The exponential expansion of the human population of the earth, together with the accelerating pr... more The exponential expansion of the human population of the earth, together with the accelerating pressure that is being placed on natural resources, is of a magnitude that threatens soon to render the expression 'scarce resources' pleonastic. Too many people chasing too few goods is a reliable recipe for disaster. The problems are of such a magnitude that the search for real solutions can readily appear futile. This is especially so because the gravest problems are often not theoretical at all, but practical. They are the problems of convincing contrary human beings of the necessity of radical changes in their life styles, and in their aspirations and expectations. The first step, however, is to find the correct theories. High on the list of priorities must be an adequate theory of the morally proper distribution among people of the scarce goods and resources which they all require. Once we have such a theory, it will be time enough to worry about getting people to listen, to ...
It is a foundational principle of the cognitive sciences that the function of brains is to proces... more It is a foundational principle of the cognitive sciences that the function of brains is to process information in order to produce adaptive behaviour. One reason why this is hard to dispute is that the notion of an information processing system is so general that it can accommodate just about any plausible theory of mind. Even so relaxed a framework, however, is problematic where consciousness is concerned: it is not at all obvious whether, and if so how, consciousness contributes to the information processing functions of the brain. This is the conundrum that motivates Valerie Gray Hardcastle (Philosophy, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University) in her book, 'Locating Consciousness.' She offers her work as "an extended example of interdisciplinary research" in which philosophical arguments are supported with data from "cognitive and developmental psychology, AI programming, linguistics, clinical neurology, neurophysiology, and neuropsychology" (p. xv). She proves to be a knowledgeable guide to the relevant science. The more philosophical excursions in which empirical data are used to illuminate the nature of consciousness are interesting enough but not always convincing, for a variety of reasons.
The simple version of the HOT theory of consciousness is easily refuted. Carruthers escapes this ... more The simple version of the HOT theory of consciousness is easily refuted. Carruthers escapes this refutation because he is actually a closet introspectionist. I agree with Carruthers that the subjective properties of experience are constituted from discriminatory and other cognitive responses, but I disagree that conceptual uptake into a language of thought is the form of uptake that is necessary. Carruthers' neocartesian argument for a divide between 'man and brute' should be rejected.
ABSTRACT There are two kinds of useful traits: adaptations, and all the others. Exaptations are j... more ABSTRACT There are two kinds of useful traits: adaptations, and all the others. Exaptations are just all the others. Exaptations are not for anything. Because there is such diversity in all the others, exaptation is not an explanatory concept. Its only real use is to block adaptationist excesses.
ABSTRACT Block's (1995) cognitive conception of consciousness might be introduced in the ... more ABSTRACT Block's (1995) cognitive conception of consciousness might be introduced in the service of two different projects. In one, the explanatory gap between science and folklore remains. In the other, a reductive claim is advanced, but the intuitive idea of consciousness is abandoned.
ABSTRACT Metacognitive knowledge of one's own cognitive states is not as useful as is oft... more ABSTRACT Metacognitive knowledge of one's own cognitive states is not as useful as is often thought. Differences between cognitive states often come down to differences in their intentional contents. For that reason, differences in behaviour are often explained by differences just in contents of first-order states. Uncertainty need not be a metacognitive condition. First-order interpretations of the target experiments are available.
ABSTRACT Representational redescription (Karmiloff-Smith 1994a; 1994) translates implicit, proced... more ABSTRACT Representational redescription (Karmiloff-Smith 1994a; 1994) translates implicit, procedural knowledge into explicit, declarative knowledge. Explicit knowledge is an enabling condition of cognitive flexibility. The articulation and inferential integration of knowledge are important in explaining flexibility. There is an interesting connection to the availability of knowledge for verbal report, but no clear explanatory work is done by the idea of knowledge that is available to consciousness.
Knowledge of one's own states of mind is one of the varieties of self-knowledge. Do any nonhuman ... more Knowledge of one's own states of mind is one of the varieties of self-knowledge. Do any nonhuman animals have the capacity for this variety of self-knowledge? The question is open to empirical inquiry, which is most often conducted with primate subjects. Research with a bottlenose dolphin gives some evidence for the capacity in a nonprimate taxon. I describe the research and evaluate the metacognitive interpretation of the dolphin's behaviour. The research exhibits some of the difficulties attached to the task of eliciting behaviour that both attracts a higher-order interpretation while also resisting deflationary, lower-order interpretations. Lloyd Morgan's Canon, which prohibits inflationary interpretations of animal behaviour, has influenced many animal psychologists. There is one defensible version of the Canon, the version that warns specifically against unnecessary intentional ascent. The Canon on this interpretation seems at first to tell against a metacognitive interpretation of the data collected in the dolphin study. However, the model of metacognition that is in play in the dolphin studies is a functional model, one that does not implicate intentional ascent. I explore some interpretations of the dolphin's behaviour as metacognitive, in this sense. While this species of metacognitive interpretation breaks the connection with the more familiar theory of mind research using animal subjects, the interpretation also points in an interesting way towards issues concerning consciousness in dolphins.
