This research note argues that political theorists of refuge ought to consider the experiences of... more This research note argues that political theorists of refuge ought to consider the experiences of refugees after they have received asylum in the Global North. Currently, much of the literature concerning the duties of states toward refugees implicitly adopts a blanket approach, rather than considering how varied identities may affect the remedies available to displaced people. Given the prevalence of racism, xenophobia, and homophobia in the Global North, and the growing norm of dissident persecution in foreign territory, protection is not guaranteed after either territorial or legal admission. This research note considers the case of LGBTQ refugees in order to demonstrate the analytical potential of more inclusive and diverse normative approaches. Taking the origin and extension of harm seriously requires a conceptualization of sanctuary after asylum that accurately reflects the experiences of the displaced. In doing so, questions arise regarding the nature and efficacy of territo...
In the literature on refugeehood in political theory, there has been a recent turn towards what h... more In the literature on refugeehood in political theory, there has been a recent turn towards what have been called “state system legitimacy” views. These views derive an account of states’ obligations to refugees from a broader picture of the conditions for international legitimacy. This paper seeks to develop the state system legitimacy view of refugeehood by subjecting the most developed version of it—the account developed by David Owen—to critical scrutiny. We diagnose an ambiguity in Owen’s theory of refugeehood, in the concept of political membership, and unpack the implications of this ambiguity for state system legitimacy views. First, we reconstruct the key aspects of Owen’s account of refugeehood and show how it represents an advance over competing theories. Then we discuss the methodological underpinnings of Owen’s account, showing the constraints and opportunities faced by state system legitimacy views. Next, we raise some problems for the conceptual distinctions that Owen develops between different types of refugee protection: asylum, sanctuary, and refuge. The underlying feature that leads to these problems is an ambiguity in the concept of political membership, which is at the core of Owen’s view of refugeehood. Finally, we distinguish two interpretations of political membership in the institution of refugeehood and chart out some possible ways forward for state system legitimacy views. The critique developed here is a sympathetic one, aimed at the further development of state system legitimacy views.
The fact that persecution is seriously wrong should be obvious. Many of the worst events in human... more The fact that persecution is seriously wrong should be obvious. Many of the worst events in human history were acts of persecution. During the reign of the Roman Empire, Christians were beaten, murdered, and forced to fight with wild animals. Until recently, Black Americans were hunted down by mobs and lynched by their compatriots. 1 They were often publicly hanged, but some were also burned alive, thrown from tall buildings, and dismembered. The centuries long persecution of Jewish people culminated in the terroristic policies of Nazi Germany and the murders of over six million Jews between 1941 and 1945. These individuals were violently targeted for their perceived membership in a particular social, religious, or political group. We know already, then, that persecution is a terrible injustice. What is not obvious, however, is why exactly this is the case. This might immediately seem like a ridiculous proposition: persecution often involves discrimination, cruelty, extreme violence, and mass murder. Surely we know that persecution is wrong precisely because it involves acts of the worst possible kind? This paper argues that the entire picture of the wrongness of persecution cannot be understood by pointing to these individual elements alone. To put it more strongly, persecution is wrong not only when (or because) it includes these other wrongs. Instead, I argue that part of the wrongness of persecution is located in the condition that it creates for the persecuted, but also for society more generally. In doing so, I follow two similar interventions from David Sussman (2004) on torture and Lea Ypi (2013) on colonialism. 2 Both papers begin with the intuition that such acts are serious wrongs. Their aim is to offer a new way of understanding why this is so. Like Ypi's, my title does not include a question mark. I ask you to accept that there is something wrong with persecution. My aim is to offer a new way of understanding what that something is.
It is clear that philosophy has a “woman problem”. Despite the recent acceptance of this fact, it... more It is clear that philosophy has a “woman problem”. Despite the recent acceptance of this fact, it is less clear what ought to be done about it. In this paper, we argue that philosophy as a discipline is uniquely well-positioned to think through the marginalisation suffered by women and other minorities. We therefore interrogate two values that already undergird conversations about inclusion— representation and intersectionality—in order to think about the path ahead. We argue that, once we have done so, it becomes clear that the slow pace of improvement over the last few decades is unacceptable and more radical steps need to be taken. First, we outline the current state of women in philosophy focusing on three areas: levels of employment, publishing, and sexual harassment. Then we turn to representation and intersectionality respectively. We conclude by arguing that many women and people of colour have been arguing for a more radically diverse philosophy for many years. What we are ...
