king and explore a route to Ming Dynasty. He also made his way into Yeojin(女眞) after capturing the party of a Joseon prince in Hoeryeong(會寧) because he was obsessed with achieving more remarkable military merits than others. It was through his military merits that he demonstrated that he was successfully implementing the orders of Toyotomi Hideyoshi(豊臣秀吉) such as "lay up provisions" and "bring Joseon people back(to live)" in addition to battles. He, however, was soon faced with a crisis. In fact, he was one of the Japanese generals that felt a crisis in an earlier and more urgent way than others. He was put in a basic crisis in a war operation, having problems with provisions and military strength and facing resistance from common people. As a matter of fact, the loss he caused outnumbered the loss caused by those who stopped their march in Pyeongyang(平壤). The damage to his pride was unbearable since he had the most desire for and pride in his military merits. Even though he was not in a position to insist on a quick operation, he had no intention to join his rivals, who were working on peace negotiations. His determination became even stronger when the Joseon prince, who was his only military merit, was sent back by his rivals as a means of promoting peace negotiations. Refusing all the peace efforts, he devoted all the military power under his supervision to the Jinju Fortress(晉州城) battle and tried to have his military merits recognized, only to fail to achieve satisfying results. He then fell into despair for a while. In the end, he began his own peace negotiations under the name of "Hideyoshi's true intention" as a way to achieve a military merit in his situation. He was a “three-dimensional” character who engaged in various deliberations to lead the war in many aspects consistently and achieve more outstanding military merits than others.
Shiryo Kohon (史料稿本) is a modern Japanese manuscript that describes Japanese history in chronologi... more Shiryo Kohon (史料稿本) is a modern Japanese manuscript that describes Japanese history in chronological form. It was part of the initial phase of the so-called state-led history writing led by the Japanese government and influenced the writing of subsequent history books. This study examines how the Imjin War of 1592 is described in Shiryo Kohon. The Imjin War was a significant event not only for Korea but also for Japan. Therefore, a review of Shiryo Kohon's accounts of the Imjin War will show, at its fundamental level, how the war was described in the process of defining modern Japanese history. The editors of Shiryo Kohon did not describe the purpose and causes of the Imjin War in clear terms. Although they wanted to produce empirical evidence based on an examination of historical material, it seems they did not have enough historical data to define the war as a "war against the Ming Dynasty." Furthermore, the Japanese troops, disciplined by the military rules under the command of Hideyoshi Toyotomi, were depicted as upright men who did not use deceitful tactics against their opponents. On the other side were placed the Ming soldiers who were portrayed as being deceitful, and requesting negotiations when at a disadvantage. Joseon armed forces appeared only as rabble-rousers that "rebelled" against the Japanese or as mere subjects of rule. The editors of Shiryo Kohon had a fundamental disadvantage, namely that it was difficult for them to write empirical history based on the critique of historical material, which was something they purported to do. In addition to the the absence of historical material on Joseon, they showed a lack of balance in their critique of historical material, such as giving interpretations favorable to Japan when the data were conflicting. The description of the prewar years and the initial stages of the Imjin War in Shiryo Kohon tries to be as accurate as empirical history writing based on modern research methods. However, although modern historical studies had only recently been imported from the West, and setting aside the limitations related to the fact that they were manuscripts, it is clear that their description is in many parts less than objective and based on empirical evidence. It is important to note that the narrative tone and the way historical materials were used in Shiryo Kohon are found in subsequent historical publications. Therefore, comprehensive research on Shiryo Kohon must be carried out.
Kōun Zuihitsu (江雲隨筆) is a collection of documents which is presumed to be compiled by a monk, in ... more Kōun Zuihitsu (江雲隨筆) is a collection of documents which is presumed to be compiled by a monk, in charge of diplomatic discourse with Joseon. Being dispatched to Tsushima from Kyoto, the monk collected various diplomatic documents from Kyoto, Tsushima, and other places. The Kenninji in Kyoto(建仁寺) has held the original documents and the Historiographical Institute the University of Tokyo(東京大學 史料編纂所) houses the mimeographed copy of the documents. This collection of documents contains important historiographical materials related to peace negotiation during Imjin War: a credential from Toyotomi Hideyoshi(豊臣秀吉) to Seonjo, the King of Joseon, written right before the Imjin War(1590), an order from Hideyoshi to hands-on staffs of the peace negotiation, the whole texts of seven provisions of terms of peace, correspondences between negotiating delegate from Ming Army and Konishi Yukinaga(小西行長), a letter from Hideyoshi to Joseon envoy(通信使) in 1596, a document which Ming Emperor gave to Hideyoshi with regard to Hideyoshi’s investiture and so forth. This study will introduce the original text of certain documents in the collection and present the translation of each document. This study will contribute to the hereafter studies of Korean researchers who are working on the Imjin War.