The exponential expansion of the human population of the earth, together with the accelerating pr... more The exponential expansion of the human population of the earth, together with the accelerating pressure that is being placed on natural resources, is of a magnitude that threatens soon to render the expression 'scarce resources' pleonastic. Too many people chasing too few goods is a reliable recipe for disaster. The problems are of such a magnitude that the search for real solutions can readily appear futile. This is especially so because the gravest problems are often not theoretical at all, but practical. They are the problems of convincing contrary human beings of the necessity of radical changes in their life styles, and in their aspirations and expectations. The first step, however, is to find the correct theories. High on the list of priorities must be an adequate theory of the morally proper distribution among people of the scarce goods and resources which they all require. Once we have such a theory, it will be time enough to worry about getting people to listen, to ...
It is a foundational principle of the cognitive sciences that the function of brains is to proces... more It is a foundational principle of the cognitive sciences that the function of brains is to process information in order to produce adaptive behaviour. One reason why this is hard to dispute is that the notion of an information processing system is so general that it can accommodate just about any plausible theory of mind. Even so relaxed a framework, however, is problematic where consciousness is concerned: it is not at all obvious whether, and if so how, consciousness contributes to the information processing functions of the brain. This is the conundrum that motivates Valerie Gray Hardcastle (Philosophy, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University) in her book, 'Locating Consciousness.' She offers her work as "an extended example of interdisciplinary research" in which philosophical arguments are supported with data from "cognitive and developmental psychology, AI programming, linguistics, clinical neurology, neurophysiology, and neuropsychology" (p. xv). She proves to be a knowledgeable guide to the relevant science. The more philosophical excursions in which empirical data are used to illuminate the nature of consciousness are interesting enough but not always convincing, for a variety of reasons.
The simple version of the HOT theory of consciousness is easily refuted. Carruthers escapes this ... more The simple version of the HOT theory of consciousness is easily refuted. Carruthers escapes this refutation because he is actually a closet introspectionist. I agree with Carruthers that the subjective properties of experience are constituted from discriminatory and other cognitive responses, but I disagree that conceptual uptake into a language of thought is the form of uptake that is necessary. Carruthers' neocartesian argument for a divide between 'man and brute' should be rejected.
ABSTRACT There are two kinds of useful traits: adaptations, and all the others. Exaptations are j... more ABSTRACT There are two kinds of useful traits: adaptations, and all the others. Exaptations are just all the others. Exaptations are not for anything. Because there is such diversity in all the others, exaptation is not an explanatory concept. Its only real use is to block adaptationist excesses.
ABSTRACT Block's (1995) cognitive conception of consciousness might be introduced in the ... more ABSTRACT Block's (1995) cognitive conception of consciousness might be introduced in the service of two different projects. In one, the explanatory gap between science and folklore remains. In the other, a reductive claim is advanced, but the intuitive idea of consciousness is abandoned.
ABSTRACT Metacognitive knowledge of one's own cognitive states is not as useful as is oft... more ABSTRACT Metacognitive knowledge of one's own cognitive states is not as useful as is often thought. Differences between cognitive states often come down to differences in their intentional contents. For that reason, differences in behaviour are often explained by differences just in contents of first-order states. Uncertainty need not be a metacognitive condition. First-order interpretations of the target experiments are available.
ABSTRACT Representational redescription (Karmiloff-Smith 1994a; 1994) translates implicit, proced... more ABSTRACT Representational redescription (Karmiloff-Smith 1994a; 1994) translates implicit, procedural knowledge into explicit, declarative knowledge. Explicit knowledge is an enabling condition of cognitive flexibility. The articulation and inferential integration of knowledge are important in explaining flexibility. There is an interesting connection to the availability of knowledge for verbal report, but no clear explanatory work is done by the idea of knowledge that is available to consciousness.
Knowledge of one's own states of mind is one of the varieties of self-knowledge. Do any nonhuman ... more Knowledge of one's own states of mind is one of the varieties of self-knowledge. Do any nonhuman animals have the capacity for this variety of self-knowledge? The question is open to empirical inquiry, which is most often conducted with primate subjects. Research with a bottlenose dolphin gives some evidence for the capacity in a nonprimate taxon. I describe the research and evaluate the metacognitive interpretation of the dolphin's behaviour. The research exhibits some of the difficulties attached to the task of eliciting behaviour that both attracts a higher-order interpretation while also resisting deflationary, lower-order interpretations. Lloyd Morgan's Canon, which prohibits inflationary interpretations of animal behaviour, has influenced many animal psychologists. There is one defensible version of the Canon, the version that warns specifically against unnecessary intentional ascent. The Canon on this interpretation seems at first to tell against a metacognitive interpretation of the data collected in the dolphin study. However, the model of metacognition that is in play in the dolphin studies is a functional model, one that does not implicate intentional ascent. I explore some interpretations of the dolphin's behaviour as metacognitive, in this sense. While this species of metacognitive interpretation breaks the connection with the more familiar theory of mind research using animal subjects, the interpretation also points in an interesting way towards issues concerning consciousness in dolphins.
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