Over the past decade, the refugee protection regime has supposedly become more inclusive of queer... more Over the past decade, the refugee protection regime has supposedly become more inclusive of queer and trans* people. Much literature has focused on the expansion of refugee status determination and the inclusion of LGBTQ asylum seekers. However, there are many areas of refugee policy that remain dependent on cisheteronormative assumptions and therefore exclude the queer and trans* forcibly displaced. This paper considers the concept of ‘the family’ and how it is used and understood in refugee protection. We make the normative argument that queer and trans* family units ought to qualify for refugee family reunion and group status determination. We do so by considering the concept of queer and trans* ‘chosen families’, arguing that these queer articulations of kinship are functionally and morally comparable to cisheteronormative conceptions of the family. We contend that considering the cisheteronormative underpinnings of the family in this way opens up the potential to queer other ar...
This history of philosophy is a history of men. Or at least, that’s how it has been told over the... more This history of philosophy is a history of men. Or at least, that’s how it has been told over the past several hundred years. But, over the last few decades, we’ve begun to see more and more recognition of women philosophers and the huge impact that they have had on the course of our discipline. There have always been philosophers who happened to be women. Hypatia of Alexandria was known by her contemporaries simply as The Philosopher, and hundreds of young men travelled from throughout the region to attend her public lectures. Philosophers who happen to be women, then, are nothing new. But our failure to recognise them as full contributors to the subject makes them appear to us as something of a surprise. A result of this is that women are often remembered as women first: they are seen more as women than they’re seen as philosophers.
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2021
This paper argues that states have a duty of legitimacy to offer refugees membership in the form ... more This paper argues that states have a duty of legitimacy to offer refugees membership in the form of citizenship. This argument builds on a popular normative approach to refugeehood put forward by D...
Most academics in philosophy departments accept that the discipline needs to change for the bette... more Most academics in philosophy departments accept that the discipline needs to change for the better. In this piece, Rebecca Buxton and Lisa Whiting offer several proposals for how to make philosophy a more inclusive place for everyone.
Temporariness has become the norm in contemporary refugee protection. Many refugees face extended... more Temporariness has become the norm in contemporary refugee protection. Many refugees face extended periods of time waiting for permanent status, either in camps or living among citizens in their state of asylum. Whilst this practice of keeping refugees waiting is of benefit to states, I argue that not only is it harmful to refugees but it also constitutes an injustice. First, I outline the prevalence of temporary assistance in the refugee protection regime. Second, I outline the orthodox view on temporary refugee protection – it is acceptable as long as it is not indefinite. I then spend the remainder of the article considering four arguments against temporary refugee protection: the plan argument, the reciprocity argument, the domination argument, and the compounding injustice argument. I contend that the first two arguments, which already feature in the literature, merely show that temporary protection is harmful to refugees. My own arguments on domination and compounding injustice...
This paper sketches an account of reparative justice for climate refugees, focusing on total land... more This paper sketches an account of reparative justice for climate refugees, focusing on total land loss due to sea-level rise. I begin by outlining the harm of this loss in terms of self-determination and cultural heritage. I then consider, first, who is owed these reparations? Second, who should pay such reparations? Third, in what form should the reparations be paid? I end with thoughts on the project of reparative justice more generally, arguing that such obligations do not depend upon a perfect account of how reparations might be fulfilled; we simply have an obligation to shoot the arrow as close to the target as we can.
Over the past decade, the refugee protection regime has supposedly become more inclusive of queer... more Over the past decade, the refugee protection regime has supposedly become more inclusive of queer and trans* people. Much literature has focused on the expansion of refugee status determination and the inclusion of LGBTQ asylum seekers. However, there are many areas of refugee policy that remain dependent on cishe-teronormative assumptions and therefore exclude the queer and trans* forcibly displaced. This paper considers the concept of 'the family' and how it is used and understood in refugee protection. We make the normative argument that queer and trans* family units ought to qualify for refugee family reunion and group status determination. We do so by considering the concept of queer and trans* 'chosen fami-lies', arguing that these queer articulations of kinship are functionally and morally comparable to cisheteronormative conceptions of the family. We contend that considering the cisheteronormative underpinnings of the family in this way opens up the potential to queer other areas of refugee policy, and therefore paves the way to a more inclusive refugee protection regime.