This paper sheds light on the conflict among the Joseon government, the expeditionary force of th... more This paper sheds light on the conflict among the Joseon government, the expeditionary force of the Ming, and the Ming government during the days of peace negotiation amid the Imjin War. In April 1593 the Ming forces and its Japanese counterpart entered into full-scale peace negotiation. Due to the huge gulf between the two on the terms of peace, however, difficulties ensued. The internecine struggle within the Ming government was another obstacle, where the officials were divided into pros and cons of the negotiation itself. Meanwhile, the Ming forces concealed the true picture of battlegrounds from Beijing government : Joseon government strived to let the Beijing government know of the ‘actual’ process of the peace negotiation. Ming forces blocked the mission sent from the Joseon government, which was heading for Beijing. This struggles led to manifold conflict. Joseon’s continued attempts to reveal the reality exacerbated the discord, resulting in a series of replacements in the Ming forces’ high command. Faced with the consistent pressure of the Ming forces, however, Joseon government had no choice but to request the investiture (册封) of Toyotomi Hideyoshi Japan to the Ming government. Concerned with the possibility that excessive resistance might render her own position precarious, Joseon made the decision aforementioned. The conflict made the connection of interests among the individual subjects obvious ; Joseon and Ming could better understand the political structure and the way of decision making of each other. Simultaneously, however, mutual distrust was deepened. Such being the case, political disputes had influence on the peace negotiation. Negotiations reached impasse and unexpected situations followed. Structure of conflict during this period of peace negotiation lingered on well into the late 1590s, the time period when the peace negotiation broke down and another war broke out and ceased.
The purpose of this study was to identify the causes behind the rupture of peace negotiations dur... more The purpose of this study was to identify the causes behind the rupture of peace negotiations during Imjin War. Through peace negotiations, ToyotomiHideyoshi gave up on his intention of having the territory of Joseon cededto him. Instead, he decided to take the prince of Joseon as a hostage anddisguise the war as Japan`s victory. He consented to the idea that thecondition of prince of Joseon was replaced with Tongshinsa(Joseon envoy)but raised complaints about a series of events that took place in the dispatchprocess of Chaekbongsa(Ming envoy) and Tongshinsa including the form of dispatched Tongshinsa. He reached a judgment that his plan to end the waras Japan`s victory failed and declared the rupture of negotiations. However, there was no immediate outbreak of war. Hideyoshi made an attempt at negotiations with the condition of taking the prince of Joseon as ahostage once again. Considering that taking the prince of Joseon as a hostage was the full condition claimed by Japan in the negotiation process, it isapparent that the cession of Joseon territory was not the cause of rupture of negotiations. Both Joseon and Ming showed positive responses to thecondition of sending envoys, being firmly determined to stop war. Judgingthat Joseon`s responses were not active, however, Hideyoshi decided to invade Joseon for the second time. Judging from the negotiation process from the declaration of rupture to the decision of another invasion and the combatguidelines for the second invasion, it is clear that the second invasion was close to armed provocation to get trophies he desired rather than a large-scalewar for the invasion of the continent and division of territory.
