Books by Paul Katsafanas
This book explores the moral psychology of devotion. In the first part of the book, I provide I a... more This book explores the moral psychology of devotion. In the first part of the book, I provide I analysis of devotion; an examination of its motivational role; and an explanation of its connection to a distinctive form of valuing, in which certain values are seen as inviolable and are rendered invulnerable to the typical effects of justificatory reflection. In the second part of the book, I assess the ethical significance of devotion, arguing that certain forms of ethically praiseworthy relationships require devotion. In the third part, I examine how devotion can easily devolve into pathological forms. I focus on fanaticism, arguing that devotion can arise from a particular form of psychological fragility that is linked to group violence. I further argue that this form of fragility can be stoked by group resentment, and that certain social groups can thus be fanatical in the sense that they encourage the emergence of individual fanatics. In the final part of the book, I ask whether there are ways of preserving some of the beneficial features of devotion while avoiding their pathologies. I investigate whether we can be devoted through irony; through affirmation; and through what I call the "Deepening Move." Each of these stances preserves a degree of flexibility and openness in the object of devotion; each one tries to preserve a form of wholehearted devotion despite this openness. (The attached file contains the introductory chapter. Email or message me if you'd like a draft of the entire book.)
This book aims to analyze and defend Nietzsche’s moral psychology, as well as to demonstrate the ... more This book aims to analyze and defend Nietzsche’s moral psychology, as well as to demonstrate the advantages that it enjoys over competing accounts. It provides a clear, comprehensive account of the core concepts in Nietzsche’s moral psychology, including his distinction between conscious and unconscious mental events; the nature of drives (Triebe or Instinkte); the connection between drives, affects, and values; his account of willing; his notion of unity of the self; and his account of freedom. Throughout, I pay sustained attention to the way in which Nietzschean claims relate to debates in the contemporary literature on moral psychology.
A central thesis of this work is that Nietzsche’s moral psychology is systematic: his accounts of the conscious/unconscious distinction, human motivation, the will, agency, the self, and freedom are inextricably intertwined. We cannot understand these accounts in isolation from one another. If we attempt to do so—if, for example, we try to understand Nietzsche’s model of willing without appreciating his drive psychology and his account of unity of the self—then we will end up with a hodgepodge of dubious and seemingly inconsistent claims. Whereas if we see how his account of willing relies on a certain understanding of the way in which drives impact reflective thought, the account becomes persuasive and insightful. In short: Nietzsche’s account of consciousness is intertwined with his drive psychology, which has ramifications for his models of the will, choice, and action; this, in turn, leads him to rethink the nature of the self and freedom. The book’s goal is to untangle these threads, revealing the force of Nietzsche’s account and critically assessing its philosophical import.
Constitutivism is the view that we can derive substantive normative conclusions from an account o... more Constitutivism is the view that we can derive substantive normative conclusions from an account of the nature of action. Agency and the Foundations of Ethics explains the constitutivist strategy and argues that the attractions of this view are considerable: constitutivism promises to resolve longstanding philosophical puzzles about the metaphysics, epistemology, and practical grip of normative claims. Yet constitutivism faces a challenge: it must employ a conception of action that is minimal enough to be independently plausible, but substantial enough to yield robust normative results. The current versions of constitutivism fall short on this score. However, we can generate a successful version by employing a more nuanced theory of action. Drawing on recent empirical work on human motivation as well as a model of agency indebted to the work of Nietzsche, the book argues that every episode of action aims jointly at agential activity and power. An agent manifests agential activity if she approves of her action, and further knowledge of the motives figuring in the etiology of her action would not undermine this approval. An agent aims at power if she aims at encountering and overcoming obstacles or resistances in the course of pursuing other, more determinate ends. These structural features of agency both constitute events as actions and generate standards of assessment for action. Using these results, the book shows that we can extract substantive normative claims from facts about the nature of agency.
Papers by Paul Katsafanas
Fanaticism and the History of Philosophy, ed. Paul Katsafanas, Routledge, 2023
What is fanaticism and why is it an important philosophical topic? In this introductory chapter, ... more What is fanaticism and why is it an important philosophical topic? In this introductory chapter, I discuss the way in which fanaticism arose as a central philosophical concern in the early modern period. Philosophical discussions of fanaticism focus on psychological, epistemic, and behavioral dimensions of fanatics. The fanatic displays psychological peculiarities; epistemic defects; and potentially problematic behavioral tendencies. I discuss the ways in which different philosophers have offered different accounts of these three features; offer a brief defense of my own account of fanaticism; and highlight some key questions about fanaticism. I close with an overview of the essays in this volume.