This research note argues that political theorists of refuge ought to consider the experiences of... more This research note argues that political theorists of refuge ought to consider the experiences of refugees after they have received asylum in the Global North. Currently, much of the literature concerning the duties of states toward refugees implicitly adopts a blanket approach, rather than considering how varied identities may affect the remedies available to displaced people. Given the prevalence of racism, xenophobia, and homophobia in the Global North, and the growing norm of dissident persecution in foreign territory, protection is not guaranteed after either territorial or legal admission. This research note considers the case of LGBTQ refugees in order to demonstrate the analytical potential of more inclusive and diverse normative approaches. Taking the origin and extension of harm seriously requires a conceptualization of sanctuary after asylum that accurately reflects the experiences of the displaced. In doing so, questions arise regarding the nature and efficacy of territo...
In the literature on refugeehood in political theory, there has been a recent turn towards what h... more In the literature on refugeehood in political theory, there has been a recent turn towards what have been called “state system legitimacy” views. These views derive an account of states’ obligations to refugees from a broader picture of the conditions for international legitimacy. This paper seeks to develop the state system legitimacy view of refugeehood by subjecting the most developed version of it—the account developed by David Owen—to critical scrutiny. We diagnose an ambiguity in Owen’s theory of refugeehood, in the concept of political membership, and unpack the implications of this ambiguity for state system legitimacy views. First, we reconstruct the key aspects of Owen’s account of refugeehood and show how it represents an advance over competing theories. Then we discuss the methodological underpinnings of Owen’s account, showing the constraints and opportunities faced by state system legitimacy views. Next, we raise some problems for the conceptual distinctions that Owen develops between different types of refugee protection: asylum, sanctuary, and refuge. The underlying feature that leads to these problems is an ambiguity in the concept of political membership, which is at the core of Owen’s view of refugeehood. Finally, we distinguish two interpretations of political membership in the institution of refugeehood and chart out some possible ways forward for state system legitimacy views. The critique developed here is a sympathetic one, aimed at the further development of state system legitimacy views.
The fact that persecution is seriously wrong should be obvious. Many of the worst events in human... more The fact that persecution is seriously wrong should be obvious. Many of the worst events in human history were acts of persecution. During the reign of the Roman Empire, Christians were beaten, murdered, and forced to fight with wild animals. Until recently, Black Americans were hunted down by mobs and lynched by their compatriots. 1 They were often publicly hanged, but some were also burned alive, thrown from tall buildings, and dismembered. The centuries long persecution of Jewish people culminated in the terroristic policies of Nazi Germany and the murders of over six million Jews between 1941 and 1945. These individuals were violently targeted for their perceived membership in a particular social, religious, or political group. We know already, then, that persecution is a terrible injustice. What is not obvious, however, is why exactly this is the case. This might immediately seem like a ridiculous proposition: persecution often involves discrimination, cruelty, extreme violence, and mass murder. Surely we know that persecution is wrong precisely because it involves acts of the worst possible kind? This paper argues that the entire picture of the wrongness of persecution cannot be understood by pointing to these individual elements alone. To put it more strongly, persecution is wrong not only when (or because) it includes these other wrongs. Instead, I argue that part of the wrongness of persecution is located in the condition that it creates for the persecuted, but also for society more generally. In doing so, I follow two similar interventions from David Sussman (2004) on torture and Lea Ypi (2013) on colonialism. 2 Both papers begin with the intuition that such acts are serious wrongs. Their aim is to offer a new way of understanding why this is so. Like Ypi's, my title does not include a question mark. I ask you to accept that there is something wrong with persecution. My aim is to offer a new way of understanding what that something is.
It is clear that philosophy has a “woman problem”. Despite the recent acceptance of this fact, it... more It is clear that philosophy has a “woman problem”. Despite the recent acceptance of this fact, it is less clear what ought to be done about it. In this paper, we argue that philosophy as a discipline is uniquely well-positioned to think through the marginalisation suffered by women and other minorities. We therefore interrogate two values that already undergird conversations about inclusion— representation and intersectionality—in order to think about the path ahead. We argue that, once we have done so, it becomes clear that the slow pace of improvement over the last few decades is unacceptable and more radical steps need to be taken. First, we outline the current state of women in philosophy focusing on three areas: levels of employment, publishing, and sexual harassment. Then we turn to representation and intersectionality respectively. We conclude by arguing that many women and people of colour have been arguing for a more radically diverse philosophy for many years. What we are ...
