Papers by yair lorberbaum
REJ, 2024
Within the context of the problems raised by the allegorical interpretation of the Jewish Scriptu... more Within the context of the problems raised by the allegorical interpretation of the Jewish Scriptures and canons, the allegorical explanation of commandments holds a distinctive place. The point of departure of this article is this question: Why did Maimonides interpret mitzvot allegorically in Mishneh Torah, but in The Guide of the Perplexed – where allegorical interpretation is a central device for resolving the perplexity caused by the plain meaning of scriptures – he refrained from allegorical interpretation of mitzvot? This question is a useful framework for examining the similarity between the allegorical interpretation of prophecies and biblical narratives and the allegorical interpretation of mitzvot, and the fundamental differences between them.
Tarbiz, 2024
Rabbi Yom-Tov Asevilli’s Book of Rememberance:
Philosophy, Kabbalah, Halakhah
Rabbi Yom-Tov Asev... more Rabbi Yom-Tov Asevilli’s Book of Rememberance:
Philosophy, Kabbalah, Halakhah
Rabbi Yom-Tov Asevilli’s (Ritva, Spain 1250-1320) Book of Remembrance (Sefer Ha-Zikaron) is a defense of Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed against Nahmanides’ harsh criticism in his well-known commentary on the Pentateuch. The Book of Remembrance is puzzling, because Asevilli, a prominent halakhist of the school of Nahmanides, comes to the defense of ha-Rav-ha-Moreh – Maimonides’ title in this book that indicate his
greatness in both halakhah and philosophy – while at the same time declares throughout his treatise that he is an adherent of the kabbalah of “our great master,” and emphasizes that Nahmanides criticized Maimonides because of his kabbalistic views. The first sections of
this article present the puzzling aspects that this composition raises, and the methods and techniques that Asevilli utilizes to defend Maimonides’ philosophy. The last sections offer a solution to the perplexity raised by the Book of Remembrance. The Book of Remembrance is a nexus at which major trends of Jewish thought in the High Middle Ages confront one another. This article interprets main passages of this book, draws an intellectual portrait of Assevilli, and analyzes his views on the relations between philosophy and kabbalah, and between both of them and halakhah. The enigma of Asevilli’s Book of Remembrance offers an opportunity to study the relationships between philosophy, kabbalah and halakhah in the world-view of sages from the school of Nahmanides, and
through them, to portray the intellectual history of the Jews in Spain at the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.
Te'udah, 2024
It is common knowledge among scholars that in the introduction to the Code (Mishneh Torah) Maimon... more It is common knowledge among scholars that in the introduction to the Code (Mishneh Torah) Maimonides declared that the Babylonian Talmud is “the ultimate (book of) Law” in Halakhah, because it was accepted by all of Israel. In this article I demonstrate that this reading is incorrect: Maimonides never maintained that all of Israel accepted the Talmud as the law, not in the introduction to his Code, nor anywhere else in his writings. Moreover, Maimonides never claimed that the Babylonian Talmud is the (only, or ultimate book of) law. In the introduction to the Code – and, indeed, throughout in Maimonides’ halakhic writings – “acceptance of all of Israel” is only relevant to gezerot, takanot, and minhagot (decrees, ordinances, and customs), that is, the legislation of the rabbis. The Babylonian Talmud, according the Maimonides, is not “the (only or ultimate) law,” indeed it is not even “Law.” Rather, the Babylonian Talmud is a reliable, and (relatively) comprehensive record of Halakhah.
This understanding is ground in a close reading of the manuscripts of relevant passages from the introduction to the code, and on Maimonides’ jurisprudence and theory of Halakhah. This article offers a conceptual-theoretical analysis of a central chapter from the introduction to the Code, which pinpoints the uniqueness of the Babylonian Talmud in Maimonides’ view, and explicates the element of consensus, and the conception of normativity in his philosophy of law.
Brill | Nijhoff eBooks, 2001
... murderer (19: 6-27) and the prohibition of taking a ransom for the life of a murderer or in l... more ... murderer (19: 6-27) and the prohibition of taking a ransom for the life of a murderer or in lieu of a flight to a city of refuge (v. 31-32), a final proclamation is presented that acts as a summary of the entire chapter:'And the land can have no expiation for blood that is shed on it'(v. 33). ...