Kato Kiyomasa(加藤淸正) was a Japanese general in the 2nd Corps that invaded Joseon during the Imjin ... more Kato Kiyomasa(加藤淸正) was a Japanese general in the 2nd Corps that invaded Joseon during the Imjin War(壬辰戰爭 : 1592~1598). Upon landing Joseon, he started the most vehement acts of invasion. He even moved up to Hamgyeong Province(咸鏡道) and captured the party of a Joseon prince. In later days of the war, he exerted huge influences on every aspect of the war including battles and peace negotiations. However, he has been considered only as a Japanese commander who was "warlike" and consistently opposed "peace negotiations" both in Korea and Japan. His actions have been interpreted based on such a simple character description as many of the studies on Imjin War focused on the analysis of battle patterns over time. This study adopted a framework of "military merits" and "peace negotiations" and made an attempt for alternative narration to analyze his actions in the overall context of time and space throughout the war, not being lost in character analysis. He was determined to lead the war in many aspects and achieve his own military merits all the time. He continued his march north even after reaching Hamgyeong Province because he wanted to capture the Joseon king and explore a route to Ming Dynasty. He also made his way into Yeojin(女眞) after capturing the party of a Joseon prince in Hoeryeong(會寧) because he was obsessed with achieving more remarkable military merits than others. It was through his military merits that he demonstrated that he was successfully implementing the orders of Toyotomi Hideyoshi(豊臣秀吉) such as "lay up provisions" and "bring Joseon people back(to live)" in addition to battles. He, however, was soon faced with a crisis. In fact, he was one of the Japanese generals that felt a crisis in an earlier and more urgent way than others. He was put in a basic crisis in a war operation, having problems with provisions and military strength and facing resistance from common people. As a matter of fact, the loss he caused outnumbered the loss caused by those who stopped their march in Pyeongyang(平壤). The damage to his pride was unbearable since he had the most desire for and pride in his military merits. Even though he was not in a position to insist on a quick operation, he had no intention to join his rivals, who were working on peace negotiations. His determination became even stronger when the Joseon prince, who was his only military merit, was sent back by his rivals as a means of promoting peace negotiations. Refusing all the peace efforts, he devoted all the military power under his supervision to the Jinju Fortress(晉州城) battle and tried to have his military merits recognized, only to fail to achieve satisfying results. He then fell into despair for a while. In the end, he began his own peace negotiations under the name of "Hideyoshi's true intention" as a way to achieve a military merit in his situation. He was a “three-dimensional” character who engaged in various deliberations to lead the war in many aspects consistently and achieve more outstanding military merits than others.
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The editors of Shiryo Kohon did not describe the purpose and causes of the Imjin War in clear terms. Although they wanted to produce empirical evidence based on an examination of historical material, it seems they did not have enough historical data to define the war as a "war against the Ming Dynasty." Furthermore, the Japanese troops, disciplined by the military rules under the command of Hideyoshi Toyotomi, were depicted as upright men who did not use deceitful tactics against their opponents. On the other side were placed the Ming soldiers who were portrayed as being deceitful, and requesting negotiations when at a disadvantage. Joseon armed forces appeared only as rabble-rousers that "rebelled" against the Japanese or as mere subjects of rule. The editors of Shiryo Kohon had a fundamental disadvantage, namely that it was difficult for them to write empirical history based on the critique of historical material, which was something they purported to do. In addition to the the absence of historical material on Joseon, they showed a lack of balance in their critique of historical material, such as giving interpretations favorable to Japan when the data were conflicting.
The description of the prewar years and the initial stages of the Imjin War in Shiryo Kohon tries to be as accurate as empirical history writing based on modern research methods. However, although modern historical studies had only recently been imported from the West, and setting aside the limitations related to the fact that they were manuscripts, it is clear that their description is in many parts less than objective and based on empirical evidence. It is important to note that the narrative tone and the way historical materials were used in Shiryo Kohon are found in subsequent historical publications. Therefore, comprehensive research on Shiryo Kohon must be carried out.
This collection of documents contains important historiographical materials related to peace negotiation during Imjin War: a credential from Toyotomi Hideyoshi(豊臣秀吉) to Seonjo, the King of Joseon, written right before the Imjin War(1590), an order from Hideyoshi to hands-on staffs of the peace negotiation, the whole texts of seven provisions of terms of peace, correspondences between negotiating delegate from Ming Army and Konishi Yukinaga(小西行長), a letter from Hideyoshi to Joseon envoy(通信使) in 1596, a document which Ming Emperor gave to Hideyoshi with regard to Hideyoshi’s investiture and so forth. This study will introduce the original text of certain documents in the collection and present the translation of each document. This study will contribute to the hereafter studies of Korean researchers who are working on the Imjin War.
He was determined to lead the war in many aspects and achieve his own military merits all the time. He continued his march north even after reaching Hamgyeong Province because he wanted to capture the Joseon king and explore a route to Ming Dynasty. He also made his way into Yeojin(女眞) after capturing the party of a Joseon prince in Hoeryeong(會寧) because he was obsessed with achieving more remarkable military merits than others. It was through his military merits that he demonstrated that he was successfully implementing the orders of Toyotomi Hideyoshi(豊臣秀吉) such as "lay up provisions" and "bring Joseon people back(to live)" in addition to battles.