Nietzsche's Metaphilosophy: The Nature, Methods, and Aims of Philosophy, ed. Matthew Meyer and Paul Loeb, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019
Nietzsche is widely reputed to have a novel approach to moral philosophy. Does he? And if so, wha... more Nietzsche is widely reputed to have a novel approach to moral philosophy. Does he? And if so, what is this approach? I argue that while Nietzsche rejects the aspiration of finding some theory-independent premise from which to derive ethical claims, he does articulate several rationally defensible constraints on acceptable normative claims. An acceptable set of normative claims must not presuppose false claims about human agency; it must not issue prescriptions that ultimately undermine human flourishing; it must secure some set of higher values; and it must avoid promoting certain forms of pathology. Nietzsche uses these constraints to assess moralities (or, more generally, sets of normative claims).
The Cambridge Critical Guide to Nietzsche's 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra', Keith Ansell-Pearson & Paul S. Loeb (eds.), 2021
Nietzsche suggests that even individuals who take themselves to bear an affirmative attitude towa... more Nietzsche suggests that even individuals who take themselves to bear an affirmative attitude toward life would be horrified by the thought of eternal recurrence (roughly, the idea that our lives will repeat endlessly in exactly the same fashion). But why? Why is it supposed to be more difficult to affirm recurring lives than to affirm a non-recurring, singular life? I argue that standard interpretations of eternal recurrence are unable to answer this question. I offer a new interpretation of eternal recurrence, which attributes its difficulty to the conditional nature of ordinary affirmation. Affirmation is conditional when it depends on the possibility of excising objectionable elements from the object of affirmation. What Nietzsche means to reveal, with eternal recurrence, is that even the most apparently affirmative individuals often manifest only a conditional affirmation of life, a form of affirmation that conceals a tacit negation. Eternal recurrence brings this hidden negation to light, thereby encouraging us to move toward an unconditionally affirmative stance. I conclude by reflecting on why Nietzsche takes the distinction between conditional and unconditional affirmation to be such an important philosophical idea. I argue that those who devote themselves to challenging, long-term goals will face psychological pressures that tend to deform unconditional affirmation into conditional affirmation.
Philosophers' Imprint
What, if anything, is fanaticism? Philosophers including Locke, Hume, Shaftesbury, and Kant offer... more What, if anything, is fanaticism? Philosophers including Locke, Hume, Shaftesbury, and Kant offered an account of fanaticism, analyzing it as (1) unwavering commitment to an ideal, together with (2) unwillingness to subject the ideal (or its premises) to rational critique and (3) the presumption of a non-rational sanction for the ideal. In the first part of the paper, I explain this account and argue that it does not succeed: among other things, it entails that a paradigmatically peaceful and tolerant individual can be a fanatic. The following sections argue that the fanatic is distinguished by four features: (4) the adoption of sacred values; (5) the need to treat these values as unconditional in order to preserve a particular form of psychic unity; (6) the sense that the status of these values is threatened by lack of widespread acceptance; and (7) the identification with a group, where the group is defined by shared commitment to the sacred values. If the account succeeds, it not only reveals the nature of fanaticism, but also uncovers a distinctive form of ethical critique: we can critique a way of understanding values not on the grounds that it is false, but on the grounds that it promotes a particular form of social pathology.
Cambridge Companion to Hermeneutics, ed. Michael Forster and Kristin Gjesdal
This essay charts several key points of contact between Nietzsche and the hermeneutical tradition... more This essay charts several key points of contact between Nietzsche and the hermeneutical tradition. It begins by arguing that the familiar claim that Nietzsche offers a hermeneutics of suspicion is potentially misleading. Seeking a more accurate representation of Nietzsche’s views, the essay argues that Nietzsche’s interpretive stance has several key features: he rejects immediate givens, endorses holism and perspectivism, and sees conscious experience as structured by concepts and language. Methodologically, Nietzsche inaugurates a genealogical approach to studying objects of philosophical concern, and offers a series of thoughts and arguments on perspectives and the ways in which they might be assessed. After explaining these points, the essay reviews the way in which Nietzsche takes religious, moral, and philosophical systems as aspiring to provide an interpretation of existence that renders it meaningful. The closing section briefly discusses the Nietzschean approach to interpretation that is adopted by Foucault.