The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity, 2014
La civilisation du judaïsme, 2012
The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy, 2013
The biblical Yitsbak is a rather pale character. What colors his personality is his name and the ... more The biblical Yitsbak is a rather pale character. What colors his personality is his name and the story of his birth, which are inseparably intertwined witb one another. My focus in this essay shall be upon the meaning of the name Yitshak and the circumstances under which it was given. I shall make two central claims. First, that the name Yitshak bears a negative connotation. This is indicated both by the meaning of the name in the biblical lexicon, and by the three contexts in Genesis in which the name is explained. Why should the son for whom the chosen father yearned, and through whom God's promise and plans were to be realized, be given an insulting name? The answer to this question-which is my second claim-is rooted in the unique interpersonal relationship between God and Abrabam. This answer is a key for understanding the saga of Abraham as whole, including the story of the Akedab.
Biblical Interpretation, 2012
In his famous essay “Halakhah and Aggadah,” written a century ago, Bialik sought to cast the hala... more In his famous essay “Halakhah and Aggadah,” written a century ago, Bialik sought to cast the halakhah in a positive light. Ostensibly harsh, cruel, and onerous, Bialik asserted that halakhah creates a framework into which the illustrious substance of the Jewish lifestyle (”aggadah”) can be poured, and he contended that rabbinic halakhic texts reflect the colorful realia of our ancestors’ lives in antiquity. This essay seeks to underscore the intrinsic beauty of the halakhah, both in its function as a normative system and as a constitutive element of the texts in which it is contained, not just as a means of shaping an exemplary lifestyle. Embodied in the halakhah itself is an abstract, meaningful spiritual foundation that shares elements with poetry and philosophy. Halakhic discourse reveals hidden dimensions of the world, heightens the ability of humans and language to shape reality, and articulates theological longing.
The Epistle on Martyrdom (known in Hebrew as Iggeret ha-Shemad or Ma’amar Kiddush ha-Shem), conve... more The Epistle on Martyrdom (known in Hebrew as Iggeret ha-Shemad or Ma’amar Kiddush ha-Shem), conveys Maimonides’ reaction to the harsh religious persecutions undergone by the Jews of Morocco and North Africa during the twelfth century. Perusal of the Epistle immediately makes the reader aware of its uniqueness. The Epistle contains a halakhic discussion, similar to that which we would find in ordinary halakhic responsa, together with words of admonition and polemics characteristic of non-halakhic epistles. Indeed, one could focus the discussion of the Epistle around the question of its classification: is it a halakhic responsum or an act of religious guidance? A complete answer to this question requires a deep discussion of the interpretation of the Epistle, involving both its halakhic and its rhetorical components. How is one to interpret Maimonides’ ruling: is it consistent with Talmudic halakhah or does it deviate therefrom? And how is one to interpret his rhetoric? Why did he exp...
Introduction 1. Anthropomorphism in Talmudic literature: trends in Jewish thought and scholarly r... more Introduction 1. Anthropomorphism in Talmudic literature: trends in Jewish thought and scholarly research 2. Anthropomorphism and imago dei - some basic distinctions 3. Halakhah and Aggadah 4. On terminology and methodology 5. The four modes of judicial execution 6. Image, likeness, and presence 7. Murder and capital punishment: diminishing the divine image 8. Procreation: 'an eternal building' 9. From the Temple to humanity: transformation in the focus of holiness Epilogue.
I IN THE FOURTH AND FINAL SECTION of Maimonides's preface to his Guide of the Perplexed, in t... more I IN THE FOURTH AND FINAL SECTION of Maimonides's preface to his Guide of the Perplexed, in the section labeled "Introduction" (muqaddima), the author lists seven "causes ... for the contradictory or contrary statements in any book or composition." (1) The best known and most significant of these is the seventh cause. Its subject, according to most classical and modern interpreters of the Guide, is intentional contradictions the purpose of which is to hide the author's true opinion from the multitude. Maimonides tells us that contradictions of the seventh type are to be found in the Guide, and in fact he delivers on that promise: in many topics touched upon in that work, we find contradictory statements that give the reader a sense of entrapment and prevent him not only from understanding the issue at hand but also from being able to grasp related matters as well. (2) The problem posed by these contradictions combines with other intentional stumbling bloc...