He, however, was soon faced with a crisis. In fact, he was one of the Japanese generals that felt a crisis in an earlier and more urgent way than others. He was put in a basic crisis in a war operation, having problems with provisions and military strength and facing resistance from common people. As a matter of fact, the loss he caused outnumbered the loss caused by those who stopped their march in Pyeongyang(平壤). The damage to his pride was unbearable since he had the most desire for and pride in his military merits. Even though he was not in a position to insist on a quick operation, he had no intention to join his rivals, who were working on peace negotiations. His determination became even stronger when the Joseon prince, who was his only military merit, was sent back by his rivals as a means of promoting peace negotiations. Refusing all the peace efforts, he devoted all the military power under his supervision to the Jinju Fortress(晉州城) battle and tried to have his military merits recognized, only to fail to achieve satisfying results. He then fell into despair for a while. In the end, he began his own peace negotiations under the name of "Hideyoshi's true intention" as a way to achieve a military merit in his situation. He was a “three-dimensional” character who engaged in various deliberations to lead the war in many aspects consistently and achieve more outstanding military merits than others.
The editors of Shiryo Kohon did not describe the purpose and causes of the Imjin War in clear terms. Although they wanted to produce empirical evidence based on an examination of historical material, it seems they did not have enough historical data to define the war as a "war against the Ming Dynasty." Furthermore, the Japanese troops, disciplined by the military rules under the command of Hideyoshi Toyotomi, were depicted as upright men who did not use deceitful tactics against their opponents. On the other side were placed the Ming soldiers who were portrayed as being deceitful, and requesting negotiations when at a disadvantage. Joseon armed forces appeared only as rabble-rousers that "rebelled" against the Japanese or as mere subjects of rule. The editors of Shiryo Kohon had a fundamental disadvantage, namely that it was difficult for them to write empirical history based on the critique of historical material, which was something they purported to do. In addition to the the absence of historical material on Joseon, they showed a lack of balance in their critique of historical material, such as giving interpretations favorable to Japan when the data were conflicting.
The description of the prewar years and the initial stages of the Imjin War in Shiryo Kohon tries to be as accurate as empirical history writing based on modern research methods. However, although modern historical studies had only recently been imported from the West, and setting aside the limitations related to the fact that they were manuscripts, it is clear that their description is in many parts less than objective and based on empirical evidence. It is important to note that the narrative tone and the way historical materials were used in Shiryo Kohon are found in subsequent historical publications. Therefore, comprehensive research on Shiryo Kohon must be carried out.
This collection of documents contains important historiographical materials related to peace negotiation during Imjin War: a credential from Toyotomi Hideyoshi(豊臣秀吉) to Seonjo, the King of Joseon, written right before the Imjin War(1590), an order from Hideyoshi to hands-on staffs of the peace negotiation, the whole texts of seven provisions of terms of peace, correspondences between negotiating delegate from Ming Army and Konishi Yukinaga(小西行長), a letter from Hideyoshi to Joseon envoy(通信使) in 1596, a document which Ming Emperor gave to Hideyoshi with regard to Hideyoshi’s investiture and so forth. This study will introduce the original text of certain documents in the collection and present the translation of each document. This study will contribute to the hereafter studies of Korean researchers who are working on the Imjin War.
He was determined to lead the war in many aspects and achieve his own military merits all the time. He continued his march north even after reaching Hamgyeong Province because he wanted to capture the Joseon king and explore a route to Ming Dynasty. He also made his way into Yeojin(女眞) after capturing the party of a Joseon prince in Hoeryeong(會寧) because he was obsessed with achieving more remarkable military merits than others. It was through his military merits that he demonstrated that he was successfully implementing the orders of Toyotomi Hideyoshi(豊臣秀吉) such as "lay up provisions" and "bring Joseon people back(to live)" in addition to battles.
He, however, was soon faced with a crisis. In fact, he was one of the Japanese generals that felt a crisis in an earlier and more urgent way than others. He was put in a basic crisis in a war operation, having problems with provisions and military strength and facing resistance from common people. As a matter of fact, the loss he caused outnumbered the loss caused by those who stopped their march in Pyeongyang(平壤). The damage to his pride was unbearable since he had the most desire for and pride in his military merits. Even though he was not in a position to insist on a quick operation, he had no intention to join his rivals, who were working on peace negotiations. His determination became even stronger when the Joseon prince, who was his only military merit, was sent back by his rivals as a means of promoting peace negotiations. Refusing all the peace efforts, he devoted all the military power under his supervision to the Jinju Fortress(晉州城) battle and tried to have his military merits recognized, only to fail to achieve satisfying results. He then fell into despair for a while. In the end, he began his own peace negotiations under the name of "Hideyoshi's true intention" as a way to achieve a military merit in his situation. He was a “three-dimensional” character who engaged in various deliberations to lead the war in many aspects consistently and achieve more outstanding military merits than others.