Cambridge History of Philosophy 1945-2015
Constitutivism is the view that we can justify fundamental normative claims by showing that agent... more Constitutivism is the view that we can justify fundamental normative claims by showing that agents become committed to these claims merely in virtue of acting. Constitutivists aspire to show that action has structural features—constitutive aims, principles, or standards—that are present in each instance of action and that generate substantive normative conclusions. In showing that the authority of fundamental normative claims is sourced in our own actions, constitutivists hope to avoid familiar objections to justificatory projects in ethics.
This essay provides a very brief overview of constitutivism. Section one outlines the basic structure of constitutivism. Sections two and three examine how the constitutive feature would generate normative results. Section four considers an objection to the constitutivist theory. Section five distinguishes between constitutivist theories that attempt to provide fully general accounts of normativity and more modest versions. Section six asks how much normative content constitutivist theories are supposed to generate. Section seven concludes.
Routledge Philosophy Minds: Nietzsche
I argue that the rarely discussed Antichrist can serve as perhaps the best guide to Nietzsche’s m... more I argue that the rarely discussed Antichrist can serve as perhaps the best guide to Nietzsche’s mature ethical theory. Commentators often argue or assume that while Nietzsche makes many critical points about traditional morality, he cannot be offering a positive ethical theory of his own. This, I argue, is a mistake. The Antichrist offers a substantive ethical theory. It explicitly articulates Nietzsche’s positive ethical principles, shows why these principles are justified, and uses them to condemn traditional Christian morality. The chapter reviews and explains Nietzsche’s ethical theory. It also considers why commentators so often assume that Nietzsche cannot have an ethical theory: I argue that commentators tend to be driven by the assumption that all ethical theories embrace seven commitments. These commitments are, I suggest, definitive of Enlightenment ethical theory, but not of ethical theory as such; Nietzsche’s rejection of them in no way precludes his having a positive ethical theory of his own.
This is a response to Bernard Reginster's, Jorah Dannenberg's, and Andrew Huddleston's comments o... more This is a response to Bernard Reginster's, Jorah Dannenberg's, and Andrew Huddleston's comments on Agency and the Foundations of Ethics. I address the main points raised in their critiques: Dannenberg's concerns about whether I've adequately characterized nihilism and his argument that Nietzschean constitutivism would be of no help to the nihilist; Reginster's argument that constitutivism offers no interpretive advantage over internalism and subjectivism, his contention that it is a mistake to see all drives as aiming at expression, and his arguments against my claim that all actions aim at power; and Huddleston's critiques of the will to power thesis and objections to the constitutivist project. I argue that these objections and concerns can be answered.
Philosophy of Action from 1500 to the Present Day, edited by Constantine Sandis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
An overview of Nietzsche's philosophy of action.
This paper examines a claim defended by an unlikely pair: Friedrich Nietzsche and Iris Murdoch. T... more This paper examines a claim defended by an unlikely pair: Friedrich Nietzsche and Iris Murdoch. The claim is that perceptual experience itself—as distinct from perceptually based judgments and beliefs—can be morally significant. In particular, Nietzsche and Murdoch hold that two agents in the same circumstances attending to the same objects can have experiences with different contents, depending on the concepts that they possess and employ. Moreover, they maintain that this renders perception an object of moral concern. This paper explicates these claims, examines the way in which we might distinguish between better and worse perceptual experiences, and argues that if some version of the Murdochian/Nietzschean claim is accepted, then certain influential approaches to moral epistemology and agency must be rejected.
Journal of the American Philosophical Association
Nietzsche’s discussions of nihilism are meant to bring into view an intriguing pathology of moder... more Nietzsche’s discussions of nihilism are meant to bring into view an intriguing pathology of modern culture: that it is unable to sustain "higher values". This paper attempts to make sense of the nature and import of higher values. Higher values are a subset of final values. They are distinguished by their demandingness, susceptibility toward creating tragic conflicts, recruitment of a characteristic set of powerful emotions, perceived import, exclusionary nature, and their tendency to instantiate a community. The paper considers Nietzsche’s arguments for the claim that we are committed to instituting some set of higher values. The cost of not doing so is vitiating our deepest aim and precluding a central form of happiness.