idea and played no role in the binding precepts. At the same time that greater flexibility was in... more idea and played no role in the binding precepts. At the same time that greater flexibility was increasingly allowed for the aggadic elucidation of Scripture, that flexibility became restricted to the words of the individual, and as such the aggadah has no binding authority, neither as an interpretative method, nor as a regulator of everyday life. Yonah Frenkel noted the similarity between these comments and the statements of R. Hai Gaon. This approach reverberates, both expressly and implicitly, in the writings of a number of modern scholars of talmudic literature. 2. On the Separation between Aggadah and Halakhah in Jewish Tradition and in Hebrew Culture in Recent Generations Apart from this halakhic-ideological tradition, which, as mentioned, originated with the geonim, the dearth of research on the connection between halakhah and aggadah resulted from a number of other factors as well. The dichotomy of halakhah and aggadah finds expression in various fields of Jewish tradition in...
The Journal of Religion, 2009
... other biblical contexts, God is not willing (and perhaps unable) to come forward to meet sinf... more ... other biblical contexts, God is not willing (and perhaps unable) to come forward to meet sinful human beings “all the way.” Thus, for example, following the sin of the Golden Calf, God plans in His great anger to destroy the people and to begin everything anew with Moses (Exod. ...
Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought, 2021
In generations past, thinkers and preachers, rabbis and halakhists, have avoided attributing reas... more In generations past, thinkers and preachers, rabbis and halakhists, have avoided attributing reasons for commandments and halakhot. Their hesitation is rooted in various religious outlooks. According to one outlook, the reasons for commandments are beyond attainment. According to another outlook, the reasons for the commandments are not relevant since the essence of the religious-halakhic life is servitude to God (“accepting the yoke of Heaven”). These two outlooks are often coupled with the view that reasons undermine the force of commandments and are liable to bring about disregard for them. This leads those who adopt these outlooks to relate to commandments as entities, or to view them as laws of nature that do not have – and do not need – purposes and justifications. They simply exist. From these understandings comes the view that attributing reasons to commandments is a matter only for philosophers, whose musings are outside the boundaries of the halakhic discourse. According to these thinkers and halakhists, this was the way reasons for commandments were always understood – in the Bible, in the Mishnah and Talmud, and in the medieval halakhic literature.
Philosophers, jurists, and other halakhists, understood differently. Legal rules are categorically different from laws of nature, inter alia, because they are rooted in reasons, i.e. purposes and justifications. Studies in philosophy, particularly in the last generation, have demonstrated that even though partial separation of laws from their reasons is essential to their effectiveness, reasons are nonetheless the essence of legal rules. In this article, I will demonstrate how the understandings that arise from these philosophical discussions shed new light on the link between commandments and halakhot and their reasons. Furthermore, these understandings illustrate how halakhic claims that appear to be disconnected from reasons, encapsulate different types of reasons. I will demonstrate these claims in various halakhic and literary contexts. The analysis that I will present is of crucial importance to understanding the development of halakhah and identifying changes that occurred in the fundamental infrastructure of halakhic discourse over the generations.
This study critically examines unconscious or semi-conscious assumptions that have been widespread in recent generations regarding the reasons of the commandments and the halakhot. The article offers a new conceptual foundation that points to the tight bond between commandments and their reasons in the canonical Jewish literature: The Bible, the Mishna, Talmudic discussions, and Maimonides’ Code. This conceptual foundation is grounded in philosophical inquiry that readers of Jewish Studies scholarship are unaccustomed to. My aspiration is that the conceptual formulations that I will lay out in the first part of the article will produce, in the second part, understandings regarding the general nature of reasons in halakhah. These understandings, in turn, will contribute to this philosophical-jurisprudential discourse.