Over the past decade, the refugee protection regime has supposedly become more inclusive of queer... more Over the past decade, the refugee protection regime has supposedly become more inclusive of queer and trans* people. Much literature has focused on the expansion of refugee status determination and the inclusion of LGBTQ asylum seekers. However, there are many areas of refugee policy that remain dependent on cisheteronormative assumptions and therefore exclude the queer and trans* forcibly displaced. This paper considers the concept of ‘the family’ and how it is used and understood in refugee protection. We make the normative argument that queer and trans* family units ought to qualify for refugee family reunion and group status determination. We do so by considering the concept of queer and trans* ‘chosen families’, arguing that these queer articulations of kinship are functionally and morally comparable to cisheteronormative conceptions of the family. We contend that considering the cisheteronormative underpinnings of the family in this way opens up the potential to queer other ar...
This history of philosophy is a history of men. Or at least, that’s how it has been told over the... more This history of philosophy is a history of men. Or at least, that’s how it has been told over the past several hundred years. But, over the last few decades, we’ve begun to see more and more recognition of women philosophers and the huge impact that they have had on the course of our discipline. There have always been philosophers who happened to be women. Hypatia of Alexandria was known by her contemporaries simply as The Philosopher, and hundreds of young men travelled from throughout the region to attend her public lectures. Philosophers who happen to be women, then, are nothing new. But our failure to recognise them as full contributors to the subject makes them appear to us as something of a surprise. A result of this is that women are often remembered as women first: they are seen more as women than they’re seen as philosophers.
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2021
This paper argues that states have a duty of legitimacy to offer refugees membership in the form ... more This paper argues that states have a duty of legitimacy to offer refugees membership in the form of citizenship. This argument builds on a popular normative approach to refugeehood put forward by D...
Most academics in philosophy departments accept that the discipline needs to change for the bette... more Most academics in philosophy departments accept that the discipline needs to change for the better. In this piece, Rebecca Buxton and Lisa Whiting offer several proposals for how to make philosophy a more inclusive place for everyone.
Temporariness has become the norm in contemporary refugee protection. Many refugees face extended... more Temporariness has become the norm in contemporary refugee protection. Many refugees face extended periods of time waiting for permanent status, either in camps or living among citizens in their state of asylum. Whilst this practice of keeping refugees waiting is of benefit to states, I argue that not only is it harmful to refugees but it also constitutes an injustice. First, I outline the prevalence of temporary assistance in the refugee protection regime. Second, I outline the orthodox view on temporary refugee protection – it is acceptable as long as it is not indefinite. I then spend the remainder of the article considering four arguments against temporary refugee protection: the plan argument, the reciprocity argument, the domination argument, and the compounding injustice argument. I contend that the first two arguments, which already feature in the literature, merely show that temporary protection is harmful to refugees. My own arguments on domination and compounding injustice...
This paper sketches an account of reparative justice for climate refugees, focusing on total land... more This paper sketches an account of reparative justice for climate refugees, focusing on total land loss due to sea-level rise. I begin by outlining the harm of this loss in terms of self-determination and cultural heritage. I then consider, first, who is owed these reparations? Second, who should pay such reparations? Third, in what form should the reparations be paid? I end with thoughts on the project of reparative justice more generally, arguing that such obligations do not depend upon a perfect account of how reparations might be fulfilled; we simply have an obligation to shoot the arrow as close to the target as we can.
Over the past decade, the refugee protection regime has supposedly become more inclusive of queer... more Over the past decade, the refugee protection regime has supposedly become more inclusive of queer and trans* people. Much literature has focused on the expansion of refugee status determination and the inclusion of LGBTQ asylum seekers. However, there are many areas of refugee policy that remain dependent on cishe-teronormative assumptions and therefore exclude the queer and trans* forcibly displaced. This paper considers the concept of 'the family' and how it is used and understood in refugee protection. We make the normative argument that queer and trans* family units ought to qualify for refugee family reunion and group status determination. We do so by considering the concept of queer and trans* 'chosen fami-lies', arguing that these queer articulations of kinship are functionally and morally comparable to cisheteronormative conceptions of the family. We contend that considering the cisheteronormative underpinnings of the family in this way opens up the potential to queer other areas of refugee policy, and therefore paves the way to a more inclusive refugee protection regime.
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Papers by Rebecca Buxton