Oxford Philosophical Concepts: Animals, edited by Peter Adamson and G. Fay Edwards
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, philosophers including Kant and Hegel draw... more In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, philosophers including Kant and Hegel draw a sharp distinction between the human and the animal. The human is self-conscious, the animal is not; the human has moral worth, the animal does not. By the mid to late nineteenth century, these claims are widely rejected. As scientific and philosophical work on the cognitive and motivational capacities of animals increases in sophistication, many philosophers become suspicious of the idea that there is any divide between human beings and other animals. This paper traces the transitions in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century thought about animals. My focal point is the notion of drive or instinct (Trieb, Instinkt). Although in sporadic usage during earlier times, the drive concept explodes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It begins playing central roles in three distinct areas: embryology, ethology, and metaphysics. In embryology, drive describes a force, inaccessible in itself but whose results are visible and susceptible to scientific and philosophical study, governing organic development. In ethology, drives are the sources of seemingly deliberate, highly articulated, yet non-conscious activities, which are directed at ends of which the animal is ignorant. In metaphysics, drive describes the human essence. I focus on the way in which the emergence of the drive concept in each of these three domains undermines the idea that there is any sharp distinction between the human and the animal. I conclude by considering how, in light the collapse of the human/animal divide, ethical theories are reshaped.
Key Debates in Nineteenth-Century Philosophy, ed. Kristin Gjesdal, Routledge, forthcoming
This is a response to Bernard Williams' classic paper "Nietzsche's Minimalist Moral Psychology." ... more This is a response to Bernard Williams' classic paper "Nietzsche's Minimalist Moral Psychology." The response focuses on four central claims in Williams’ article: that Nietzsche is a naturalist; that he endorses minimalism in moral psychology; that he both critiques traditional accounts of willing and offers a new account of his own; and that he is an anti-systematic thinker. I assess the cogency of these claims and discuss the way in which they have been developed in the recent literature on Nietzsche.
Character: Multiple Perspectives, ed. Iskra Fileva, Oxford University Press, forthcoming
Autonomy, traditionally conceived, is the capacity to direct one’s actions in light of self-given... more Autonomy, traditionally conceived, is the capacity to direct one’s actions in light of self-given principles or values. Character, traditionally conceived, is the set of unchosen, relatively rigid traits and proclivities that influence, constrain, or determine one’s actions. It’s natural to think that autonomy and character will be in tension with one another. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake: while character influences and constrains choice, this poses no problem for autonomy. However, in particular cases character can affect autonomy by generating a particular kind of influence upon choice. As a first approximation, character limits autonomy when it influences the agent’s choice in a way that were she aware of it, (1) she would disavow the influence, and (2) the influence could no longer operate in the same way. Put a bit differently, I argue that character undermines autonomy when it generates reflectively unstable perceptions of warrant.
The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, ed. Daniel Star
This paper introduces constitutivism about practical reason, which is the view that we can justif... more This paper introduces constitutivism about practical reason, which is the view that we can justify certain normative claims by showing that agents become committed to these claims simply in virtue of acting. According to this view, action has a certain structural feature – a constitutive aim, principle, or standard – that both constitutes events as actions and generates a standard of assessment for action. We can use this standard of assessment to derive normative claims. In short, the authority of certain normative claims arises from the bare fact that we are agents. This essay explains the constitutivst strategy, surveys the extant attempts to generate constitutivist theories, and considers the problems and prospects for the theory.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Jan 2012
Kant and Nietzsche are typically thought to have diametrically opposed accounts of willing: put s... more Kant and Nietzsche are typically thought to have diametrically opposed accounts of willing: put simply, whereas Kant gives signal importance to reflective episodes of choice, Nietzsche seems to deny that reflective choices have any significant role in the etiology of human action. In this essay, I argue that the dispute between Kant and Nietzsche actually takes a far more interesting form. Nietzsche is not merely rejecting the Kantian picture of agency. Rather, Nietzsche is offering a subtle critique of the Kantian theory, denying certain aspects of it while preserving others. On a standard reading, the Kantian theory of willing is committed to three claims: (1) choice causes action, (2) motives do not determine choice, and (3) reflective deliberation suspends the effects of motives. I argue that Nietzsche accepts claims (1) and (2) while denying claim (3). I show that Nietzsche's denial of (3) is premised upon a sophisticated conception of motivation. I contend that Nietzsche's denial of (3) leads him to a new model of reflective agency. This model preserves certain Kantian insights about the nature of self-conscious agency, while embedding these insights in a more complex and arguably more plausible account of motivation. The resultant theory of agency is considerably more sophisticated than has yet been appreciated.