In the late Middle Ages, Jewish tradition saw the development of an outlook whereby the reasons f... more In the late Middle Ages, Jewish tradition saw the development of an outlook whereby the reasons for commandments [ta'amei ha-mitsvot] are beyond human understanding. The outlook was not limited to particular commandments that were perceived as beyond comprehension, rather the true, deeper meaning of all commandments was seen to transcend human capacity. According to this outlook, the very nature of the commandments is defined by transcendence and mystery. The mysterious essence of the commandments is unconnected to their practical application; as instructions, commandments and laws are clear. Were this not the case, it would be impossible to fulfill the commandments and keep the laws. Rather, the mystery refers to the strata of reasons, i.e., the purposes, for the commandments and laws. This outlook expands the element of transcendence from the realm of metaphysical knowledge regarding the Divine-matters that are referred to
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Papers by yair lorberbaum
Philosophy, Kabbalah, Halakhah
Rabbi Yom-Tov Asevilli’s (Ritva, Spain 1250-1320) Book of Remembrance (Sefer Ha-Zikaron) is a defense of Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed against Nahmanides’ harsh criticism in his well-known commentary on the Pentateuch. The Book of Remembrance is puzzling, because Asevilli, a prominent halakhist of the school of Nahmanides, comes to the defense of ha-Rav-ha-Moreh – Maimonides’ title in this book that indicate his
greatness in both halakhah and philosophy – while at the same time declares throughout his treatise that he is an adherent of the kabbalah of “our great master,” and emphasizes that Nahmanides criticized Maimonides because of his kabbalistic views. The first sections of
this article present the puzzling aspects that this composition raises, and the methods and techniques that Asevilli utilizes to defend Maimonides’ philosophy. The last sections offer a solution to the perplexity raised by the Book of Remembrance. The Book of Remembrance is a nexus at which major trends of Jewish thought in the High Middle Ages confront one another. This article interprets main passages of this book, draws an intellectual portrait of Assevilli, and analyzes his views on the relations between philosophy and kabbalah, and between both of them and halakhah. The enigma of Asevilli’s Book of Remembrance offers an opportunity to study the relationships between philosophy, kabbalah and halakhah in the world-view of sages from the school of Nahmanides, and
through them, to portray the intellectual history of the Jews in Spain at the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.
This understanding is ground in a close reading of the manuscripts of relevant passages from the introduction to the code, and on Maimonides’ jurisprudence and theory of Halakhah. This article offers a conceptual-theoretical analysis of a central chapter from the introduction to the Code, which pinpoints the uniqueness of the Babylonian Talmud in Maimonides’ view, and explicates the element of consensus, and the conception of normativity in his philosophy of law.
Philosophers, jurists, and other halakhists, understood differently. Legal rules are categorically different from laws of nature, inter alia, because they are rooted in reasons, i.e. purposes and justifications. Studies in philosophy, particularly in the last generation, have demonstrated that even though partial separation of laws from their reasons is essential to their effectiveness, reasons are nonetheless the essence of legal rules. In this article, I will demonstrate how the understandings that arise from these philosophical discussions shed new light on the link between commandments and halakhot and their reasons. Furthermore, these understandings illustrate how halakhic claims that appear to be disconnected from reasons, encapsulate different types of reasons. I will demonstrate these claims in various halakhic and literary contexts. The analysis that I will present is of crucial importance to understanding the development of halakhah and identifying changes that occurred in the fundamental infrastructure of halakhic discourse over the generations.
This study critically examines unconscious or semi-conscious assumptions that have been widespread in recent generations regarding the reasons of the commandments and the halakhot. The article offers a new conceptual foundation that points to the tight bond between commandments and their reasons in the canonical Jewish literature: The Bible, the Mishna, Talmudic discussions, and Maimonides’ Code. This conceptual foundation is grounded in philosophical inquiry that readers of Jewish Studies scholarship are unaccustomed to. My aspiration is that the conceptual formulations that I will lay out in the first part of the article will produce, in the second part, understandings regarding the general nature of reasons in halakhah. These understandings, in turn, will contribute to this philosophical-jurisprudential discourse.