Nietzsche and the Problem of Subjectivity, João Constâncio (ed.), forthcoming
Kant recognizes two distinct forms of self-knowledge: introspection, which gives us knowledge of ... more Kant recognizes two distinct forms of self-knowledge: introspection, which gives us knowledge of our sensations, and apperception, which is knowledge of our own activities. Both modes of self-knowledge can go astray, and are particularly prone to being distorted be selfish motives; thus, neither is guaranteed to provide us with comprehensive self-knowledge. Nietzsche departs from Kant in arguing that these two modes of self-knowledge (1) are not distinct and (2) are far more limited than Kant acknowledges. In addition, Nietzsche departs from Kant in arguing that we can acquire self-knowledge by looking away from ourselves. I provide a brief sketch of the ways in which this is so. In particular, Nietzsche argues that genealogy enables a form of self-knowledge: it helps us to identify some of the subtle factors shaping our actions as well as the influence of our current conceptual repertoires on our perceptions and understandings of our actions.
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Books by Paul Katsafanas
A central thesis of this work is that Nietzsche’s moral psychology is systematic: his accounts of the conscious/unconscious distinction, human motivation, the will, agency, the self, and freedom are inextricably intertwined. We cannot understand these accounts in isolation from one another. If we attempt to do so—if, for example, we try to understand Nietzsche’s model of willing without appreciating his drive psychology and his account of unity of the self—then we will end up with a hodgepodge of dubious and seemingly inconsistent claims. Whereas if we see how his account of willing relies on a certain understanding of the way in which drives impact reflective thought, the account becomes persuasive and insightful. In short: Nietzsche’s account of consciousness is intertwined with his drive psychology, which has ramifications for his models of the will, choice, and action; this, in turn, leads him to rethink the nature of the self and freedom. The book’s goal is to untangle these threads, revealing the force of Nietzsche’s account and critically assessing its philosophical import.
Papers by Paul Katsafanas
This essay provides a very brief overview of constitutivism. Section one outlines the basic structure of constitutivism. Sections two and three examine how the constitutive feature would generate normative results. Section four considers an objection to the constitutivist theory. Section five distinguishes between constitutivist theories that attempt to provide fully general accounts of normativity and more modest versions. Section six asks how much normative content constitutivist theories are supposed to generate. Section seven concludes.
A central thesis of this work is that Nietzsche’s moral psychology is systematic: his accounts of the conscious/unconscious distinction, human motivation, the will, agency, the self, and freedom are inextricably intertwined. We cannot understand these accounts in isolation from one another. If we attempt to do so—if, for example, we try to understand Nietzsche’s model of willing without appreciating his drive psychology and his account of unity of the self—then we will end up with a hodgepodge of dubious and seemingly inconsistent claims. Whereas if we see how his account of willing relies on a certain understanding of the way in which drives impact reflective thought, the account becomes persuasive and insightful. In short: Nietzsche’s account of consciousness is intertwined with his drive psychology, which has ramifications for his models of the will, choice, and action; this, in turn, leads him to rethink the nature of the self and freedom. The book’s goal is to untangle these threads, revealing the force of Nietzsche’s account and critically assessing its philosophical import.
This essay provides a very brief overview of constitutivism. Section one outlines the basic structure of constitutivism. Sections two and three examine how the constitutive feature would generate normative results. Section four considers an objection to the constitutivist theory. Section five distinguishes between constitutivist theories that attempt to provide fully general accounts of normativity and more modest versions. Section six asks how much normative content constitutivist theories are supposed to generate. Section seven concludes.