Philosophy, Kabbalah, Halakhah
Rabbi Yom-Tov Asevilli’s (Ritva, Spain 1250-1320) Book of Remembrance (Sefer Ha-Zikaron) is a defense of Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed against Nahmanides’ harsh criticism in his well-known commentary on the Pentateuch. The Book of Remembrance is puzzling, because Asevilli, a prominent halakhist of the school of Nahmanides, comes to the defense of ha-Rav-ha-Moreh – Maimonides’ title in this book that indicate his
greatness in both halakhah and philosophy – while at the same time declares throughout his treatise that he is an adherent of the kabbalah of “our great master,” and emphasizes that Nahmanides criticized Maimonides because of his kabbalistic views. The first sections of
this article present the puzzling aspects that this composition raises, and the methods and techniques that Asevilli utilizes to defend Maimonides’ philosophy. The last sections offer a solution to the perplexity raised by the Book of Remembrance. The Book of Remembrance is a nexus at which major trends of Jewish thought in the High Middle Ages confront one another. This article interprets main passages of this book, draws an intellectual portrait of Assevilli, and analyzes his views on the relations between philosophy and kabbalah, and between both of them and halakhah. The enigma of Asevilli’s Book of Remembrance offers an opportunity to study the relationships between philosophy, kabbalah and halakhah in the world-view of sages from the school of Nahmanides, and
through them, to portray the intellectual history of the Jews in Spain at the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.
This understanding is ground in a close reading of the manuscripts of relevant passages from the introduction to the code, and on Maimonides’ jurisprudence and theory of Halakhah. This article offers a conceptual-theoretical analysis of a central chapter from the introduction to the Code, which pinpoints the uniqueness of the Babylonian Talmud in Maimonides’ view, and explicates the element of consensus, and the conception of normativity in his philosophy of law.
Philosophers, jurists, and other halakhists, understood differently. Legal rules are categorically different from laws of nature, inter alia, because they are rooted in reasons, i.e. purposes and justifications. Studies in philosophy, particularly in the last generation, have demonstrated that even though partial separation of laws from their reasons is essential to their effectiveness, reasons are nonetheless the essence of legal rules. In this article, I will demonstrate how the understandings that arise from these philosophical discussions shed new light on the link between commandments and halakhot and their reasons. Furthermore, these understandings illustrate how halakhic claims that appear to be disconnected from reasons, encapsulate different types of reasons. I will demonstrate these claims in various halakhic and literary contexts. The analysis that I will present is of crucial importance to understanding the development of halakhah and identifying changes that occurred in the fundamental infrastructure of halakhic discourse over the generations.
This study critically examines unconscious or semi-conscious assumptions that have been widespread in recent generations regarding the reasons of the commandments and the halakhot. The article offers a new conceptual foundation that points to the tight bond between commandments and their reasons in the canonical Jewish literature: The Bible, the Mishna, Talmudic discussions, and Maimonides’ Code. This conceptual foundation is grounded in philosophical inquiry that readers of Jewish Studies scholarship are unaccustomed to. My aspiration is that the conceptual formulations that I will lay out in the first part of the article will produce, in the second part, understandings regarding the general nature of reasons in halakhah. These understandings, in turn, will contribute to this philosophical-jurisprudential discourse.
The center of this study is a close reading of two relatively long responsa of Rashba, in which he offers his principal views on the rationale of the commandments: Rashba's Responsa, Part I:94 (discussed in section b), and Rashba's New Responsa, sec. 366 (section d). I'll also interpret Rashba's Responsa, Part IV:253, (section c) which focuses on one aspect of Rashba's view alluded to in I:94.
The view that is developed in these responsa is as follows: in all the commandments is hidden a divine wisdom. This wisdom, which is the theosophy of Kabbalah, is their reasons, yet it us beyond the limits of human apprehension. Allusions of this sublime wisdom flashes to few initiated sages (kabbalists) in each generation (yahid she-ba-dor), yet Rashba emphasizes that none exist in his generation. These responsa intertwine different versions of halakhic religiosity of mystery and transcendence: Reasons as vague and opaque flashes, simple-mundane reasons as the "tip of the iceberg," and "decline of generations" combined with "the initiated few." Besides portraying the profound kabbalistic reasons as above the intellectual ability of blood and flesh, these responsa undermine the simple-"rational" reasons of the commandments: compared to the profound-transcendent reasons, the mundane-moral reasons are like "a drop in the sea." It is as if these (known) reasons are "not their purpose" at all. In Rashba's view, these two elements – the elevation of the kabbalistic reasons to transcendence and the undermining of the simple reasons - are two sides of the same coin.